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Special Studies 



Harry L. Coles 

Albert K. Weinberg 



Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 62-60068 

First Printed 1964— CMH Pub 11-3 

For »le by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 

. . to Those Who Served 


In the midst of the large-scale combat operations of World War II, the Army 
was called on to occupy, to govern, and to help rehabilitate complex, war-torn 
countries and economies. Few of its task turned out to be as difficult and chal- 
lenging as these civil affairs missions. 

The present history, consisting for the most part of documentary material, 
deals primarily with civil administration in Italy, France, and northwest Europe. 
Its purpose is to illustrate certain basic and generic problems of civil affairs-^- 
their character, the approaches to their solution, and their impact upon the 
people who had to deal with them. 

Because of the ideological aspect of the struggle and because the United 
States acted as a member of a coalition of Allies, U.S. military leaders sometimes 
had to add to their traditional roles as soldiers those of the statesman and the 
politician. They were beset by the problems of resolving conflicting national 
interests and of reconciling political idealism and military exigency. On an- 
other level — in feeding hungry populations, in tackling intricate financial and 
economic problems, and in protecting the cultural heritage of a rich and ancient 
civilization — they had to exercise skills that are also normally considered civilian 
rather than military. 

For its insight into how the Army met its civil affairs mission, for its focus 
on the vital and continuing problem of the relationship between soldier and 
civilian — in short, for its graphic analysis of soldiers as governors — this volume 
will be read with profit in a world where the problems of the soldier have 
become increasingly political. 

Washington, D.C. WILLIAM H. HARRIS 

25 May 1961 Brig. Gen., U.S.A. 

Chief of Military History 


The Authors 

Albert K. Weinberg received his Ph. D. from The Johns Hopkins University 
and has taught there, in addition to being for a time a member of The Institute 
for Advanced Study. His principal publication is Manifest Destiny: A Study of 
Nationalist Expansionism in American History. During World War II he 
served, successively, as an analyst in the Civil Affairs Section of the Office of 
Strategic Services, as Chief of the Reports Division in UNRRA, and as senior 
editor and later Chief of the Civil Affairs Section in the Office of the Chief of 
Military History. 

Harry L. Coles, Professor of History at Ohio State University, received the 
Ph. D. degree from Vanderbilt. He has been awarded both a Rosenwald Research 
Fellowship and a Mershon Post-Doctoral Fellowship. He served as an Army Air 
Forces historian in World War II and was later assigned to the Civil Affairs 
Division of the War Department. A contributor to the seven-volume Army Air 
Forces in World War 11, he is also the editor of the recently published Total War 
and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military. 



The title of this volume may not convey the precise scope of its contents but 
the authors could think of no other that would be more suggestive without 
being overponderous. Broadly speaking the volume deals with U.S. Army and 
Anglo-American planning and operations in the sphere of relations with civilians 
in certain liberated and conquered countries in World War II. Although far 
more than mere difference in nomenclature was involved, the Army manuals 
generally referred to occupational operations in liberated countries as civil 
affairs and to those in conquered countries as military government. 1 In both 
types of occupation the range and complexity of the problems to be dealt with 
were as great as in the whole scope of modern government. In liberated coun- 
tries the Army needs and Allied aims could be satisfied largely through existing 
governmental regulations and personnel, but in enemy countries drastic changes 
in laws, institutions, and administrators were necessary. Whether old or new 
governmental machinery was used, civil affairs doctrine emphasized the desira- 
bility of indirect control. In spite of this emphasis, in areas of military govern- 
ment Allied officers, whether from necessity or impatience, sometimes per- 
formed various governmental functions and in any case closely supervised them. 
In the liberated areas their intervention was far less direct, but, under the 
paramount authority residing in the theater commander by either the laws 
of warfare or by international agreement, they advised or assisted the indig- 
enous authorities. Thus, in various senses and degrees, soldiers became 

The long and crowded history of Allied civil affairs activities, like the 
history of tactical activities, may be divided into the operations that took place 
before and those that took place after the military drive into the main enemy 
areas — Germany and Japan. The scope of this volume encompasses only the 
pre-Germany-Japan phase of the war, in which the Army prepared and 
organized for its tasks, conducted its first belligerent occupation (in Italy), and 
carried on the liberating occupations in France and northwest Europe prelim- 
inary to invasion of Germany. It was in this phase, in short, that the Army 
initiated and gained maturity in its civil affairs responsibilities. The omission of 
Germany and Japan may well disappoint some readers insofar as the operations 
in those countries were the largest and most consequential of the war. But the 
basic aims and methods took form in the earlier operations, and the 
occupation of Germany and Japan, however distinctive in some respects, 
cannot be adequately understood except in the light of what went on before. 
Moreover, when this project was first undertaken the records of military govern- 
ment in Germany and Japan were still located in those countries for the use of 

1 In this volume, as also quite commonly in military usage, "civil affairs" has generally been employed 
for greater brevity to designate military occupation generically. 


historical sections engaged in writing first narratives. In any case it would have 
been impossible to include all civil affairs operations in this volume without 
doing far less than justice to any one. 

The historiography of civil affairs encounters, indeed, in World War II a 
documentation unique in broad scope and variety. Though the civil affairs 
problem was not new in World War II, as the wealth of novels and other popu- 
lar literature about it might suggest, the Army did go beyond its traditional role 
in an unprecedented degree and manner. In the American experience military 
occupations had followed the war with Mexico, the Civil War, the Spanish- 
American War, and World War I. World War II differed from these earlier 
conflicts in that the duration and size of civil affairs operations were much 
greater, there was a far larger degree of specialization, and soldiers from the 
very outset found themselves required to handle political problems to an extent 
never necessary before. 

As for size, it has been estimated that Army operations overseas vitally af- 
fected the lives of more than 300 million people. At the same time, like all other 
phases of World War II, civil affairs required more specialization than ever 
before. In earlier wars a good soldier was generally a jack-of -all-trades. In the 
Civil War, for example, an artilleryman or the driver of a supply wagon might 
be temporarily detailed to clearing roads or dispensing relief and would then 
return to his regular duties. Civil affairs being of limited scope, no special train- 
ing or indoctrination was considered necessary. In World War II, however, a 
Civil Affairs Division was created, on a high War Department level, to co- 
ordinate all planning as well as training. An extensive recruiting and specialized 
training program was organized for the first time, and G-5 (civil affairs and 
military government) staff sections were added at the theater army, corps, and 
even division levels. 

Most important of all, in World War II soldiers became governors in a much 
broader sense than ever before — so much more than was foreseen that the 
Army's specialized training proved scant preparation for perhaps the most 
important phase of their role. They became not merely the administrators of 
civilian life for the Army's immediate needs but at the same time the executors 
and at times even, by force of circumstances, the proposers of national and 
international political policy. This broader role arose from the fact that in 
World War II the Allies strove to realize from the very beginning of occupation 
political aims that had usually not been implemented during war or, if during 
war at all, not until active hostilities had ended. Thus, in enemy countries civil 
affairs officials were immediately to extirpate totalitarian governmental and 
economic systems, in liberated countries they were as soon as possible to aid in 
restoring indigenous systems and authorities, and in both types of countries they 
were to make an all-out effort to effect gradual transition toward the envisaged 
postwar national and international order. This unprecedented mission was com- 
plicated, moreover, by the fact that occupation was joint rather than zonal as 
in World War I. Thus British and American military authorities found them- 
selves compelled to take part in reconciling often quite conflicting views on both 
immediate and long-range goals. Believing that these essentially political tasks 
called for civilian rather than military aptitudes, the President and his advisers 


planned initially to entrust the conduct of civil affairs to civilian rather than 
military agencies as soon as military conditions permitted. But the plan was not 
carried out, and as matters developed the Army had on its hands for the duration 
a twofold task which required the soldier to serve military expediency on the 
one hand and politico-social directives on the other. 

The question of why, despite every initial prospect to the contrary, soldiers 
rather than civilians became and remained governors is indeed an interesting 
one. To the extent that they could do so without neglecting equally important 
though less dramatic problems, the authors have attempted to present and to 
emphasize the materials that suggest the explanation. There is no simple answer 
and certainly not, it seems to the authors, one so simple as the hypothesis that 
the Army wanted and strove to capture as broad a role in civil affairs as possible. 
Materials in Part I, concerned with the preparatory and organizational stage, 
suggest that the President's eventual decision to entrust the responsibility in the 
initial phase to the Army was due to civilian unreadiness rather than to any 
inveterate Army ambition. Portions of Part II make clear the difficulties of fitting 
civilian agencies, even in later phases of the Italian operation, into the context of 
battle and a military framework, and indicate reasons for the resultant decision 
to leave the military authorities in exclusive administrative control. As Part III 
reveals, despite this experience, Allied authorities, in planning for the liberated 
countries of northwest Europe, still proposed to delegate civil affairs 
as far as possible to indigenous civilian authorities, subject only to the Supreme 
Commander's right to determine how soon a complete delegation was militarily 
feasible. In Part IV, dealing with operations, it is disclosed that despite this 
purpose, and despite also the competence of indigenous authorities, conditions 
during and immediately following hostilities made it necessary for the Allied 
armies to render these authorities, in matters of civil affairs, substantial 

The problem of the soldier's role in civil affairs was vigorously debated, 
particularly during the earlier part of these experiences. Some may feel that 
history should contribute to a solution, but to these authors it does not seem 
possible to suggest the answer to so complex a question on the basis of history 
alone, especially since history is subject to different interpretations. Perhaps, 
however, candor with the reader requires acknowledgment that any initial bias 
against entrusting largely political responsibilities to soldiers gradually became 
modified in the course of the authors' studies and thinking. Certainly this change 
came about partly from the growing suspicion that the soldier's degree of admin- 
istrative involvement in CA/MG, as also the degree of connection between ad- 
ministration and political influence, are likely to be determined by forces 
stronger than any political theory. But it came about much more as evidence 
seemed to accumulate that at least Anglo-American soldiers, professional or 
lately civilians, were — or at any rate gradually became — capable of viewing and 
handling political problems not too differently from civilians. Another consid- 
eration was that not only organizational machinery but the attitudes of military 
and civilian authorities alike ensured civilian control of basic policy, although 
the capacity of the military leaders for properly interpreting and applying 
civilian policy would probably have developed more quickly and fully if their 


broad role had not been allowed to devolve upon them so unexpectedly and 
with so little preparation for its more political phases. 

To the foregoing need only be added that, in the final view of the authors, 
the issue of military versus civilian administration was far less important than 
the issue of military values versus civilian or — more correctly speaking — political 
values; that it was the latter issue which was at the root of most of the serious 
difficulties in civil affairs decisions; and that the issue would have presented the 
same dilemma and probably been decided in much the same fashion even if the 
President's initial plan for civilian control had been carried out. The dilemma 
was foreordained when national war aims and pursuant directives imposed 
ambivalent civil affairs objectives without indicating (as of course they could 
not have been expected to do) how the conflicts between military interests and 
political interests were to be resolved. Every politico-social objective undoubtedly 
coincided to a considerable extent with long-term military interests, but it also 
conflicted to a greater or lesser degree with immediate military expediency, in 
which case the civil affairs authority could only try, without sacrificing either 
competing interest too greatly, to bring the two into the best possible accom- 
modation. The major difference which civilian control would have entailed is 
probably that civilians would have leaned over backwards lest their decisions 
seem to impair unduly military interests, whereas the military were always 
worried lest their decisions have the aspect of unduly impairing political values. 

Since civil affairs problems are for the most part solved with pen rather than 
sword, the civil affairs effort gave rise to an enormous body of documentation, 
of which only a relatively small part is marked by the aridly formal style char- 
acteristic of military intercommunication. This book differs from others in the 
same series in that documents rather than text have been given the primary role 
in the presentation of historical developments. In fact, excerpts are generally 
used since the publication of complete documents would have too greatly fore- 
shortened the range of presentation otherwise considered desirable. These ex- 
cerpts have been so selected, arranged, and entitled that, in conjunction with the 
introductory text and footnotes, they might give the reader an insight into the 
principal historical developments and their interconnections. 

The limitations inherent in the documentary method are obvious and the 
judgment of the authors that in this case the advantages outweighed the dis- 
advantages was predicated on a consideration not applicable to any other phase 
of the war or volume of this series. Basically it was the fact that the function of 
civil affairs is unique among military missions in that in this instance the tale 
of "Arms and the Man" focuses upon the man. This is to say that almost every 
other phase of war experience is too technical and too difficult to understand 
without the military historian's art. Civil affairs operations, even though condi- 
tioned by war, concern chiefly generic social problems which involve human 
nature rather than technological factors. Because decisions of civil affairs are 
made and judged by the same genus of reasoning and moral evaluation that 
figures in ordinary individual and politico-social problems, the primary 
sources — in which the reasons of the authorities for acting as they did are often 
set forth fully and candidly— acquire greater importance for public, academic, 
and military understanding and evaluation than in almost any other phase of 


war. This view appears to have been first stated not by a civilian but by a dis- 
tinguished soldier. In April 1946, when the Allied occupation of Italy was 
drawing to a close, Gen. William D. Morgan, then Supreme Allied Commander, 
Mediterranean, cabled the Combined Chiefs of Staff: 

It is the considered opinion here, after detailed examination and long discussion, that 
the records of the Allied Commission should be treated differently from records of a purely 
military nature. . . . Rather than of strictly military interest they will be of permanent 
primary interest for historical research in Economic, Social, and Political fields as records 
of an initial effort in Allied Military Government. 

The authors reached the decision, not without some misgiving, that it was 
justifiable to expose not only the formal directives and orders representing the 
end results of the decision-making process, but also the work papers illustrating 
the tentative and naturally often disputatious phases of that process. Their mis- 
giving was materially lessened after they submitted their earliest selections of 
documents to several U.S. Army participants in the events. These men were of 
the opinion that not only they themselves but the vast majority of their American 
and British associates would not mind the publication of documents revealing 
their difficulties, uncertainties, or human limitations provided such publication 
tended on the whole to give an accurate impression of civil affairs experience. 
It is the authors' earnest hope that they have achieved this goal. 

The decision to publish a history primarily documentary in approach was 
made the more fortunate perhaps by the appearance of two books in the "Civil 
Affairs and Military Government" series in the United Kingdom's History of 
the Second World War, edited by Sir J. R. M. Butler. These are Allied Military 
Administration of Italy, 1943-45, by C. R. S. Harris, and Civil Affairs and Mili- 
tary Government North-West Europe, 1944-46, by F. S. V. Donnison. Another 
textual account would have repeated to some extent the contribution that others 
have made in quite adequate fashion. 

Most of the originals or official copies of the documents contained in this 
volume are presently located in the Federal Records Center in Alexandria, 
Virginia, a subordinate element of the National Archives and Records Service 
of the General Services Administration. Records of the War Department kept 
in this center and used in this volume include files of the Secretary of War, the 
Under Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff (cited as WDCSA), the Secretary 
of the General Staff (SGS), the G-l Division of the General Staff, the Oper- 
ations Division of the General Staff (OPD decimal and message files, and also 
the ABC files kept by the Strategy and Policy Group of OPD), the Civil Affairs 
Division (CAD), Army Service Forces (ASF) files (including the files of the 
International [International Aid] Division), files of the Provost Marshal Gen- 
eral's Office (PMGO), and the central War Department file, which was main- 
tained very incompletely during World War II by the Adjutant General's Office 

The Federal Records Center in Alexandria also contains many papers of a 
joint and combined nature that have been used and cited. The War Department 
collections listed above contain the papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) that have been used. Other record collec- 
tions in the center that have been drawn upon extensively for the compilation 


of this volume include files of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC), 
and, from the Mediterranean and European theaters, files of Allied Force Head- 
quarters (AFHQ) in microfilm, files of the Allied Control Commission (ACC) 
and Advisory Council Italy, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SHAEF) files, Seventh U.S. Army G-5 Staff Section Reports, and U.S. Forces 
European Theater (USFET) General Board Studies. 

The concentration of World War II records concerning military government 
and civil affairs in one repository, the Alexandria Federal Records Center, offers 
students of these matters a unique opportunity for further research. Not all of 
the file collections and records used by the authors are as yet available to private 
scholars, but the bulk of them are, including most of the American records. 
Of course, students of the subject may need to consult some records elsewhere, 
as the authors have, including reference materials in the Office of the Chief of 
Military History. The authors were also fortunate in obtain ihgYa number 6f 
interviews with participants, as cited in their work. 

It should be noted that except in the case of documents with numbered para- 
graphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, 
asterisks are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs. 

In preparing this volume the authors have incurred so many obligations 
that it is impossible to make proper acknowledgment to all who have helped. 
They wish nevertheless to say that they profited from the first narratives pre- 
pared by the Historical Section of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Depart- 
ment, which consisted of Richard M. Welling, Edgar L. Erickson, Edwin J. 
Hayward, and Henry N. Williams. Harold Epstein was with the project in 
OCMH in its early stages. Robert W. Komer made available certain papers from 
the G— 5 AFHQ files, and his study, "Civil Affairs in the Mediterranean Theater," 
made as an Army historian, was of great help. Miss Inez V. Allen, in addition 
to doing a great deal of checking of footnotes and citations, compiled many of 
the documents relating to Fine Arts and Archives and other subjects relating to 
southern France. Col. Alfred C. Bowman, SCAO XIII Corps, Venezia Giulia, 
read all of the manuscript except that dealing with western Europe. Kent 
Roberts Greenfield, formerly Chief Historian, Department of the Army, put 
his extensive knowledge of Italian history and institutions at the disposal of the 
authors, who are also indebted for his encouragement to undertake the project 
despite its experimental aspects. Stetson Conn, current Chief Historian, con- 
tributed generously of his scholarly and critical abilities during revision of the 
first draft. David Jaffe, Acting Chief of the Editorial Branch, OCMH, assisted 
by Mrs. Helen V. Whittington, copy editor, saw the manuscript through its 
final stages of preparation for the press and exercised great skill and no less 
patience in an unusually difficult editorial task. 

These acknowledgments of assistance are in no way delegation of respon- 
sibility for the contents of the volume. The presentation and the interpretation 
contained herein are the authors' own, and they alone are responsible for faults 
of commission or omission. 

Washington, D.C. HARRY L. COLES 





The Army Must Take on an Uncongenial Task 

Chapter Pagt 


1. Shall the Nation Again Find Itself Unprepared? 6 

2. A School for Soldiers Is Established in a Civilian Institution . . 10 

3 . Civilian-Military Jockeying for Control 14 

4. The President Says Occupation Is in Most Cases a Civilian Task . 21 

5. A Debate Continues Which Will Never End 25 



1. A Civil Affairs Plan To Minimize Military Responsibility . . 31 

2. Military Leaders Must Take Responsibility for a Thankless 

Political Decision 34 

3. Complex Design for Civilian Responsibility Developed .... 37 

4. Military-Civilian Integration Must Be Achieved 43 

5. Can Eisenhower Now Be Spared Political Problems? 45 

6. Can Military Commanders Be Spared Economic Problems? ... 50 

7. The Army Must Take Charge of Civilian Relief in the Tunisian 

Campaign 52 

8. Military Commanders Become Dissatisfied but Decide To 

Leave African Arrangement Alone 55 

9. North African Experience Points Up Need for Greater Co-ordina- 

tion of Civilian Agencies 59 


ROLE 63 

1. The War Department Wants Initial Control in Future Opera- 

tions 64 

2. Creation of a Civil Affairs Division To Set the War Depart- 

ment' s House in Order 66 

3. CAD Takes On Broader Role Than Planned 69 

4. In April 1943 the War Department Takes Charge of Civilian 

Supply 73 

5. Expansion of Army Training Program Must Have Long Wait 

for Final Approval 78 

6. Europe's Cultural Heritage Must Be Protected 84 


Cbaftcr Page 



1. In Enemy Areas the Army To Have the Initial Burden .... 95 

2. Acquiescence in CAT)' s Leadership in Co-ordination of Planning . 96 

3. President Still Seeks a Way for Civilian Agencies To Control . . 98 

4. The Plan for Civilian Agency Operations Is Stalled 102 

5. Difficulties of Civilian Agency Procurement Lead to Extension 

of Period of Military Responsibility 105 

6. The Army Gets a Presidential Assignment by Default .... 108 

7. War Department Assumes Leadership in Foreign Economic 

Co-ordination for the Military Period Ill 


1. Washington and London Compromise To Create a Combined Civil 

Affairs Committee 119 

2. London Supports a Rival of the Washington Civil Affairs Com- 

mittee 125 

3. Americans Fear British Domination of Civilian Supply for 

European Theater 128 

4. Creation of a Combined Supply Committee and Riconciliation of 

British and American Supply Policies 131 

5. A Compromise on Locale of Planning — Washington and London. 135 


1. Turnover to Civilians as Soon as Possible 142 

2. Military Commanders Do Not Make Politico-Economic Policies . 144 

3. Minimum Change of Local Institutions and Authorities .... 145 

4. Maximum Use of Indigenous Administration in Nonenemy 

Countries 147 

5. The Army Tries To Keep Out of the Balkans 148 

6. Civilian Supplies Only for the Prevention of Disease and Unrest . 150 

7. The Army Is No Welfare Organization 153 


Soldiers Learn Politics in Italy 



1. AFHQ Begins Planning on the Assumption British and American 

Interests Can Be Pooled 160 

2. Each Country Wants To Be Senior Partner 165 

3. The Problem of the Chain of Command and Communication — 

Tactical or Dual? 168 

4. Direct or Indirect Rule? 170 

5. Political Advisers or an Exclusively Military Administration? . 174 

6. The CCS Directs a Military Administration and as Much 

Benevolence as Practicable 176 

7. AFHQCreates Joint Agencies and Issues Final Instructions . . . 180 


Chapter Page 


1. Mobile Military Government and the Struggle Against Chaos . . 190 

2. AMGOT Headquarters Takes Over and Revives Provincial 

Institutions 200 

3. When Fighting Ends More Complex Problems Begin 203 

4. Sicilians Become Somewhat Difficult 208 

5. CAO's Are Entangled by Their Excess of Zeal 211 

6. CCS Keeps the Military Governors on the Job 214 



1 . The Theater Hopes for Armistice Control but Plans for Military 

Government 222 

2. The Fall of Mussolini and the Shift of Military Thinking to 

Armistice Control 224 

3 . Italian Surrender and the Establishment of Two Types of Allied 

Control 226 

4. Eisenhower Recommends Strengthening the Badoglio Government 

With a View to Cobelligerency 230 

5. The Policy of "Payment by Results" and the Long-Term Armi- 

stice 233 

6. Prerequisites of Territorial Transfer and a Control Commission 

Do Not Materialise 237 

7. The Burdens of Control Become Greater Rather Than Less . . . 240 

8. An Enemy Is Made a Cobelligerent 244 

9 . Rise and Fall of Hopes for Early Returns 245 



1. Military Government Authority Is Bifurcated and Decentralized . 252 

2. Despite Washington's Misgivings Decentralization Continues . . 253 

3. More Organisations Bring More Problems of Co-ordination . . . 255 

4. Too Many Cooks for the Broth 261 

5 . The Military Governor Brings ACC and AMG Together With ACC 

Co-ordinating 264 

6. ACC Is Streamlined for Greater Co-ordination 266 

7. Anglo-American Unity and Disunity 271 


1. The CAO's Learn To Use Indirect Control 279 

2. AMG Revives Institutions Which Develop Local Government . 284 

3. ACC Starts a Job Which Calls for Patience 288 

4. The First Restoration of Territory and Its Difficulties .... 294 

5. Advisory Help in Restored Areas Must Continue . 300 

6. The Government Is Encouraged To Co-ordinate with AMG . . . 303 


Chapter Page 



1. A Serious Food Shortage Despite the Assumption of Local Self- 

Sufficiency 308 

2. Expedients Which Are Tried but Found Wanting 311 

3. Food Imports To Prevent Starvation Become the Number One 

Priority 313 

4. The Food Shortage Is at Least Alleviated 316 

5. The Initial Food Experience Teaches Valuable Lessons .... 319 

6. Epidemic Knows No Nationality 322 

7. Refugees Are a Serious Military Problem 328 

8. The Poor and Sick Are Always With Them 333 


1 . Only Limited Economic Assistance Is Planned 344 

2. Allies Find a Serious Degree of Inflation 346 

3. Matters Are Helped Neither by Allowing Nor Disallowing 

Wage Increases 348 

4. AMG/ACC Now Tries Selective Price Control 350 

5. Improvement Is Sought Through Supervision of the Government' s 

Fiscal Policies 353 

6. The Theater Told To Reduce Import Burden by Increasing Italian 

Self-Sufficiency 358 

7. Rehabilitation Supply Program: Limited Imports Now To Reduce 

Imports Later 361 

8. Why the Theater Did Not Do Better in Promoting Economic 

Revival 364 


1. Imperium ac Justitia 375 

2. To What Extent Can the Removal of Fascists Be Allowed To 

Imperil Administrative Effectiveness! 382 

3. Fascist Laws and Institutions Are Gradually Annulled . . . . 390 

4. Italian Labor Receives a New Charter of Rights 394 

5. A Primarily Negative but Important Mission in Education . . 400 

6. The Theater Becomes Increasingly Involved in Displaced Persons 

Problem 405 

7. Cultural Treasure Gives Pause to Military Expediency .... 413 


1 . Patience and Impatience Over Issue of Political Change .... 428 

2. Strange Interlude of Political Courtship 431 

3. A Government of Technical Experts Until Rome Is Taken . . . 433 

4. Under Military Government Politics Must Wait 435 

5. Allied Military Government Finds It More Troublesome To 

Prohibit Meetings Than To Permit Them 437 

6. It Becomes Increasingly Difficult for Allies To Be Politically 

Neutral 440 


Chapttr Page 


7. Should One Change Horses in the Middle of a Battle? .... 442 

8. Soviet Power Politics Will Not Wait 445 

9. The King Agrees To Retire and Badoglio Goverment Is Broad- 

ened 450 

10. Some Matters Will Have To Wait 452 


1 . Great Political Possibilities Foreseen in Occupation of Rome . . 457 

2. First European Capital Is Liberated 458 

3 . The King Retires and a New Government Is Formed 464 

4. The Italian Government Comes to Rome and Takes on More 

Responsibility 467 

5. Italians Take Lead in DefascistiZation 471 

6. Patience With the Government Is Sometimes Difficult 477 

7. In the Advance Beyond Rome AMG Tries New Expedients . . . 481 

8. Can This Be the Turning Point in Direction of Civilianization? . . 487 


1. It Is Hard for Italians To Remain in Tutelage 495 

2. It Is Hard To Stay Angry With Italians 496 

3. An Anglo-American New Policy and a Rooseveltian New Deal . 499 

4. No Way To Ship Flour Without Ships 501 

5. No Way To Broaden Supply Policy Until Resources Are More 

Plentiful 505 

6. For the Time Being Disappearance of Control Is Only Nominal . 506 

7. Harold Macmillan Argues Astutely for a New Directive . . . 508 

8. Anglo- American Disagreements Are Compromised in a New Direc- 

tive 513 

9. At Long Last Bread Ration Is Increased 518 

10. Controls Are Finally Relaxed 519 

11. Rehabilitation Program Must Wait for Peace and UNRRA . . 524 



1. Somewhat Pulling Cobelligerents Behind Enemy' s Lines . . . 528 

2 . Liberated Partisans Prefer Their Swords to Plowshares .... 532 

3. Partisan Units To Be Accepted in the Italian Army 535 

4. War Makes Strange Alliances 538 

5 . The Government Tries To Protect Its Own Fences 542 

6. After Contract Is Signed — Misgivings and Curtailment of Aid . . 544 

7. Treat Partisans Right and They'll Behave — Perhaps 546 


1 . A Task of Unprecedented Magnitude Calling for Novel Methods . 554 

2. Whirlwind Occupations and Great Expectations 560 

3. The CLN's Get Temporarily Out of Hand 564 


Chapter Page 



4. French Forces Remain Too Long in Aosta Valley 568 

5. The Nationality Problem in Bolzano 571 

6. Italy's Most Productive Region Is in Danger of Economic Stag- 

nation 575 

7. An Overwhelming Influx of Repatriates Before Facilities Are All 

Ready 579 

8. AMG Must Stay Overtime 583 



1. AMG Will Be Used To Uphold the Principle of Peaceful Settle- 

ment 590 

2. SACMED Tries To Temper Political Principle With Military 

Pragmatism 592 

3. SACMED Was Right in Predicting Trouble 595 

4. Military Pragmatism Prevails 600 

5. Yugoslav System Rejected on Good Pragmatic but Doubtful 

Legal Grounds 603 

6. AMG Gets Local Government Going by Indirection 607 

7. We Expect Release in Seven Months but Must Stay Seven Years . 612 


1. After the Foreign Enemy Is Defeated an Internal Enemy Emerges . 619 

2. The Allies Take Steps To Meet Italy's Security Needs .... 624 

3. The United States Continues Aid as Vital to Postwar Aims . . 627 

4. With Allied Encouragement Democracy and Republicanism Are 

Given Their Chance 629 

5. The Prospect of an Early and Satisfactory Settlement Recedes . . 634 

6. Return of AMG Territory Continues Notwithstanding Obstacles . 636 

7. Residual Controls Are Further Curtailed . 639 

8. Hotv Soon Can AC Be Closed Down or Civiliani%edl 642 

9. The Peace Treaty and Subsequent U.S. -Italian Agreements . . 645 
10. At Long Last Close-Out 647 


Soldiers and Statesmen Plan for the Liberated Countries 
of Western Europe 


1. A Draft Agreement Which Delegates CA to the Norwegian 

Government as far as Compatible With Military Needs . . . 656 

2. Civil Affairs Agreements Are Consummated 658 

3. British and Americans Finds Themselves at Loggerheads over the 

De Gaulle Committee 661 


Chafttr Page 


4. U.S. Nonrecognition of De Gaulle Hampers Civil Affairs 

Planning for France 665 

5. Both U.S. and U.K. Try Still Other Lines in Effort To Get 

Together on FCNL 667 



1 . A Headquarters Organisation for Civil Affairs Is Set Up . . . 673 

2. In Final Plans CA Organisation in the Field Will Be Under 

Tactical Commander 677 

3. Basic -Policies for Civil Affairs Operations „ . . -. . . . . . • 679. 

4. Final Reorganization in SHAHF To Establish Direct SHAEF 

Control of Country Units 680 

5. Civilian Supply: Military Program 681 

6. British and Americans Argue Over Kind of Currency To Be Used . 687 

7. Allies Agree on Currency for France but De Gaulle's Support Is 

Uncertain 693 


1 . Organisation and Planning for Southern France 700 

2. The Currency Issue Is Still Unsolved After D-Day 707 

3. The Currency Dispute Complicates Operations in the Northern 

France Beachhead 709 

4. Allies and FCNL Come to Terms 711 


Soldiers Liberate Peoples and Restore Governments 


1 . Civil Affairs Troops Hit the Beaches in the Assault 722 

2 . French Take Initiative in Restoring Civil Administration . . . 726 

3. Cherbourg Is the First Large City To Be Liberated 730 

4- Prospective Supply Crisis in Paris Is Prepared For 738 

5. Paris Is Liberated 742 

6. Troop Spending Raises Question of Anti-Inflationary Measures . 745 

7. FCNL Is Recognised as the Provisional Government and a Zone of 

the Interior Is Created 749 



1 . Status of CA Organization on D-Day and Ensuing Changes . . 753 

2. The First Ten Days 756 

3- The CA Setup Is Put to the Test in Troubled Areas 762 

4. The Liaison Offices Serve as Clearinghouses 767 


Chapter Page 

FRANCE — Continued 

5. Undesirable Element in FFI Must Be Disarmed 770 

6. Illegal Trafficking in Army Goods Grows to Racket Proportions . 772 

7. Transport, Labor, Food — The Most Serious Problems 773 

8. SHAEF Assumes Responsibility 787 

9. Retrospect and Conclusions 789 



1. Organizing and Planning for Belgium and Luxembourg, . . . 798 

2. Conditions in Belgium Right After Liberation 801 

3. SHAEF Mission Comes to Belgium 804 

4. Trouble in Disarming Resistance Forces Imperils the Govern- 

ment 805 

5. SHAEF Mission Finds Troubled Conditions in Luxembourg. . . 809 

6. Ardennes Counteroffensive Puts Civil Affairs Personnel to the 

Test 813 

7. New Government Formed in Belgium 817 

8. Allies Straighten Out Their Representation in Luxembourg . . 819 



1. The Planners Assume Complete German Evacuation After Collapse . 822 

2. The U.S. Army Liberates Portion of South Holland and Meets 

Real Problems 823 

3. The Greatest Problem Is Food 826 

4. Dramatic Arrangements To Bring Food Into German-Occupied 

Holland 830 

5. All Holland Is Now Liberated 832 


1 . Allies Find Effective Danish Government in Operation .... 836 

2. Jurisdictional Niceties Cut Short Dispatch of Relief Supplies to 

Northern Norway 840 

3. The Underground Restores Indigenous Government in Norway . 842 



1 . Civilians Become a Serious Problem in France During Rapid 

Army Advance 848 

2. Delegation of the Problem Does Not Work 851 

3. Allied Authorities Must Take More Responsibility Everywhere . . 854 

4. The Reception Plan Is Changed in the Last Phase of Hostilities . 857 



1. " Protect and Respect These Symbols Whenever Possible" . ... 861 


Chapter Page 



2. Less Damage Than Expected In Northern France 867 

3. A Good Job in Southern France Too 871 

4. Art Officers to the Rescue in Belgium, the Netherlands, and 

Norway 873 


1 . Delivery Falls Behind During the First Six Months 878 

2. Action Taken as Supply Problem Becomes Critical 884 

3. Pressures for National Import Programs 888 

4. Problem of Terminating the Military Supply Program 892 





Should Soldiers Be Governors? 

The story of civil affairs in World War 
II as it emerges from the documents reveals 
the effort to perform a mission un- 
precedented in complexity and size. The 
mission called for military, political, and 
economic activity on every level — from 
the job of rebuilding a village bakery to 
that of rooting out and replacing Fascist 
and Nazi ideology and institutions. The 
impact and interplay of these activities are 
highlighted in General Eisenhower's letter 
to General Marshall a few weeks after the 
opening of the North African campaign 
in 1942: "The sooner I can get rid of these 
questions that are outside the military in 
scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes 
I think I live ten years each week, of which 
at least nine are absorbed in political and 
economic matters." They are high- 
lighted, on a lower plane, in an officer's 
problems on first entering a Sicilian town : 
"And what a lot of headaches I found. 
Water supply damaged. No power. No 
food. No fuel, and corpses all over town 
to bury." 

The plight both of the theater com- 
mander and of the lower officer inevitably 
suggests the question of just why the U.S. 
Army in World War II had to take on 
civil affairs. That some agency, military 
or civilian, had to assume the heavy bur- 
den was dictated both by the laws of war 
and by common sense, but as a military 
mission civil affairs is unqiue among the 
Army's missions in that it seems to involve 
a radical disparity between its ends and 
the soldier's means. It is related to war only 

insofar as it is the conduct of administra- 
tion in foreign countries, enemy or 
friendly, which an army occupies either 
under the rules of war or by international 

The civil affairs officer must so govern as 
to help the combat forces but his work is 
also judged by nonmilitary standards: 
ability to comply with the rules of interna- 
tional law; and, because military policy is 
but the instrument of national policy, by 
the ability to promote the nation's political 
interests. Civil affairs does not, like other 
phases of war, demand vast aggregations of 
men or (except for emergencies of civilian 
supply) of materials. But it does demand 
extraordinary intellectual and administra- 
tive skill in doing things, difficult enough in 
peacetime, under the conditions and special 
needs of wartime. The greatest difficulty 
is that most of the requisite skills of civil 
affairs are not those which the soldier ac- 
quires in his ordinary training and experi- 
ence. They are political, economic, and 
technical skills — the skills of civilian more 
than of military life. Moreover, even 
though the civil affairs officer does not 
make basic policy, these skills are not, in 
practice, merely executory. Because policy 
directives are often not entirely clear or 
leave considerable discretion, because there 
are many unforeseen exigencies which 
they do not cover, and because officials 
issuing the directives generally feel 
dependent upon the recommendations and 
information of people on the spot, civil 
affairs requires more than mere ability to 


follow orders. It demands, at least at higher 
levels, an understanding and sensitivity 
with regard to political and economic in- 
terests and the ability t© sense what policy 
makers would wish done about such in- 
terests under particular circumstances. In 
sum, when the soldier becomes governor 
he must transcend the limits of his knowl- 
edge, experience, and even values as a sol- 
dier; he must become, as best he can, 
something of a statesman. 

Because soldiers ordinarily are not 
trained to perform duties of this sort, and 
also because of the American tradition 
against the military exercise" of civil power 
under any but desperate circumstances, the 
civil affairs function of the U.S. Army 
evoked bitter debate in every major war 
from the war with Mexico to World 
War I. The qualms felt by so-called anti- 
imperialists against military government 
after the Spanish-American War and 
World War I led to what the Army re- 
garded as unfortunately premature substi- 
tution of government by civilians. That 
the Army's record in civil affairs has on the 
whole been very creditable, that its errors 
appear greatly outweighed by its humane 
aspiration and its efficient performance, 
has not overcome strong convictions that 
the use of civilians would have been far 
better. If only because of this historical 
background, it was natural that in World 
War II the great debate should have flared 
up again. But the debate was the more 
natural because in that war military and 
political aims were so largely comple- 
mentary and interdependent. Civil affairs 
authorities not only had to extirpate and 
replace Fascist and Nazi institutions. 
They also had to take charge of civilian 
relief on an unprecedented scale, to pave 
the way for an ambitious postwar recon- 
struction, and to do all these and other 
things with the knowledge that by their 
performance foe and friend alike would 
judge the sincerity and worthiness of Allied 

war aims. Never did the exercise of civil 
affairs authority call more strongly for 
wise statesmanship and never was it more 
important thar such authority should be 
placed in the best hands. 

The documents which follow, while con- 
cerned also with the early development of 
the Army's civil affairs training program, 
have been selected primarly to illustrate 
the causes, character, and consequences of 
the debate which raged over the Army's 
belief in its duty to assume initial leader- 
ship in the purely administrative prepara- 
tions for civil affairs. Implications of the 
documents point up better than any ab- 
stractions the difficulties of a democracy's 
army in entering into such a sphere. It 
is true that, as soon as the War Department 
made its rather belated decision to place 
the responsibility for civil affairs in a 
specific agency — the Provost Marshal 
General's Office (PMGO)— the authorities 
immediately concerned quickly thought 
of measures calculated to make soldiers 
satisfactory civil administrators. This time, 
they resolved, they would not find 
themselves unprepared as, in the past, and 
this time they would fashion personnel 
who while soldiers in garb would be 
civilians in knowledge and skill. They 
established a school for military govern- 
ment where, in the atmosphere of a uni- 
versity and under the tuition of civilians, 
this metamorphosis could take place. 
However, the documents also reveal the 
candid admission of these authorities that 
their initial measures were highly inade- 
quate — not only in number of trainees but 
also in the failure to make sufficient use 
of civilian specialists and training 

The Army quickly sought to repair these 
errors by an enlarged and revised training 
program. But as soon as these larger plans 
were announced, it found to its consterna- 
tion that its training program, together 
with its entire role in civil affairs, was now 


threatened by the conviction of many, in- 
cluding the President, that military control 
of civil affairs was both inexpedient in 
practice and wrong in theory. 

The documents do not reveal as clearly 
as one would like the precise grounds of 
this belief. Aside from certain allegations 
about the Charlottesville School, the criti- 
cisms were marked by vague generality 
and cliche but probably rested upon ideas 
put forward to the same effect many times 
in the past : first, that the Army is not quali- 
fied to conduct civil affairs efficiently; 
second, that though it may do so quite 
efficiently it cannot do so with sufficient 
humanity, democracy, or politico-economic 
enlightenment; third, that though the 
Army may on occasion govern foreign 
territory both efficiently and with enlight- 
enment, the taste of civil power may give 
some military leader ambitions for polit- 
ical power at home; fourth, that even 
though Army administration may have 
had no bad effects at home or abroad, 
nevertheless it is irretrievably wrong in 
principle for a democracy to make soldiers 
governors in any place and at any time. 
On the other hand, it does not appear 
that, at least in their second thoughts, the 
critics of the Army denied the need for a 
very limited degree of military control. 
First, they recognized that the military 
commander must have at least formal para- 
mount authority over all matters in a 
theater of war. Second, they admitted that 
members of the armed forces must carry 
out certain functions of civil affairs as long 
as bullets fly too thick for civilians. The real 
ground of the apprehensions was the as- 
sumption, suggested by the scope of the 
Army's plans, that the military did not in- 
tend to relinquish control as soon as pos- 
sible ; rather, they were plotting to retain it 
for the duration and even in the crucial 
posthostilities period. 

The records reveal that, in trying to 
allay such fears, Secretary of War Henry 

L. Stimson and others displayed a patience 
and forensic skill (including even humor) 
which had been developed in the Army 
by more than a century and a half of such 
tribulations. They did not contest any of 
the traditional canons on the superiority 
of the civil power, or even the desirability 
of using it as soon as possible in wartime. 
They adopted as their main defense the 
position that, whatever might be desirable 
in theory, it was impossible in practice to 
entrust civil affairs to anyone but soldiers 
while certain military conditions prevailed. 
They also pointed out that the precise dura- 
tion of these conditions could not be pre- 
dicted, that while it might in some cases be 
very brief it might in others be rather long 
because of the tactical and logistical rela- 
tionships between an area where fighting 
has stopped and adjacent or even remote 
areas where it is still going on. They added 
that, in any case, civil affairs would be con- 
ducted for the most part by persons who 
but lately had been civilians, having 
been commissioned because of their skills 
in civilian life and so far as possible on the 
recommendation of the civilian agencies. 
This last argument was supposed to clinch 
the Army's case, but it did not do so. The 
civilian critics evidently felt that a uni- 
form and discipline can quickly change a 
man's soul and that, by wiles alone, the 
Army has often taken intellectually into 
camp supposedly free spirits like scientists, 
journalists, and even historians. 

However, a number, including the 
President, appeared to be reassured in 
part — at least as to the honesty of Army 
intentions. Both those who were some- 
what reassured, and those who were not, 
had to suffer the continuation of the 
Army's training program. In this as in so 
many later issues, the decisive fact was that 
though the civilian agencies might be 
strong in theory they were weak in orga- 
nization. They had waited too long to 
make preparations for a training program 


of their own, and it was now too late to 
start. Tacit acquiescence did not, indeed, 
signify any change in the plan of the 
President and civilian agencies for pre- 
ponderant civilian control. The unfor- 
tunate stalemate in the training issue only 
strengthened their determination that 
those whom the Army had trained should 

as soon as possible be taken out of uni- 
form, purged of military indoctrination, 
and placed under the control of civilians 
who would know better than soldiers how 
to govern foreign peoples in accordance 
with American democracy and the blue- 
prints for a brave new world. 


Historical Background: In World War I In- 
adequate Army Preparations and Eventual 
Civilian Control 

[Col. Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, 
Third Army and American Forces in Germany, Rpt, 
American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 
1918-1920, 4 Mar 20, pp. 56-57 (hereafter referred to 
as Hunt Rpt) , OCMH files] 

* * * All of the energy of the American 
army had been centered on an early decision in 
the field and there had been no opportunity to 
study the civil problems involved in an occupa- 
tion of German territory. The American army 
therefore began its duties in occupied territory 
with only the scantiest information both of the 
particular situation confronting it and even of a 
broader nature, such as would permit it to intelli- 
gently frame an organization commensurate with 
its wide governmental powers. From the begin- 
ning therefore there was a crying need for per- 
sonnel trained in civil administration and pos- 
sessing knowledge of the German nation. 1 

It is extremely unfortunate that the qualifica- 
tions necessary for a civil administration are not 
developed among officers in times of peace. The 
history of the United States offers an uninter- 
rupted series of wars, which demanded as their 
aftermath, the exercise by its officers of civil gov- 
ernmental functions. Despite the precedents of 
military governments in Mexico, California, the 
Southern States, Cuba, Porto Rico, Panama, 
China, the Philippines and elsewhere, the lesson 
has seemingly not been learned. In none of the 
service-schools devoted to the higher training of 
officers, has a single course on the nature and 
scope of military government been established. 

1 * * * Except in the case of documents with 
numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the num- 
bering that material has been omitted, asterisks are used 
to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs. 

The majority of the regular officers were, as a 
consequence, ill-equipped to perform tasks differ- 
ing so widely from their accustomed duties. . . . 

With the signing of the armistice, the prospec- 
tive occupation became a real factor in the situ- 
ation, and the problems to which it gave rise 
could no longer be evaded. On 11 November 
1918, a month still ensued before our armies 
would reach German soil, — a period sufficient 
to at least lay a solid foundation for the future 
military government. The magnitude of the re- 
sponsibilities assumed appear to have been gready 
underestimated. There can be no doubt that the 
belief, felt in many quarters . . . that the armies 
could occupy enemy soil and yet divest themselves 
of the responsibilities of government, was both 
prevalent and powerful. . . . The military situ- 
ation, serious enough when we consider that 
General Headquarters was at this time faced 
with the problem of moving 300,000 men to the 
Rhine, and the uncertainty in regard to the 
nature of the occupation, was no doubt responsi- 
ble for the American failure to prepare for the 
task at hand. The failure, however, laid a heavy 
burden on the shoulders of the Third Army 
Commander and his subordinate officers charged 
with the security of their several commands. In 
all this force, with the exception of perhaps a 
half-dozen men, there was probably no one who 
had the faintest conception of the German gov- 
ernmental system, of its functions, limitations or 
channels of communication. The Second Section 
of the General Staff at G. H. Q. had, it is true, 
in November, prepared a pamphlet dealing with 
this subject, but its material was antiquated and 
its treatment inaccurate. . . . 

The conclusion from these facts is incontest- 
able; the American army of occupation lacked 
both training and organization to guide the 
destinies of the nearly 1,000,000 civilians whom 


the fortunes of war had placed under its tempo- 
rary sovereignty. 2 

[Ltr, Pierrepont B. Noyes, American Delegate, Inter- 
Allied Rhineland Comm., to President Woodrow Wilson, 
27 May 19, Hunt Rpt, pp. 313-14] 

After a month spent in the Rhineland as Ameri- 
can commissioner, I feel there is danger that a 
disastrous mistake will be made. The "Con- 
vention" for the government of these territories, 
as drafted by the military representatives of the 
Supreme War Council on May eleventh, is more 
brutal, I believe, than even its authors desire 
upon second thought. It provides for unendurable 
oppression of six million people during a period 
of years. 

This "Convention" is not likely to be adopted 
without great modification. What alarms me, 
however, is that none of the revisions of this 
document which I have seen, recognizes that 
its basic principle is bad — that the quartering of 
an enemy army in a country as its master in time 
of peace and the billeting of troops on the civil 
population will insure hatred and ultimate 

I have discussed this matter at length with 
the American commanders of the Army of Oc- 
cupation; men who have seen military occupa- 
tion at close range for six months. These officers 
emphatically indorse the above statements. They 
say that an occupying army, even one with the 
best intentions, is guilty of outrages and that 
mutual irritation, in spite of every effort to the 
contrary, grows apace. Force and more force must 
inevitably be the history of such occupation long 

Forgetting the apparent ambitions of the 
French and possibly overlooking political limita- 
tions, I have sketched below a plan which seems 
to me the maximum for military domination in 
the Rhineland after the signing of peace. Our 
Army Commanders and others who have studied 
the subject on the ground agree with this 

Skeleton Plan 

I. As few troops as possible, concentrated in 
barracks or reserve areas, with no "billeting," ex- 
cepting possibly for officers. 

II. Complete self-government for the terri- 
tory, with the exception below. 

' The policies and procedures indicated in the Manual, 
Military Government (FM 27-5) prepared by the JAG 
in 1940 were promised almost entirely on the Rhineland 
experience, PMGO, History of Military Government 
Training, p. 4. 

III. A Civil Commission with powers: 

a. To make regulations or change old ones 
whenever German law or actions 

(1) threaten the carrying out of treaty 
terms, or 

(2) threaten the comfort or security of 


b. To authorize the army to take control un- 
der martial law, either in danger spots or through- 
out the territory, whenever conditions seem to 
the Commission to make this necessary. 3 

Until 1940 No Field Manual for Military 

[Memo, Brig Gen William E. Shedd, ACofS, G-i, for 
ACofS, G-3, 18 Jan 40, G-i files, 9985-41] 

i . Attached is an extract of a study, prepared by 
a student committee at the Army War College, 
pertaining to a proposed Basic Field Manual, en- 
titled: Military Law, The Administration of Civil 
Affairs in Occupied Alien Territory. It is recom- 
mended that a Basic Field Manual be prepared 
and published by the War Department, using the 
attached study as a guide. 

2. Under date of October 11, 1939, in a memo- 
randum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, the 
Judge Advocate General expressed the opinion 
that there was no necessity for publishing a sep- 
arate field manual on this subject. The Personnel 
Division, based upon considerations discussed 
below, does not concur in this viewpoint. 4 

The Field Manual Places MG Planning and 
Training Under G-i 

[WD Basic Fid Manual, Military Government (FM 27- 
5). 1940] 

6. Planning — The Personnel Division (G-i) of 
the War Department General Staff is respon- 

* Mr. Noyes' proposal for civilian government of oc- 
cupied Germany was accepted by the President. He pre- 
vailed upon America's allies to enter into a convention 
which, on 28 June 1919, set up the Inter-Allied Rhine- 
land High Commission. But America's participation in 
the convention was contingent upon its acceptance of the 
peace treaty, and the failure of the Senate to ratify this 
treaty made it impossible for the United States, though 
sponsor of the arrangement for civilian government, to 
participate formally in the civilian high commission. 

4 JAG's opinion was based largely upon the fact that a 
field manual was already in existence for the laws of war- 
fare (FM 27-10) which included the legal questions of 
military government. But this manual did not enter into 
questions of policy and organization, with which special- 
ists in miltiary government had to be familiar. Although 
the nonlegal phases of military government were touched 
upon in a number of Army field manuals, at the beginning 
of 1940 no manual existed which dealt with them 
systematically and exclusively. 


sible for the preparation of plans for and the 
determination of policies with respect to mili- 
tary government. The personnel section (G-i) 
of the staff of the commanding general, theater 
of operations, will, in advance of the necessity 
for the establishment of military government, 
make such further and more detailed plans there- 
for as may be necessary. * * * 

I 8. Training — the Personnel Division (G-i) of 
the War Department General Staff plans and 
supervises the instruction and training of the 
personnel necessary for military government. In 
accordance with such plans and subject to such 
supervision, the personnel section (G-i) of the 
staff of the commanding general, theater of oper- 
ations, makes such further and more detailed 
plans as may be necessary with respect to such 
instruction and training, so far as they may be 
carried on in that theater, and supervises them. 
... In advance of the need for its use, the Mili- 
tary Intelligence Division (G-2) of the War De- 
partment General Staff will furnish data on 
the subjects last mentioned which may be used 
for instructional purposes. . . . 5 

Three Months Before Pearl Harbor JAG 
Proposes Advance MG Training 

[Ltr, Col Harry A. Auer, JAGD, for Brig Gen Wade H. 
Haislip, ACofS, G-i, 5 Sep 41, G-i files, 16308-125] 

i. American forces are now serving in a num- 
ber of bases in foreign countries, which service 
involves difficult and delicate questions arising 
from relations with the local government; and 
there is a possibility of future service involving 
the administration of military government by 
the United States Army. These facts indicate 
the need of competent personnel for such duties. 
Their detail from combatant units will deplete 
the officer strength of such units, and officers so 
detailed will in most cases be inexperienced and 
untrained in such duties. . . . 

2. It is therefore recommended that commis- 
sioned personnel be selected and trained in a 
school or course of instruction for duty on the 
staff of the commander of any force which may 

5 The manual does not seem to envisage the actual 
conduct of training, as distinguished from its super- 
vision, by G-i. This is left to the theater commander 
insofar as it is carried on in the theater. Thus, as will 
be seen, it became necessary to consider the question of 
the appropriate authority to conduct advance training 
in the Zone of Interior. 

have a mission involving military government or 
liaison with an existing government. ... It is 
further recommended that personnel be selected 
with a view to their future detail as Officers in 
Charge of Civil Affairs or Chief Liaison Offi- 
cers, and for heads of the departments mentioned 
in paragraph 13, FM 27-5, to-wit: Public Works 
and Utilities, Fiscal, Public Health, Education, 
Public Safety, Legal, Communications, Public 
Welfare, and Economics. 6 

G-i Begins To Study the Training Question 

[Memo, ACofS, G-i, for ACofS (WPD), 10 Sep 41, 
G-i files, 16308-125] 

i. The Personnel Division has under study a plan 
to provide preliminary training for officers to fill 
key positions in Civil Affairs Sections on staffs of 
certain Task Force commanders. Such training 
will be confined to those staffs which may reason- 
ably be expected to operate a military govern- 

2. In order to furnish a basis for the number of 
officers to receive such training it is requested that 
you submit a list of theaters based on present 
plans where such a contingency may arise. 

PMGO Recommended for Control of Advance 

[Memo, ACofS, G-i, for CofS, 3 Dec. 41, AF files, 352 

( 1 2-3-41) (1), School of Military Government (SMG), 

I. Discussion. 

1. Possible future requirement involving 
administration of military government by the 
Army suggests advance training of officers for 
military government and liaison. . . . 

8 This is the first formal War Department proposal for 
advance military government training but the nucleus of 
the idea appears to have arisen earlier. The PMGO His- 
tory of Military Government Training points out: "A clas- 
sified report from the United States Military Attache in 
London, dated 2 May 1941, recommended that the United 
States take preliminary steps for the selection and training 
of Army officers and others for postwar activities abroad. 
(At this time, Great Britain had already constituted a 
politico-military course for training officers for recon- 
struction and other possible postwar missions in different 
sections of the world.) This report was referred by the 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to the Assistant Chief of 
Staff, G—3, on 11 June 1941" (p. 4). The proposal of 
May 1941 had reference primarily to training for post- 
war liaison activities, such as was carried on in the British 


2. Operation of necessary school is properly 
a Zone of the Interior function and should be 
charged to an existing War Department agency. 

3. The Provost Marshal General has offered 
to include the necessary instruction in military 
government in the curricula of a school which 
he is organizing for other purposes. 

II. Action recommended. 

1. That the Provost Marshal General be 
charged with the operating function of training 
officers for future detail in connection with mili- 
tary government and liaison. 

2. That the Provost Marshal General be di- 
rected to confer with the Personnel Division 
relative to the preparation of detailed plans for 
initiating and operating the course of instruction 
under discussion. [Approved by Secretary of 
War, 7 January 1942.] 

[Memo, Maj Gen Myron C. Cramer, JAG, for ACofS, 
G-i, 23 Dec 41, G-i files, 16308-125, Tab C] 

5. On September 5, 1941 . . . this office recom- 
mended that such [military government] train- 
ing be given. All who have considered the 
question agree that such training should be given, 
but differ as to who should give it. It has been 
suggested at various times that the task should 
be imposed upon the Assistant Chief of Staff, 
G-i; the Civil Affairs Section, G.H.Q., The 
Judge Advocate General; and The Provost 
Marshal General. The objecton to G-i being 
charged with the task is that a division of the 
General Staff is not an operating body; to General 
Headquarters, that it should be mobile and have 
no other than combatant duties; to this office, 
that its function is solely to give legal advice and 
military government is not primarily a legal but 
an administrative task. By first indorsement, 
dated November 19, 194 1 . . . , Alajor General 
Allen W. Gullion, who was then both The 
Judge Advocate General and The Provost Mar- 
shal General, but who now occupies the latter 
position only, expressed a willingness to include 
instruction in military government in a school for 
military police and provost marshals which he is 
setting up. The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-i 
and War Plans Division, have concurred in that 
plan, but the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, de- 
clines to do so, saying: 

. . . The scope of Military Government (FM 

27-5) is so broad and so different from Military 
Police matters that it is difficult to see any ma- 
terial advantage in combining the two types of 
instruction. * * * 

6. The breadth of the instruction necessary 
will be seen from the following quotation from 
FM 27-5, paragraph 8: 

. . . So far as time and available facilities permit, 
the instruction will cover the laws and practice 
of military government, the history of such gov- 
ernments in the past, and the language, geogra- 
phy, history, economics, government, and poli- 
tics of the country to be occupied. * * * 

7. The above citations show that the Assistant 
Chief of Staff, G-3, is entirely right in saying 
that the scope of military government is much 
broader than and different from the work of 
military police. As a strict matter of logic, instruc- 
tion in military government does not belong in 
a school whose primary object is the instruction 
of military police. But the question is a practical 
as well as a theoretical one. As has been shown, 
there are strong objections to the assignment of 
the task of instruction in military government 
to any one of the other agencies which have been 
suggested, but The Provost Marshal General is 
willing to undertake the task. The present 
Provost Marshal General, Major General Allen 
W. Gullion, who presumably will serve as such 
for the duration of the existing war, has had a 
wide and varied experience, both civil and mili- 
tary. . . . While he was the Judge Advocate 
General, the Field Manual on Military Govern- 
ment (FM 27-5) and numerous opinions on 
that subject were prepared under his supervision. 
It would be difficult to find an officer better quali- 
fied to have charge of instruction in military 
government. . . . Moreover, this instruction can 
be given in addition to that normally given in 
the Military Police School without additional 
school facilities, whereas such facilities would 
have to be duplicated if the instruction were 
given elsewhere. 

8. For the above reasons I am of opinion that, 
whatever theoretical objections may be raised to 
the assignment to The Provost Marshal General 
of the task of giving instruction in military 
government, as a practical matter that assignment 
will be a good working solution of the problem. 
I have therefore concurred in the memorandum 
for the Chief of Staff in reference as indicated by 
my initials thereon. 



Teaching Civil Affairs Within a Military 

[Memo, Jesse I. Miller/ PMGO, for PMG, 10 Jan 42, 
PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, Est] 

• * * The Provost Marshal General has been 
been charged with the responsibility of training 
officers for future details in connection with mili- 
tary government and liaison incident thereto [see 
above ] . The execution of this assignment involves 
the establishment of a School of Military Gov- 
ernment. The purpose of this preliminary memo- 
randum is to outline the general nature, scope 
and personnel of such a school. 

A- General: 

The ideal type of military government is one 
which integrates the local laws, institutions, cus- 
toms, psychology and economics of the occupied 
area and a superimposed military control with 
a minimum of change in the former and a maxi- 
mum of control by the latter. * * * 

This involves fundamentally the selection of 
a group of officers possessing some special or 
promising talent and their instruction in two 
general and sharply denned areas: 

1. The international conventions and the 
American regulations, procedure and experience 
relevant to the administration of military gov- 
ernment, and 

2. The historical, political, social and eco- 
nomic backgrounds of the occupied regions in 
which they may be called upon to function. 

B. Scope of Instruction: 

1. Basic Instruction 

• • * The entire course above indicated 
should extend over a period of from six to eight 
weeks, preferably eight. 

2. Politico-Military Instruction 

* * • Under present conditions, this course 
should be limited to four weeks. 

C Personnel: 

1. Executive and Faculty. 
The flavor of a Civil Affairs Section in 

T Jesse I. Miller was a civilian consultant in the War 
Department, who had been in military service during 
World War I. After the Military Government Division 
was set up in t he Provo st Marshal's Office on 25 July 
1943 (see bdow[~D. 16 1 . Mr. Miller was commissioned 
and made Associate Director, later Director. 

any occupied territory is military; its problems 
are primarily civQ. Hence, there should be a 
Commandant of the school who should be a 
Regular Army officer, assisted by a Director who 
should be a civilian or an officer commissioned 
from civil life for that purpose. Thus, the special 
problems of the Army could be stressed and the 
two points of view integrated with the emphasis 
on the military. 

The faculty would consist principally of 
lecturers drawn from the ranks of the best quali- 
fied persons in their respective fields. The perma- 
nent faculty would be small; at this stage it 
would be well to leave its composition to the 
Commandant and the Director. 
2. Student. 

Here is, perhaps, the crux of the entire 
matter. For, no matter how well the course be 
designed and no matter how excellendy it be 
presented, the entire project will become so much 
wasted effort if the student group is incapable of 
absorbing it. Hence, student-officers should be 
selected with great care and only those whose 
background and ability indicate some aptitude 
for the assignment should be selected. * * • 

D. Recommendations: 

At the present time, recommendations are 
limited to the following: 

1. That the school be designed to include 
both Courses 1 and 2, supra, and that its instruc- 
tion cover a period of from 10 to 12 weeks. 

2. That the school be in charge of a Com- 
mandant, who shall be an officer of the Regular 
Army, assisted by a Director, who shall be either 
a civilian or an officer commissioned from civil 
life for the purpose. 

3. That the first student group consist of 30 
officers of whom three shall be of sufficient age, 
rank and experience to qualify as the Chief of 
a Civil Affairs Section of an army of occupation 
and that the remaining 27 officers be selected 
from among younger officers of talent and ability 
and with backgrounds more or less equally dis- 
tributed among the special fields above men- 
tioned, i.e., engineers (electrical, civil and sani- 
tation), accountants, lawyers, economists, sociolo- 
gists and the like. 

4. That the school be located at a place easily 
accessible to the War College where alone can be 
found the bulk of essential reading materials. 


Secretary Stimson Sees the Importance of 
the Training Project 

[Telecon, Gullion and SW Henry L. Stimson, 5 Feb 42, 
AG files, 352 ( 1 2-3-41) (1), SMG, Est] 

Gullion: . . . Wickersham would be the head 
of the whole thing. He would be the Comman- 
dant of the College. It's a big man's job, there's 
no doubt about that. 

Stimson: I should think that would be a very 
important position. 

Gullion: No doubt about it. If we're going to 
win this war, we're going to have to occupy some 

Two Months After Start of War a School of 
Military Government Is Authorized 

[AG Ltr to PMG, 9 Feb 42, AG files, 352 (12-3-41) (i), 
SMG, Est] 

i. The Provost Marshal General is charged with 
the operating function of training officers for 
future detail in connection with military gov- 
ernment and liaison at a school of military gov- 
ernment to be established for that purpose. 

2. The Provost Marshal General will confer 
with the Personnel Division, General Staff, rela- 
tive to the preparation of detailed plans for initi- 
ating and operating the course of instructions. 

Proposal To Locate the School at a Nearby 

[Memo, Brig Gen Cornelius W. Wickersham, PMGO, 
for PMG, 21 Feb 42, PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, Est] 

* * * It is believed that advantage should be 
taken of the offer of the University of Virginia 
and that the School of Military Government 
should be located there. The facilities are suffi- 
cient for a school of about 60 students, 10 execu- 
tive officers and members of the faculty, and a 
clerical and stenographic force of about 15. When 
the new Naval Building is finished and addi- 
tional space is thereby made available, there will 
be room for some expansion. 8 

"The offer was informally made by President John 
Lloyd Newcomb to General Wickersham at a conference 
of 1 9 February, was confirmed by a letter of 23 February, 
and was shortly accepted by the Provost Marshal General. 
While some military installations in and around Wash- 
ington had also been considered, the practical difficulties 
were immediately apparent. It is noteworthy that from 
the outset the inclination of the Provost Marshal Gen- 
eral's Office was to establish the school at a university, 
which would afford use of a library and other facilities 
not obtainable in equal degree on military premises. 

A Dry Directive Initiates a Rather Exciting 

[Ltr, AG to PMG, 13 Mar 42, PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, 

i. Supplementing directions contained in letter, 
this office . . . , February 9, 1942, subject, Train- 
ing of Personnel for Military Government and 
Liaison, it is desired that the Provost Marshal 
General establish at the University of Virginia, 
Charlottesville, Virginia, a school to be known 
as The School of Military Government. This 
school will be under the direct supervision of The 
Provost Marshal General. 

2. The course of instruction will not exceed 
sixteen weeks in duration, the first course to 
begin on or about May 1, 1942. Subsequent 
courses will follow, the second course to begin 
on or about September 1, 1942. 

3. The School of Military Government is based 
upon instruction at one time of a student body 
consisting of not to exceed 100 officers. Perma- 
nent overhead for the school, exclusive of out- 
side lecturers, will not exceed 12 officers and 
civilian instructors, 25 civilians, and one en- 
listed man, as arranged after consultation with 
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G—i. 

4. The School of Military Government at the 
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, 
is designated as an exempted station, under the 
control of The Provost Marshal General, but 
is authorized to communicate directly with The 
Adjutant General and with other persons and 
agencies with reference to other than policy 
matters. 9 

The Charlottesville Curriculum Comprises 
Largely Civil Subjects 

[Outline of Curriculum, First Course (May-Aug 42) 
submitted by Comdt, SMG to TAG [The Adjutant Gen- 
eral], 13 May 42, AG files, 352 (12-3-41) (1), SMG, 

I. Introduction and orientation: text material 
and bibliography. 

Distinguishing military law, martial law and 
military government; clarifying the nature, scope 
and general phases of the latter; outlining the 
general objectives of the course. 

II. The organization and operation of the War 
Department and the Army. 

A general outline of the organization of the 
War Department; military organization (tactical 

"The school opened on 11 May 1942 with 49 student 
officers in attendance. The small enrollment was prob- 
ably the result of the short interval between the announce- 
ment of the school and its opening. 


and territorial) ; relation of the War Department 
to the Army; official correspondence, etc. 

III. The international law of military govern- 

The relevant conventions; the rules of land 
warfare; growth and general survey. 

IV. The American regulations. 

A survey and study of War Department regu- 
lations (FM 27-5), presenting the basic policies 
and mechanics of military government. 

V. American experiences in military govern- 

Study of illustrative techniques in previous ex- 
periences. Application to objectives in: (1) liaison 
in friendly situations and (2) the Atlantic 

VI. Other experiences. 

The experiences and practices of other coun- 
tries in military government. 

VII. Public administration. 

General principles of public administration, 
including local and state government; public 
finance; public health and sanitation; communi- 
cations; utilities and public works; education; 
public safety; public welfare; economic problems. 

VIII. Introduction to politico-military back- 

Discussing American Constitutional Govern- 
ment, the Adantic Charter, Nazi ideology and 
other political philosophies. 

IX. Politico-military backgrounds — general. 

Races and racial theories; general or compara- 
tive historical geography; geo-politics. 

X. Politico-military backgrounds — special. 

(Three selected political or geographical areas) 
Political histories; economic histories; systems 
of government; social psychology; geography; 
legal system:;. 

XI. Liaison. 

Liaison functions; correlation of problems of 
military government and friendly liaison. 
Study of selected areas and special features relat- 
ing thereto. 

Charlottesville's First Major Finding: The 
School Inadequate Unless Supplemented by 
Co-operation With Civilian Training 

[Memo, Wickersham, Comdt, SMG, for PMG, 17 Jun 42, 
PMGO files, 321.19, MG] 

3. Certain factors should be noted as follows: 

(a) . The obligation implicit in the Army's 
mission of military government is, perhaps, of as 
great importance as any connected with the war. 
As has heretofore been pointed out by General 
Lee in his report on the British School, the termi- 
nation of hostilities will probably leave the Amer- 
ican army as the sole agency capable of initiating 
the reconstruction process in wide areas scattered 
over the entire world. 

(b) . It will not be disputed (at this time) 
that the prime direction and administration of 
any military government belong wholly to the 
military command. . . . There are, however, 
two overriding aspects of military government, 
when conducted extensively and in widely scat- 
tered areas, which the Army should not attempt 
to deal with alone, viz., general political policy 
and general economic policy. Joint efforts by 
the Army and other agencies of the government 
will be needed. Consequently, it would seem de- 
sirable to inaugurate a program in the beginning 
which would anticipate the inevitable liaison and 
which would forestall the premature loss of mili- 
tary direction and control. 10 

(c) . The only form of military government 
contemplated by the international Conventions 
arises upon the occupation of enemy territory. 
American forces, may, however, find themselves 
in the occupation of the territories of neutrals, 
quasi-neutrals, puppets, or even allies. An entirely 
unexplored field of international law is in pros- 
pect, with little precedent save the Japanese. 

(d) . The American occupation of the Rhine- 
land during the last war involved at no time an 
excess of 250,000 American troops. The number 
of military Civil Affairs personnel required there 
was 213, or approximately 1/10 of 1 percent 
of the armed forces. . . . 

(e) . In the 1918 German occupation, local 
German officials were extensively utilized in the 

"General Wickersham could not foresee that primacy 
of the military establishment in the administration of 
occupied territory was very shortly to be denied by the 


functioning of local institutions. Under present 
conditions in Germany, it would doubtless be un- 
wise to continue Nazi officials in office or in key 
positions. The demands upon American per- 
sonnel, at least during the initial stages of any 
occupation, would therefore be substantially in- 
creased. A similar situation would probably exist 
in any occupation of Japanese territory. Conse- 
quently, any estimate based upon the Rhineland 
experience of the last war is subject to the neces- 
sity of supplementing the trained Civil Affairs 
officers with large numbers of operatives and 

4. The total task confronting the Army is to 
have available at the proper time (a) a trained 
personnel sufficient for the key administrative 
positions, (b) an adequate number of subordi- 
nates and (c) to find a sufficient number of opera- 
tives and specialists to meet the conditions that 
are likely to exist in both Germany and Japan. 
The combined total might run to several thou- 
sand men capable of functioning under military 
control and direction, but with consistent politi- 
cal and economic policies in widely separated 
areas all over the world, and in some instances, 
under circumstances where there will be little, if 
any, international precedent. 

7. The following agencies may be considered 
sources of personnel within their respective 

(a) . School of Military Government. This 
can be increased to 150 student officers for the 
next course as already recommended, and this 
would make possible the training of 450 officers 
per year available for detail to military govern- 
ment and liaison. Those assigned to military 
government would occupy the key positions as 
military governors, Civil Affairs officers, and 
members of Civil Affairs Sections of staffs of 
commanders of higher units. Some further ex- 
pansion would also be feasible for later courses. 

(b) . Military Police Schools. Additional in- 
struction in military government might be given 
in these schools so as to constitute a training 
ground for subordinate positions. 

(c) . Universities and Colleges. A number of 
these institutions have indicated an interest in 
the inauguration of courses in training for 
specialist and technical personnel. Columbia Uni- 

versity has already begun the setting up of such a 
course which will begin this summer. . . . 
Princeton and the Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy have already indicated a desire to em- 
bark on projects relating to postwar problems. 
It is sufficient to say that the programs contem- 
plated by these institutions would provide the 
sort of background training which might fit older 
students for services in specialized fields in par- 
ticular areas, and younger students for later work 
in this field. 

(d) . Army Specialist Corps. This organiza- 
tion is indicated as a procurement agency for 
expert and advisory personnel. 

(e) . Board of Economic Warfare. This 
agency is believed to be in close touch with tech- 
nical talent in the United States, particularly in 
the field of economics and would probably be 
willing to co-operate both in the selection and 
in specialized training of expert personnel for 
special tasks in the economic and sociological 

(f ) . Private or Semipublic Agencies. One or 
two private agencies have indicated an interest 
in the subject, but it is not deemed advisable to 
rely upon them for direct assistance. 

9. Recommendations. In view of the foregoing, 
the following recommendations are submitted: 

(a) . That the necessary steps be taken in 
accordance with paragraphs 7a and 7b above. 

(b) . That arrangements be made with the 
Army Specialist Corps and the Board of Eco- 
nomic Warfare for procurement of specialist and 
operative personnel with particular reference to 
Germany and Japan so that they can be obtained, 
when the time comes, on short notice. 

(c) . That approved universities and colleges 
should be encouraged to conduct courses in 
specialist and technical training and should not 
be discouraged from conducting the courses 
which increase the knowledge of students that 
may be useful to them in connection with later 
training for military government or postwar 
needs provided that it is made clear that the 
course will in no way constitute a short cut to a 
commission. 11 

11 General Wickersham envisaged, of course, the com- 
missioning or enlistment of qualified civilians, in accord- 
ance with par. 7 of FM 27-5 . 



A Civilian Agency Seizes the Initiative With 
the President 

[Copy of Memo, Arthur C. Ringland, War Relief Contl 
Bd, 20 Jun 42, forwarded to President Franklin D. Roose- 
velt, OUSW files, MG] 

(i) The Administration has announced from 
time to time that this Government and the United 
Nations collectively must undertake the respon- 
sibility for multiple tasks of administration in 
occupied and liberated areas. 

(2) In preparation for these tasks, several 
Federal agencies — notably the State, War, Navy 
and Agriculture Departments, the Board of 
Economic Warfare, the War Production Board, 
the National Research Council, the League of 
Nations and the International Labor Office, and 
many other institutions and organizations, are 
engaged in the study of procedures and plans to 
be made effective upon the cessation of hostilities. 
These plans would be immediately effective and 
extend through phases of relief and reconstruc- 
tion from the time of the armistice until the 
establishment of a stable pattern of administra- 
tion in the affected areas. 

(3) It is obvious that trained personnel of 
varied capacities and of a speculative number will 
be needed for these tasks. It is certainly reason- 
able to anticipate that Army and Navy personnel 
will be needed for military governments of 
liberated and occupied areas at the end of this 
war as it was at the end of the last. After the 
Armistice in 1918, it was necessary to set up a 
military government in the Rhineland and to 
carry out an enormous task of food administra- 
tion, relief and public health work throughout 
the countries of central Europe, the Balkans, and 
the Baltic States, the Near East and Russia. It is 
anticipated that this time there will be a similar 
but vastly greater task in Europe and in other 
parts of the world. This time and in view of the 
circumstances of the war, the exigencies of the 
situation may well require much more work of 
an economic and social character. 

(4) At present the only formalized training 
for international administration is provided at the 
Army School of Military Government at Char- 
lottesville and by the training program of the 
School of International Administration to be 
launched at Columbia University on August 17 
with a nucleus of students detailed by the Navy, 
and it is understood, by certain civilian agencies. 

(5) Neither the Army School nor the Colum- 
bia program will be in any way adequate to meet 

the training program. It is understood that other 
educational agencies and certain of the Govern- 
ment departments are contemplating diverse 
aspects of the problem. There is to be considered 
too the use of the personnel and organizational 
resources of private agencies which have had 
experience in the foreign field. 

(8) It is suggested that the President should 
request someone — or perhaps a small informal 
President's committee, to explore immediately 
the entire problem of the selection and training 
of personnel for international administration, in- 
cluding relief, rehabilitation and reconstruc- 
tion; to evaluate what is now being done in these 
fields of training and education; and recommend 
what should be done in terms of an administra- 
tive setup. Co-ordinated action of this charac- 
ter will at once facilitate needed liaison, both 
within the several agencies of Government and 
between the Government and private institutions 
now interested in war and postwar tasks. 12 

Immediate Action Needed if the Army's Plans 
Are Not To Be Forestalled 

[Memo, Gullion for CG, SOS, 23 Jun 42, PMGO files, 
321.19, MG] 

5. . . . There are serious doubts that 150 men of 
desired ability and qualifications can be obtained 
from the Army at this time, in view of the demon- 
strated reluctance of commanders to release good 
men. This is, I take it, one of the reasons that 
General Wickersham has recommended that 
extraordinarily qualified persons be commis- 
sioned directly from civil life for the purpose of 
instructing them at the Charlottesville School. 
These men are to be chosen because of their ex- 
perience in government or in public utilities or in 
sanitary or civil engineering. 

u Mr. Ringland's proposal would, of course, have re- 
opened the whole question of the control of military 
government training, which the War Department, in 
accordance with tradition, had itself assumed. From this 
point of view the Ringland memorandum had, to the 
Provost Marshal General's Office, a different character 
from the numerous offers which other civilians and civilian 
agencies were making at the same time to establish co- 
operation in military government problems. Typical of 
many of these was the offer of Harold Weston, Secretary 
of the Reconstruction Services Committee, in a letter to 
the Provost Marshal General of 3 June 1942. Mr. Weston 
proposed that the committee should be authorized to con- 
sult confidentially with government agencies in its pur- 
suit of studies regarding the rehabilitation of liberated 
areas. PMGO files, 014.13 Relations Between Civil and 
MG Authority. 


6. While I foresee that we shall need men of the 
experience indicated by General Wickersham 
[Memo 17 June, Section 2 above], I am not at 
present prepared to recommend that they be' 
commissioned in the Army of the United States, 
because, following their completion of the four- 
month course at Charlottesville, their services 
would be limited to standing and waiting. I 
should approve General Wickersham's request if 
it is possible to have these men commissioned in 
the Specialist Corps with the understanding that 
upon completion of their course at Charlottesville 
they be returned to civil life subject to call under 
their specialist commission when needed. . . . 

7. The military government which the United 
States must, of necessity, establish, will dwarf all 
of our previous efforts in that line. ... It is im- 
perative that this responsibility be clearly recog- 
nized from the beginning and that the efforts of 
the military be not blocked or impeded by other 
agencies of our government. 

* * * Since the primary responsibility for 
the administration of any military government 
rests with the Army, it follows that the Army 
should ta\e the initiative in the preparation of 
policies and plans, including the procurement and 
training of personnel, designed to assist the 
liberated areas and to govern conquered territory. 

In my opinion, unless the Army acts immedi- 
ately and decisively it will find any plan which 
it subsequently develops will become lost in the 
maze of plans which are now being formulated 
by civilian agencies, both governmental and pri- 
vate, notably the Board of Economic Warfare 
and Columbia University. * * * 

I am strongly in favor of the proposal to in- 
crease the faculty and student body of the School 
of Military Government. 

8. I intend to set up a Military Government 
Division in this Office, with a view to the Army's 
assuming leadership in enlisting the services of 
the Board of Economic Warfare and other agen- 
cies in preparing for Military Government. I re- 
quest authority to take the necessary preliminary 
steps toward the integration of such agencies un- 
der War Department leadership. . . , 13 

A Disturbing Memorandum From the Presi- 

[Ltr, USW Robert P. Patterson to Roosevelt, 20 Jul 42, 
OUSW files, MG] 

The memorandum which you sent me on July 

a There is no evidence that at the time of writing this 
memorandum General Gullion knew of the Ringland 
proposal, which was not brought formally to the atten- 
tion of the War Department until a month later. 

17th on the training of personnel for postwar 
administration relates to a subject of much inter- 
est to the War Department. 14 The memorandum 
poults out that while some steps have been taken 
on postwar planning, very little attention has 
been paid to the training of personnel. 

I am in full accord with the suggestions con- 
tained in it that steps be taken to explore the 
problem of selection and training of personnel, 
evaluate what is now being done, and recom- 
mend an administrative setup. However, I 
strongly feel that it is most important there 
should be no public announcement about this at 
the present time and that the work be done in- 
formally and without any publicity whatsoever. 

Any time that you wish to discuss this with me 
I will be available. 

[Memo, Miller, Dir, Military Government EH vision 
(MGD), for PMG, 28 Oct 42, PMGO files, 321, PMG 

* * * Last July a memorandum by Mr. 
Arthur C. Ringland raised an issue at the White 
House that threatened the War Department's 
leadership in the field of military government. 
As a result, a comprehensive program for mili- 
tary government was inaugurated by The Provost 
Marshal General at the direction of the Under 
Secretary of War." * * * 

Unwisdom of Premature Civilian Interfer- 
ence in the Light of History 

[Memo, Miller for Col Edward S. Greenbaum, OUSW, 23 
Jul 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG] 

i. The prime direction and administration of 
military government belong wholly to the mili- 
tary command. If there is one outstanding lesson 
to be gained from prior American experiences 
in military government, it is the unwisdom of 
permitting any premature interference by civilian 
agencies with the Army's basic task of civil ad- 
ministration in occupied areas. 

3. ... In those important American experi- 
ences in military government — three in num- 
ber — where civilian influence was permitted to be 

14 This was the 20 June memorandum of Mr. Ringland 
(above) which the President sent to the Under Secretary 
of War, asking "Will you please speak to me about this 
at your convenience?" OUSW files, MG. 

u This memorandum, though not written until October, 
is included here because it testifies not only to the con- 
cern entertained in July by the War Department but also 
to the influence of that concern in expediting action upon 
training plans. 


exercised, the results were, respectively, demoral- 
izing, costly and ludicrous. . . . 

(a) The Civil War. The grand strategy of 
the Union forces in the early days of the war was 
to drive a wedge into the Confederacy, which 
was accomplished by the partial occupations of 
Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee. The mili- 
tary commanders in these three states thus ac- 
quired the right to impose military government. 
However, in the spring and early summer 1862, 
President Lincoln appointed George F. Shepley 
and Andrew Johnson as military governors of 
Louisiana and Tennessee respectively. Johnson 
was then a United States Senator; Shepley was a 
civilian. Both were given the rank of Brigadier 
General and assumed their duties as "military" 
governors of the respective states. 

There was . . . violent conflict between 
these civilian "military" governors and the com- 
manders in Louisiana and Tennessee. . . . 

(b) The Philippine Insurrection. General 
Gullion's communication of June 23, 1942, to 
the Commanding General, Services of Supply, 
refers briefly to the Philippine episode. His re- 
marks may be quoted as follows: 

"The early history of the American occupa- 
tion of the Philippines demonstrates the dangers 
to be encountered when the military and civil 
branches of the government exercise functions in 
the same occupied area. William Howard Taft 
admitted that under such circumstances there 
was bound to be 'inevitable friction!' The com- 
manding officers in the Philippines, Generals 
Otis, [Arthur] Mac Arthur and[Adna Romanza] 
Chaffee, successively, were severely handicapped 
by the Schurman and Taft Commissions who 
were endeavoring to introduce civil government 
to the Islands prematurely. General Otis felt that 
the activities of the Schurman Commission cost 
the lives of many American soldiers and Gen- 
erals MacArthur and Chaffee resented the injec- 
tion of civilians into a situation which, in their 
judgment would be, and as events proved, was, of 
a purely military nature." 16 * * * 

Military Government Division Created To 
Assert War Department Leadership 

[Memo, Gullion for the USW, 25 Jul 42, PMGO files, 321, 

I have been directed by the War Department 

10 The third issue discussed by Miller — the Rhineland 
occupation — is omitted in view of the reference to it in 
the second document of this chapter. It is noteworthy 
that the person citing this historical evidence against 
premature civilian interfer ence in MG was no profe ssional 
soldier. See also below, | Miller's memorandum | of 30 
July 1942. 

(through the Chief of Administrative Services) 
to take immediate steps to integrate, under War 
Department leadership, the civilian agencies now 
or hereafter to be interested in problems of mili- 
tary government. 

Pursuant to that directive, I have established a 
Division of Military Government in the Office of 
The Provost Marshal General and have placed 
Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham in charge 
of that Division. General Wickersham will con- 
tinue as Commandant of the School of Military 
Government at Charlottesville but will spend 
much of his time in Washington where he has 
fully equipped offices. 

Subject to such instructions as he may receive 
from you, General Wickersham has been told to 
make contact first with the Board of Economic 
Warfare and later with other agencies, such as 
Columbia University. 

No Consensus on General Gullion's Aim 

[Memo, Harold H. Neff, Spec Asst to SW, for Greenbaum, 
OUSW, 29 Jul 42, OUSW, Secret files, MG] 

* * * I doubt, however, whether the draft of 
memorandum by General Gullion is correct, be- 
cause I don't see how, except by superior author- 
ity, the War Department can take steps to 
integrate under its leadership the several civilian 
agencies. Without direction from above, is not 
that an assumption of authority? Or is the idea it 
can be done sub rosa, as it were? 

The Provost Marshal General'? Office Tries 
To Sell Its Own Program 

[Memo, Col Joseph V. dep. Dillon, DPMG, for Chief 
Admin Servs, SOS, 31 Jul 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG] 

On the evening of July 29, 1942, at the invitation 
of Mr. Max Lowenthal [Board of Economic War- 
fare] and with the approval of the Provost Mar- 
shall General, Brigadier General C. W. Wicker- 
sham, Commandant, The School of Military 
Government, and his assistant, Mr. Jesse Miller, 
attended an informal conference to discuss the 
general program of military government. Five 
United States Senators and four or five mem- 
bers of the Board of Economic Warfare also 

General Wickersham outlined a program 
which included the integration of all interested 
agencies (Government and private) in matters 
of military government, under the leadership of 
the War Department. All present were highly 


pleased with what had been accomplished thus 
far and appeared to be extremely co-operative. 

Colonel Greenbaum, of the Office of the Un- 
der Secretary of War, was informed of the de- 
velopments of that informal meeting. On the 
morning of July 30th, Colonel Greenbaum called 
General Wickersham and informed him that Mr. 
Wayne Coy, of the Office of the President, had 
called Secretary Patterson and requested the re- 
turn of the President's memorandum, with the 
enclosure written by Mr. Ringdale [Ringland] to 
the President. It was inferentially indicated that 
the President was satisfied that the War Depart- 
ment had taken the proper steps to develop the 
program. With the return of that memorandum, 
Colonel Greenbaum attached the following 

Subject: Military Government. 

The outstanding lessons gained from American 
experiences in military government, including 
the Civil War and the Philippine Insurrection, 
and from the experiences of other countries, is 
that the prime direction and administration of 
military government belongs wholly to the mili- 
tary command. In recognition of its important 
obligation to fulfill the mission of military gov- 
ernment, the War Department has established, 
under the Provost Marshal General, a School of 
Military Government, at Charlottesville, Vir- 
ginia; Military Police Schools at Chickamauga, 
Tennessee, and the Division of Military Govern- 
ment in the Office of The Provost Marshal 

The School of Military Government is for 
training the personnel to fill the key positions in 
military government and the Military Police 
Schools will train personnel to perform subordi- 
nate and preliminary functions. The Division of 
Military Government is taking steps to integrate, 
under War Department leadership, civilian 
agencies, both public and private, now or here- 
after to be interested in the problem of military 
government. Its duties include the activation of 
the program, to recruit, train and make available 
such reservoirs of additional personnel as may be 
deemed requisite for missions of military govern- 
ment, including technical experts and advisory 
personnel, both of whom will have to be recruited 
from persons presently in civil life. 

Judge Patterson added to this memorandum to 
the President, this statement: 

"Whenever you care to do so, I will be glad 
to arrange a meeting to give you further infor- 
mation about the matter." 

The Army Points to Affirmative Action in 
Order To Forestall Civilian Control 

[Memo, Miller, Associate Dir, MGD, for Greenbaum, 
OUSW, 30 Jul 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG] 

I think you may find the inclosures [not at- 
tached] useful at this time in connection with 
any White House discussions. The program out- 
lined in the accompanying papers now has the 
approval (with minor and immaterial variations) 
of both General Gullion and General Wicker- 
sham and has therefore been put into operation. 

Specifically . . . the following affirmative action 
has already been taken in respect of the six 
recommendations there set out: 

1. A Military Government Division has been 
set up in the Office of The Provost Marshal 
General with the personnel recommended in 
memorandum of July 25, 1942. 

2. The School of Military Government has 
been directed to prepare appropriate recommen- 
dations relative to revised Tables of Organiza- 
tion covering Civil Affairs personnel and the 
School is already engaged in that task. 

3. Arrangements have been formulated for 
post-graduate work to begin concurrently with 
the opening of the second session of the School 
of Military Government on or about September 
9, 1942. It is hoped that portions of this post- 
graduate work can be conducted in co-operation 
with certain universities, principally (at the 
moment) Yale, Columbia and Johns Hopkins. 
Yale has already submitted definite and, I think, 
highly satisfactory proposals. 

4. The Military Police Schools have indicated 
their willingness and capacity to train per year 
400 to 500 subordinate officers and 1,200 enlisted 
military police for special duties in military gov- 
ernment. The only obstacle to immediate action 
is a housing one to cost approximately $20,000. 

5. The Army Specialist Corps has indicated 
its complete willingness to serve as a vehicle for 
the recruitment of technical and advisory person- 
nel, and its staff is now studying the feasibility 
of creating an Army Specialist Corps Reserve in 
connection with this project. 

6. Liaison has been established with the Board 
of Economic Warfare and the areas of presently 
acceptable co-operation with the War Depart- 
ment already delimited. . . . 

As you will observe from the program out- 
lined in the inclosures, the immediate over-all 
objective is to silence any claims by civilian 
agencies to leadership in the military govern- 
ment program by giving to all of them an active 
part in the program but in such a relation to it 


as to forestall their seizing its direction or con- 
trol. In this connection, I inclose a copy of a letter 
dispatched today to the Board of Economic 

The War Department Gives Qualified Ap- 
proval to General Gulaion's Proposals 

[Memo, Asst Seer, GS, for PMC Through CG, SOS, 14 
Aug 42, PMGO fiks, 321.19, MG] 

The expansion of The School of Military Gov- 
ernment, as proposed by The Provost Marshal 
General, is approved, with the following 

(1) That the increase in the number of 
students and tbc increase in the faculty of the 
School be provided from personnel of the Army 
Specialist Corps. 

(2) That the Army Specialist Corps person- 
nel detailed as students will be returned, at the 
completion of the course, to an inactive status 
without pay, if there arc no vacancies for their 

The Provost Marshal General is authorized to 
establish a Military Government Division in the 
Office of The Provost Marshal General, provided 
this can be done without any increase in the 
allotment of officers assigned to The Provost 
Marshal General. The Military Government 
Division in the Office of The Provost Marshal 
General will engage in broad planning activities, 
with detailed estimates to be undertaken by Hie 
School of Military Government. 

Hich-Level Decision: It Is Time To Announce 
a War Department Program 

fTcJtcon, Gullioa and Patterson, 4 Sep 42," PMGO 
files, 321, PMGO fc MGD] 

* • * Judge P. General, I had a talk this 
morning at a meeting with [Henry] Morgen- 
thau, Jr. I thought h was just on the currency 
proposition but it developed that he had . . . 
an agenda there that included a good many 
other things and it developed into a discussion 
of military government in general. He showed 
a good deal of awareness of what had been going 
on. I told him that we had the subject in hand 
and after some more discussion he said well if 
you have got the subject in hand 111 lay off with 
only a respond when you want our assistance. 

" Transcript of conversation, with inaccuracies and 
omissions, is included to show the trend of thought which 
led to me preparation of the War Department Program 
of Military Government. 

I said that's all right. The State Department 
and the Board of Economic Warfare were also 
there. [Frank] Knox was also there from the 
Navy and Knox showed that he didn't know 
anything at all about any developments being 
on. He said that he had discussed it recently 
with the President. The President thought that 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff ought to do it. Well, I 
told him that the work was in hand in the War 
Department and we [if] thought best by all 
concerned to transfer it to the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff that could be done too, although I didn't 
think it was necessary or feasible. That prompts 
me though to the thought that I think the time 
has probably arrived when we ought to put down 
on paper the outline of the policy in the War 
Department for planning and preparation so that 
it could be given to Treasury and Navy, etc 
Don't you think so? 

Gen. G. Yes, it wouldn't require much of an 
elaboration of what we already have on paper, 
as to the purposes of this School. 

Judge P. Well, I thought the School, yes, but 
you've also set up your division. It seemed to me 
that if we could state on a couple of sheets of 
paper a brief outline of present War Department 
policies on the preparation of Military Govern- 
ment. Well, such a thing as this. I suppose the 
policy is eventually on any passport to have some- 
one on Military Government on the staff of the 
commanding officer. 

Gen. G. That's true. 

Judge P and he would assemble the neces- 
sary people, military and civilian, with a view to 
the performance of the jobs that he would have 
right in the particular area in mind. The area 
itself having been studied and its problems having 
been given consideration. The assembly of the 
people having being planned with that in mind, 
and then I suppose we ought to give our concept 
quite briefly of the operation of Military Govern- 
ment, that I suppose that staff officer in the name 
of the commanding officer orders this not to be 
done. Knox was talking in a very vague about 
civil governor and working in collaboration 
and . . . 

Gen. G. That's all wet. That's the very thing 
we don't want. 

Judge P. Of course not. I said that. But I think 
that we have got to make kind of an affirmative 
statement. I think the time has come and I think 
ought probably be passed around to the other 
Government agencies so that a meeting such as 
Morgenthau called this morning might not be 
held at all. He called the meeting off and I told 

him, I thought it was a , he said well that's all 

right; he said, putting it very bluntly, he'd rather 


that we didn't discuss these things and that they're 
in hand in the War Department, that you'll let us 
know when you'll need us. I said that is true. 
With that, we broke up. But there had been a 
good deal of rather feudal [futile] discussions 
before that. I think the memorandum might also 
cover in a rather concise way the progress that has 
been made and the planning that is being done, 
of course, this I take it that the School equips 
officers for general overall use in this job and that 
it is contemplated that the necessary civilian skills 
will be assembled, at least in a tentative way, the 
necessary governmental agencies gotten in touch 
with on any operation that comes up and see the 
currency man from the Treasury Department and 
someone from the Board of Economic Warfare 
and so forth. 

Gen. G. That's exactly how I have planned. 
# * * 

Judge P. Is this set down on paper anywhere 
in a brief way? 

Gen. G. No, it has not been. 

Judge P. Don't you think that you and Wicker- 
sham ought to? 

Gen. G. Yes, I'll call Miller today and tell him 
to come up here. 18 

Judge P. It'll head off a lot of trouble, I'm sure, 
and that maybe we ought to send them to the 
White House as well, because. . . . 

Gen. G. Oh, yes, he's [the President] very 
much interested in it, you know. 

Judge P. He might then confine the discussion 
of it to people who know something about it 
rather than to talk to people who haven't thought 
of it at all and think there's nothing been going 
on. * * * 

The Army Announces Its Preparations for 
Administrative Authority in the Initial 

[Synopsis of WD Program for MG, 4 Sep 42, PMGO files, 
321, PMGO ic MGD] 

Any occupation of hostile or Axis-held territory 
may be divided into two phases: (a) a period of 
military necessity and (b) an ensuing period 
when military necessity will no longer exist. Dur- 
ing the first phase, it is the obligation of the 
armed forces to establish and maintain military 
government; during the second phase, civilian 
authority of some type will probably assume the 
mission then to be surrendered by the Army. 
Until the second phase has begun, however, it 

18 Jesse I. Miller was in Charlottesville where he also 
assisted General Wickersham. 

develops upon the Army to administer the gov- 
ernment of any occupied area. 

In recognition of these basic principles, the 
War Department is now pursuing a program de- 
signed to accomplish two objectives: (1) the 
procurement and training of an adequate per- 
sonnel to fulfill its mission of military govern- 
ment and (2) the development of a technique 
which will effect the transition from military to 
civilian control with a minimum impairment of 

The procurement and training program is de- 
signed to produce, with the necessary rapidity, the 
following categories of personnel for military gov- 
ernment: (a) top administrative commissioned 
personnel, (b) junior commissioned personnel, 
(c) occupational (or military government) mili- 
tary police, and (d) technical and advisory per- 
sonnel. Category (a) is now being produced at 
the School of Military Government at Charlottes- 
ville, Virginia, which graduated its first class on 
August 29, 1942, and which began its second 
four-month course on September 9. Categories 
(b) and (c) will be produced at two new schools 
to be opened at the Provost Marshal General's 
School Center at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, about 
November 1, 1942. Category (d) will be devel- 
oped in the manner presently to be indicated. 

This last-mentioned group of technical and 
advisory personnel is to be selected from highly 
trained civilians. Since there will be no im- 
mediate need for their services, it would be in- 
advisable to withdraw them from their present 
nonmilitary pursuits at this time. However, it is 
necessary to compile a roster of these specialists, 
select those best-qualified, and make arrange- 
ments to have them available at call. Only a 
minimum amount of training in the special field 
of military government will be necessary for them 
as they will be already highly trained in their re- 
spective fields for the specialized functions which 
they will later perform. On them will fall the 
burden of performing the important duties here- 
after referred to. 

Many complicated technical problems will in- 
evitably arise in any occupation. Among these 
will undoubtedly be fiscal matters of far-reaching 
economic importance. Control of local banking 
establishments must be undertaken. Disentangle- 
ment of monetary systems from Axis-imposed 
regulations must be accomplished and American 
occupational currency and rates of exchange 

The economic problems that will arise will be 
of doubly difficult solution because of the prior 
Axis occupation and total disarrangement inci- 


dent thereto. Industries must be surveyed to de- 
termine those to be continued in operation or 
re-established. Raw materials, operating person- 
nel, and funds must be allocated to obtain max- 
imum efficiency of production. 

Administrative problems arising from the care 
and feeding of liberated peoples will require 
special technique, tact, and skilled administra- 
tion. Public health and sanitation will present 
other problems requiring specialized knowledge. 
The broad field of public utilities will demand 
trained technical administrators. 

These problems, but a few of those that may be 
anticipated, prove the immediate need, at the 
beginning of an occupation, for skilled techni- 
cians and advisors in all fields of public endeavor. 

The Army's mission of military government is 
primarily an administrative one. Many under- 
lying policies will be determined by agencies 
other than the War Department or the Army. 
Thus, the political policy of an occupation will 
be determined by the State Department; the eco- 
nomic policy by the State Department or the 
Board of Economic Warfare, or both; the fiscal 
policy by the Treasury Department and the Fed- 
eral Reserve Board, and so forth. These general 
policies will be administered in great part by 
the technicians referred to above who will, how- 
ever, during the period of military government, 
be under military control and direction. But since 
the functions to be performed by them will be 
largely the administration of those policies for- 
mulated by agencies other than the War Depart- 
ment, it is planned to recruit them from nomina- 
tions supplied by the various agencies concerned, 
since such agencies are in a position to discover 
the best-qualified individuals for the tasks in 
which they have a peculiar interest. 

In the light of the foregoing, the following 
immediate co-operative activities between the 
War Department and other agencies of the gov- 
ernment are indicated: 

a. The furnishing to the War Department 
of lists of persons qualified for missions in mili- 
tary government in the special field with which 
any agency is concerned. From such lists, the 
technical and advisory group referred to above 
will be principally recruited. The War Depart- 
ment has already requested such lists from cer- 
tain agencies; a general request will be made 

b. The study, by certain agencies, at the 
request of the War Department, of various 
special and technical problems arising in mili- 
tary government. The War Department has 
heretofore suggested to the State Department 

and the Board of Economic Warfare certain 
studies in the fields of international law and 
economics. A need for research in other fields 
exists, and studies concerning them are to be 

c. For the past five months, several depart- 
ments and agencies have been co-operating with 
the School of Military Government in furnishing 
it with materials and lecturers in connection with 
its instructional work. These activities are con- 

[Ltr, SW Stimson to Heads of Govt Depts, 26 Sep 42, 
PMGO files, 321, PMGO 8c MGD] 

From the enclosed copy of a "Synopsis of War 
Department Program for Military Government" 
you will observe that, among other objectives, it 
is planned to create groups of technical and ad- 
visory personnel for eventual duties in military 
government. It is hoped to recruit these groups 
principally from the agencies of the government 
having an interest in certain special fields that 
may be involved in future military occupation. 

Since your Department may have now or may 
later develop a peculiar interest in certain aspects 
of military occupations, it is believed that you will 
desire to co-operate with the War Department in 
their indicated activity. 

Accordingly, if you have not already done so, 
will you be good enough to designate some 
person in your Department to establish and main- 
tain liaison for that purpose with Maj. Gen. 
Allen W. Gullion, the Provost Marshal General, 
who is directly in charge of the military govern- 
ment program? 

The White House Seems To Be Satisfied 

[Memo, Gullion for ASW John J. McCloy, 12 Sep 42, 
PMGO files, 321, PMGO & MGD] 

Sorry to impose additional information on you, 
especially since Mr. Harry Hopkins says he is 
satisfied. However, herewith is General Wicker- 
sham's list of students in the first class with ex- 
planations as to their sponsors or other reasons 
for selection. * * * 

Civilian Agencies and the Colleges Seem 

[Memo, Miller, Dir, MGD, for Gullion, 28 Oct 42, PMGO 
files, 321, PMGO & MGD] 

The most important phase of the program (from 


the point of view of establishing War Depart- 
ment leadership) related to the recruitment from 
among . . . governmental agencies of a large 
reservoir of technicians and professional per- 
sonnel. By personnel contacts with all these agen- 
cies (except the State Department) they were 
advised that the War Department intended to 
commission 2500 persons, principally from nomi- 
nations by government agencies, in the Army 
Specialist Corps under an arrangement which 
would continue such persons in their present 
civilian pursuits until they were required for mili- 
tary government missions. This phase of the War 
Department program met with immediate and 
enthusiastic response from practically every 
agency of the Government, including the Presi- 
dent's War Relief Control Board, to which Mr. 
Ringland is attached, and from Mr. Ringland 
himself. All these agencies are now at work com- 
piling lists of highly qualified persons for vari- 
ous functions in occupied areas. Included among 
the liaison agents now engaged in this work is 
Mr. Charles [S.] Hyneman, for the Bureau of 
the Budget, who is now making an investigation 
and preparing a report for the President on the 

Ringland memorandum. 

While these matters were proceeding, an ef- 
fort was being concurrendy made to conciliate 
the American colleges and universities, which 
were, not without cause, complaining that the 
War Department was unwilling or unable to 
suggest to them some more useful participation 
in the war effort than had theretofore been made 
available. It was stated to the representatives of 
a number of universities-and thereby circulated 
rather generally throughout the university field- 
that this office hoped to be able ultimately to 
establish a program somewhat as follows: 

That when the reservoir of technicians already 
mentioned had been recruited to some substan- 
tial extent and commissioned in the Army Special- 
ist Corps, these specialists would be earmarked 
for specific areas and then farmed out in groups 
of 50 to 100 among a number of colleges and 
universities for brief training periods in the back- 
ground of the areas in which they would ulti- 
mately be utilized. This suggestion met with in- 
stant approval in university circles and has drawn 
their almost unanimous support to the War De- 
partment program. * * * 


The Charlottesville School Is Given a 
Favorable IG Report 19 

[Memo, Maj Gen Virgil L. Peterson, IG, for the DCofS 
(Summary of Report of Special Inspection of SMG), 12 
Aug 42, PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, Est] 

/. Conclusions: 

(1) Is the School developing officers who can 
be used efficiendy as administrators in conquered 

Yes. The School superimposes upon the 
students' previous experience a familiarity with 
the problems of a theater commander, and these 
of the higher executives of military government. 
A habit of thinking is established which develops 
administrators by the solution of practical in- 
dividual and group problems of research, judg- 
ment and decision. 

"This report was later brought to Mr. Stimson's at- 
tention to assist him in meeting the President's criticism 
of the School of Military Government. It is pertinent 
chiefly to the debate soon to arise over whether the school 
was selecting the wrong type of students or wasting the 
time of students in impractical studies. 

(2) Does the curriculum seek to develop states- 
men instead of administrators? 

No. There is a tendency so to do; the 
method of statement of some of the problems 
which require the student to make many assump- 
tions of the decisions of higher authority upon 
organization and administration tends to en- 
courage protracted discussion of statesmanship 
beyond the scope of executives of military govern- 

(3) Is adequate emphasis placed on developing 
skilled administrators such as city engineers, 
sanitation officials, etc.? 

The emphasis is adequate for the capabil- 
ity and purpose of the School. Emphasis is not 
placed upon developing skilled administrators 
of the kind mentioned; but rather upon develop- 
ing executives who can direct such administra- 
tors. Emphasis is placed upon the necessity for 
the administrators of large areas (country, region, 
city) to consider every department of government 
and to have some familiarity with the problems 
of each. In the selection of students effort is made 
to secure a cross-section of all administrative 


skills. In the short course, there is not sufficient 
time to specialize in any one of the subdivisions 
of governmental administration (city engineer, 
sanitary engineer, finance, etc.). 

(4) Is there any overemphasis on legal phases, 
such as international law and political philosophy 
which, while useful, may not be essential for 
subordinate officials? 

Yes, to some extent. It is considered that 
too many hours were devoted to legal subjects 
in the first class; they are being reduced in the 
second class. . . . 

(5) Is the course practical? 

(a) Yes. The applicatory method is 
stressed; students deal with real statistics, and 
with the actual value of all other factors in occu- 
pied countries as far as very extensive resources 
in data can disclose them. 

(b) Considerable time is used in lectures 
in orientation upon the major enemy countries. 
This orientation is valuable and essential. 

(c) Part of the course must be used to 
indoctrinate the students and to instruct them in 
fundamental military organization, policies and 
procedures; the demands of this period will in- 
crease as more students with limited or no mili- 
tary service are selected. * * * 

(8) Are the officers selected for students suit- 

Yes. The first class consists of a very rea- 
sonable spread of skills and success in civilian 

(9) Are officers whose backgrounds include 
experience in the administrative phases of munic- 
ipal government being selected to attend the 

Yes. In the selection of students an effort 
is made to secure officers of this type. The present 
class includes a city manager, police chief, physi- 
cian, two city attorneys, several utility specialists, 
public health officer, judges, and the Fiscal Di- 
rector of the Port of Oregon. 

(10) Are individuals who have spent many 
years in areas in which military government is 
contemplated being selected? 

No. This is not a factor of any appreciable 
weight in the selection. Although several mem- 
bers of the class have had periods of residence 
in foreign countries. 

(11) Are there too many officers whose back- 
ground includes political experience only? 

No. Although there are 17 lawyers in the 
class of 51 there are only 8 of the 51 who have 
"Political experience" only. * * * 

A Rather Critical Letter From a Civilian 

[Ltr, Gardner Jackson, Spec Asst to Under Secy of Agri- 
culture, to Miller, 13 Oct 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG] 

You may remember the question I asked General 
Wickersham the other evening during the dis- 
cussion on government of occupied areas. You 
will recall that my question was whether Gen- 
eral Wickersham's School of Military Govern- 
ment used any criteria in the selection of its 
candidates to test the social attitudes of those can- 
didates, the degree of their devotion to democ- 
racy, their racial attitudes, etc. 

You will recall that he replied by saying that 
the question had never arisen and that he saw no 
reason why it should arise, that since the candi- 
dates were picked by the Army they naturally had 
as deep a devotion to democracy as he or I. 

The . . . address by Wayne Coy [Spec Asst 
to the President] on the problem of Government 
and democracies more fully explains why I asked 
the question I did. . . . 

The President Reproves the Secretary of 

[Memo, Roosevelt for the SW, 29 Oct 42, PMGO files, 
321.19, MG] 

I understand that the Provost Marshal General 
is training a substantial number of men from 
civil life to assume the duties of Military Gov- 
ernor or civilian advisors to Military Governors 
of occupied territories. I should like to have from 
him a complete explanation of the project — a list 
of the personnel, officer and civilian, under such 
training, and a statement of their previous 

This whole matter is something which should 
have been taken up with me in the first instance. 
The governing of occupied territories may be of 
many kinds but in most instances it is a civilian 
task and requires absolutely first-class men and 
not second-string men. 20 

a See Under Secretary Patterson's letter to the President 
dated 20 July 1942 in I Section 3. above] in which he 
states that he is available at any time to discuss the selec- 
tion and training of personnel in connection with govern- 
ing occupied territories. The President was no doubt re- 
ferring to a later phase of occupation than the assault 
period. From observations which appear in subsequent 
chapters of this volume, it is clear that President Roosevelt 
not only objected to military administration in a postwar 
period but was anxious that the Army relinquish its con- 


Charlottesville Is Criticizes at a Cabinet 

[Memo, Col Robert N. Young, SGS, for CG, SOS, 30 
Oct 43, PMGO files, 321.19, MG] 

The following are notes which the Secretary of 
War dictated following the Cabinet Meeting, 
October 29, 1942. It is requested that a memo- 
randum be submitted to this office on the ques- 
tions which were raised and on which 
the Secretary should be furnished additional 

"1. Charlottesville school for Army instruction 
as to occupied places: This was discussed at 
Cabinet with evident suspicion on the part of 
Departments which may have liked to have had 
a hand in the matter. The President, however, 
said that he thought the idea was good within its 
proper scope but he had been a little impressed 
with the fact that the instructors did not seem to 
be the best that could have been collected. He 
thought they were rather second-rate. The mat- 
ter was held to be important enough for me to 
think that I should like to get a pretty careful 
synopsis of what has been done, the staff of in- 
structors, courses, and the men being trained. 11 
"Secretary Ickes had received a message from 
Gullion to the effect that he proposed to educate 
a thousand Specialist Corps men for use in occu- 
pied countries in which proposition he saw the 
germ of imperialism and was much alarmed." 

The Provost Marshal General Answers the 

[Memo, Gullion for SW, 9 Nov 42, PMGO files, 321.19, 

i. The attacks upon the School fall into two gen- 
eral classes: (1) that the faculty is second-rate, not 
containing names famous in scholastic and espe- 
cially in international law circles; and (2) that 

trol to civilian agencies as soon as possible in the middle 
phase when active hostilities were over in large areas 
though the war still continued elsewhere. The President's 
reference to "second string" men is difficult to understand. 
It seems probable that his distrust of the Charlottesville 
group rested on the strictures of Secretary of Interior 
Harold L . Ickes and other New Dealers. See below, 
I Section s- 1 

With regard to the question of proper scope, a later 
observation (at the meeting of the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Training, 16 March 1943, sec 5, this 
chapter) seems to indicate that the President was con- 
cerned lest a large Army training program would lead to 
continuing and even postwar monopolization of foreign 
administration by the military. 

ideology and pure theories consume time that 
should be devoted to practical studies." 

2. Enclosure A contains a list of the names and 
qualifications of those responsible for the con- 
duct of the School. Enclosure B contains the 
names and qualifications of outside lecturers. 
The men listed on Enclosure A (faculty) were 
chosen by General Wickersham and me from our 
personal knowledge or as a result of informa- 
tion received from authorities in whom we had 
great confidence. In choosing the faculty we 
wanted a working lot of practical men. The mat- 
ters studied fall in the dirt farming category, 
as it were, not in the cultural realm. To an extent, 
men with big names are not the kind of workers 
we desire. We did not want men who think that 
the writing of a book is summum bonum, nor 
did we want professional delegates to interna- 
tional conferences. . . . The faculty works hard 
and makes the students work hard and the 
studies submitted herewith will show that the 
work is practical. Enclosure B (outside lec- 
turers) indicates a combination of men with big 
names and men with practical knowledge of ad- 
ministration and of the backgrounds of areas of 
potential occupation. 

The faculty consists of a judicious combina- 
tion of lawyer-soldiers, soldier-administrators 
and civilian specialists. They have had the ad- 
vantage of records many of which are confiden- 
tial and to be found only in the War College, 
War Department, Strategic Services and BJLW. 
files. No constellation of big names in a Cam- 
bridge orbit would have done as wcIL 

3. Accompanying this memorandum arc prob- 
lem solutions which will show you how the school 
works. General Eisenhower was furnished a 
number of these and cabled a request that he be 
supplied with others. 

4. In addition to scheduled formal lectures 
and conferences, study and reading, the students 
engage in the highly practical work of solving 
concrete problems. For this purpose the class 
is divided into committees to make surveys of 
foreign countries or areas, formulate recom- 
mendations for the establishment of military gov- 

B General Gullion here overlooks a third type of attack 
which dearly, in certain circles, was predominant- This 
was that the school was not giving its students enough of 
the kind of philosophy which would have made them 
sympathetic to progressive and liberal idea s. In a memo- 
randum of 27 November 1942 (see bdow.|"3m scctionD. 
General Gullion does note this type of criticism. It was 
the most difficult type for him to meet because the school 
operated on the premise that matters of social philosophy 
were outside its purview. 


eminent, or for liaison work in an area and to 
submit a definite plan for the administration in 
that area of such matters as public safety, public 
sanitation, education and public welfare. * * * 

Secretary Stimson Defends Charlottesville 

[Memo, Miss E. C. Neary, Personal Secy to the SW, I 
Dec 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG] 

The following notes on the subject of the School 
of Military Government were dictated by the 
Secretary of War on his return from Cabinet 
meeting on Friday, November 6, 1942. 

When Cabinet meeting came at 2 o'clock 
and I was called on, I brought the matter of the 
Military School at Charlottesville up myself and 
explained the objectives of the school and the 
manner in which it had been created, and showed 
how ridiculous was the proposition that we were 
trying to train Army officers for proconsular du- 
ties after the war was over. 

I kept the discussion on a light basis, not 
getting too serious but showing earnestly how im- 
portant it was. 

When Mr. Stimson was leaving for Cabinet 
meeting the following week and this subject was 
mentioned, I believe he stated that the Presi- 
dent's questions about the School had been 
settled the previous week at Cabinet. 23 

It Is Thought That the President Has Been 

[Memo, Col George F Schulgen, Asst SGS, for CG, SOS, 
1 Dec 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG] 

The attached note signed by Miss Neary, per- 
sonal secretary to the Secretary of War, indicates 
that the questions raised on the subject matter 
were answered by the Secretary of War in a 
Cabinet meeting to the satisfaction of the Presi- 
dent; and therefore eliminates the need of the 
Secretary of War's memorandum to the Presi- 
dent in answer to the Presidential memorandum 
of October 29, 1942. 

Mr. McCloy is of the opinion that these papers 
should be filed without any further action. 

23 It seems clear from Miss Neary's memorandum that 
Mr. Stimson decided not to use the elaborate brief in 
defense of military government which Colonel Miller pre- 
pared for him. Copy of the brief will be found in PMGO 
files, 321.19, MG. 

On 23 November the program for commissioning and 
training 2500 civilian specialists was formally approved 
by the War Department (see below, Chapter III, Note 16). 

The Attacks Continue and Find One Vul- 
nerable Target 

[Memo, Gullion for CofS Through CG, SOS, 27 Nov 
42, G-i files, Personnel, SMG, Misc Info] 

I. Attacks upon the Charlottesville School of 
Military Government and upon Army's plans 
for military government continue. Several (Cabi- 
net) departments of the government and inde- 
pendent agencies appear to be jealous of each 
other, though somewhat united in their attack 
upon us. 

2. Chronologically, these attacks may be sum- 

(a) On The Provost Marshal General's per- 
sonal ambition. 

(b) On the political composition of the 
faculty and student body, it is being alleged that 
The Provost Marshal General packed the school 
with Republicans and anti-New Dealers who are 
not "socially minded." 

(c) On the alleged second rate quality of 
the students and the consequent inadvisability of 
the Army's having anything to do with the gov- 
ernment of occupied territory. 

3. We believe that attack (a) has been de- 
feated and that attack (b) has been stalled. The 
attack on the quality of the students and upon 
the Army's suitability to govern occupied terri- 
tories continues. Within the last week Mr. Wil- 
liam Bullitt, ex-Ambassador to France and Mr. 
Jonathan Daniels, son of Josephus Daniels, in 
separate personal interviews with me, stated that 
the President had told them individually to in- 
vestigate and report to him upon the quality of 
the students, the work being done by them and 
on our plans for military government in 

4. We are vulnerable in one particular, i.e. 
we are not getting enough high class students. 
Unless the quality of the student body improves 
materially and rapidly, there is real danger that 
the Commanding General in each theater will 
have a commissar by his side, or a civil governor 
with power deriving directly from the President, 
acting independently of the commanding 

5. The next class reports january 8, 1943. Most 
of the officers recommended for it are distinctly 
below the average of students in former classes. 
One commanding general included six (6) 
colored captains in his list of seventeen (17) 

6. Herewith is a directive designed to improve 
the quality of the student body. 


More Forceful Action To Obtain Satisfac- 
tory MG Personnel 

[Memo, ACofS, G-i, for the CG, SOS, 4 Dec 42, G-i 
files, 352, SMG] 

I. Action recommended in your Memorandum 
for the Chief of Staff, above subject [Charlottes- 
ville School of Military Government], is approved 
in principle, except that Tab B is not believed 
sufficiently forceful to accomplish the necessary 
results. 24 

2. In this connection, the Secretary of War 
directs that letters allotting quotas for the Janu- 
ary 8th and subsequent classes at the School of 
Military Government include statements sub- 
stantially as follows: 

Selection of officers to fill the quotas allotted 
will be given the personal attention of the com- 
manders to whom the quotas are allotted. Those 
commanders will be held responsible that the 
individuals selected under their quotas are the 
highest type, are genuinely possessed of the es- 
sential qualities listed in Memorandum No. 
W350-107-42, dated October 27, 1942, and have 
outstanding leadership qualities and unimpeach- 
able character. 

Students accepted for enrollment but who 
subsequently fail will be either reclassified or 
reported to the Commanding General, Army 
Ground Forces or Services of Supply, whichever 
is appropriate, for reassignment. 

Officers desiring to attend the School of Mili- 
tary Government are authorized to forward ap- 
plications through channels to The Provost 
Marshal General for consideration. Direct cor- 
respondence is authorized between The Provost 

21 Tab B is the directive referred to in par. 6 of above 
document. The Commanding General, SOS, recom- 
mended that it be published as a directive of the Secre- 
tary of War. 

Marshal General and commanders concerned 
relative to applications received through chan- 
nels by The Provost Marshal General. 

The President's Investigator Finds That 
Charlottesville Should Expand 

[Memo, Wickersham, Comdt, SMG, for PMG, to Dec 42, 
PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, Est] 

i. When he was here on December 3d, Honor- 
able William C. Bullitt, who, as you know, was 
representing the President, made the point that 
in our training program we shall concentrate 
on the study of those areas of the world where 
civil affairs officers are most apt to be needed in 
an order of priority, and that so far as possible 
we should train the individuals for the particular 
country to which they would ultimately be as- 
signed. He made a further point that in doing 
so every effort should be made both in selection 
of students and in instruction so that they would 
be able to speak the language fluently. He regards 
this as a matter of major consequence. He made 
the further point that our efforts should be ex- 
panded and that more students should be trained 
here than under the present program. * * * 

[Ltr, William C. Bullitt, Spec Asst to the SN, to USW 
Patterson, 30 Dec 42, OUSW files, Misc and Sub, MG] 

* * * I have already reported to the Presi- 
dent assuring him that the accusations against the 
School were without foundation. I told the 
President about different changes that General 
Wickersham was making and recommended that 
he should cease to worry about the School, but 
might, if he wanted, send down someone to 
look at it again during the latter part of 
February. * * * 


Mr. Ickes Seeks a Role in Military Govern- 
ment for His Own Department 

[Ltr, Ickes to Roosevelt, 28 Dec 42, Franklin D. Roosevelt 

Various members of my staff and I have had 
numerous conversations with Mr. Bullitt concern- 

M The further development of the training program is 
considered here only insofar as it raises the issue of mili- 
tary versus civilian control. For some of the administra- 
tive developments see below, [Chapter 111, Section 5.| 

ing the problem of civilian participation in the 
government of occupied and reoccupied terri- 
tories. I believe that Mr. Bullitt shares my feeling 
that, because of this Department's unique experi- 
ence with primitive people, we should participate 
actively in the administration of any island in the 
Pacific which may be occupied and governed by 
the United States. 

Mr. Bullitt suggested that during the period of 
military government of these islands, it might be 
helpful if the Navy Department were to call upon 


the Secretary of the Interior to designate advisors 
on Native Affairs who would work with the 
Naval Commandant assigned to each group of 
islands. This would have the dual purpose of 
providing qualified assistance to the Naval Com- 
mandant in connection with civilian problems 
and of training civilians for eventual establish- 
ment of civilian government. 

If you are in favor of a program of this sort, 
I should like to consult with Secretary Knox as 
to the details. It would be necessary for us to 
compile a roster of qualified people, and to spend 
a small amount of money which might have to be 
supplied from the President's Emergency Fund, 
training them and in compiling information 
which should be available for this sort of work. 
We would, of course, co-ordinate our studies with 
the work which is being done at the Navy school 
at Columbia University. 

The President Seems To Favor Mr. Ickes' 

[Memo, Roosevelt for Ickes, 30 Dec 42, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library] 

I wish you would talk with Frank Knox in regard 
to caring for Native Affairs in the Islands of the 
Southwest Pacific. 

The War Department's Attitude Toward 
Imperialism Is Stated at Charlottesville 

[Addies by USW Patterson, at Graduation Exercises of 
SMG, 29 Dec 42, ASF, International Division (ID) files, 
Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)] 

It is as good a time as any to clear away miscon- 
ceptions that have grown up about military gov- 
ernment and about "the Army moving in," as 
some people express it. I have recently heard 
people who ought to know better give expression 
to fears along this line. Whenever this nation has 
been engaged in a war of a critical character and 
has undertaken to protect itself by raising a strong 
Army, the timid would have raised the ghost of 
"rule by the sword." Washington's letters in the 
dark days of the Revolution are full of discussions 
of this groundless fear and of how damaging to 
the success of our arms were certain policies based 
in large part upon such fear. * * * 

We have no use for imperialism. That is no 
part of the Army's policy. But the Army is con- 
fronted with an essential administrative task. It 
will be called on to preserve order among a dis- 
affected or confused people. It will be called on 
to operate a water supply system or an electric 

power system. It will be called on to attend to the 
distribution of the necessaries of life. For all of 
this we need to have officers trained to manage 
such matters, and we also need civilians with the 
appropriate technical experience. Many of the 
policies will be the concern of other agencies of 
the Government. But the execution of the policies 
will be the responsibility of the military com- 
mander, until the conflict will have moved 
far enough away or will have ceased alto- 
gether. * * * 

A Civilian Studies Center Is Proposed To 
Prevent Army Control of Postwar World 

[Memo, Saul K. Padover, Dept of the Interior, for Ickes, 
8 [an 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library] 

The civilians are in danger of losing the postwar 
world by default. They are in danger of losing 
out because they seem to lack a comprehensive 
plan and a unified purpose. The Army, on the 
other hand, has a plan and a purpose. The Army's 
plan is to train administrators for the postwar 
world and thereby to control it. Furthermore, this 
plan will monopolize all of the training and re- 
search faculties of the country by a process of 
total absorption. In other words, the present plan 
is to put the men skilled in social science, public 
law, administration, scientific management, etc, 
into uniform. 

So far, the Army's plan and goals have not 
been successfully challenged by any civilian 
groups or agencies. 

The truth is that civilian groups and agencies 
have offered no comprehensive plan or blue- 
print for the postwar world. The Army did. And 
so the Army is moving in by default. 

From a democratic point of view — from the 
point of view of what the United Nations are 
fighting for — this situation is disturbing. We are 
fighting for a civilian, democratic, free world — 
not for a world ruled by armed forces — even the 
best-intentioned armed forces. Moreover, by tradi- 
tion, training, background, and oudook, the 
Army is not equipped for long-term administra- 
tion of foreign areas, especially if those areas are 
to be given the essentials of a democratic, social- 
economic structure. 

What, then, are the civilians in the Govern- 
ment doing about it? 

What plans, if any, are they proposing to the 

This is a proposal for the establishment of a 
civilian Center of Administrative Studies. 

Such a center should be set up inter-Depart- 
men tally by those agencies of the Government 


that are concerned with the problems at issue. 
The most important of these agencies are the 
Department of the Interior, the State Depart- 
ment, and the Board of Economic Warfare. 

Interior, State, and B.E.W. have the kind of 
specialized experience and skill needed for post- 
war world reconstruction. * * * 

The "Ambitious" General Gullion Still Dis- 
turbs Secretary Ickes 

[Ltr, Ickes to Roosevelt, 9 Jan 43, enclosing Padover's 8 
Jan Memo, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library] 

* * * The present plans of the ambitious 
General Gullion as they are reported to me, fill me 
with grave misgivings. If a stop is not put to 
them, I think we are headed into the worst kind 
of trouble, notwithstanding who may win the 
war. * * * 

The Provost Marshal General Tries To Con- 
ciliate the New Dealers 

[Memo, Gullion for Col Reuben Jenkins, Chief, Offi- 
cers Branch, SOS, 6 Feb 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt 

* * * I took up directly with the Secretary 
of War the matter of having an advisory board 
composed partly of civilians which would screen 
the thousands of applicants for commission for 
military government duty, and suggested to the 
Secretary that Oscar Chapman, Assistant Secre- 
tary of the Interior, and John J. Corson, who had 
been with the Social Security Board almost from 
the beginning, be the civilians on the advisory 
board. Mr. Stimson wanted to be sure that the 
civilians named would not be "appointing Army 
officers." When he understood that the advisory 
board was merely the first screen and that there- 
after the usual appointive and selective processes 
of the War Department were to be applied, he 
signed letters to Secretary of Interior Ickes and 
to Chairman [Arthur J.] Altmeyer of the Social 
Security Board, asking respectively for the serv- 
ices of Messrs. Chapman and Corson. . . . 

The basis for an advisory board composed 
pardy of civilians was: At a Cabinet meeting, 
Secretary Ickes had denounced our military 
government plans as "imperialistic" and the 
President told the Secretary of War by memo- 
randum that he thought the government of 
occupied territories was a civilian rather than a 
military matter. Mr. Harry Hopkins called upon 
Mr. McCloy to obtain a breakdown of the faculty 
and students showing former occupations and 

reasons for their selection and said to Mr. Mc- 
Cloy, "Gullion is packing the school with Re- 
publicans and men who are anti-socially 
minded." (Gullion happens to be a Democrat 
and a former Administrator of the NRA in 

Mr. Isadore Lubin, a close advisor of the Presi- 
dent with offices in the White House and an 
intimate friend of Colonel Miller (head of the 
Military Government Division, PMGO, and for 
nine months Executive Secretary of the Na- 
tional Labor Board) suggested to me through 
Colonel Miller that the White House suspicions 
and misunderstandings would be largely dis- 
pelled if two well-known liberal civilian members 
of the administration of character and ability 
be utilized as advisors in the screening of 
candidates. * * * 

The Civilian Advisory Board Fails 
To Conciliate 

[Memo, Jonathan Daniels for Roosevelt, 8 Feb 43, Frank- 
lin D. Roosevelt Library] 

I was very much interested in the note from 
Secretary Ickes and its attached memorandum 
which you asked me to read. However, since the 
Secretary sent you this memorandum early in 
January, the Department of the Interior, through 
Assistant Secretary Oscar Chapman, has been 
leading in some interdepartmental planning in 
this field. 

Some time ago Mr. Chapman became chair- 
man of a committee which is engaged in creating 
the roster from which all civilians accepted by the 
army for training at the School of Military Gov- 
ernment in Charlottesville will be drawn. . . . 

While Mr. Chapman took the chairmanship 
of this committee with the agreement of Mr. 
Ickes, I do not take that to mean that the Secre- 
tary has changed his mind about the Charlottes- 
ville school. Indeed, both he and Mr. Chapman, 
I think, are acting to improve a situation which 
fills them both with the grave misgivings the 
Secretary spoke of in his note to you. As you 
know, I have shared those misgivings. I doubt 
that this committee can, by improving the quality 
of its student personnel, cure the serious defect 
in the Charlottesville School of Military Govern- 
ment or eliminate the dangers which Secretary 
Ickes and others have seen in that School. None 
of its nominees will enter the School before May. 

In addition to his work in assisting in the 
selection of civilians, Mr. Chapman has interested 
himself in the creation of an interdepartmental 
board which, I understand, would supervise the 


training of personnel to be used in the occupation 
of all enemy or Axis-held territory. Some of the 
advocates of this plan think that from it might 
grow a nonmilitary Occupational Authority 
which would supervise any American occupation 
and co-ordinate the responsibilities of various 
Federal Departments and agencies in such an 
occupation. This plan, of course, would not pre- 
clude such a Center of Administrative Studies 
as the Secretary of the Interior's memorandum 
proposed. It might insure the proper democratic 
attitude in the selection, training and use of men 
who, as our representatives, will be responsible 
for the American impression of important parts 
of the postwar world. * * * 

General Gullion on the Defensive Still 

[Memo, Gullion for Brig Gen Edwin M. Watson, Secy 
to the President, 6 Feb 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library] 

Our military government plans have been at- 
tacked as unprecedented, un-American, imperi- 
alistic, grandiose and personally ambitious. What 
follows may be illuminating. 

1. Every victorious army invading hostile ter- 
ritory has had to set up a military government. 
Belisarius, under Justinian, erected one in North 
Africa fourteen hundred years ago. . . . General 
[Winfield] Scott's splendid military government 
in Mexico in 1847-48 was bitterly attacked but 
historians of his period praised it. 

2. So long as there is danger of the enemy 
continuing or resuming the fight, the person in 
control of the occupied territory must be immedi- 
ately responsible to the will of the commanding 
general who is the military governor. . . . 

3. When the President decides that military 
government is no longer necessary, it may be re- 
placed by civil government or returned to control 
of the former enemy. . . . 

4. For years the Germans and the Japanese 
have been training for military government. The 
Germans have seven thousand occupational per- 
sonnel — as distinguished from combat person- 
nel — in Poland alone. After two years of training, 
including those junior officers at the Fort Custer 
schools, we shall have only six thousand to spread 
over possibly a dozen occupied countries. 

The President Thinks the Provost Marshal 
General Needs "Elasticity" 

[Memo, Roosevelt for Watson, 16 Feb 43, in re Gen 
Gullion's Memo to Watson, 6 Feb 43, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library] 

I want to see Gullion sometime and talk to him 

about this. He evidently has no elasticity of mind 
and he needs some! 

A Committee Is Created To Study Training 
of Civilians for Civil Affairs 

[Ltr, Actg Secy of State Sumner Welles to the SW, 
8 Mar 43, CAD files, 353 (3-8-43), sec. 1] 

The President has directed the Secretary of State 
to establish and assume the Chairmanship of an 
Interdepartmental Committee to study the need 
for civilian personnel for nonmilitary overseas 
service. The Committee is to be composed of a 
representative and alternate of each of the several 
Departments and Agencies of the Government 
herein specified: Treasury Department, War De- 
partment, Navy Department, Department of 
Justice, Department of the Interior, Department 
of Agriculture, Civil Service Commission, Board 
of Economic Warfare, Office of Lend Lease Ad- 
ministration, War Manpower Commission, 
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation 
Operations, and War Shipping Administra- 
tion. 26 * * * 

The Secretary of State has designated Mr. G. 
Howland Shaw, Assistant Secretary of State, to 
serve as his alternate . . . and it is proposed that 
the first meeting be held on Tuesday, March 16, 
at 10:30 a.m., in Mr. Shaw's office. 

[Memo, Col John H. F. Haskell, Actg Dir, Civil Affairs 
Division (CAD), for the ASW, 17 Mar 43, CAD files, 353 
(3-8-43). sec- 1] 

2. . . . Mr. Ickes said that the matter has been 
discussed in the Cabinet and that his understand- 
ing of the President's position is that the military 
will be in complete control in recovered terri- 
tories until civil government can be restored, at 
which latter time civilian personnel would be 
used. 27 

23 For additional coverage of this subject, se el Chapter III 
27 This memorandum reported the discussions of the 
first meeting of the new Interdepartmental Committee 
which was held on 16 March 1943. Although Secretary 
Ickes apparently envisaged the use of civilian personnel 
as soon as civil government could be restored, Assistant 
Secretary of State Shaw had a more limited expectation. 
He told Colonel Haskell it was his feeling that it was not 
the intention of the committee to set up any intervening 
civilian government between the time military govern- 
ment ceased and local civil authority was restored. 
Rather, he felt that the civilian personnel in question 
would be used largely to assist and advise local govern- 
mental agencies in occupied territories after military 
government had ended. 


The War Department Proposer To Defend 
Its Jurisdiction Over MG Training 

[Min of Remarks of Haskell, Aotg Dir, CAD, i Apr 43, 
a: Meg Called in WD to Consider Its Attitude Toward 
the Interdepartmental Comm., OPD files, 230 Civ Em- 
ployment, sec. 1] 

4. Colonel Haskell summarized the views ex- 
pressed at this meeting with the concurrence of 
all present as follows: 

a. That the War Department should main- 
tain the concept of military control of the admin- 
istration of areas occupied as a result of military 
operations for as long a period as military neces- 
sity makes it essential. 

b. That it is considered best that training 
of specialists in the Army, be they government, 
finance, engineer, medical, etc., be conducted by 
the Provost Marshall General under staff super- 
vision of G-i and interested War Department 

c. That it is not the present understanding 
of the War Department that there will be a U.S. 
colonial or other type of civilian administration 
of occupied foreign countries prior to the time of 
the restoration of control in the local papulation; 
therefore, the need of training governmental ad- 
ministrators, mayors, governors, etc., on the part 
of civilian agencies is not apparent. 

d. That from the beginning, and in fact in 
advance of operations, the War Department will 
require the assistance, advice, guidance and in- 
structions of certain specific governmental agen- 
cies such as the State, Treasury, etc., Depart- 
ments for policy and direction of the theater 
commander and military governor. It is recog- 
nized that at the earliest practicable date certain 
governmental agencies such as Office of Foreign 
Relief and Rehabilitation, Lend Lease, Board of 
Economic Warfare, etc., will require a limited 
amount of trained personnel on the call of the 
theater commander to supervise certain activities 
in occupied areas. 

5. It was agreed that the above-stated views 
would be used as the basis for discussion with 
the Assistant Secretary of War and the Secretary 
of War with a view to formulating War Depart- 
ment policy. 28 

28 The civilian training project of the Interdepartmental 
Committee proved to be abortive. 

Does the Charlottesville Faculty Include 

[Ltr, Hyneman, Chief, Trig Sec, MGD, to S. Harrison 
Thomson, Univ of Colorado, 6 Jul 43, PMGO files, 
330.14, Criticisms] 

Your letter of June 28 to the Provost Marshal 
General came to my attention and I asked to be 
permitted to write you a personal letter about the 
matters you discussed. I did this because all of 
my own adult life (until after the declaration of 
war) has been spent in university teaching and I 
believe that I have some appreciation of the con- 
siderations which cause you to write frankly 
about the things which disturb you. * * * 

Your characterization of the faculty as con- 
taining "American imperialists" . . . presents a 
question on which I can write you with some 

Whether some members of the faculty are im- 
perialists, I do not know. I believe it is irrele- 
vant. My inquiries (and I have checked on this 
since reading your letter) indicate that only one 
of the resident faculty touches more than casually 
upon a subject matter that lends itself to attitude- 
building for or against imperialism, and I find 
no evidence that he prejudices or attempts to 
prejudice minds on this matter in either direction. 
I am told that very few of the lectures by visiting 
lecturers (probably not more than a dozen of ap- 
proximately 80 delivered to the third class) dis- 
cussed questions of policy in which a question of 
imperialism is involved. I would say that if a 
preponderance of predilection was revealed in 
these lectures, it was in favor of a Good Samar- 
itan internationalism. The offense, if there was 
any, I dare say was one of failure to present ade- 
quately the alternatives — policies of American 
imperialism or American isolation. I presume 
these are legitimate possible policies, even though 
reprehensible to you or me. 

But the point I must press is not one of whether 
internationalism, imperialism and isolation are 
entided to equal consideration as possible future 
policies for America; the point is that our military 
government training now proceeds on the as- 
sumption that these issues are none of the mili- 
tary government officer's business. 



French North Africa Puts Civilian 
Control to the Test 

At the time of operation Torch, the 
invasion of North Africa, the most impor- 
tant civil affairs issue seemed to be the 
politically dramatic problem of the Darlan 
Deal and the apparent compromise of 
political principle which it involved. 
Many were unfavorably impressed by the 
military role in this issue, which seemed to 
place the Army on the side of political op- 
portunism if not of worse. The public was 
not in a position to know the imperative 
reasons which led to the temporary accept- 
ance of a Vichy statesman as collaborator. 
The public also could not know that the 
decision to use Darlan grew out of what 
was originally a civilian decision — that of 
the President — to accept whatever admin- 
istration U.S. forces found in French 
North Africa, and that General Eisen- 
hower's recommendation regarding Dar- 
lan was approved by the State Depart- 
ment's representative on the spot, and later 
by both the President and Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull. 

In any case, when the Torch operation 
is considered from the point of view of its 
place in the general development of 
American civil affairs policy, the Darlan 
issue, which effected no lasting change in 
the political principles underlying this 
policy, does not seem the most important 
matter at all. What is most important 
is the fact, little noticed at the outset, that 
Torch put the theory of civilian control to 
its first test and resulted in certain con- 

clusions which affected all later civil af- 
fairs planning. To be sure, in French 
North Africa there was neither military 
government nor, in the narrower sense, 
even civil affairs ; the ordinary administra- 
tion of civil affairs was left to Admiral 
Darlan's government except for certain 
rights which could be exercised in emer- 
gencies. But there was a many-sided 
Allied economic program, to say nothing 
of political issues, for which the Allies 
could not escape responsibility, and thus 
the Allied program involved difficult prob- 
lems which it seems impossible to charac- 
terize by any other name than civil affairs. 
It entailed the setting up of control ma- 
chinery, and as the documents of this 
chapter reveal, this machinery was estab- 
lished on the principle of primary civilian 
responsibility. They indicate further the 
great difficulties encountered not only in 
linking together the many civilian agencies 
concerned but also in so integrating the 
civilian setup with the military that the 
principle of the theater commander's para- 
mount authority was not violated. 

More important still are the implica- 
tions of the documents as regards the oper- 
ational consequences of adopting the prin- 
ciple of civilian responsibility. It appears 
that instead of relieving General Eisen- 
hower of responsibility and concern over 
the economic and political problems which 
arose, the civilian setup actually interfered 
with his freedom of action. To be sure, 


only the most serious of these problems 
could receive his special attention, and it 
remains to consider whether the more 
routine matters of civilian supply and eco- 
nomic assistance or exploitation, which in 
their aggregate were also important, were 
handled with satisfaction. One should 
not, indeed, consider that the limited evi- 
dence presented here permits a definitive 
judgment on the performance of the 
civilian agencies. The documents have 
not been selected for that purpose but 
merely to show the contemporary opinions 
both of military and civilian authorities, 
which, whether just or unjust, exercised 
an influence on civil affairs preparations 
for future areas of operations. With re- 
gard to the question of objective evalu- 
ation, it need only be stated that while a 
number of spectators and participants 
spoke as though the performance was an 
utter fiasco, the bulk of the evidence indi- 
cates that this was a great exaggeration; 
the errors lay more in Washington than 
with the civilian agencies in the theater; 
and, whatever the errors, they were not of 
such a character that they could not be 
remedied in time to prevent serious injury 
to military operations. The documents do 
show plainly that not only the military 
authorities concerned, but also some of the 
civilian authorities, considered that civilian 
control had not been satisfactory. This 
conclusion was the more impressive be- 

cause civilian control had been tested under 
the most favorable conditions — in a 
friendly country, with local authorities as- 
suming the burden of actual civil admin- 
istration. Moreover, the troubles were not 
attributed to civilians as individuals, most 
of whom had put forth admirable efforts, 
but rather to a system. While the absence 
of sufficient organizational preparation 
seems also to have been a contributing 
factor, yet military men considered the 
essential error to have been the attempt to 
divorce the control of civil affairs from 
military organization even though every 
civil affairs problem is bound up with 
military operations. Some leading War 
Department authorities decided as the 
result of the Torch experience that they 
could not safely acquiesce in its pattern of 
control in future operations, least of all 
those in enemy areas. Executives of the 
civilian agencies were also disturbed but 
they felt that the difficulties of French 
North Africa could be obviated by effecting 
a much better co-ordination of civilian 
agencies than had thus far obtained. They 
overlooked the fart that they were recog- 
nizing the principle of undivided author- 
ity only in a limited degree, and that if this 
principle was carried to its logical con- 
clusion it would mean the acceptance of 
the theater commander's control through 
an administration of purely military 


Civil Affairs Section Designed To Rest Upon 
State Department Aid 

[Memo, Gen George C. Marshall for President Roosevelt, 
3 Sep 42, OPD files, 381, Torch, sec 1] 

The success of the Touch operation is critically 
dependent upon the reactions of the authorities, 
inhabitants and troops of North Africa. With this 
in mind, General Eisenhower has on his staff a 
Civil Administrative Section to co-ordinate the 

civil and political matters in immediate relation 
to the operation. He urgendy requests that men 
from the State Department be released to serve on 
this body. . . .* 

1 The Civil Affairs Section of AFHQ in London was not 
formally activated until 15 September 1942. But as early 
as 21 August, Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower cabled the 
War Department that it was necessary to organize on his 
staff a Civil Administrative Section in addition to his 
already existent Political Section, and asked for a civil 


In all these matters it is understood that you 
will take personal direction of this phase of the 
Torch operation, but it will be necessary for Gen- 
eral Eisenhower to be in immediate control and 
fully aware of the details. The men referred to in 
their relation to General Eisenhower will be in a 
position somewhat analogous to that of a Military 
Attache to an Ambassador. They would exercise 
their functions under General Eisenhower, but as 
State Department officials they would be in a 
position to act when desirable through our diplo- 
matic agencies and representatives in the area. 

I believe it is your desire that the War Depart- 
ment should undertake to carry out this operation 
in all respects, but the political and civil phase 
of the plan could be facilitated by the aid of the 
State Department. The Civil Administrative Sec- 
tion was created to insure the complete co-ordina- 
tion of military and civil preparations in 
connection with the operation and to effect the 
civil administration of that area. * * * 

Eisenhower Concerned Over His Civil Ad- 
ministrator's Divided Responsibility 

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Sep 42, OPD Msg 
files, CM-IN 8213] 

I have gone over Murphy's directive very care- 
fully. 2 I hesitate to raise an issue which may 
cause you any embarrassment, particularly after 
our intimate and successful conversations here 
with Murphy as I have the utmost confidence in 
his judgment and discretion and I know that I 
will be able to work with him in perfect har- 
mony. However, as I am responsible for the suc- 
cess of the operations I feel that it is essential that 
final authority in all matters in that theater rest 
in me, subject only to the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff and the President, with Murphy as my 

administrator and key "military and civilian" assistants. 
Robert D. Murphy, former Counselor of the American 
Embassy at Vichy, was selected to head the Civil Affairs 
Section and a number of officers who had just graduated 
from Charlottesville were sent as military assistants. 
Civilian as sistants were p rovided later by the State Depart- 
ment (see I below, MsgJ WD to Eisenhower, 24 Nov 42, 
sec. 3). Mr. Murphy's selection was due in great measure 
to his firsthand acquaintance with conditions in French 
North Africa. There, in the summer, he had gathered 
information showing the disposition of certain French 
groups, notably that of Brig. Gen. Charles E. Mast, to 
co-operate with the Americans in case they invaded this 

2 The civil affairs plan which appears in President 
Roosevelt's directive to Mr. Murphy (following docu- 
ment) was no doubt one which the latter had largely 
suggested (see George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seiz- 
ing the Initiative in the West, UNITED STATES ARMY 
IN WORLD WAR II (Washington: 1957) (hereafter 
cited as Howe, Northwest Africa), Chapter IV). 

operating executive and advisor for civil affairs. 
This is in accordance with my understanding 
of the President's intentions through oral mes- 
sages delivered to me by Harriman, and I believe 
the directive should clearly set forth this rela- 
tionship. Prior to the commencement of the spe- 
cial operation it is essential that Murphy have 
status as the President's personal representative 
in that area. There is a possibility that unless the 
directive is revised as indicated, there may de- 
velop in the minds of the French officials, after 
my arrival, the idea that there is division of 
authority between the American civil and mili- 
tary officials. I am sure that Murphy will agree 
with the foregoing and with the necessity of 
presenting the French with a clean-cut and single 
authority. 3 

President's Entire Plan Rests Upon Military 
and Administrative Co-operation With the 

[Directive (rev), Roosevelt to Murphy, Chief Civil Ad- 
ministrator, AFHQ, 22 Sep 42, in William L. Langer, 
Our Vichy Gamble (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 
1947), White House Papers, pp. 315-16] 

i. Upon the occupation of French North Africa 
by American military force, you will act as the 
Operating Executive head of the Civil Affairs 
Section and Advisor for Civil Affairs under Gen- 
eral Eisenhower. ... * 

2. You will work in close co-operation with 
General Eisenhower ... in the preparation and 
execution of plans of a civil and political nature 
for the occupation of French North Africa by 
American Military Forces. 

3. You will at an early date contact personally 
and through your Psychological Warfare and 
other assistants those French nationals whom 
you consider reliable, and give them the follow- 
ing information: 

Information having been received from a 
reliable source that the Germans and Italians are 
planning an intervention in French North Africa, 
the United States contemplates sending at an 

'Although revised to make it more in accord with Gen- 
eral Eisenhower's views on military authority, the direc- 
tive, even in its revised form (see the following 
document) reflected the conception that, so far as con- 
cerned purely political civil affairs planning, Murphy was 
to have a great deal of latitude. 

'Murphy was thus not to assume charge of the Civil 
Affairs Section until after the occupation began. This was 
due to the secret mission to French North Africa on 
which he departed immediately after his appointment. 
H. Freeman Matthews, of the State Department, served 
as acting chief of the section throughout the planning 
period. Howe, Northwest Africa, ch. III. 


early date a sufficient number of American troops 
to land in that area with the purpose of prevent- 
ing occupation by the Axis and of preserving 
French Sovereignty in Algeria, and the French 
administrations in Morocco and Tunisia. 

No change in the existing French Civil Ad- 
ministration is contemplated by the United 

Any resistance to an American landing will, 
of course, have to be put down by force of arms. 

The American forces will provide equip- 
ment as rapidly as possible for those French 
troops who join in denying access to French 
North Africa to our common enemies. 

Money, in addition to that provided by 
French sources, will be made available for addi- 
tional expense incurred through co-operation 
with American forces. 

The American Government will guarantee 
salaries and allowances, death benefits and pen- 
sions of those French and other military, naval 
and civilian officials who join with the American 
expeditionary forces. 

The proposed expedition will be American, 
under American command, and it will not in- 
clude any of the forces of General [Charles] de 
Gaulle. * * * 

Regardless of Resistance the French Are To 
Be Treated as Friendly 

[AFHQ GO 4, ii Oct 42," OPD files, 381 Torch, sec. 1] 

lb. It is expected that all governmental officials, 
officers and employees of the local government in 
all of its branches, and who are trustworthy, will 
remain in office, and that all officials and em- 
ployees of the civil administration, civilian public 
services and facilities, will carry on their normal 

3#. The principle upon which all relations with 

the civilian authorities is to be based, is that 

regardless of resistance, the French are friendly 

and are to be maintained in their government. 
* * * 

Even if Military Government Is Necessary 
French Personnel Should Administer 

[AFHQ GO 5, 12 Oct 42, OPD files, 381, Torch, sec. 1] 

1 . The purpose of a civil affairs section is to assist 
the Commander to which it is assigned to carry 
out the policy of the Commanding General, 
namely: To maintain and control for the Com- 
manding General the civil governments of the 

5 AFHQ General Orders form the main part of the 
plan prepared by the Civil Affairs Section. 

territories of French North Africa as soon as 
military control of those territories is secured; to 
retain the existing form or forms of government 
in the territories under control, and to retain the 
civil governments and their officials and em- 
ployees in their present positions, insofar as they 
are willing to continue in office, and as is con- 
sistent with the military mission and the policy 
of the Commanding General; to supplant those 
persons not in accord with the war aims of the 
United States, and its supporting ally [Great Bri- 
tain], with other capable and efficient local per- 
sonnel; or with military personnel in the event 
there is hostile action on the part of the armed 
forces of the territories to be occupied or by the 
inhabitants after the control is secured. 6 * * * 

3a. The Commanding General will be the 
Military Governor of all territory in French 
North Africa controlled by the United States and 
its supporting ally. 7 * * * 

igb. The salaries, wages and pensions, pen- 
sion rights and all other benefits and emoluments 
of all French and native governmental, terri- 
torial, municipal and other subdivisional dis- 
tricts, and regional officials and employees, and 
all Army, Navy and Air Force personnel, will be 
guaranteed by the United States of America, as 
long as they remain in their present positions 
carrying on their normal duties in a manner sat- 
isfactory to the military governor of the territory 
or the area occupied, and do nothing by word or 
deed that can in any way be construed as dis- 
respectful to the United States or its supporting 
ally, or to their personnel and property. 

A Principle of the Manual Is Followed 
[FM 27-5, 1940] 

* * * Economy of effort. Every man en- 
gaged in military government is withdrawn 
either from the combatant forces or from pro- 
ductive labor at home. All plans and practices 
should be adopted with a view of reducing to 
the minimum consistent with the proper func- 
tioning of military government the number of the 
personnel of our Army employed in that govern- 
ment and the amount of work required of them. 

* * * 

It had been decided that, because of the bitter feeling 
against Great Britain which the attack on Dakar had 
aroused among the French, the administration should be 
entirely in the hands of Americans. 

' The planners did not consider the declaration of mili- 
tary government desirable but were obliged to plan for it 
as a possibility. 


[AFHQ GO 5, 12 Oct 42, OPD files, 381, Torch, sec 1] 

Only 500 Tons of Civilian Supplies Requested 

6d. Plans and practices will be adopted with a 
view of reducing to the minimum consistent with 
the proper functioning of military administra- 
tion, the number of the personnel from the armed 
forces employed in that administration. * * * 

It Now Seems Giraud Will Be Governor 

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 Oct 42, OPD Msg files, 
CM-4N 7296] 

* * * Giraud to be recognized as our prin- 
cipal collaborator on the French side, with the 
proposal that he accept the position immediately 
of French governor of all French North Africa, 
responsible for all French civil and military af- 
fairs, and whose position will be supported and 
protected by the Allied forces. Giraud to be re- 
quested to make proper contacts with Darian and 
to accept him as Commander in Chief of French 
military and/or Naval Forces in North Africa or 
in some similar position that will be attractive to 
Darian. In this way the French Forces could co- 
operate immediately, under the general direc- 
tion of the Allied Commander in Chief. 8 

* With the emergence of the possibility of using Gen- 
eral Giraud 's help the thought of declaring military 
government, never a preferred plan, receded still more. 
It had recently become known to Washington and AFHQ 
that Darian would not be disinterested in co-operating if 
a sufficiently promising American invasion was launched. 
However, despite General Eisenhower's consideration of 
this alternative, it was not approved in Washington. The 
narrative of the complicated negotiations with Giraud 
and other French leaders is to be found in Langer, Our 
Vichy Gamble, and in Howe, Northwest Africa, Chapters 
II and III. 

[Memo, Matthews, Asst Chief, Civil Affairs (CA) Admin- 
istration, AFHQ, for DCofS, AFHQ, 22 Oct 44; Civilian 
Supply: A History of the Civilian Supply Branch, Inter- 
national Division, ASF (2 vols, text and 3 vols, documen- 
tary supplement), prepared by International Division, ASF, 
documentary supplement 1. Hereafter cited as ASF, ID, 
Hist of Civ Sup, DS, MS in OCMH.] 

The measure of support to our [North Africa] 
Operation and the United Nations cause on the 
part of the population, both French and native, of 
North Africa, will depend in no small part on the 
amount of badly needed consumer goods we can 
put into the area in the early days. While the first 
convoys must necessarily be filled with military 
equipment and supplies, it has been suggested 
that approximately 500 tons of such items could 
be stowed in odd corners of early ships.' » * • 

Eisenhower's Economic Responsibilities 

[Ltr, Brig Gen John R. Deane, Secy, CCS, to the Secy 
of State, 12 Nov 41, WDCSA [War Department Chief of 
Staff, U.S. Army] files, 386, Africa 1942] 

* * * At a meeting of the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff on 30 October it was agreed that General 
Eisenhower should be informed that he would 
concern himself with economic policies only to 
the extent that they affect his operations and that 
further action in this regard would be handled 
by the appropriate civil departments of the United 
States and the United Kingdom. » * * 

* After the landings, 30.000 tons a m onth were re- 
quested as a bare minimum. See] Section 6,| below. 


Why a Deal Was Made With Darlan 

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 14 Nov 42, OPD Msg files, 
CM-IN 6267] " 

* * * Can well understand some bewilder- 

w The Allies landed in French North Africa on 8 No- 
vember. They soon learned that Admiral Jean Francois 
Darian, Commander in Chief of the French Forces, hap- 
pened to be in Algiers visiting his ill son. Conferences 
with him began after the Americans took Algiers and 
discovered that the local French leaders would follow only 
Darian, not Gen. Henri Giraud. This message was sent 
after Darian had been won over to co-operation with the 
United States. On 13 November the French leaders in 
North Africa agreed to form a new government with 
Darian as civil head and Giraud as head of the armed 

ment in London and Washington with the turn 
that negotiations with French North Africans 
have taken. The actual state of existing senti- 
ment here does not agree even remotely with 
some of prior calculations. The following 
salient facts are pertinent and it is extremely im- 
portant that no precipitate action at home upset 
such equilibrium as we have been able to 

Foremost is the fact that the name of Marshal 
[Henri] Petain is something to conjure with 
here. Everyone from highest to lowest attempts 
to create the impression that he lives and acts 
under the shadow of the Marshal's figure. The 


Civil Governors, Military leaders and Naval 
Commanders will agree on only one man as hav- 
ing an obvious right to assume the Marshal's 
mantle in North Africa. That man is Darlan. 
Even the Kingpin [Giraud], who had been our 
most trusted adviser and staunchest friend since 
early conferences succeeded in bringing him 
down to earth, clearly recognizes this overpower- 
ing consideration and has drastically modified his 
own ambitions and intentions accordingly. The 
resistance we met initially was offered because all 
ranks believed this to be the Marshal's wish and 
for this reason the Kingpin is deemed to have 
been guilty of at least a touch of treachery in 
urging nonresistance to our landing. The King- 
pin himself understands and appears to have 
some sympathy for this universal attitude. All 
concerned profess themselves to be ready to go 
along with us provided Darlan tells them to do 
so, but they are absolutely not willing to follow 
anyone else. For example, [Vice] Admiral [Jean- 
Pierre] Esteva in Tunis says he will obey Darlan, 
while Nogues stopped fighting in Morocco by 
Darlan's order. Recognition of Darlan's position 
in this respect cannot be escaped. 

The gist of the current agreement is that the 
French group will do what it can immediately 
to assist us in taking Tunisia. The group will 
organize French North Africa for effective co- 
operation and will begin reorganization, under 
Kingpin, of selected military forces for active 
participation in the war. . . . 

Our hope of early conquest of Tunisia and of 
gaining here a supporting and organized popula- 
tion can not possibly be realized unless there is 
accepted a general agreement along the lines 
which we have just concluded with Darlan and 
his Admirals, with the Kingpin, with [Gen. 
Auguste Paul] Nogues, who controls the tribes in 
Morocco, with [Gen. Alphonse] Juin and others. 
The Kingpin is now so fully aware of his inabil- 
ity to do anything by himself, even with Allied 
moral and military support, that he has cheer- 
fully accepted the post of Military Chief in the 
Darlan group. He fully agrees also that his own 
name should not be mentioned in connection 
with this movement for a period of several days. 
Without a strong French government of some 
kind here we would be forced to undertake com- 
plete military occupation. The cost in time and 
resources would be tremendous. In Morocco 
alone [Major] General [George S.] Patton 
[Jr.] calculates that it would require sixty thou- 
sand Allied troops to hold the tribes quiet, and in 
view of the effect that any tribal disturbance 
would have on Spain, you can see what a prob- 

lem we are up against. 

The Kingpin is honest and will watch Darlan. 
Moreover, Murphy, who has done a grand job, 
will, as head of my Civil Affairs Section, practi- 
cally live in Darlan's pocket. [W. H. B.] Mack 
[British head of the Political Section, AFHQ] 
and other capable men will co-operate with him. 
I realized that there may be a feeling at home 
that we have been sold a bill of goods, but I 
assure you that these agreements have been ar- 
rived at only after incessant examination of the 
important factors and with the determination to 
get on with military objectives against the Axis 
and to advance the interest of the Allies in 
winning this war. * * * 

Military Chiefs at Home Feel the Soldier 
on the Spot Must Have Freedom of Action 

[Memo, Admiral William D. Leahy, CofS to CinC, to 
Roosevelt, 15 Nov 42, WDCSA files, 386, Africa, 1942] 

General Eisenhower's message relating to ar- 
rangements made with Darlan, Nogues, Giraud, 
and [Gen. Yves] Chatel in North Africa has been 
forwarded to you. I do not believe that we have 
sufficient information here to issue detailed in- 
structions to him. The arrangements he has made 
represent probably the only practical course at the 
moment when his interest is necessarily focused 
on the vast importance of a hurried conquest of 
Tunisia, the possible acquisition of the French 
fleet at Toulon, and the avoidance of a necessity 
for large reinforcements in order to hold his 
present position. * * * \ 
. . . I consider it necessary that General Ei- 
senhower and his advisers in Africa should be 
given a free hand in this matter. 

General Marshall is in full agreement. 

Proposed Agreement Is a Purely Military One 

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 19 Nov 42, CAD Msg files, 

Attention is invited ... to the fact that this 
agreement is merely one between a Commander 
in the field and a Commission which is exercising 
ordinary civil and military functions in the 
theater in which he is operating. 11 Its terms are 
intended only to facilitate the operations of the 
Allied Forces brought here, although, naturally, 

11 On the same day General Eisenhower had dispatched 
to Washington a copy of the proposed agreement with 
Admiral Darlan. Although consummation of the agree- 
ment called for the greatest haste, General Eisenhower felt 
that, in view of the deviation of the agreement from 
both of the alternative armistice drafts given him before 
the landings, CCS approval was required. 


accomplishment of this purpose involves certain 
economic and transportation features. * * * 

Upsetting Present Arrangement Would Be 

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 20 Nov 42, CAD Msg files, 
CM-IN 8525] 

We entered this theater with a knowledge that 
we would have to deal with North African civil 
affairs through the existing civil organization 
covering all North Africa. We did not set up any 
official. We merely required the existing officials 
to agree upon a form of central commission 
through which we could deal. I attempted to 
force Giraud upon them as head but he collapsed 
under me. He himself finally admitted that he 
could not do it because he could not control the 
situation except on the basis of a huge military 
support which I could not possibly afford. As a 
result of the agreements we have made we have 
secured an opportunity to press our concentra- 
tion toward the east for battle in Tunisia with- 
out worrying about the rear. At every principal 
port we would be badly handicapped without 
the assistance cheerfully rendered us now by 
French military, naval and civil groups. What I 
am trying to point out is that even if we should 
only have passive resistance, our operations would 
be sadly slowed up and our position badly weak- 
ened. We have these advantages through the in- 
fluence of the entire group through which we 
have worked. I have conferred incessantly with 
many individuals at various points in the theater, 
and every British and American officer that I 
have seen is convinced that any early attempt to 
upset the present arrangement will result dis- 
astrously for us. I hope it can be generally under- 
stood that the arrangement we have is one made 
for practical military purposes and should not be 
attacked as long as it works at its present effi- 
ciency and until the objects for which this army 
was directed to invade Africa have been attained. 
If the arrangement we have made is broken up 
now both governments must be prepared for 
extensive occupation of this country. * * * 

Provisions of Darlan Agreement Leave Ad- 
ministration With the French But Reserve 
Certain Economic and Military Rights 

[Agreement signed between Lt Gen Mark W. Clark, 
representing the CinC, AEF, and Admiral Francois Dar- 
lan, High Cmsr in French North Africa, 22 Nov 42, 
CAD files, 371, N. Africa (8-27-42) (1)] 14 

" As finally consummated the agreement recognized the 
role of Great Britain in the area by adding to its refer- 
ences to the CG, U.S. Army, the phrase "and its sup- 
porting Allies." 


The forces of the United States and their sup- 
porting Allies have landed in French North 
Africa for the purpose of preventing the domina- 
tion of this territory by German and Italian forces 
and their Allies and for carrying on the war for 
the defeat of the Axis powers. 

By a common agreement among leading 
French officials in French North Africa, a High 
Commissioner in French Africa has been estab- 
lished in the person of Admiral of the Fleet Fran- 
cois Darlan. 

It has been agreed by all French elements con- 
cerned and United States military authorities that 
French forces will aid and support the forces of 
the United States and their Allies to expel from 
the soil of Africa the common enemy, to liberate 
France and to restore integrally the French Em- 
pire. In order that this high purpose may be 
accomplished, and to make appropriate arrange- 
ments for the presence in North Africa of large 
forces of the United States and its Allies, the fol- 
lowing agreement is entered into at Algiers this 
twenty-second day of November 1942. 


There shall be the closest co-operation between 
the Commander in Chief of the French Land, 
Sea and Air Forces and the Commanding Gen- 
eral, United States Army and supporting forces 
to accomplish the purpose set forth above. 


French governmental personnel will continue 
in the performance of their functions with loyalty 
to the purpose of the forces under the command 
of the Commanding General, United States 
Army and supporting forces. Such government 
personnel will take such measures as are neces- 
sary for the maintenance of order and public 
administrative services throughout the territory 
in consultation with the Commanding General 
of the United States Army. 


In North Africa areas deemed by the Com- 
manding General, United States Army, to be of 
importance or useful to the purpose set forth 
in the preamble hereof, from time to time, may be 
declared by him to be military areas under his 
control whereupon the maintenance of order and 
administrative and public services in such areas 
shall come under the direct control of such Com- 
manding General. The French authorities will be 
promptly notified in the event that such a step 
becomes necessary. 




If the internal situation at any time be such as 
in his opinion to endanger his lines of communi- 
cation or threaten disorder the Commanding 
General, United States Army will inform the 
French authorities of such danger and the French 
authorities will undertake, in concert with him, 
such administrative and other measures as may 
be necessary for the protection of the military 
interests of the forces under his command and 
supporting forces. 


The Commanding General, United States 
Army, will appoint such military, naval, air and 
economic and branch Missions as he may deem 
requisite to regulate, in liaison with such agency 
or agencies as the local authorities will institute 
for this purpose, the application of the present 


There shall be immediately appointed a Joint 
Economic Commission which will be charged 
with the study of the economic needs of French 
North Africa. The Commission will suggest such 
measures as may seem appropriate to it regard- 
ing exportation and importation, as well as for 
the increase of agricultural and industrial pro- 
duction, as well as for the establishment of eco- 
nomic stability, and the creation of prosperity in 
French North African territories. 

A joint censorship commission shall be estab- 
lished. It will extend its action to the press, 
radio broadcasts, telecommunications, postal serv- 
ices and all public means for the dissemination of 
information and shall operate in full conformity 
with the common purpose set forth in the pre- 
amble thereof. The French members of the 
Commission will be appointed by the High 
Commissioner. * * * 

Fortunate We Do Not Have To Do the Job 

[Memo, Lt Col Bernard Bernstein, former Financial 
Adviser, North African Econ Bd, for Brig Gen Arthur H. 
Carter, Chief of Finance, SOS, 10 Feb 43, OUSW files, 
A49-94, Misc and Sub, MG] 

A.7. One of the reasons given for permitting the 
French authorities to run their own govern- 
mental affairs was that we did not have the 
organization to do it ourselves, and therefore we 
had to let the French do it in order not to inter- 
fere with our military effort. In a sense we were 
fortunate that we did not have to undertake a 
full military government in North Africa. With 
the inadequate organization that existed in the 
field and in Washington, such an undertaking 
probably could not have been successfully dis- 
charged. All phases of military government and 
civil affairs are likely to be far more complicated 
and require more immediate and comprehensive 
action when we go into Europe than was or 

might have been the case in North Africa. 
• # # 


Combined Chiefs Decide That Civilian 
Agencies Will Handle Economic Matters 

[Ltr, CCS to Secy of State Cordell Hull, 12 Nov 42. 
WDCSA files, 386, Africa, 1942] 

About two weeks ago the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff received a proposal from the British Chiefs 
of Staff regarding certain economic measures to 
be taken in North Africa upon our occupation 
of that country. * * * 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff . . . agreed 
to recommend to the appropriate civil depart- 
ments of the United States and the United King- 
dom that they maintain close collaboration in 
respect to the economic policies to be adopted in 
North Africa. This letter is to inform you 

In order that any policies adopted may be con- 
sidered on a combined basis it is suggested that 
you initiate conversations with Washington rep- 
resentatives of the British Ministry of Economic 
Warfare in the near future. 13 

Department of State Given the Leading Role 

[Ltr, Roosevelt to Hull, 18 Nov 42, ASF, ID, Hist of 
Civilian Supply (Civ Sup), Documentary Supplement 
(DS 7)] 

I am reverting to our conversation the other day 

13 The CCS, who had jurisdiction over civil affairs as 
over all other phases of combined military operations, 
were in effect delegating CA responsibility to civilian 
agencies, with the reservation t hat they should b e kept 
informed on policy matters. See I CCS Secretarial]Memo- 
randum of 27 November 1942, below. 


concerning the economic, political and fiscal ques- 
tions which were developing in the wake of the 
advancing American armies in North Africa. 
While our conversation related especially to de- 
velopments in that particular area, it is very 
apparent the same or similar problems will de- 
velop throughout the world as the scene changes. 
While it is a Mediterranean question today, it 
will later be extended to Pacific and to other 

Consequently, the policies of our Government 
will develop towards dependent and independent 
peoples under the relevant parts of the Adantic 
Charter and the Declaration of the United 

All this concerns foreign relations and inter- 
national co-operation in the immediate present 
and after the war, and involves both political 
and economic elements. 

As the conduct of these affairs lies in your 
hands, you have my full authority to designate 
to serve under you a person to whom you will 
look to carry out our policies. 

You, yourself, have full authority to secure 
the co-operation of persons in your Department 
and can make such transfers as you deem 
necessary. 14 

You are hereby authorized to draw upon any 
of the other departments or agencies of the Gov- 
ernment for any assistance that may be needed. 

I consider that full co-operation and co-ordi- 
nation is not only important but is necessary to 
the proper fulfillment of our objectives in the 
field of foreign relations. 

War Department Acquiesces in Civilian 
Responsibility for Purely Civil Matters 

[Paraphrase of Msg, WD to Eisenhower, 24 Nov 42, 
CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1) ] 

Under the general supervision of the State De- 
partment, the Lend-Lease Administration has 
been charged by the President with providing 
food and other essentials for all occupied terri- 
tories. 15 Civil activities in occupied areas have 
been made the responsibility of the State Depart- 

11 In accordance with this letter the Secretary of State, 
on 21 November, established in the State Department the 
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations 
(OFRRO), with Governor Herbert H. Lehman as its 
director, and on 24 November the Office of Foreign 
Territories, which immediately assumed "the responsi- 
bility for implementing the economic and social pro- 
gram" for North Africa in Washington. 

u The President's earliest step in assigning responsibility 
to civilian agencies was his letter of 13 November to the 
Lend-Lease Administrator authorizing him to render lend- 
lease aid to French North Africa as vital to the defense 

ment. That department's designated representa- 
tive will act as the Commanding General's civil 
adviser, but when civil activities affect or are 
affected by military operations he will be subject 
to your decisions. As per its cables to Murphy of 
13 November, the State Department, pursuant 
to the Presidential directive, is now sending an 
administrative expert and highly qualified repre- 
sentatives of Department of Agriculture, War 
Shipping Administration, Lend-Lease, Treasury 
Department, and Board of Economic Warfare, 
who will work under Murphy. It will be re- 
quested of the State Department that a USCC 
[United States Commercial Company] represen- 
tative be sent. A survey should be made after 
these experts arrive to develop definite program 
and procedures including channels of communi- 
cation which you approve and to determine addi- 
tional staffs. The responsibility for decisions that 
must be made in the field to co-ordinate efforts 
of British and our representatives must rest with 

To co-ordinate War Department interest in 
these activities and to represent you in these mat- 
ters a separate section is being established under 
[Lt. Gen. Brehon B.] Somervell, which will 
maintain constant liaison with the Department 
of State, and through it with other interested 
agencies of the Government. Is this arrangement, 
finally established here with interested agencies, 
satisfactory to you? 16 

Combined Chiefs Willing To Be Bypassed on 

[Memo, Secy's, CCS, approved by CCS, 27 Nov 42, CAD 
files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1)] 

It is recommended that the secretariat of the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff be authorized to refer 
questions of detail relating to civil, economic, 
and financial matters, which are referred to the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff by General Eisenhower, 
directly to the Committee of Combined Boards. 17 

of the United States. The letter implied that the Lend- 
Lease Administration was not merely to finance such aid 
but to procure supplies as an operating agency. About the 
same time the President declared that "No one will go 
hungry ... in any territory occupied by the United 
Nations." Dept of State Bull, Nov 42. 

18 It is doubtful that, in acquiescing so readily in the 
degree of control given to civilian agencies, War Depart- 
ment authorities were appreciative of the great civilian 
supply problem which French North Africa was to 
present. Interv, Harold Epstein, OCMH, with Donald H. 
McLean, former ASF working member of CAD, 17 Apr 

17 The Committee of Combined Boards was being set 
up pursuant to the CCS recommendation of 12 November 
(above) . 


Further, that in order to expedite action, the 
secretariat be authorized to communicate the de- 
cisions of civil agencies concerned direcdy to 
General Eisenhower without reference to the 
combined Chiefs of Staff if in their opinion the 
action taken will have no adverse effect on Gen- 
eral Eisenhower's military operations. It would, 
of course, be understood that political questions 
involving important matters of government policy 
would not be included within the scope of these 

Civilian Agencies Fear Military Involvement 
in Civilian Supply 

[Memo for Red, 4 Dec 42, Capt Arthur E. Palmer, ASF, 
ID, on Discussions of 3 December with Representatives 
of Office of Lend-Lease Administration (OLLA), ASF, 
OUSW files, Civ Sup, DS-11] 

3d. It was feared that the Army would delib- 
erately and unnecessarily omit Lend-Lease cargo 
from shipment and would replace it by similar 
cargo procured by the Army or would not re- 
place it at all. 18 In this connection OLLA and 
State are frankly worried that if the Army pro- 
vides the civilian supplies it will obtain first 
possession of them in North Africa and will thus 
have a dominant position. * * * 

Proliferation of Washington Civilian Agen- 
cies for North African Economic Matters 

[Memo, Col John B. Franks, Dir, International Aid Div, 
ASF, 1 * for CofS, SOS, 17 Dec 42, CAD files, 092.3, N. 
Africa (n-10-42) (1)] 

i. As instructed, this office has followed closely 
the course of the procedures now under develop- 
ment in Washington for handling problems re- 
lating to civilian supply in conquered countries, 
with particular reference at this time to North 
Africa. The procedure is now becoming suffi- 
ciently well defined to be the subject of an interim 
report. It is still, however, in a state of changing 
development. 20 

M The subject under discussion was the Army's purchase 
and shipment in November of barter goods and other 
civilian supplies requested by Eisenhower for French 
North Africa. The War Department had assumed re- 
sponsibility pending the crystallization of civilian agency 
plans and procedures. 

"International Division and International Aid Division 
were used interchangeably. 

" A concise account of all agencies set up by the State 
Department for handling civilian supply will be found in 
Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global 
Logistics and Strategy, 1943-45, a volume in preparation 
WAR II (hereafter cited as Coakley and Leighton, Global 
Logistics, 1943-45). 

2. Committees: The following committees have 
been organized in Washington for dealing with 
these problems. 

1. Committee of Combined Boards called 

This Committee has been established at the 
instance of the State Department to handle Com- 
bined (i.c, matters of interest to the British as 
well as to the United States) civilian economic 
matters regarding North Africa. This Committee 
is intended to be the focal point for all non- 
military requirements for North Africa, whether 
prepared in North Africa, Washington or Lon- 
don, and is to recommend action to be taken 
thereon. Representation is drawn from the State 
Department, the British Embassy, and the execu- 
tive secretaries of CPRB [Combined Production 
and Resources Board], CRMB [Combined Raw 
Materials Board], CSAB [Combined Shipping 
Adjustment Board], and CFB [Combined Food 
Board ]. Part of the secretariat of this committee is 
furnished by the secretariat of the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff, consisting of a representative from 
the office of General Deane (Colonel Hammond) 
and a representative from the office of Brigadier 

It is the stated intention of this Board to have 
communications from North Africa on civilian 
matters sent directly from General Eisenhower 
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. * * * 

2. Combined Requirements Group 

This Committee has both U.S. and British 
membership and acts in effect as a subcommittee 
of the C.O.B., which is outlined above. It was 
organized at the instance of Mr. Tom [K.] Fin- 
letter of the State Department, with the concur- 
rence of the C.O.B., and is to act under direction 
of the State Department. It has been charged 
with the limited duty of passing on and approv- 
ing civilian requirements for North Africa, and 
reporting them to the C.O.B. for its action. This 
Committee has been merged with a similar com- 
mittee which was appointed for the same purpose 
by Mr. Paul Appleby, Director of the Office of 
Foreign Territories of the State Department, and 
Mr. Appleby now serves as its Chairman. 

It is not dear that a committee of this promi- 
nence will concern itself only with screening of 
requirements, and the demarcation of jurisdic- 
tion between this Committee and the C.O.B., 
mentioned above, and the Interdepartmental Ad- 
visory Committee, mentioned below, can not be 
considered as finally determined. * * * 

3. Interdepartmental Advisory Committee 
This Committee has only U.S. representa- 
tion on the main committee, but may have also 
British representation on some or all of its sub- 


committees. It has been established as an ad- 
visory committee, under the chairmanship of 
Mr. Paul Appleby, Director of the Office of 
Foreign Territories of the State Department. 

The stated purpose of this Committee is "Im- 
plementation of the Economic and Social aspects 
of the North African Program." 21 Consequently, 
its jurisdiction appears to be broader than the 
jurisdiction of the Combined Requirements 
Group referred to next above. 

The relationship between this Committee and 
the other Committees is not yet definitive, but it 
now appears that all U.S. interests will meet 
in this group to handle problems relating to all 
civilian matters in North Africa. * * * 
4. Public Health 

This is presendy being handled by Governor 
Lehman's office, acting in concert with Lend- 
Lease and the Red Cross. * * * 

Murphy Becomes President's Personal Repre- 
sentative in the Theater 

[Msg, WD to Eisenhower, 18 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, 
CM-OUT 6349] 

Following message under date of December 15 
furnished you from the President: "I am today 
appointing Mr. Murphy to be my personal repre- 
sentative in North Africa with the rank of Min- 
ister. He will continue on General Eisenhower's 
staff in his present capacity as Civil Affairs Offi- 
cer until such a time as consultation with the 
War Department suggests a change." 22 

North African Economic Board Created To 
Carry Out State Department's Economic 

[AG AFHQ Ltr, 1 Dec 42, CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa 
(11-10-42) (1)] 

i. The Department of State has been charged 
by the President of the United States with the 
responsibility for the development and execution 
of a plan for the economic support of North 
Africa, subject to military exigencies. 

2. a. The North African Economic Board 
(NAEB) is hereby set up to carry this plan into 
effect. Initially, since the requirements of mili- 
tary operations are dominant, the Board shall 
consist of both military and civil representatives 
as follows: 23 

21 The function of this committee was to advise the 
Office of Foreign Territories on matters of policy. 

** This appointment gave Murphy direct access to the 
President and the State Department on matters of policy. 

28 The charter of the North African Economic Board 
was revised on 8 January. Among the changes made was 

The Joint Chairman: 

Civil: Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil 

Military: Maj. Gen. H. M. Gale, Chief 
Administrative Officer, Allied Force Headquar- 

Executive Vice-Chairman (to be desig- 
nated by the Joint Chairman). 

Heads of Sections of the Boards Executive. 
Representatives of: 

G-i, AFHQ 

G-4, AFHQ 

Civil Affairs Section, AFHQ 
together with such other persons as the Chair- 
man of the Board may from time to time 

9. a. The functions of NAEB shall be: 

( 1 ) The supply of essential materials to the 
civil population and to vital utilities and indus- 
tries. This function will involve a continuing ex- 
amination of needs and such participation in dis- 
tribution as may prove desirable. 

(2) The purchase both of strategic materials 
which are immediately required in the United 
Nations war effort and, in reasonable quantities, 
of other products, the production and normal 
markets for which have been disturbed. This 
function will involve not only purchase and ex- 
port but storage of the latter type of produce for 
future sale or use in eventual United Nations 

(3) The handling of currency and financial 
problems. This function will involve a survey 
of the whole financial situation and the establish- 
ment of whatever controls may prove necessary, 
as well as the examination of the files of Axis 
firms and of government documents, with a view 
towards obtaining information concerning per- 
sons engaging in undesirable commercial and 
financial transactions and enemy plans and 

(4) Initially in accordance with military 
requirements the maintenance, repair and expan- 
sion of vital transportation facilities, including 
railroads, port facilities and automotive transport. 

the division of the board into a Civil Department and a 
Military Department, the latter dealing solely with mili- 
tary economic matters. On 23 January 1943 AFHQ, in 
informing the War Department of organizational and 
personnel developments of the Board, stated that "re- 
sponsibility has been placed in the civilian side but pend- 
ing arrival of adequate civilian personnel military men 
will be detailed temporarily to civil department." OPD 
Msg files, CM-IN 10177. Civilian agencies soon filled 
the leading positions of the board's various divisions. To 
be sure, NAEB did provide for representation of the 
military component, both in its chairmanship and in its 
Military Department, and its general functions embraced 
the co-ordination of military and civilian interests. 


This function will involve a careful survey of 
needs and advice and assistance in operation. 

(5) The maintenance of public health. This 
function will involve an estimate of needed sup- 
plies and advice as to their utilization. The func- 
tion will involve co-ordination with the Red Cross 
and other relief agencies. 

(6) Expansion of the production of finished 
articles, foodstuffs, and other materials needed by 
the civil population, by our armed forces, or else- 
where in the United Nations. This function will 
involve a survey of the pertinent industries, the 
supply of needed equipment and advice and 
assistance in its installation and use. * * * 

State Department Procedure for Implement- 
ing Economic and Social Programs 

[Memo, Implementation of the Econ and Social Aspect 
of the North African Program, attached to Min of the 
Mtg of the Interdepartmental Comm. of the OFT, 22 Dec 
42, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-8] 

The responsibility for implementing the economic 
and social program shall be centralized in the 
Office of Foreign Territories [OFT] which shall 
operate as follows: 

1. Recommendations concerning the policies 
and methods to be followed in dealing with the 
supply, purchase and distribution of materials 
will be submitted by the Civil Affairs Officer to 
the Office of Foreign Territories. 

2. The Combined boards in Washington shall 
be asked by the Office of Foreign Territories (a) 
to consider the recommendations of the Civil 
Affairs Staff as to the materials required in North 
Africa and to determine the amounts of such 
materials to be sent to that area as well as the 
sources from which they are to be obtained; (b) 
to designate materials required from North 
Africa and to decide as to their disposition; (c) 
to designate materials the production of which in 
North Africa should be expanded and appropriate 
sources of equipment required for this produc- 
tion; (d) to assign shipping for the movement 
of these materials. 

3. There shall be established by the Office of 
Foreign Territories an operating committee or 
committees to examine the recommendations of 
the Civil Affairs Officer in regard to questions of 
supply, purchase and distribution; to request the 
appropriate instructions from the Combined 
Boards and other authorities; and to carry out 
through' the appropriate United States and other 
agencies the decisions agreed upon. This commit- 
tee or committees shall include representatives of 
State, Lend-Lease, B.E.W. [Board of Economic 
Warfare], and the appropriate foreign represen- 

tatives. Representatives of the Combined Boards 
shall be members of the operating committee or 
committees concerned with (a) the purchase of 
materials in North Africa, and (b) supply of 
goods to be sent to North Africa. The operating 
committee of the Combined Boards may be util- 
ized to arrange for the allocation of strategic 
materials in accordance with the decisions of the 
Combined Board. The various United States and 
other agencies represented on the committee 
shall be asked to perform the operational func- 
tions necessary to implement other agreed-upon 

4. There shall be established by the Office of 
Foreign Territories a procedure for examining 
recommendations submitted by the Civil Affairs 
Officer and for establishing programs with respect 
to financial and commercial control matters in- 
cluding currency, exchange control, trading with 
the enemy control, enemy property control, and 
such control of local commercial and financial 
transactions as is necessary to prevent Axis firms 
in North Africa from being able to engage in 
such transactions. This procedure will involve 
regular consultation, perhaps through the crea- 
tion of a committee, perhaps through simple 
liaison arrangements with War and Treasury 
Departments of this Government and with any 
interested foreign representatives. Censorship and 
communications are regarded at this stage as 
military in character and must be handled by 
the military. 

5. Questions involving relief, public health and 
rehabilitation will be the responsibility of the 
Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation. 
Appropriate liaison and exchange of information 
will be maintained between the Director and the 
Office of Foreign Territories in order that matters 
of common interest, including the co-ordination 
of relief and rehabilitation supply requests with 
other supply programs, may receive the required 
attention in both offices. * * * 

Establishment of Political and Economic 
Council To Formalize British and American 

[AFHQ GO 4, 7 Jan 43, ACC (Allied Control Commis- 
sion) files, 10000/134/11] 

i. Announcement is made of the establishment of 
a Political and Economic Council for the purpose 
of advising the Commander in Chief, Allied 
Force, on political and economic matters and 
additionally for the purpose of co-ordinating and 
guiding the work of the various experts, Ameri- 
can and British, in North Africa. 


2. The Council will consist of a representative 
of the Commander in Chief, a representative of 
the Naval Commander in Chief, Expeditionary 
Force; Mr. Robert D. Murphy, and Mr. Harold 
[M.] Macmillan, as full members. 24 Such other 
members as are designated will attend council 
meetings as required. * * * 

6. The Council will deal with the wide aspect 
and range of political and economic problems 
which arise from time to time and such other 
matters as the Commander in Chief may refer to 
it for consideration. 

A Plan for Gradual Change To Complete 
Civilian Control 

[AFHQ Staff Memo 13, 10 Feb 43, G-5, AFHQ, MTO, 
HS files, Civil Affairs Office (CAO-44)] 

As soon as the military situation permits, the 
conduct of political and economic relations with 
the French Authorities in North Africa will pass 
into normal civilian channels. In order that this 
may be accomplished gradually, the following 
transition arrangements will be put into effect: 

a. The American Minister [Murphy], as 
Chief Civil Administrator, Allied Force, is 
charged with the direction of political and eco- 
nomic affairs as a member of the staff of the 
Commander in Chief. In order that there may 
be complete Anglo-American unity of purpose 
and policy in regard to these matters, the British 
Minister [Macmillan] has been invited to associ- 
ate himself closely with Mr. Murphy in the exer- 
cise of this function. Mr. Macmillan has accepted 
this invitation. 

b. For the purposes of insuring that civil 
administration is in accord with military require- 
ments, the Political and Economic Council set up 
by General Order No 4 of 7 January 1943, will 
remain in being. (The Council will meet as 

c. The Ministers will be assisted by a Secre- 
tariat which shall act as a Joint Secretariat to 
co-ordinate the work of the Ministers and the 
Boards or sections concerned. 

d. The particular functions in question are: 

"Macmillan, a member of the British Cabinet, was 
at the end of December 1942 appointed British Resident 
Minister at AFHQ to keep His Majesty's Government in- 
formed on political matters and to supervise the British 
civilians who were coming to assume positions in NAEB. 
The Political and Economic Council was formed in 
order to provide a formal means for co-operation with 
Macmillan, who, not being a member of General Eisen- 
hower's staff, required some medium for official collabo- 

(1) Conduct of relations with the French 
authorities on political and economic questions 
as distinguished from military questions. 

(2) Direction of all activities of NAEB 
subject to dominant military requirements. Any 
necessary readjustment of the existing machinery 
will be carried out in consultation with the CAO 
[Civil Affairs Officer]. 

(3) Direction of all activities of North 
African Shipping Board subject to dominant 
military requirements. Any necessary readjust- 
ment of the existing machinery will be carried 
out in consultation with naval and military au- 
thorities concerned. * * * 

Still More Washington Committees Arise 

[Memo, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for Dir, International 
Aid Div, 24 Apr 43, AFS, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-36] 

15. b. CCNA {Combined Committee for North 
and West Africa). 25 This committee consists of 
representatives of Lend-Lease, State, B.E.W., 
Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 
Army, Agriculture, Combined Shipping Adjust- 
ments Board and the British Embassy. It goes 
over and answers all cables from NAEB, assign- 
ing action to the appropriate agency and discus- 
sing the action taken or proposed, and the con- 
sequent cable answers. It handles about two hun- 
dred cables a month. . . . The Secretariat of the 
committee is furnished by the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff. . . . 

c. CCNA (U.S. Members only). This com- 
mittee meets upon call ... in Mr. Finletter's 
office to discuss problems of interest only to 
American agencies. Only one representative from 
each agency is permitted to attend, and he is 
supposed to be prepared to speak on behalf of 
this agency. . . . 

d. Tunisia Committee. The name of this com- 
mittee is perhaps misleading since it is intended 
by the State Department that this committee 
shall be a focal point for discussion of plans for 
all areas that are apt to be occupied by military 
action. . . . 

e. CCNA (Section II — Fiscal and Economic 
matters). These meetings are devoted to fiscal 
or economic matters which are attended by the 
Fiscal Division, ASF, and by the Civil Affairs 
Division. The committee picture is in a constant 
state of change at the present and is supplemented 
by various working subcommittees. 

*° Established in February 1943, it was an operating 
committee of the Committee of Combined Boards, and 
did its more routine work. 



During Initial Stages the CCS Should Be 
Kept Informed on Policy Matters 

[Memo, Secy's, CCS, approved by CCS, 27 Nov 42, CAD 
files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1)] 

Under the leadership of the State Department, 
the Committee of the Combined Boards has been 
set up in Washington to handle combined civilian 
economic matters regarding North Africa . . . 
[above, Sec. 3] 

Until the situation stabilizes in North Africa, 
civil and military matters will, of necessity, be 
closely interwoven and to some extent cut across 
each other. Civil matters in North Africa will be 
handled by the Civil Affairs Section of General 
Eisenhower's staff, and the channel of communi- 
cations will be from General Eisenhower to the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff. As the situation settles 
down, it is probable that the U.S. and U.K. 
Governments will establish some agency in North 
Africa which will take over many of the duties 
of the Civil Affairs Section of General Eisen- 
hower's staff, and, similarly, the civil agencies 
in Washington will be able to act progressively 
more and more independently from the Com- 
bined Chiefs of Staff. 

During the initial stages, however, and until 
the situation settles down, it is believed that the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff should be kept in- 
formed constantly of the actions taken by the 
Committee of Combined Boards which is being 
set up. In order to accomplish this, arrangements 
have been made whereby the secretariat of the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff will provide part of 
the secretariat necessary for the Committee of 
Combined Boards. * * * 

Eisenhower Again Protests Against the 
Semblance Of Divided Authority 

[Msg 609, Eisenhower to Marshall, 26 Nov 42, CAD 
Msg files, CM-IN 1492] 

Mr. Murphy has received, through this office, two 
messages from the State Department which out- 
line State Department plans for sending to North 
Africa a mission of economic and other experts 
to assist Murphy in his difficult tasks. . . . There 
is an acute need for such a body because the 
success of future operations from this base will 
depend very largely upon the speed with which 
the economy of this country is rehabilitated, at 
least to the point of sustaining a majority of the 
population above the starvation level. However, 
there is an implication in these messages that 
while Murphy is expected to remain a Staff 

Officer of mine, he would in another capacity 
be independently responsible to the State Depart- 
ment. This intent may not exist but the matter 
is so important that I must invite your immediate 
attention to it. 

No one could be more anxious than General 
Clark and myself to rid ourselves completely of 
all problems other than purely military, but the 
fact remains that, at this moment and until 
North Africa is made thoroughly secure, in which 
process the capture of Tunisia will be an im- 
portant incident, everything done here directly 
affects the military situation. Therefore, the body 
of experts mentioned should be sent at the earliest 
possible date to report to Murphy who should, 
for the time being, have the single status of head 
of my civil affairs section. * * * 

The purpose of this message is to request your 
aid in assuring, for the moment, that single- 
handed responsibility is maintained here, while 
the State Department may be assured that its 
staff of experts, through my civil affairs section, 
will receive every possible assistance and support 
in carrying on the work which is so vital to the 
future of successful military operations in and 
from this region, 

Mr. Murphy and his assistants are in complete 
accord with the conclusions above presented. 

Eisenhower's Authority in Civil Affairs 
Will Be Paramount as Long as Military Situ- 
ation Requires 

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Nov 42, OPD Msg 
files, CM-OUT 9420] 

I want to assure you that the State Department is 
working in closest co-operation with the War 
Department in supporting your operations in 
North Africa. . . . Your number 609, November 
26 [above] and this reply have been read by the 
Secretary of State. Mr. Hull is in complete agree- 
ment with the contents of this message. * * * 
As long as military operations in North Africa 
require it, Murphy will remain a member of your 
staff and be directly subordinate to you in all 
respects. The State Department had this in mind 
in sending its instructions to Murphy. 26 When 

20 Nevertheless, on 18 December 1942, Eisenhower was 
notified that Murphy had been appointed the personal 
representative of the President with the rank of Minister 
(see above). It has been observed, however, that one of 
Murphy's great contributions was that he represented the 
political point of view while attempting to fit completely 
into the military framework, Interv, Epstein, OCMH, 
with Brig Gen Charles M. Spofford, one-time member 
of the Jt Exec Vice Chairmanship, NAEB, 17 Apr 50. 


the military situation permits, and the time of 
arrival of this condition cannot be forecast now, 
the State Department desires to relieve you of the 
responsibility for civil matters. When that time 
arrives Murphy will begin operating directly 
under the State Department, but in closest co- 
operation with the military commander in North 
Africa. The War Department is in complete 
agreement with this plan, but as stated above it 
cannot be executed until the military situation is 
stabilized to a point permitting it. The final 
divorcement of civil matters from your control 
will be based on a recommendation from you at 
the time that the military situation permits such 
action. There may also be a transition period dur- 
ing which you might wish to divest yourself of 
certain responsibilities and the civilian group un- 
der Murphy's direction will be able to undertake 
them as you see lit and in accordance with your 
judgment. (This last sentence was drafted by Mr. 
Hull personally.) * * * 

War Department Seeks and Obtains Repre- 
sentation in the Washington Committee 

[Memo, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for the Dir, ID, 24 Apr 
43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-36] 

13. In the initial phases of the organization in 
Washington on the North African problem no 
provision was made for direct War Department 
representation on any of the organizations con- 
cerned. The only military representation pro- 
vided was that which resulted from having half 
of the secretariat of the Washington committee 
composed of Army representatives (one U.S., 
one U.K.) of the Secretariat of the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff. Consequently, there was no direct 
relationship between the Washington committee 
and the War Department. As a necessary result 
there was no co-ordination of War Department 
communications and those through other chan- 
nels. War Department communications on the 
subject were received from Allied Force Head- 
quarters; Combined Chiefs of Staff cables on the 
same subject were received by the Civilian Com- 
mittee, and some State Department cables on the 
subject were also, turned over to the Civilian 
Committee. Consequently neither group knew 
whether action proposed by it duplicated or 
merely supplemented action of the other group. 
It soon became evident that the Washington State 
Department committee for civil affairs could not 
properly handle the problem without the help of 
proper representation from the War Department. 
It was accordingly arranged in January that the 
Assistant Secretary of War, the Commanding 

General, Services of Supply, and the Operations 
Division, War Department General Staff, should 
be represented on the Washington committee. 
By informal delegation the responsibilities of 
these three offices were discharged by the Inter- 
national Division until the creation of the Civil 
Affairs Division. . . 

Civilian Supplies Must Be Consigned to the 

[ID Agenda, Mtg of WD Sup Officers, 12 Dec 42, ASF, 
ID files, 014, Civ Sup, N. Africa, vol. I] 

15. The question of consignment of civilian goods 
has arisen. The civilian agencies wished to have 
them consigned to Murphy; the War Department 
wished to have them consigned to General Eisen- 
hower. The matter was referred to General Eisen- 
hower by cable, with State and Lend-Lease agree^ 
ing to abide by his answer. The answer, received 
yesterday, requested all goods to be consigned to 
General Eisenhower. A supplemental cable indi- 
cates that this is to be accomplished as to "non- 
common" stores, by consignment to the North 
African Economic Council, as a subdivision of 
General Eisenhower's staff. 

Theater Commander Must Have Ultimate 
Responsibility for Civilian Supply 

[ID Agenda, Mtg of WD Sup Officers, 12 Dec 42] 

i. Responsibility for civilian supply for conquered 
territories, including places such as North Africa, 
has been delegated by the President to Lend- 
Lease, acting through the State Department. 
Such responsibility does not, however, encroach 
upon the responsibilities of the commanding 

:7 In December 1942 McCloy, Assistant Secretary of 
War, had become the War Department representative 
on the Committee of the Combined Boards and also on 
the State Department's Interdepartmental Advisory Com- 
mittee. Subsequently, the War Department obtained repre- 
sentation on the Combined Committee for North and 
West Africa (CCNA) and substantially all the other inter- 
departmental committees. AFS, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, 
I, 22, 26. 

Also in December there was established in the War 
Department an informal committee for North African 
Civilian Supply, consisting of representatives of the Inter- 
national Division, SOS; Operations Division, GS; Oper- 
ations Division, SOS; Transportation Corps, SOS; and 
the Army-Navy Petroleum Board. The committee acted 
under the chairmanship of the Director, International 
Division, which provided the secretariat Matters relating 
to civilian supply for North Africa were referred to the 
International Division for action so that proper distribu- 
tion of the problems might be made within the War 
Department, and correlation maintained between the ac- 
tion of the War Department and the action of the other 
agencies in Washington. 


generals of the theaters in question, and shall be 
at all times subordinate to him while the situation 
in the theater is purely under the commanding 
general on matters which affect or are affected by 
military operations. 

7. Since all ships that can be placed on the 
North African run are, and for some time will be, 
needed for military equipment, civilian supplies 
can be sent only as filler cargo unless displacement 
of military cargo is ordered by General Eisen- 
hower. This fact is not yet fully appreciated by 
the civilian agencies in Washington. 

9. Under present conditions, priority of military 
versus civilian cargo, and priority within civilian 
cargo, is in effect a command decision to be made 
by General Eisenhower and OPD. The other 
agencies of the War Department have the func- 
tions of: 

(a) Implementing such decisions. 

(b) Referring requests for civilian cargo, to- 
gether with analysis of possible treatment, for 

(c) Relating conduct of civilian agencies to 
the main problem. * * * 

But There Are Highly Trained CA Officers 
Without Appropriate Functions 

[Memo, Col Charles W. Rooth, Asst Civ Admr, AFHQ, 
for Murphy, Chief CA Admr, AFHQ, 29 Nov 42, CAD 
files, Husky Plan] 

Should the decision be made that the Civil Ad- 
ministration in French Africa be a function of 
the State Department 100 percent, then it is sug- 
gested that all trained Civil Affairs officers be 
segregated and organized into a planning group 
for the next tactical operation and the subsequent 
administration of Military Government. It is ex- 
tremely important that these trained officers be 
accessible for such planning with a minimum 
disruption to any local civil administration. 28 

28 Colonel Rooth headed the group of CA officers who 
had been trained at Charlottesville. His proposal was not 
acted upon. 

CA Officers Used Merely To Check Unload- 

[Memo, Rooth for the Exec Vice Chairman, NAEB, 6 
Jan 43, CAD files, Husk* Plan, ExecOff file] 

2. a. Are Civil Affairs officers to continue check- 
ing the unloading of ships? * * * 

[Memo, Bernstein, Financial Adviser, NAEB, for Carter, 
Chief of Finance, SOS, 10 Feb 43, OUSW files, A49-94, 
Misc and Sub, MG] 

A. 8. . . . Many of the Civil Affairs officers have 
had little opportunity to do useful work since 
their arrival in North Africa and they have had 
a sense of uselessness. Furthermore, at Oran and 
Casablanca, especially after the creation of the 
Mediterranean Base Section and the Adantic 
Base Section, the commanding army officers were 
increasingly disregarding the Civil Affairs offi- 
cers and using other military units to handle 
such matters as the civilian supply and ex- 
ports. * * * 

The Army Must Handle Deliveries 

[Memo, unsigned for ASW McCloy, Based on Conversa- 
tions With Persons Interested in Civil Affairs in Algiers, 
19 Mar 43, CAD files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)] 

The problem of getting the goods away from the 
ships and the docks to the warehouses (where the 
French take delivery and issue receipts) has been 
largely handled by the Army up to the present 
time and it has been decided that this job will 
be handled by the Army, so as to insure that the 
docks will be cleared promptly. NAEB is not 
equipped or staffed to handle this job, and if it 
had to assume responsibility for it, could only 
accomplish the task by borrowing men and 
equipment from the Army or by pushing the 
French to do the physical work. 


Eisenhower Welcomes Prospective Relief 
From Nonmilitary Questions 

[Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 30 Nov 42, WDCSA files, 
386, Africa, 1942] 

. . . The sooner I can get rid of all these ques- 
tions that are outside the military in scope, the 
happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten 
years each week, of which at least nine are ab- 
sorbed in political and economic matters. 

He Must First Settle Political Issue of 
French Federation 

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 Dec 42, CAD Msg files, 
CM-OUT 986] 

The President desires that when the "agreement" 
you refer to is completed, it be issued by you 
and French parties concerned as a "Joint an- 
nouncement" rather than as an "agreement," ref- 


erence your number ioio 2 December. 29 

The President does not wish the words "French 
Imperial Federation" included in such "Joint 

The foregoing is based on the premise that no 
act of ours can recognize any particular govern- 
ment setup, except such provisional one as is 
locally necessary for the prosecution of military 
operations. . . . 

Eisenhower Meets Political Difficulties in 
Seeking Help of French West Africa 

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 Dec 42, CAD Msg files, 
CM-IN 1629] 

Repeatedly Boisson [Governor General of French 
West Africa] said to me, "I want to put every- 
thing I have at the disposal of the United Nations 
under the leadership of the United States. But it 
is impossible for me to return to French West 
Africa, announcing such an intention and se- 
cure an enthusiastic reaction unless I can show 
that the United Nations and particularly England 
are taking obvious steps immediately to treat us 
as friends. Raids, propaganda and unauthorized 
flights must stop at once and I must be able to 
say that any of our people held prisoner by any 
part of the United Nations are to be freed at 
once." 30 

My point in all this is that it is necessary for 
us here to preserve the attitude that we are treat- 
ing with a friend rather than an enemy. With 
us this whole problem is cold-blooded military 
necessity; we do not show weakness as you can 
see from the nature of the rights and privileges 
accorded us by the French in original agreement. 
But I feel it is a mistake to demand co-operation 
and a friendly attitude on the one hand and on 
the other to act like we have here a conquering 
army which enforces its will by threat and views 
with intense suspicion every proposal of these 
people. . . . Frequendy some detail can be ex- 
changed for a big advantage and that is what we 
are trying to get when we ask for the full use of 
French West Africa. . . . 31 

"The agreement whereby French West Africa pro- 
posed to join Admiral Darlan's commissariat in forming 
a French Imperial Federation. 

M On 3 December AFHQ had sent to Washington the 
text of an agreement with Governor General [Francois 
Pierre] Boisson giving the United States all the military 
advantages which it sought in French West Africa. 
There were no civil affairs provisions in the agreement. 
See Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 270-71. 

81 On 5 December the British Chiefs of Staff sent a 
message to the British Joint Staff Mission giving the 
assurance that the Government of the United Kingdom 
would not permit action or propaganda from British 

Problem of Vichy Legislation Is Put Up to 

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 7 Dec 42, CAD Msg files, 
CM-OUT 2210] 

The following memorandum from the President 
is quoted for your information: 

There is a real desire here and in England 
that a statement be issued by the appropriate 
authority indicating that civil restrictions im- 
posed on the population in North Africa by the 
Vichy Government have been withdrawn, in- 
cluding the freeing of political prisoners, the 
abolition of the ban against labor unions and 
the lifting of restrictions against the Jews. 

I think that such a statement, if it could 
be made, would be very helpful, but I hesitate 
to do this without Eisenhower knowing about 
it and getting his views. Would you be good 
enough to get an expression from Eisenhower 
on this point and indication from him as to the 
effect of a statement such as I have indicated on 
the Moslems and the Arabs? 32 

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 Dec 42, CAD Msg files, 
CM-IN 3437] 

I am strongly in favor of President's plan. Three 
weeks ago I began working on the suggested 
lines and progress has been made in securing 
liberalization in many directions. . . . 

Upon receipt of your message, the subject was 
again discussed with Darlan, with the view of 
giving publicity not only to accomplishments but 
to announced aims. He is particularly grateful 
to the President for realizing and mentioning 
the fact there is a local Jew-Moslem problem that 
is full of explosive possibilities unless carefully 
handled. He is in favor of a public announcement 
that aligns him definitely on the side of liberal 
government and opposed to the Axis and what 
it stands for. I believe that the place and methods 
of issue of the statement can probably be decided 
better by appropriate authority at home than we 
can here. ... 33 

West African territories directed against the authority of 
Boisson. Eisenhower was asked to inform Boisson to that 
effect. OPD files, Exec 5, Item 4. 

''It is notewordiy that even in a purely political 
matter — and one in which the President felt the deepest 
concern — it seemed impossible to proceed without first 
obtaining the theater commander's views. The para- 
mountry of military necessity appears to have been recog- 
nized no less in Washington than in the theater. This 
was to be the case with most subsequent political issues 
as well. 

83 A statement was drafted for Admiral Darlan but it 
was made public in entirety only outside of French North 
Africa. It was feared that the liberal tenets advanced would 
not have happy repercussions locally. 


The Allied CINC Hears Criticisms op Politi- 
cal Situation Under Darlan 

[Msg, JCS to Eisenhower, 10 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, 
CM-OUT 3524] 

We have been disturbed by reports received dur- 
ing the last few days from North Africa via 
Europe about conditions in French Morocco and 
Algeria. These reports, which come from inde- 
pendent and reliable sources, all paint the same 
picture of the results which follow from our 
inability in existing circumstances to exercise 
control over the local French authorities in in- 
ternal administrative matters. 

These reports state "That the S.O.L. and kin- 
dred Fascist organizations continue their activ- 
ities and victimize our former French sympathiz- 
ers some of whom have not yet been released 
from prison. The first reaction of these organi- 
zations to the Allied landing was rightly one of 
fear but it seems that they have now taken cour- 
age to regroup themselves and continue their 
activities. Well-known German sympathizers 
who had been ousted have been reinstated. Not 
only have our enemies been thus encouraged but 
our friends have been correspondingly confused 
and cast down. There have been cases of French 
soldiers being punished for desertion because 
they tried to support the Allied Forces during the 
landing. * * * 

It is desired that you talk these reports over 
with Murphy and submit your comments and 
advice on all phases of this message at the earliest 
practicable date. It is suggested that you take such 
corrective steps as are practicable. 34 

Eisenhower Hopes That Civil Affairs Prob- 
lems Will Soon End 

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 22 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, 
CM-IN 9542] 

It is true as ever that complete military occupa- 
tion of this territory by the Allied forces should 
be undertaken only as a final and inescapable 
measure. We are trying to make a system work 
here which is admittedly full of defects from 
every standpoint, both at home and here. We 
know that many petty and even some prominent 
officials all over North Africa are either strad- 

" On 13 December Eisenhower replied at length to 
this message. While admitting that the political situa- 
tion was "most confused and very difficult," he did not 
feel that the reports in general were accurate and stated 
that on the whole he was "gratified with the progress 
being made toward a sound civil administration." OPD 
Msg Files, CM-IN 6093. 

dling the fence or are actually antagonistic. In 
this diverse population there is no general en- 
thusiasm in support of the war and there is no 
question that various reverses to us would be 
intensified in effect because of trouble in the rear 
and in the interior, which the civil administra- 
tion might not be strong enough to control com- 
pletely. This factor merely increases the tasks nor- 
mally involved in a military operation, so you can 
understand how earnestly we are seeking to pre- 
vent internal friction, at least until the difficult 
problem in Tunisia can be solved. * * * 

I have carefully kept my relationships with 
Darlan on a military basis, and he clearly under- 
stands this. But our military situation has con- 
tinued to be such as to make all of these civil 
matters an essential part of active operations. 
They have been a great burden but I understand 
that measures are under way whereby as quickly 
as possible civil and military matters may be even 
reasonably well separated and I can be relieved 
of direct responsibility for most of these things. 
I will be delighted. * * * 

War Department Also Wishes Eisenhower 
Freed From Nonmilitary Distractions 

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 22 Dec 42, OPD files, 
Item 36a, Exec 12] 

I think you should delegate your international 
diplomatic problems to your subordinates and 
give your complete attention to the battle in 
Tunisia and the protection of the Straits of 
Gibraltar. * * * 

New Political Problem Created by Darlan's 

[Hq Fifth Army, Red of Events and Documents, 9 Nov- 
25 Dec 42, Fifth Army Opn Rpts, OPD 105-11.5 

Algiers, December 24, 1942 — Admiral Jean 
Francois Darlan, High French Commissioner in 
French North Africa, is assassinated today! 

The enigmatic French politician-sailor is shot 
through the face and chest as he is entering his 
office at the Summer Palace following a late 
lunch. The assassin is a 22-year-old University 
student who is arrested immediately. By mid- 
night it still has not been learned if the murder 
was instigated by the Axis or some political 
clique or what, exacdy, was the assassin's motive. 
His true name has not been learned. * * * 

General Clark personally is shocked by Ad- 
miral Darlan's death. Darlan had fulfilled his 
many obligations and promises to Allied officers. 
There had been no indication that Darlan was not 


sincere. Repercussions of the Admiral's death can 
lead almost anywhere. What will the DeGaullists 
do? What perverted tangent will Axis propa- 
ganda take? Who can fill the void caused through 
Darlan's death? General Clark doesn't look for 
any serious unrest, but he thinks a few groups 
"may take advantage of the opportunity to cause 
disorder." As he looks at the dead French leader, 
the General thinks of two statements Darlan 
made to him at the luncheon yesterday: "Tomor- 
row the Axis press will say I gave this luncheon 
for you because you had a gun pointed at me." 
"I'd like to turn this thing over to General Gi- 
raud. He likes it here and I don't." * * * 

Late in the evening, General Clark gets in 
touch with General Eisenhower by telephone. 
The Commander in Chief will return to Algiers 
tomorrow. General Giraud is going to fly back 
from the front. General Eisenhower later radios 
General Clark: "You were quite right in abso- 
lutely rejecting Nogues. Consider Kingpin 
(Giraud) only possibility." Later, a radio comes 
from Washington saying that President Roosevelt 
"desires that no announcement be made refer- 
ence Darlan's successor." 

Question of Darlan's Successor and Proposal 
To Break With Vichy Pattern of Legality 

f Jt Msg, Eisenhower to CCS and Murphy to Secy of State, 
26 Dec 42, Exec 5, Item 4, CM-IN 11073] 

Immediately after Darlan's death last evening 
General [Jean Marie] Bergeret, Deputy High 
Commissioner asked me to call for a discussion 
of the situation resulting from Darlan's pass- 
ing. . . . Bergeret was in a state of indecision as 
to the procedure to be followed but he thought 
that it would be necessary to follow that estab- 
lished in a secret ordinance . . . said to have 
been signed by Darlan on 2 December 1942. . . . 
This document in essence provides that in case 
of inability or absence of the High Commissioner 
his functions would be assumed by General 
Nogues, Resident General in French Morocco, 
but if the inability was of long duration within a 
period of one month the Imperial Council would 
definitely exercise the functions of High Com- 
missioner. . . . He asked my personal opinion 
and I told him unequivocally that I felt that 
General Giraud is the only possible choice, that 
I felt that General Nogues would be unac- 
ceptable, and that furthermore I felt that now is 
the time of breaking with the notion that legality 
as provided by Vichy legislation is necessary to 
assure the functioning of a regime established 

in North Africa for the prosecution of the com- 
mon war effort. 35 

The United States Is Still Not Strong 
Enough To Impose Its Will On the French 

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Jan 43, CAD Msg files, 
CM-IN 2173] 

We have learned that in some quarters at home 
there ... is an apparent conviction that we are 
in North Africa as an occupying powerful, con- 
quering army fully capable of carrying out our 
military missions and, if need be, of controlling 
the population by force. ... As a result of this 
conviction it appears to be assumed that we are 
in position to deal with the French on the basis 
of giving orders and compelling compliance. I 
am writing this message for your exclusive and 
confidential information with the request that 
when opportunity arises you do what you can to 
correct or soften this view at least to the extent 
that during the ensuing critical weeks we do not 
receive any arbitrary instructions which might 
precipitate a military crisis. I know that you fully 
understand the essentials of our military situation 
and, therefore, are aware of the extent to which 
we are dependent upon active co-operation of 
the French. From the very beginning, this whole 
task would have been an easy one for us here, 
both militarily and politically, if we had been con- 
tent merely to seize ports and solidify our own 
bases and pacify the country. We did not take 
the easy, safe course, and I know you have always 
agreed that the decision to rush ahead although 
risky was fully justified. Even yet I think we 
gained tremendously by that decision, in spite of 
political difficulties that all have had their roots 
in the extent to which we have exposed our rear 
to sabotage and disruption. We must always face 
the fact that it will be many weeks yet before we 
can perform the military tasks in front of us and 
still be strong enough to impose our will arbi- 
trarily upon the local French. 

Ever since 9 November we have, in full con- 
formity with the spirit and letter of our original 
instructions, attempted to secure active French 
co-operation on the basis of friendship and have 
made our military dispositions on a continuation 
of such a relationship. I will be prompt in report- 

85 Giraud was, shortly afterward, chosen by the Im- 
perial Council as High Commissioner. He remained in 
that office until, on 3 June 1943, De Gaulle and Giraud 
became co-presidents of a French Committee of Na- 
tional Liberation. In August 1943 the United States and 
Great Britain recognized this body as de facto governing 
body in North Africa and other areas where its authority 
was accepted. 


ing to you personally when the time arrives that 
we are strong enough in front and rear to disre- 
gard, if so ordered, French and other viewpoints. 
The immediate effect of nonco-operation now 
would be catastrophic and, if anything we should 
be instructed to do might result in nonco-opera- 
tion, we must have ample time in which to re- 
adjust dispositions much more conservatively 
than at present. * * * 

Eisenhower Explains Why the Peyrouton 
Appointment Was Sanctioned 

[Msg, Eisenhower to Elmer Davis, Dir, OWI, 24 Jan 43, 
OPD Msg files, CM-IN 1 1349] 

. . . But what no American critic seems to un- 
derstand is that there is a great paucity of quali- 
fied men to fill the highly specialized posts in the 
civilian administraton of Morocco and Algiers. 
America further fails to consider the importance 
of a continuing orderly civil administration to 
our military operations. Abrupt, sweeping or 
radical changes, bringing into office little known 
or unqualified administrators, could create seri- 
ous difficulties for us. This is particularly true 
where the administration is connected with Arab 
affairs. Thus after two years of German pressure 
and propaganda, it is obvious that we could not 
find Frenchmen in positions of influence or 
power in this area, who would satisfy the demo- 
cratic feelings of America. But what America 
fails to understand is that amongst Vichy ap- 
pointed or Vichy approved officials here there 
still exist some Frenchmen who are bitterly Anti- 
Axis. It is not possible quickly and easily to de- 
termine beyond question which are the French 
officials who merely change their coats with the 
shift of the wind and which are those who can 
be counted upon to co-operate fully against the 
Germans. We have tried to work with the exist- 
ing administrative machinery, judging not on the 
basis of prejudice or past political affiliations in 
France, but upon a practical basis of how each 
French official proves himself in action over a rea- 
sonable period of time. Admiral Darlan offered 
to discharge any official for whom we could offer 
a substitute acceptable to the Allies and to the 
American and British press, provided only that 
he be qualified and also acceptable to the local 
population. No useful suggestions were forth- 
coming. Any Gaullist was considered as impos- 

sible, being regarded as too extreme by the leaders 
of the French armed forces. 

The present criticism on the part of the Ameri- 
can press centers around Peyrouton's appoint- 
ment. This case provides a typical example of the 
limited alternative which had been open to us. 
We could have retained Chatel with his heritage 
of weakness and political harlotry. Or we could 
have insisted upon a Gaullist candidate to which 
the French military leaders would have been 
completely opposed. Or we could accept the ap- 
pointment of Peyrouton, a man of known ad- 
ministrative ability with experience in dealing 
with such intricate North African problems as 
that of the Arabs. 

Contrary to the reaction in America, [Marcel] 
Peyrouton's appointment has caused no outcry 
here. It has been well received to all appearances. 
He is generally regarded as strongly anti-German 
and his antagonism to Laval is well-known. The 
State Department consented to Peyrouton coming 
here and knew of his intended appointment. 
The only active dissatisfaction may be presumed 
to be among the Gaullists and left wing groups 
which in North Africa however plentiful do not 
constitute an organized body capable of running 
a government. . . . 

Nine Months After Invasion Eisenhower 
Still Has Political Problems 

[Msg, Gen Smith, CofS, AFHQ, to Marshall, 6 Jul 43, 
CAD Msg files, CM-IN 3980] 

Murphy has just shown me a draft of a message 
to the Secretary of State suggesting for the Presi- 
dent's consideration that Giraud's visit to the 
United States affords an appropriate occasion to 
announce the recognition by the United States 
of the French Committee of National Liberation 
[FCNL] as the body which is collectively re- 
sponsible for the representation of French inter- 
ests until such time as a national government is 
established. 36 General Eisenhower concurs in this 
recommendation and our particular interest lies 
in the fact that once this recognition is afforded 
and representation of the British and American 
Governments is established here, we will be able 
to shift many of the political problems which 
now embarrass an encumber us to the shoulders 
of the customary representation. . . . 

38 For recognition of FCNL, see |Chapter XXTVJ, 



In Theory the State Department Is To Have 
All the Economic Worries 

[Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 30 Nov 42, WDCSA files, 
396, Africa, 1942] 

This morning I received your telegram [28 Nov 
42, in Section 4] concerning the functions of the 
State Department in developing the economy of 
this particular theater. I agree with every word of 
it and I can assure you that no trouble whatsoever 
will occur in the execution of the plan. * * * 

Eisenhower Concerned Over Effects of Civil- 
ian Supply Shortages on Military Operations 

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 9 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, 

... I am concerned at the present economic 
situation in North Africa and its possible influ- 
ence on military operations and urge that steps to 
alleviate it shall be initiated immediately. ... I 
cannot over emphasize adverse political effect of 
not meeting minimum needs of civilian popula- 
tion where it is possible to do so in view of public 
assurances in United States which have been 
given prominence in the press here. . . . 

Unless Tonnage Is Provided for Civilian Needs 
Military Shipping May Have To Be Reduced 

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 10 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, 
CM-IN 4698] 

. . . These tonnages are entirely inadequate to 
meet civil and French military needs. The civil 
needs are so closely tied up with success of the 
military campaign, that unless there is a general 
readjustment of shipping to increase the tonnages 
received here I ahall be compelled to decide be- 
tween reducing the size of the total forces or 
causing disaffection with the French by failing to 
supply essentials which they are expecting to 
receive. 87 

°* Shortly after this message, Brig. Gen. William K. 
Harrison, Jr., of the Office of ACofS for Materiel, reported 
a recent conversation with General Eisenhower as follows: 
"General Eisenhower places great stress on the necessity 
of doing everything possible to import the maximum of 
supplies for civilian economy. The underlying reason for 
this is the long unprotected communication line — approxi- 
mately 1,500 miles, Casablanca to Tunisia — the security 
of which in large measure is dependent on local military 
forces and civilian population." ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, 
I, 30-31- 

Thirty Thousand Tons of Civilian Supplies 
Monthly Needed 

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 26 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, 
CM-IN 1 1940] 

. . . I agree with civil experts that urgent local 
needs at present require approximate monthly 
civilian supply shipments of 30,000 tons and am 
convinced that any reduction in this figure would 
be dangerous from political and military stand- 
points. * * * 

Only Wheat Imports Will Effect 

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 29 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, 
CM-IN 12697] 

We agree that on crop figures there should be 
heavy quantities of wheat hoarded by Arabs 
especially in Morocco. As explained . . . there 
are two policies advised here to effect dehoarding: 
A: Substantial and early shipment of grain and 
B: importation of consumer goods. French esti- 
mate grain requirement civilian needs only was 
two eight zero thousand tons up to end of May. 
Our view however was that forty thousand tons 
quickly shipped and widely publicized and ac- 
companied by consumer goods would effect 
dehoarding. In view of shipping and port clear- 
ance difficulties we have necessarily had to 
reduce our wheat figure. This accounts for re- 
duction monthly demand ... to ten thousand tons 
only. We have gravest doubt however whether 
this quantity plus consumers goods will in fact 
effect our policy but proposed division of re- 
quirements in our opinion best compromise 

Civilian Supplies Should Be Sent Either as 
Broken Stowage or in Additional Ships 

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 5 Jan 43, OPD Msg files, 
CM-IN 2397] 

... I sincerely hope that experience in shipping 
to North Africa will parallel that in other 
theaters and that it will be possible to meet the 
civil needs without infringing on my military 
requirements. The following policy must be ad- 
hered to at least until the urgent military needs 
are met: No tonnage should be used for other 
than military supplies except that which can be 
made available by reduction of ballast and use of 


broken stowage not utilized for military supplies. 
The tonnage of any ships which are added to 
the present convoy limitations may be used exclu- 
sively for civil and French rearmament ship- 
ments. 38 

Stop Sending Stockings and Nail Polish 
[Msg, AFHQ to OLLA, 7 Jan 43, OPD Msg files, 4638] 

As set forth in our summaries of civilian require- 
ments stockings, nail polish and other items not 
on our requirements list, should be cut off in 
view of the more urgent items. 39 * * * 

What the Theater Urgently Requires the 
Civilian Agencies Cannot Provide 

[Msg, WD to Eisenhower, 27 Feb 43, CAD files, 200, 
N. Africa (2-27-43) (1) ] 

Personnel problem outlined McCloy's 2663, 
February 24, 40 recognized here as urgent. Civil 
agencies cannot find male stenographic help. All 
clerical help difficult to obtain. Executive per- 
sonnel being obtained by each agency. After con- 
sultation with State Department and other agen- 
cies appropriate solution for immediate problems 
appears to be to make available from here a 
limited number of enlisted men capable of sten- 
ographic or clerical work and junior officers 
trained for administrative work. . . . These men 
would report to you and could be detailed by you 
to the State Department to be used to complete 
NAEB field organization. In due course they 
would probably be replaced by civilian personnel 
when available. * * * 

Army Supplies Must Be Used When Lend- 
Lease Procurement Breaks Down 

[Memo, Franks, Dir, ID, for Dir, Distribution Div, SOS, 
15 Mar 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-21 ] 

5. The Office of Lend-Lease Administration had 
considerable difficulty in meeting . . . require- 
ments on the initial convoys to North Africa due 
in large part to the short notice upon which they 
were asked to make these goods available. 41 The 

38 The shortage of shipping was always to be far more 
serious than tie shortage of supplies. 

"These items could, of course, be justified on the 
ground that the farmers' wives would sell wheat to obtain 

* Assistant Secretary of War McCloy had made a trip to 
French North Africa and had sent an urgent cable on the 
personnel shortages. 

a For criticisms of OLLA supply operations, tee below] 
Also see Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics, 1943-45. 

Office of Lend-Lease Administration at once pur- 
chased existing stocks of French materials in this 
country and undertook steps to make available 
as quickly as possible the additional items 
needed. However, one of the early convoys upon 
which appropriate shipping space for the 30,000 
ton program was made available, was due to 
sail before Lend-Lease could make available 
sufficient cargo to meet General Eisenhower's 
request. Accordingly, at a general discussion on 
this subject in New York City on 5 January 
1943, called for the purpose of discussing an 
appropriate stockpile program to meet shipping 
needs, it was recommended that supplementary 
"insurance" stockpiles for this purpose be created 
by the Army, and it was decided that the New 
York Port should draw on port reserves to make 
up the necessary shipments for the convoy then 
in question. . . . 

Since the loading of the ships was then pro- 
ceeding, this decision was put into effect forth- 
with and a statement with respect thereto was 
submitted to the Office of the Quartermaster Gen- 
eral on 6 January 1943. 

6. On 23 January 1943 a meeting was held at 
which ... it was concluded that in lieu of estab- 
lished Army stockpile as an insurance measure 
for the above purpose, it would be better to follow 
the procedure where necessary of drawing on 
port stocks. * * * 

Even Minimum Requirements May Be Beyond 
Our Resources 

[Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 16 Jan 43, OPD Msg files, 
CM-OUT 57321 

2. . . . the Combined Boards here are some- 
what concerned lest the import requirements of 
North Africa be stated to Washington more in 
terms of normal pre-war needs than in terms of 
the situation as it exists today. The impression 
we get ... is that you intend to work out the 
import requirements on the basis of certificates 
of necessity, and we welcome this. Nevertheless, 
we think it is important to emphasize that it 
would only cause disappointment and difficulty 
if, in compiling the first estimates to be screened 
in North Africa, the impression should be gained 
by the French that anything like pre-war normal 
imports would be possible. . . . There will be 
other areas requiring support which have been 
much more severely affected by the war than 
North Africa. Therefore to set too high a stand- 
ard there would not only cause disappointment 


in that area bat resentment elsewhere at a later 
stage. 42 

War Department Supply Authorities Must 
Cooperate Even Though Without Formal 

[Memo, Maj. Arthur E. Palmer, Jr., Chief, Civ Sup 
Branch, for Dir, International Aid Div, 24 Apr 43, ASF, 
ID Hist o£ Civ Sup, DS-36] 

22. The supply functions of ASF with respect to 
areas such as North Africa would be divided 
roughly into two aspects. First as to North and 
West Africa itself, since the prime responsibility 
for availability of supply is that of the Office of 
Lend-Lease Administration, it is the duty of the 
International Division to be informed as to the 
needs for civilian supplies in these areas insofar 
as such needs are of interest to the military, and 
the manner and extent to which such needs are 
being met by the Office of Lend-Lease Adminis- 
tration. Since this type of problem is a new one 
to the Office of Lend-Lease Administration the 
matter is an organizational phase in that office 
and the work of keeping currently posted on 
progress is considerably greater than should be 
the case in the future. Nevertheless, there are 
instances in which assistance can be rendered to 

On the whole, the 30,000-ton-a-month program set 
by General Eisenhower was successfully met. The diffi- 
culty lay in the fact that both the French and some of 
the Washington civilian agencies believed a larger pro- 
gram desirable. 

Lend-Lease with its procuring problems and 
should be in order to make sure that the military 
requirements are met. . . . 

23. In addition to this general duty with respect 
to the present arrangement, the International 
Division also acts as a focal point in instances 
where the War Department is asked by the Office 
of Lend-Lease Administration to act as a procur- 
ing agency for items needed for civilian supply 
for North or West Africa. This occurs only in 
instances where the War Department is the 
sole procuring agency except in cases of emer- 
gency. * * * 

Nine Months After the Landings Military 
Chiefs Still Have Economic Worries 

[Memo, Brig Gen Robert H. Wylie, Asst Chief of Trans- 
portation, for Dir, International Aid Div, 22 Jul 43, ASF, 
ID files, 014, Civ Sup, N. Africa, vol. Ill] 

i. ... As the situation stands at present, our 
docks are practically clear of Lend-Lease cargo 
and none has been made available to us for Con- 
voys 14 and 15 . . . 

2. Cables from Eisenhower indicate that he 
holds the Army responsible for any movement of 
these supplies, but obviously we are at the mercy 
of the supplier in this instance. Frankly, we feel 
that we are being given the run around in this 
matter and feel that Mr. [Edward R.] Stettinius, 
Jr. [Director, Lend-Lease Administration] should 
be made cognizant of the situation. * * * 


Initial Uncertainty as to Who Is To Distrib- 
ute Supplies 

[Memo, M. S. McDougal, OLLA, for Oscar Cox, OLLA, 
19 Nov 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG] 

This is to report a conference with Col. Jesse I. 
Miller ... of the Provost Marshal General's 
Office. . . . 

Col. Miller is very much concerned about two 
problems: (1) The absence of any high policy or 
integrated planning for how the peoples of oc- 
cupied countries are to be fed, etc.; (2) the failure 
of his office in efforts to establish effective liaison 
with Lend-Lease. 

1. The Provost Marshal General's Office is 
charged with the responsibilities of training per- 

sonnel for military government and of making 
long-range plans (surveys, tentative programs, 
etc.) for the government of occupied areas. Yet 
that office does not now know who is to be 
charged with the task of feeding people in occu- 
pied territories. Is it to be the Army, or the Red 
Cross, or Lend-Lease, or some new organization 
which is to be tagged? Decision should not be 
postponed for improvisation each time some new 
territory is taken. Some agency should be charged 
in advance for all areas, with the duty of training 
personnel, making detailed preparations of all 
kinds, etc. Presumably (according to Col. Miller) 
the commanding officer will direct the policy of 
distribution; but he will not be able to do the 
detailed administration. ("Something's got to be 
done, and be done right away.") 


AFHQ Fortunately Able To Use Normal 
Civilian Channels for Most Distribution 

[ Pers Views of CA Sec. AFHQ, Recent Information From 
North Africa, 28 Dec 42, CAD files, 014, N. Africa 
(11-24-42) (1)] 

Distribution. . . . Taking the pool as a whole 
(Army barter goods, lend-lease goods, and British 
goods mixed together), it has been unanimously 
agreed in NAEB to divide the goods into four 
parts, the first of which will comprise the great 

1. Goods to be distributed through normal 
civilian channels. 

2. Selected goods to be given as a gift to hos- 
pitals, charitable institutions and extremely needy 

3. Goods to be sold through U.S. Army-oper- 
ated "company stores," to dock workers, airport 
workers and other special groups working for 
the Allied armies. . . . 

4. Goods to be accumulated as an emergency 
stockpile for use in Tunisia. 

All of these distributions will be under NAEB 

OFRRO To Get Ready for Field Operations 

[Msg, Hull to Eisenhower and Murphy, AFHQ, 1 Jan 
43, ASF, ID files, 014, N. Africa, vol. 11] 

In compliance with the responsibility placed by 
the President upon Governor Lehman as Director 
of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, 
relief and rehabilitation operations are to be con- 
ducted under his direction. 43 * * * 

[Statement of Lehman before the Senate Comm. on 
Appropriations, 9 Feb 43, CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-5- 
43 (i)l 

Mr. Lehman: . . . So far as concerns the goods 
used by the Army in its operations, that, of 
course, will be under Army direction and the 
direction will be American. 

Senator [Harold] Burton: And this American 
personnel that distributes the relief directly, do 
they wear Army uniforms, Navy uniforms, or 
civilian clothing? . . . 

Mr. Lehman: Of course those who distribute 
relief can't personally give it out; so they are 
using, to a great extent, local personnel. 

Senator Burton: Local civilian personnel? 

Mr. Lehman: Local civilian personnel. The 
Red Cross is co-operating, and their representa- 
tives are in the Red Cross uniform. Our men 

" The first OFRRO field mission left for North Africa 
the middle of January 1943. 

who will go over there will be in civilian 
clothes. * * * 

It Appears Unsafe To Rely Upon French 
Administration for Relief in Tunisia 

[Ltr, American Consul at Constantine, Algeria, to Secy 
of State, 30 Dec 42, CAD files, 400, N. Africa (12-30- 
4«) (1)] 

It is apparent that the economic situation fac- 
ing the Allied troops upon their entry into 
Tunisia, which unfortunately seems to be delayed 
in spite of the favorable conditions which existed 
there at the beginning, will be disastrous and 
will require immediate action. Such action should 
be undertaken directly by the Allied forces them- 
selves, as it is probable that the French Admin- 
istration will be so shattered by the present oc- 
cupation that some time will be necessary to 
re-establish it. * * * 

Operational Conditions Seem To Require 
Military Control of Relief in Tunisia 

[Memo, Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, ACofS, OPD, for 
CG, SOS, 8 Jan 43, CAD files, 400, N. Africa (12-30- 
42) (1)] 

2. Recent reports from General Eisenhower in- 
dicate that operational logistical problems of in- 
creasing seriousness now exist. My view is that 
it is essential that all military and civilian activ- 
ities operate under the unified and supreme con- 
trol of the theater commander, to insure that 
such activities will not complicate, but actively 
assist the accomplishment of the military mission. 
General Eisenhower should have final decision 
on all these matters including the amount and 
character of civilian aid, and control of the prior- 
ities and methods of its shipment, unloading, 
local transportation, distribution, payment diver- 
sion. * * * 

Civilian Agencies Want Army To Have 
Initial Burden in Tunisia 

[Notes on Mtg in Dept of State between Representatives 
of Civ Agencies and WD, 19 Feb 43, CAD files, 014, 
Tunisia (2-2—43) (')l 

Mr. [Luther] Gulick [OFRRO]: The OFRRO 
has been studying the problems of relief and re- 
habilitation which would be necessary in Tunisia. 
(He outlined some of the problems.) I assume 
that the initial operation of the program would 
be that of the Army, and in the next phase that 
of the French and the North African Economic 

Mr. [Thomas K.] Finletter [Director of the 
OFT] : Has the Army plans for handling these 
civil affairs and the initial period in Tunisia? 


Colonel Haskell: There is no information of 
that here. It is a job to be done on the ground 
and the War Department is not keen on plan- 
ning from this side. However, Eisenhower will 
be sent a cable asking his plans, stating that the 
belief here is that he should be planning for con- 
duct of civil affairs in the initial stages, and ask- 
ing if he agrees. 

Mr. Finletter: I then understand that the ini- 
tial chaotic phase will be an Army problem. 
(Everybody present agrees.) 44 But we here want 
to know Eisenhower's plans; not the details but 
the broad outlines. * * * 

Eisenhower Is Asked Whether He Will Do 
the Job 

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 23 Feb 43, OPD Msg 
files, CM-OUT 8356] 

State Department, Governor Lehman, Lend- 
Lease, and Board of Economic Warfare desire 
War Department views as to the United States 
agency to be responsible for planning operation 
civilian relief repair and restoration economy in 
Tunisia when occupied. 

Our view is that these activities during the 
initial stages of occupation will be so intimately 
linked to military operations transport and supply 
in this area that 

1. They should be definitely the sole respon- 
sibility of the military 

2. Administered by military personnel and 

3. Advance planned by you on the ground. 

State Department and above-cited civilian agen- 
cies are now of same opinion and would plan 
to relieve the military of such of these affairs as 
soon and in such degree as in your judgment is 
prudent. In the meantime they offer to place all 
information and such detailed plans which they 
have assembled here at your disposal. * * * 

Initial Phase of Civilian Relief Will Be a 
Military Job 

[CAD Memo for Red 13 Mar 43," CAD files, 014, Tunisia 
(2-2-43) (1)] 

i. By exchange of cables between the War De- 
partment and General Eisenhower, it has been 
established that civil supply and civil affairs in 

" It is clear that the civilian agencies did not con- 
sider themselves able to cope with this phase for the 
present. Whether or not they felt that the Army should 
always handle relief initially is less clear. In his testimony 
before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 9 Feb- 
ruary [above], Governor Lehman had stated that OFRRO 

Tunisia upon its recovery will be, for an initial 
period, a direct and sole military responsibility. 

3. Consequently it is a military function to sup- 
ply the necessary materials and personnel for 
discharging this responsibility, and in addition 
the materiel and personnel for continuing these 
operations until such time as military and other 
relevant circumstances permit the Theater Com- 
mander to delegate this responsibility to agencies 
of this government or the French or both. No 
other way can be relied upon for assuring the 
availability of appropriate supplies (shipped and 
procured on military priority), properly con- 
structed and packaged and marked for use under 
combat conditions. It is doubtful that other 
governmental agencies should be required to 
assume this responsibility. * * * 

Military Agencies Will Handle Even Pro- 
curement in Tunisia 

[Msg, WD to AFHQ, 18 Mar 43, OPD files, 014.1 Civil 
Govt, sec. 1 ] 

Final determination by War Department and 
United States governmental agencies is that plan- 
ning and initial stages of operation of civilian 
relief in Tunisia will be stricdy military respon- 
sibility. . . . 

Procurement and other support this phase of 
operation will be handled here by War Depart- 
ment and not through Committee of Combined 
Boards. ..." 

AFHQ Has Placed Civilian Relief Under a 
Special Detachment as a Military Respon- 

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 27 Mar 43, CAD Msg files, CM- 
IN 14509] 

Initial stages and planning of operation of civilian 
relief in Tunisia by Tunisian detachments a mili- 
tary responsibility. It is being directed by the Civil 
Affairs Section of this headquarters. The North 
African Economic Board is included in that sec- 
tion as is the representative of OFRRO. These 
agencies act joindy in the Tunisian operation. 47 

men could have gone in with the Army over the North 
African beaches if his office had been in existence then. 

** For organization o£ Civil Affairs Division see Chapter 

"The War Department had, previously, handled pro- 
curement of civilian supply only in emergencies, and 
generally by borrowing from existent Army supplies. 

" In other words, although the direction was to be mili- 
tary, the actual operation in Tunisia was to be joint mili- 
tary-civilian. In this respect it was only the nucleus of the 
full military control which was to come in later operations. 


Military-Civilian Team Operates in Tunisia 
Under Military Direction 

[Paraphrase of Msg, Murphy, Chief, Civ Admin, AFHQ, 
to Dept of State, 10 Apr 43, CAD files, 014, Tunisia 
(2-2-43) (1)] 

The War Department is in charge of relief work 
in reoccupied Tunisia and a detachment of Army 
officers and civilians with headquarters at Lekef 
[Le Kef] and representatives with the 8th 
[Eighth] Army are at the present time operating 
under my direction, in liaison with French civil- 
ian administration and co-operating with the 
latter on civilian relief. This detachment includes 
representatives of the Lend-Lease Administration, 
State Department and OFRRO. * * * 

How Tunisian Detachment Filled the Breach 
When French Distribution Broke Down 

[Lt Col Harvey S. Gerry, CO, Tunisian Det, Rpt to 
Murphy, Chief, Civ Admin, AFHQ, 10 Jun 43, CAD 
files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)] 

V. Food and Civilian Supplies 

Food and other civilian supplies that were 

shipped into Tunisia were divided between Lend- 
Lease goods and Tunisian stockpile supplies. 
We, at first, maintained control of the stockpile 
goods but at a very early date most of these sup- 
plies were also turned over to the French, for 
distribution subject to our control. Supplies were 
located at various strategic points around Le Kef, 
Souk-El-Arba, Tebessa and other towns with the 
idea that needed food and clothing would be 
rushed in as soon as an area was liberated. Cer- 
tain supplies were immediately brought in on our 
trucks but the bulk of the supplies were to be 
brought in by the French. The French distribu- 
tion system did not work and as late as 1 June 
only a few carloads of supplies had arrived for 
the Medenine, Gabes, Sfax, Kairouan and Sousse 
areas. Supplies for the Tunis area, however, did 
arrive close to schedule. 

When it became apparent that the distribution 
system by train planned by the French was not 
working, steps were immediately taken to obtain 
trucks which the French could use to bring sup- 
plies into the various areas and to distribute such 
supplies locally within these areas. . . . 


Should Some of the Civilian Agencies Be 
Tied Up Under the Military Staff? 

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 Dec 42, OPD files, Exec 
10, Item 36a, CM-OUT 968] 

. . . Mayor [Fiorello H.] LaGuardia has had 
some conversation with the President in regard 
to organization and control of propaganda activi- 
ties in your area in view of possible develop- 
ments upon termination of present activity. The 
idea is that he with a small staff with proper 
language qualifications should be assigned to you 
as part of your staff primarily for the co-ordina- 
tion of various activities now engaged in some 
phases of propaganda and psychological warfare. 
This scheme if approved, developed and executed 
would place the co-ordination of these activities 
in the hands of a man with the necessary back- 
ground and knowledge of local conditions. It 
might be a decided asset to you and at the same 
time relieve other members of your staff of the 
annoyance, confusion and loss of time attendant 
upon the activities of a number of semi-inde- 
pendent civilian agencies now in your area or 

about to descend upon you such as FCC, OWI, 
BEW, Red Cross, etc. It might also result in a 
decrease in the tendency to inject at this time a 
growing number of civilian agencies who want 
to have a finger in the pie. 

Prior to taking any action in the premises your 
reaction first to the acceptability of Mayor La- 
Guardia as a member of your staff, and second, 
reaction to the principle of placing all American 
civilian agencies i-n the area under one man on 
your staff is desired. 

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, 
Item 36a, Exec 10, CM-IN 1675] 

Do not consider it advisable at this time further 
to complicate my staff problems and procedure 
by drafting of Mayor LaGuardia. No individual 
regardless of personal qualifications could serve 
at this time as head of my civil affairs section 
except a man that has lived through the hectic 
experiences of the past few weeks. Murphy's 
broad experience precludes any thought of plac- 
ing him in a subordinate position. * * * 


What Sense ik Nonoperational Agencies 
Doing the Job the Army Is Qualified for? 

[Memo, Lt Col Frederick B. Wiener, DJAG, for the JAG, 
7 Dec 42, OPD files, 014.1, Civil Govt, sec. 1] 

1. Late Saturday afternoon Major J. [Joseph] M. 
Scammel, C.M.P., came from The Provost 
Marshal General's Office to see whether I knew 
of any precedents which might be of assistance 
in the following situation: 

It appears that the State Department and the 
Board of Economic Warfare are toying with the 
idea of taking control of civil affairs in North 
Af rica out of General Eisenho wer's hands [see 
|AFHQ Memo 13, 10 Feb 43^ section 3 above.] 
The frovost Marshal (jeneral was interested in 
finding instances in our history where civilians 
had been given such control, with a view to 
demonstrating from actual instances that it was 
a mistake to make any such transfer. 

3. I said that I did not know of any such in- 
stances because it had been the almost unvarying 
American practice to leave control of civil affairs 
in the hands of the military for a very long time. 

6. While therefore there were very few prec- 
edents of divided control, it would seem to me 
that on principle there was every reason not to 
remove civil affairs from the jurisdiction of the 
military commanders while hostilities were still 
in progress. I could see no compelling reason 
indicating why the State Department or the 
Board of Economic Warfare were better fitted 
for the task than was the Army. The State De- 
partment was not an operating agency and dealt 
only with the relations between sovereign states. 
The Board of Economic Warfare was not an 
operating agency and its functions were limited 
to a relatively narrow field. On the other hand, 
the Army had had experience in doing the thou- 
sand and one things that a government must do; 
it fed men, it housed them, it guarded their 
health, it operated camps larger than many cities, 
and it maintained courts and dispensed justice. 
By any functional standard the Army was in- 
finitely better qualified to administer a local 
government by reason of experience and practice 
than either of the other two agencies, and ex- 
perience indicated that, in any event, such control 
must be left to the military authorities as long 
as hostilities continued. 

Objection to Civilian Agency Operations 
Within the Theater 

[Memo, Miller, for Greenbaum, OUSW, 21 Dec 42, ASF, 
ID files, 014, Civ Sup, N. Africa, vol. I] 

(a) Civilian agencies have the entirely proper 
and useful function of assembling, outside the 
theater, and laying down in it the necessary sup- 
plies and material for civilian use. Distribution 
or other handling, after arrival in the theater, 
should be under the absolute control and direc- 
tion of the theater commander during any period 
of military necessity. Military necessity is a mat- 
ter of fact, not a matter of law or international 
politics. From this point of view, the activities 
of COB seem to be sound, provided General 
Eisenhower is left in supreme command in the 

(b) The formulation of long-view political, 
social and economic policies is properly the func- 
tion of civilian agencies of the government; 
their "implementation," during any period of 
military necessity, is the function of the military 
command. The implications of the asserted pur- 
poses of the Interdepartmental Advisory Com- 
mittee are, therefore, fraught with great danger. 

An Ill-Fated Proposal for Military Control 
of Civil Affairs From Mayor La Guardia 

[Memo, Maj Gen George V. Strong, ACofS, G-2, for 
the CofS, 23 Dec 42, WDCSA files, 386, Africa, 1942] 

r. Enclosed herewith is a letter from Mayor 
LaGuardia outlining a plan for propaganda and 
civil affairs in connection with the next phase 
of operations in the Mediterranean. 

3. Basically this plan is a matter of control, co- 
ordination and execution of propaganda, sub- 
versive activity, espionage and counterespionage, 
and other nonmilitary activities including civil 
affairs, in the theater, except those of the State 
Department, under a Staff Officer of the Com- 
manding General. It has the advantage of being a 
single military setup rather than having these 
affairs handled by a number of separate civilian 
agencies. Its disadvantage is that it runs counter 
to some of the activities assigned to OWI and 

4. It is recommended that this be forwarded 
to Admiral Leahy in order that the desires of 
the President in the premises might be made 


[Memo, Leahy for Deane, Secy, JCS, 24 Dec 42, WDCSA 
files, 386, Africa, 1942] 

The President says he will delay any action 
on this for a long time. 

War Department Observer Reports Need of 
Tightening Control and Co-Ordination in 

[Memo (unsigned), for McCloy based on conversations 
with persons interested in Civil Affairs in Algiers, 19 
Mar 43, p. io, CAD files, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)] 

. . . NAEB needs an experienced businessman 
to administer it and a good executive secretariat 
to pull it together. If possible, the "separate 
agency" idea should be minimized, and all civil- 
ian employees (whether Relief, BEW, Lend- 
Lease or what have you, and their British coun- 
terparts, if any), should be employees of NAEB. 
NAEB should be able to use any of its staff on any 
job for which need arises. There is some over- 
lapping between the functions of several of the 
divisions of NAEB. 48 

Head of Service Forces Wants Military Con- 
trol of Economic Matters 

[Memo, Somervell, CG, ASF, for McCloy, 3 Apr 43, OPD 
files, 014. 1, Civil Govt, sec. 1] 

i. Reference is made to your note to me of March 
29, and its inclosure consisting of . . . notes dated 
March 19 giving a resume of certain organiza- 
tions for handling civil affairs in the North 
African Theater. 

2. I have had these notes studied in my office, 
and submit the following comments and recom- 

a. Joint Economic and Political Council 
While the JEAPC [Joint Economic and Po- 
litical Council] is divided into two sections, one 
political and one economic, Mr. Murphy is the 
American representative on both. It will be noted 
that the British representative on the political 
side is from their Foreign Office, while their 
representative on the economic side is from their 
Military Supply Group. Obviously, this is an 
advantageous arrangement, for the British. Dur- 
ing military operations, economic matters must 

48 This is an excerpt from a lengthy report, evidently 
written by an individual close to McCloy, who had just 
returned from a visit to North Africa. It was circulated 
among leading War Department authorities concerned 
with civil affairs and received much attention because of 
its realistic description and analysis of the entire setup 
for civil affairs in the theater. The writer, though con- 
cerned over the lack of co-ordination, did not himself 
criticize the principle of civilian control. 

be decided by their military rather than by their 
political import. Mr. Murphy as a representative 
of the State Department must necessarily be 
largely guided in his actions by his political views, 
which may be at variance with military necessity. 
I am very definitely of the view that the economic 
side of the picture should be completely disas- 
sociated from the political. Mr. Murphy should 
act as a political adviser to the Theater Com- 
mander in conjunction with his British opposite. 
Certainly, the Theater Commander will take this 
advice into consideration in making decisions 
with respect to the economy in North Africa. 
However, the reports reaching him, and the 
policies with respect to the economy in North 
Africa should not be drawn up with the political 
question dominant. It is believed that the Eco- 
nomic and Political Councils should be separated 
entirely, and that a Staff Officer experienced in 
suppLy should replace Mr. Murphy on the North 
African Economic Board if this Board is con- 

b. North Africa Economic Board 
I believe that the North Africa Economic 
Board should be abolished and its functions taken 
over by appropriate Staff Divisions on the 
Theater Command Staff. . . . Basically, there 
might be three such divisions: (1) A General 
Purchasing Agency to replace the military section 
with both British and American purchasing 
agents; (2) A Civilian Supply Section which 
would control both imports and exports; (3) A 
Fiscal Section, and (4) if necessary, a Relief 
Section. These sections should all be handled by 
Staff Officers, and the representatives of the civil- 
ian agencies should be assigned as advisors during 
the initial occupation and while military opera- 
tions are still under way. As the military move 
out, these officers should be prepared to take over 
and carry on. The initial staff should be provided 
from military personnel to be replaced later by 
appropriate civilian administrative and clerical 
assistants as these assistants can be brought into 
the area. * * * 

General Comments on NAEB — The general 
comments on NAEB spring definitely from lack 
of advance planning, failure to establish firm poli- 
cies, and the many divisions of responsibility 
which result from so many of its representatives 
reporting indirectly to so many different agencies 
in Washington or London before being willing 
to expound their positions. * * * 
3. Recommendations 

I would strongly recommend that the Acting 
Director of the Civil Affairs Division of the War 
Department, together with representatives of the 
Operations Division, WDGS, and of the Army 


Service Forces, specially selected for the purpose, 
be formed into an ad hoc committee to prepare 
a sound joint organization, and a guide manual 
to be presented for United Kingdom agreement 
so that this may be promulgated and issued as a 
directive to all Theater Commanders. The time 
for preparation of such a guide is limited now, 
and early action is needed. 

Civilian Control Should Not Be Abandoned 
Until We Occupy Enemy Areas 

[Memo, Col Julius C. Holmes, Chief, MGS [Military 
Government Section], AFHQ, for Haskell, Actg Dir, 
CAD, 10 Apr 43, CAD files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) 

(2-b) The recommendation that the North 
African Economic Board be abolished is not, I 
believe, in conformity with General Eisenhower's 
policy. 49 He has indicated that as rapidly as the 
military situation permits, he wants to have civil 
activities, both political and economic, separated 
from the military. Under his instructions, some 
progress has been made in that direction already. 
I believe that one reason which prompts this 
attitude on General Eisenhower's part is that 
North Africa is not enemy-occupied territory and 
is rapidly assuming the status of an ally, if not as 
yet an admitted member of the United Nations. 

General Somervell's memorandum seems to 
cover two general subjects, that is, the existing 
situation in North Africa, and plans which should 
be made for future operations. It is of course 
recognized that a different policy must be pur- 
sued and different machinery set up to take care 
of the situation in enemy territory. I think that 
General Eisenhower would agree that the admin- 
istration of enemy-occupied territory should be 
handled entirely by the military, and this is in 
conformity with plans with which you are fami- 

[Memo (unsigned), for Dir of CAD, 13 Apr 43," CAD 
files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)] 

2. ... It seems clear that the organization of 
the NAEB was a mistake and that all matters 
handled by it should have been handled by ap- 
propriate sections of the staff. If experts from 
other branches of the government were needed 
they should have been commissioned for the pur- 

** Colonel Holmes happened to be in Washington at 
the time, having brought over the AFHQ plan for mili- 
tary government in Sicily. 

80 This is an extract from a very rough draft, comment- 
ing on General Somervell's memorandum for McCloy of 
3 April, above. 

pose. However, it may be doubted whether it 
would be wise to disturb this situation at the 
present time. Any attempt to do so would almost 
certainly bring on protracted arguments with 
other branches of the government. And the at- 
tempt might be ultimately unsuccessful. It would 
seem wiser to stand pat on the present situation in 
North Africa and to make certain, in the case of 
the next occupied territory, that the whole matter 
be handled by the military. It will be psychologi- 
cally and politically easier to prevent the estab- 
lishing of another NAEB in the next occupied 
territory than it would be to abolish the present 
board. "Possession is nine points of the law." 
There are many vested interests that would al- 
most certainly resist the abolition of the present 
board. And if these should succeed in saving the 
NAEB they would then be in position to argue 
that the principle had been settled and might 
thereby be able to bring about the establishment 
of such boards for other areas. 51 * * * 

Lend-Lease Does Not Seem a Proper 
Operating Agency 

[Memo, Capt Palmer, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for the 
Dir, ID, ASF, 16 Apr 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS- 

7. The best information available to date indi- 
cates that the only important civilian supply 
problem for North Africa is the problem of ful- 
filling a stated requirement of approximately 
10,000 tons a month of industrial materials. This 
material is in short supply in this country and 
presents a real procurement problem. It is stated 
by civilian authorities in North Africa to be es- 
sential to the economy of the country. The prob- 
lem of providing food is a very simple problem 
and, to some extent, the same may be said of 
clothing and other miscellaneous materials. 

8. On the basis of all available evidence it is 
not possible to come to the conclusion that Lend- 
Lease may be able to discharge with any degree 

61 Although NAEB was left in the control of civilian 
agencies, it retained its status within the military frame- 
work much longer than was originally intended. In 
accordance with the plan of eventual "civilianization" of 
Allied economic activities in French North Africa, the 
decision was made, after the completion of the Tunisian 
campaign, that NAEB should be superseded by a wholly 
civilian organization in November 1943. But it proved 
very difficult to find civilian replacements for certain 
key military personnel, and the conversion of NAEB was, 
consequently, long delayed. Finally, on 1 June 1944, it 
was replaced by the North African Joint Economic Mis- 
sion, a civilian agency, which was placed directly under 
the two Allied governments. Robert W. Komer, Civil 
Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean 
Theater, MS, OCMH files, pp. ;9ff. 


of success its supply responsibilities as to indus- 
trial materials. Lend-Lease states that the matter 
is well in hand and that substantial deliveries will 
be expected in the near future and may be ex- 
pected to continue at a satisfactory rate. 

9. Although this may well be the case, all 
available evidence points to a contrary conclusion. 

10. Analysis shows that the North African 
•Economic Board has requested 50,400 tons of 
critical industrial material for delivery by 30 June 
1943. Lend-Lease has filed requisitions for ap- 
proximately 29,700 tons of such material, has ob- 
tained deliveries of 1,250 tons, has shipped 9,300 
tons to North Africa, and expects to have 2,700 
tons at ports of export by 30 April 1943. 

11. In response to repeated attempts to obtain 
detailed information as to forecasts of delivery 
schedules, no information has been provided 
other than oral assurance that "everything is 
under control." 

12. The basic difficulty to be faced is that Lend- 
Lease has never been organized as a procuring 
agency and is not now staffed to perform such a 
duty. It was created after the main foreign coun- 
tries had already established large and capable 
purchasing missions in this country. Consequent- 
ly, it has operated in only a general staff capacity. 
Similarly, Treasury Procurement, the operating 
agency for most of the purchasing in question, 
has at all times had available the assistance of the 
foreign purchasing missions and there is no 
evidence that it is a properly qualified operating 
agency to undertake the difficult procurement 

13. In view of the foregoing the conclusion 
seems inevitable that only a small percentage of 
the critical industrial materials stated to be needed 
in North Africa will be furnished in the absence 
of a drastic change in the present operation. 
There are several possible solutions. One is to 

strengthen Lend-Lease and Treasury Procure- 
ment in such a way that they are capable of truly 
discharging their responsibility. Another is to 
establish a strong French Purchasing Mission to 
provide the assistance which is normally provided 
in the case of most foreign governments. A third 
possible solution is to have General Eisenhower 
requisition through G-4 of the War Department 
all materials, the supply of which is truly im- 
portant in North Africa. 52 

More Criticism of Civilian Agency Supply 

[Memo, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for Dir, ID, ASF, 24 
Apr 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-36] 

. . . matters of civil supply were not properly 
organized and to date are still in an unsatisfactory 
state of initial organization. As a direct result, 
the exports from the United States to North 
Africa for the purpose of supporting the civilian 
economy have not included appropriate materials. 
Exports to date have consisted of large quantities 
of wheat, flour, sugar, tea and soap, with some 
cotton cloth and varied industrial materials in- 
cluded. The requirements for the area, it now 
appears, would have been much more satisfac- 
torily met had the exports consisted of industrial 
items in large quantities and cotton cloth and 
spare parts of automotive equipment to re-estab- 
lish the internal transportation which is the most 
vital problem now facing the population. Con- 
sequently a rich food producing area is importing 
food for its cities, and to some extent food is pil- 
ing up at the ports rather than being distrib- 
uted. * * * 

52 For an account of the continuing problem of indus- 
trial rehabilitation supplies for devastated areas, see 
Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics, 1943-45. 


Eisenhower Foresees That the "Locusts" 
Will Need Co-ordination 

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Dec 42, OPD files, Item 
36A, Exec 10, CM-IN 1672] 

I hope you will keep track of the various agencies 
which you say will soon be sending representa- 
tives like locusts to descend upon me and con- 
vince them that the whole should be organized 

in the states into a single unit under a man like 
LaGuardia. 53 The idea of a single staff authority 
over the whole gang is eminently sound and I 
want them all to understand it before coming 

K See above, |page 5571 for the abortive plan of co- 
ordinating propaganda and civil affairs under Mayor 
LaGuardia as a member of General Eisenhower's staff. 


North Africa — A Warning Signal of Impend- 
ing Breakdown 

[Memo, James E. Webb, Dir of Bur of the Budget, for 
Roosevelt, 6 Feb 43, WDCSA files, 386, Africa, 1942] 

North Africa, the first sizable relief problem en- 
countered, provides a warning signal of impend- 
ing breakdown in our international operations. 

Under its original Executive Order, the Board 
of Economic Warfare was given broad powers 
for post-war international economic planning. . . . 
It is still responsible presumably for procurement 
and development of North African raw materials, 
and for stockpiling goods in foreign areas for 
relief purposes. At present it has a mission in 
North Africa. 

When North Africa was invaded, the Lend- 
Lease Administration was directed to procure, 
finance, and distribute relief goods, and to meet 
all other civilian requirements, OLLA has accord- 
ingly begun to staff itself for the relief job. 

The State Department then received a directive 
to co-ordinate the activities of all civilian agencies 
operating in North Africa. 

Meanwhile, the War Department is maintain- 
ing a school to train officers to administer reoccu- 
pied territories in the wake of our armed forces. 
In North Africa military expediency had dictated, 
as it must, the direction of our economic opera- 

To sum up: BEW plans, hopes to rehabilitate, 
and may develop; Lend-Lease plans, procures, 
finances, and distributes; the Department of 
State plans and attempts to direct; the Army 
plans, administers, and directs; — all with respect 
to the same geographical area. 

Much more is needed here than the mere addi- 
tion of another authority with broad vague 
powers of "co-ordination and integration." 54 It is 
the confusion in the basic war jobs — the multi- 
plicity of operating agencies — which complicates 
the task. * * * 

[Memo, Dir of Bur of the Budget for Roosevelt, 3 Mar 43, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library] 

3. In reviewing 1944 budget estimates and cur- 
rent proposals for allocations of funds for mis- 

" This memorandum was largely prompted by the 
issue whether the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilita- 
tion Operations, as its director desired, should be given 
an executive order vesting it with power of co-ordinating 
civilian agencies in the sphere of civilian relief and re- 
habilitation abroad. Although OFRRO had been in exist- 
ence for several months, its powers had not as yet been 
authoritatively defined. 

sions to be sent to North Africa by Lend-Lease, 
BEW and OFRRO, I find even more striking 
cases of duplications in the proposed programs 
of these agencies than I had heretofore suspected. 
Each agency is mobilizing an almost identical 
corps of industrial, agricultural, transportation, 
construction, economic, and foreign trade experts 
to be sent to North Africa; and programs for 
other areas are in the making. 

4. The Army is gravely concerned over the 
task of dealing with a large array of civilian 
agencies here, in North Africa, and on new 
fronts. . . . Issuance of the OFRRO order as 
now written would further difficulty. 

5. The State Department has taken some 
positive measures to correlate economic opera- 
tions and policy in occupied areas, as for example 
the establishment of an interdepartmental com- 
mittee in Washington and the North African 
Economic Board. But . . . current methods 
leave large gaps in harmonizing these operations 
and they fail to tie economic programs together 
closely enough with the propaganda and political- 
diplomatic programs. Deficiencies in the inter- 
nal organization of the State Department and 
the number of separate agencies to be co-ordi- 
nated offered serious obstacles. 

6. Current disunity and competition among 
American agencies play into the hands of the 
enemy and confuse our allies. A unified front in 
dealing with the British, the French in North 
Africa, and others is lacking. The Axis propa- 
ganda machine is making the most of the con- 
flict of American agencies. 

When the several agencies with foreign eco- 
nomic programs all go up to Congress in support 
of their 1944 budget and describe virtually iden- 
tical programs and types of operations to be 
carried on both in Washington and overseas, the 
Administration will be subject to heavy criticisms. 
Moreover, Congressional reaction might be such 
as to endanger the whole foreign economic pro- 
gram by refusing to appropriate for important 
segments and by airing the whole situation in 
public, to the detriment of the program both 
at home and abroad. 

Recommended Steps: 

1. Assign to the State Department (not to 
OFRRO) [See I Chapter IV, Section H] the re- 
sponsibility for co-ordinating the war programs 
of American civilian agencies abroad. . . . 

2. Establish adequate and properly organized 
facilities within the State Department for co- 
ordinating foreign economic, propaganda, and 
political policies and for guiding the policies and 


programs of civilian agencies abroad (e.g., North 
African Economic Board). 

3. Organize OFRRO, Lend-Lease, BEW, and 
perhaps certain RFC agencies and parts of CIAA 
[Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs] as con- 
sistent parts of a single agency, somewhat in the 
form of the National Housing Agency. This 
would immediately clear up any of the difficulties 
cited above and would bring into manageable 
dimensions the job of the State Department in 
harmonizing American civilian, military, other 
national and United Nations organizations with- 
out its having to sit on a fox's lair of competing 
American agencies. With a consolidated eco- 
nomic agency, the separate and competing mis- 
sions of American agencies could be replaced by 
an integrated staff headed by an operating official 
working under the direction of the State Depart- 
ment. * * * 

An Integrated Policy Needed if Bad Perform- 
ances Are Not To Be Repeated 

[Memo, Capt Donald McLean, CAD, for Actg Dir, CAD, 
on a meeting with Thomas K. Finletter, Spec Asst to the 
Secy of State, 3 Apr 43, CAD files, 334, CCNA (3-2-43) 

3. Mr. Finletter then stated that he was becom- 
ing increasingly concerned over the possibility 
that problems involving the civilian economy of 
occupied areas might be as badly handled in new 
areas as they had been in North Africa. 55 He said 
they thought the question should be investigated 
by all the agencies with a view toward developing 
an integrated program. . . . 

4. For the purpose of stimulating thought on 
the subject, Mr. Finletter suggested that skeleton 
staffs be set up in Washington to consider pro- 
posed areas, with the end in view that the group 
which had been working on a given area in 
Washington would assume responsibility of the 
same nature in those areas as soon as the Com- 
manding General authorized their assumption 
of responsibilities. Although the specific question 
did not arise, Mr. Finletter was assuming the 
possibility that the NAEB pattern would be fol- 
lowed in all areas. * * * 

68 Some of the most critical remarks about the working 
of the civilian agency setup came from civilian agencies 
themselves, particularly the State Department and OFRRO. 
It should be noted that much stronger criticism was direc- 
ted against the Washington agencies than against NAEB 
in the theater, which, despite the transiency of its per- 
sonnel, appears to many to have done a rather good 
job. Interv, Epstein, 18 Apr 50, with Spofford who was 
connected with the North African operation in a military 

The Civilian Supply Branch Deplores Con- 
fusion of Responsibility 

[Memo, Maj Palmer, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for Dir, 
ID, 24 Apr 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-36] 

12. . . . The delegation of . . . duties in Wash- 
ington has not been focalized in a satisfactory 
manner. The State Department in Washington 
purports to act on such affairs under a letter from 
the President rather than under the request from 
the War Department. In addition, the State De- 
partment acts as chairman of an informal com- 
mittee which in turn was charged with certain 
duties with respect to civilian affairs in North 
Africa in CCS 126 [COB]. The Office of Lend- 
Lease Administration, which has assumed the 
responsibility for providing necessary civilian 
supplies to the area, purports to act under a di- 
rective received from the President rather than 
under a directive from the State Department or 
from the War Department, either of which could 
have been proper procedure. . . . The result of 
the foregoing is that none of the agencies in 
Washington are responsible to any of the direct 
participants in the operation and their only com- 
mon meeting ground is the informal State De- 
partment committee in which they participate 
and from which they can withdraw without 
weakening their responsibility with respect to 
North African affairs. 

Should War Department Provide Leadership? 

[Memo, Lt Comdr Perry R. Taylor, USNR, for Deane, 
CCS Secretariat, 7 May 43, CAD files, 014, N. Africa 
( 1 1-24-42) (1)] 

Several indications are now appearing that the 
CCNA activities might develop into mere for- 
malities. Matters requiring decision by COB can- 
not be determined by CCNA and there is an 
increasing trend on the part of the individual 
U.S. agencies to return to the pre-COB system, 
where each agency carries on what it considers its 
business without any reference to other agencies. 
Duplication and lack of co-ordination are the 
obvious results. It is believed that the principal 
cause for this trend has been the inability or un- 
willingness of the State Department to give ade- 
quate leadership to the necessary co-ordination 
among the U.S. agencies. 

. . . There appear to be two courses; one, that 
the military urge the State Department to take 
the leadership insofar as French Africa is con- 
cerned, and two, that the military provide this 
leadership itself. * * * 


General Hilldring Prefers Diplomacy to War 
Department Leadership 

[Memo, Maj Gen John H. Hilldring, circa Jun 43, CAD 
files, 321, (1-1-43) (1)] 

* * * In consultation with State Department 
yesterday afternoon, I agreed that a subcommit- 
tee appointed by Secretary Hull would have 
greater legal standing than one appointed by the 
Secretary of War. My consent to this arrange- 
ment was not without consideration for the fact 
that present excellent relationship between War 
Department and State Department would be en- 
hanced by this arrangement, and would be 
severely strained if not damaged, if I barged 
ahead with my original plan. 

Please prepare a letter for the Secretary of 
War's signature requesting that he appoint un- 
der the authority cited a subcommittee on mili- 
tary government. . . . 

Machinery for Co-Ordination of Civilian 
Agencies Will Be Set Up 

[Min, Mtg of WD Gen Council, 14 Jun 43, OPD files, 
334.8, Gen Council] 

General Eisenhower has experienced much dif- 
ficulty with various civilian agencies operating 
within his theater because of absence of definite 
understanding concerning the jurisdiction of 
these agencies. Settlement of such jurisdictions 
should be made before these units go overseas. 
Bureau of the Budget is now attempting to set 
up machinery to accomplish this, and last week 
the President directed the Secretary of State to 
designate one of his assistant secretaries to co- 
ordinate with all such agencies. . . , SG 

M The reference here is to the President's establish- 
ment of the Office of Foreign Economic Co-ordination. 
See below, | Chapter IV, Section 3. | 



The War Department Prepares for a 

Broader Role 

Before operations in French North 
Africa the only War Department agency 
to engage in intensive preparation for a 
role in civil affairs was the Provost 
Marshal General's Office — more particu- 
larly the small Military Government Divi- 
sion established in that office in July 1942. 
This division, although vested with a 
charter authorizing it to engage in broad 
planning, was in fact scarcely in a position 
to extend its activities and influence beyond 
the sphere of training. The division, if not 
the Provost Marshal General's Office itself, 
was on too low a level to speak for the War 
Department as a whole and, aside from the 
backing given General Gullion by the Sec- 
retary of War in the issue over the Army's 
control of training, it did not command 
much active support. The attitude of 
other agencies of the War Department ap- 
pears, indeed, to have been less one of 
opposition to or support of military con- 
trol of civil affairs than lack of awareness 
of the issue. The multitude of major prob- 
lems which pressed upon the Army during 
the first year of the war left little time for 
concern over the onset of civil affairs 
responsibilities in French North Africa. 
Because this area was friendly territory, 
and arrangements for civil affairs adminis- 
tration could be placed in the hands of 
the French, it seemed possible to allow 
civilian agencies to take over the handling 
of the economic problems which would 

normally have been the responsibility of 
military authorities in Washington. 

The close relationships between supply 
problems and military operations disclosed 
by the French North Africa experience, 
together with the failure of civilian agen- 
cies to handle such problems with com- 
plete satisfaction, jolted a number of War 
Department authorities out of their com- 
placency. Although the decision was 
made for practical reasons to leave the 
arrangements in French North Africa un- 
changed, the matter was quite different as 
regards occupation of enemy territory. 
This became a pressing question when it 
was decided in January 1943 to launch an 
invasion of Sicily. In the early months of 
1943 assertions in the War Department as 
to the importance of placing civil affairs 
under military control became more fre- 
quent and emphatic, particularly among 
supply authorities. 

But it would be impossible to assume 
such control, or to defend it against the 
conflicting aspirations of civilian agencies, 
without correcting the confused and in- 
adequate organization for civil affairs 
which then characterized the War and 
Navy Departments. This placing of the 
military house in order entailed particu- 
larly the establishment of a high-level 
agency in the War Department to assume 
for that department, if not for both of the 
armed services, the central co-ordination 


of military civil affairs activities and a uni- 
fied liaison in this sphere with civilian 
agencies. Other questions involved were 
the settlement of the responsibility for 
planning military policies for future civil 
affairs operations, the establishment of a 
military program and organization for 
civilian supply, and the further enlarge- 
ment of a training program. The prob- 
lem of preparing control machinery for 
combined operations was also involved, 
and the disposition of the British to favor 
the delegation of future operations to a 
combined civilian agency proved a potent 
stimulus to the crystallization of a War 
Department decision to assume the lead- 
ing role in initial civil affairs operations. 
The creation of combined organization for 
civil affairs came later than the establish- 
ment of an improved civil affairs organi- 
zation and involved different types of 
problems ; it is therefore treated separately 

(see iChapter V|) . The effective organi- 
zation of the American military establish- 
ment for civil affairs involved many ad- 
ministrative issues, including such difficult 
ones as the compromise of conflicting de- 
partmental claims. Still more important, 
it involved the question of how long the 
military authorities should assume civil 
affairs duties in a situation where tactical 
efforts demanded so imperatively the 
greatest concentration of military re- 
sources. Far from indicating a military 
plot to wrest complete control of civil af- 
fairs from the nonmilitary agencies of the 
government, the record of the War De- 
partment's early organizational activities 
in this sphere suggests rather an attempt 
to limit the military role in time as much 
as possible. 

Because of this attempt the organiza- 
tional structure first designed later 
proved inadequate. 


Lay Plans Well or See Civilian Agencies 
Take Over Everything 

[Undated Memo, signed "Eastern" for Brig Gen Miller G. 
White, ACofS, G-i, on 16 Dec 42 conf, G-i files, Per- 
sonnel SMG, Misc Info] 

2. Agenda 

a. . . . Apparently there is a loose under- 
standing that the Army will provide personnel 
for military government of occupied countries 
(i.e., Civil Affairs sections). At any rate, if the 
Army does not have well laid plans, the State De- 
partment will take over everything, just as it 
apparently did in North Africa. * * * 

The War Department Asserts a Claim to 
Initial Jurisdiction Over Civil Affairs 

[WD Statement of Policy, 1 Feb 43, ASF, ID files, Basic 
Policy-Gen (1942-43)] 

r. Experience with North Africa has indicated 
that in any military operation which results in 
occupation of substantial areas of inhabited terri- 

tory, provision must be made as part of the mili- 
tary plan of attack for' the welfare of the civil 
population over which jurisdiction is thus ob- 

2. The Military Plan must make adequate 
preparation for the following: 

a. Feeding the civilian population. 

b. Health of the civilian population. 

c. Housing for the civilian population. 

d. Maintenance of order and security. 

e. Acquisition of raw materials available. 

f. Restoration of civil control over the area in 


3. Restoration of civil control over the area in 
question may be effected in several ways. It may 
be by restoring sovereignty to the native popula- 
tion; it may be by delegating sovereignty to civil 
agencies of the occupying forces. For the present 
it is assumed that there will be a considerable 
period of time following the invasion and pre- 
ceding the time when sovereignty should be dele- 
gated to civil instrumentalities of the governments 
of the occupying forces. 


4. For an initial period following the invasion, 
the matter must however be handled as part of 
the military operation. The military stores as- 
sembled for the operation should consequently 
include food, medical supplies and housing facili- 
ties, based on previous estimates of the condition 
to be faced. The Military Commander has a 
special staff section — Civil Affairs — for distribu- 
tion of supplies, maintenance of order, establish- 
ment of municipal and public utility services, and 
supervision of civil government personnel. 

5. Upon the event of an armistice terminating 
hostilities, or in the event that sufficient territory 
is acquired to make possible the resumption of 
normal life in substantial areas behind the fight- 
ing lines, it will then be possible to relinquish to 
civilian agencies the following duties in the order 
named : 

a. Feeding civilian population. 

b. Health of civilian population. 

c. Housing of civilian population. 

d. Resumption of trade relations (i.e., to obtain 

raw materials, etc.). 

6. At such time civilian personnel for the pur- 
pose should be admitted to the area as required 
for the tasks to be taken up by the civilian repre- 
sentatives. Initially, they should be attached to the 
Staff of the Commanding General. 

7. The period of time between the invasion and 
the assumption by civilian agencies of the occu- 
pying forces of initial responsibility of feeding 
the civilian population may not, under fortunate 
circumstances, be more than a few days. An ex- 
ample of this is found in certain areas of North 
Africa. Under less fortunate circumstances the 
shift in responsibility may be much longer de- 
layed. 1 

We Must Break the President Out of His Idea 

[Telecon between Maj Gen Lucius D. Clay, ACofS for 
Materiel, SOS, and Gullion, 5 Feb 43, ASF, ID files, 
Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)] 

Clay: We are interested in Civilian Supply, 
particularly relationships with Governor Leh- 

1 The statement was initiated by the International Divi- 
sion, SOS, during the course of conversations in January 
1943 with a representative of the Commanding General, 
ETO, suggesting that civilian supply be planned and 
handled by the Army as an integral part of military 
operations. It had the concurrence of Headquarters, SOS, 
of the Operations Division, WDGS, and of McCloy, ASW, 

man's organization. Our International Aid 
[Division] is interested from point of supplying 
shipping, items to be selected and stockpile prior 
to moving into area, and establishment of what 
we should NOT do. We feel question of civilian 
supply in the Theater of Operations should be 
handled as military operation. . . . 

Gullion: I have had several conferences with 
Governor Lehman and others and we have an- 
other conference on Monday. It would be unfor- 
tunate if we got wires crossed. Occupation is 
bound to be military. The President thinks it 
should be civilian and we have to see if we cannot 
break him out of the idea. Governor Lehman is 
preparing to duplicate what we are doing. They 
are working on economics, public health and 
schools. We are to go in first and they would take 
it up later. I do not want to take on any respon- 
sibility of supply if it means transportation or 
acquisition of supplies but civilian supply section 
of the Military Staff would advise him where 
supplies would go. 

Clay: There is a dividing line as to where it 
is G-4 and where civilian. * * * 

A Real Lesson Has Been Learned From North 

[Memo, Somervell, for McCloy, 3 Apr 43, OPD files, 
014, Civil Govt, sec. 1 ] 

We have had the opportunity to learn a real lesson 
from North Africa which lesson to me is that you 
cannot separate the handling of civil affairs from 
military operations in areas in which military 
operations are under way, and that an attempt to 
do so in a hostile country would be disastrous. 
Each Theater Commander contemplating active 
operations should have a Civil Affairs Division 
under an experienced officer selected for his ad- 
ministrative qualities to act for the Theater Com- 
mander in all civil affairs. This division would 
plan in advance the administrative procedure 
to be established in an occupied country, the 
supplies which must be brought into the coun- 
try at an early date, and the staff which must 
be asssembled to handle these affairs after 
occupation. . . . 

but it had no immediate practical repercussions outside 
the War Department. ASF, ID, History of Civ Sup, I, 



The African Experience Prompts Investiga- 
tion of War Department Organization for 
Civil Affairs 

[Memo, Neff, OUSW, for USW Patterson, 16 Jan 43, 
OUSW files, Misc and Sub, MG] 

Colonel Greenbaum asked me to look briefly into 
the question of the War Department organiza- 
tion concerning military government as illustrat- 
ed by the experience with North Africa. , 

Your responsibility in regard to the matter 
would seem to be twofold, first, as regards the 
military school at Charlottesville, and second, as 
regards to procurement of civilian supplies for 
North Africa. As far as I have been able to as- 
certain neither one of these matters had been 
fully co-ordinated with the whole of the civilian 
affairs action concerning North Africa. The 
matter is of importance not only as concerns 
North Africa but also more generally, because 
the pattern being set there may well be followed 
in other areas. In fact, that view has been ex- 
pressed by other agencies. 

In consequence, it seems to me that this mat- 
ter should be fully explored, particularly with 
Mr. McCloy, to see if the situation cannot be 

CA Functions Are Scattered Helter Skelter 
All Over the Pentagon 

[Memo, Neff, OUSW, for Patterson, 26 Jan 43, CAD 
files, 092,3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1)] 

As shown below, at the present time the powers 
concerning Military Government are scattered 
within the War Department, and delimitations 
of authority are not clear. This situation, it would 
seem, needs correction. 2 The present memoran- 
dum is merely exploratory, to raise the question 
whether there should not be a full examination 
of the matter. 

Whatever be the form of government in for- 
eign territory occupied by American troops, there 
are bound to be a great number of questions af- 
fecting Civil Affairs which will have to be re- 
ferred to the War Department for advice or de- 
cision. Their number and importance may vary, 
depending upon whether you have a purely mili- 
tary government or some variation thereof. They 

* On 6 February, Colonel Miller, Director MGD, made 
the same recommendation, though considerably stronger, 
to the Provost Marshal General. 

arise both in the planning and the operations 
phase. * * * 

The agencies of the War Department most 
concerned with these matters are: the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of War; Operations Divi- 
sion of the General Staff; Headquarters, SOS; 
G-i of the General Staff the Military Govern- 
ment Division of the Provost Marshal General's 
Office; and the International Division of SOS. 

The actual functions of these several agencies 
seem to have evolved in practice out of the North 
African experience and to have departed from 
the organization as contemplated in the Manual 
of Military Government. 

G-i of the General Staff, according to the 
Basic Field Manual for Military Government, is 
"responsible for the preparation of plans for and 
the determination of policies with respect to 
military government." The exact limit of these 
powers does not seem clear. . . . 

When set beside the above powers, those con- 
ferred upon the Military Government Division 
of the Provost Marshal General's Office are even 
less clear. They are derived from a letter from the 
General Staff dated August 14, 1942, by which 
The Provost Marshal General, in regard to mili- 
tary government, is to be given the power to 
"engage in broad planning activities, with de- 
tailed estimates to be undertaken by the School of 
Military Government." The relationship between 
"broad planning activities" and the "preparation 
of plans" charged to G-i of the General Staff is 
not defined. * * * 

In actual operation, however, neither G-i of 
the General Staff nor the Military Government 
Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office 
have been actively engaged either in the planning 
or in the day to day questions arising in the only 
present instance of occupation by our troops, 
namely, the operation in North Africa. 

The matters of large policy hav.- been acted 
upon directly by the Under Secretary of War, and 
Assistant Secretary of War, and the Joint or Com- 
bined Chiefs of Staff. The run-of-the-mine ques- 
tions have come to the War Department through 
a committee of which the State Department 
furnishes the chairman and the War Depart- 
ment part of the secretariat. . . . Those ques- 
tions which are not acted upon directly by the 
War Department representation on this com- 
mittee are cleared by the International Division 
with such parts of the War Department as seem 
to have an interest. They have not gone to G-i, 


which, as stated above, is charged with the mak- 
ing of plans and the formulation of policies for 
military government. They have gone, however, 
for comment to the Military Government Division 
of the Provost Marshal General's Office, to 
Operations of the General Staff, the Fiscal Divi- 
sion of SOS, and other agencies of the War De- 

G-i, as far as I have been able to ascertain, has 
not performed any of the functions assigned to 
it by the Manual for Military Government, ex- 
cept that it has given directives to the Provost 
Marshal General's Office concerning the procure- 
ment of personnel. The training of the personnel 
has been directed by the Provost Marshal Gen- 
eral under directives from G-3 of the General 
Staff and Training, SOS. * * • 

It is . . . suggested that consideration should 
be given to the charging of some single unit in 
the War Department with all of the powers and 
duties concerning military government, with 
provision for such routines for concurrences as 
should be required. 

Otherwise, it is not seen how the War Depart- 
ment can accomplish its task. This is particularly 
so because other agencies may be inclined, unless 
corrective steps are taken, to assume authority 
properly belonging to the War Department In 
fact, if steps are not taken to forestall it, the 
pattern as to North Africa may be taken as the 
model one, and thus impede the proper establish- 
ment of full military government in areas where 
it may be imperatively required. 

A Conference Concludes War Department 
Interests Can Be Protected Only by a Single 

[Memo, Capt J. O. Hall, PMGO, for Miller, Dir, MGD, 
PMGO, 2 Feb 43, PMGO files, 321, PMGO & MGD] 

The problems presented for discussion were (1) 
that of protecting the interests of the War De- 
partment in North Africa civil affairs organiza- 
tional setup in Washington, and (2) co-ordination 
and operation generally, within the War Depart- 
ment, of civil affairs matters referred by com- 
manders in the field. 8 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff informally pro- 
posed releasing to the State Department the func- 
tion of handling communications regarding civil 

* Captain Hall refers to a conference which he attended 
in the Office of the Under Secretary of War on 31 January 
1943. In another memorandum he adds the information 
that Col. A. H. Wade, handling civil affairs for ETOUSA, 
presented to the conference an appeal for a strong, parent 
civil affairs organization in the War Department to pre- 
vent such difficulties as he was facing in London. Colonel 

affairs in North Africa (and elsewhere as the 
problems arise) for action and information of 
interested agencies. The proposal was made be- 
cause of the great volume of work involved. After 
considerable discussion it appeared to be the sense 
of the meeting that the War Department could 
not adequately have its interests protected by the 
proposed change, and that the CCS should con- 
tinue to perform the job. Colonel Haskell and 
Captain Palmer were to inform the CCS infor- 
mally of these views. 

On the second problem the opinion seemed to 
be that a staff would have to be set up in the War 
Department to act as a central clearing house on 
civil affairs. G-i, G-4, and GS-OPD were men- 
tioned as possible organizations in which a civil 
affairs section might be created. 

There was cognizance of possible greater War 
Department interest in civil affairs in future 
theaters, and in a theater in which the War 
Department was directly interested rather than 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

A Single Liaison Agency Needed for Civilian 

[Memo, Gullion for Secy, GS, 16 Feb 43, PMGO files, 
Hist of MG Tng, Tab 14] 

2. At the conference on February 15, 1943 [offi- 
cials of WD and OFRRO] . . . memorandum 
was submitted by Mr. Sayre and Mr. [Kenneth] 
Dayton, indicating the necessity for careful ad- 
vance planning and co-ordination of activity be- 
tween the Army and the Office of Foreign Relief 
and Rehabilitation. Mr. Dayton said that Gover- 
nor Lehman had personally delivered the original 
of the memorandum to the Secretary of War. . . . 

3. Governor Lehman's organization has been 
impressed by the fact that no agency of the War 
Department has been erected to deal authorita- 
tively will all phases of civil affairs activities and, 
in such capacity, to make valid commitments for 
the War Department in working out co-operative 
arrangements with civilian agencies. 

4. ... On this point the . . . memorandum 

"Where the Army group fits into Army organi- 
zation is a matter for its determination, but the 
problems suggested above indicate the importance 
of the task from the Army's own point of view 

Wade stated that only such an organization could enable 
him to secure decisions on policy and obtain information 
or carry on for him the necessary liaison with U.S. civilian 
agencies. He declared that the Military Government Divi- 
sion as currently constituted was inadequate to serve his 
needs. Memo, Hall for Wickersham, 31 Jan 43, PMGO 
files, 321, PMGO and MGD. 


so that it seems apparent that this Civil Affairs 
Section should be headed by somebody of high 
rank and authority. It seems to us that it should 
be attached directly to the General Staff, but 
should make proper use of the group who are 
training for military government and of the 
Services of Supply." 

5. At the moment, operating Civil Affairs func- 
tions within the War Department are spread 
among a number of agencies. . . . 

6. General Spalding and I make the following 

That some agency of appropriate level be con- 
stituted, the function of which shall be to co- 
ordinate and direct all civil affairs activities for 
the War Department. This should be done im- 
mediately. 4 

Should CA Be Under Chief of Staff or 
Secretary of War? 

[Memo, Maj Gen Wilhelm D. Styer, CofS, ASF, for the 
CG, SOS, 14 Feb 43, ASF, Somervell files, Dec 42-Feb 

c. Organization to handle civil matters in occu- 
pied countries. General Handy informs me that 
the Secretary of War has been discussing this 
matter with the Chief of Staff, and that the Secre- 
tary of War had proposed setting up an organiza- 
tion to report to him to handle these matters. 

On February 9, General Clay and I discussed 
this matter with General Handy, and later with 
General Marshall. Clay's and my opinion was 
that any organization established must be closely 
co-related with the theater commanders and 
operations in the theaters, and should, therefore, 
be under the Chief of Staff rather than directly 
under the Secretary of War. It should be a staff 
agency rather than an operating agency. For 
operation, it should utilize the existing machinery 
of the SOS and other agencies of the govern- 
ment. 5 

General Marshall had discussed the matter 
again with the Secretary of War, and while he 
agreed that these matters should be very closely 
correlated with the theater commanders and 

'According to Colonel Miller, Director, MGD, General 
Gullion realized that "because of the Provost Marshal 
General's inferior position in the Army Service Forces, he 
lacked authority to implement those basic policies requir- 
ing co-ordination of military and civilian agencies." 
Memo, Miller for Contl Div, PMGO, 17 Sep 45, sub: 
Commentary of Military Government (MG), PMGO files, 
319. 1 Rpts — MG Inter-Office. 

5 OPD also had definite views about the location of the 
proposed civil affairs division. The Logistics Group had 
been handling most of the theater communications on 
civil affairs, and Brig. Gen. Patrick H. Tansey, its head, 
felt that a separate division should be established within 

operations of the theater, he believed that it 
would develop into such a large matter that a 
separate organization should be set up to handle 
it. The Secretary of War appeared to be of the 
opinion that it should report to him. * * * 

A Civil Affairs Division Is Established 

[Ltr, AG to Haskell, OPD, 1 Mar 43, CAD files, 321 
(1-1-43) (1). sec. 1] 

i. By direction of the Secretary of War, a Civil 
Affairs Division of the War Department is hereby 
established. You are designated Acting Director 
of this Division. 6 

2. The primary function of the Civil Affairs 
Division is to inform and advise the Secretary 
of War in regard to all matters within the pur- 
view of the War Department, other than those 
of a strictly military nature, in areas occupied 
as a result of military operations. The Civil Af- 
fairs Division will perform such additional ad- 
visory and administrative functions in connec- 
tion with civil matters as may be prescribed by 
the Secretary of War. 

3. Close co-ordination will be maintained be- 
tween the Civil Affairs Division and the Opera- 
tions Division of the War Department General 
Staff and other military agencies of the War 
Department. To this end, all communications 
from the Civil Affairs Division to a commander 
in the field will be cleared through and trans- 
mitted by the Operations Division. The Civil 
Affairs Division will maintain liaison with civil- 
ian agencies exercising functions in any theater in 
which the Civil Affairs Division may be engaged. 

4. The initial organization of the Civil Affairs 
Division will include a Chief of Division, an 
Executive, a secretary and such additional officers 
as the Secretary of War may direct. One work- 
ing member of the Civil Affairs Division will be 
detailed thereto by the Chief of the Operations 
Division, War Department General Staff, and 
one working member will be detailed thereto by 
the Commanding General, Services of Supply. 

5. The Civil Affairs Division will maintain an 
office of record on civil affairs matters and action 

this branch for such matters. After the Secretary's Office 
had initiated discussions, General Handy, Assistant Chief 
of Staff, OPD, requested General Tansey to prepare an 
outline and chart. Colonel Haskell, later the first head of 
CAD, drafted these for General Tansey in accordance 
with his idea of locating the new division within OPD. 
Interv, Albert Weinberg with General Tansey, 5 Apr 50. 

"Hilldring was designated Chief of the Civil Affairs 
Division on 7 April 1943. The division was placed on the 
General Staff and, therefore, under the Chief of Staff 
as well as the Secretary of War. About a month after its 
creation, CAD was shifted to the Special Staff, where it 


taken by it in the performance of its assigned 

CAD Will Not Give the Theater Commander 

[Discussion between Haskell, Actg Dir, CAD, and Leh- 
man, Dir, OFRRO, 5 Mar 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy- 
Gen (1942-43)] 

Colonel Haskell described the War Department's 
policy in dealing with theater commanders, ex- 
plaining that the War Department assigned the 
mission and provided the necessary means in the 
way of troops and equipment. The job was then 
up to the theater commander. If he proved to be 
unsatisfactory, the cure was to relieve him, not 
to tell him in detail what to do. If the mission 
was diminished or increased, the means provided 
or made available would vary commensurately. 

Theater Commanders Are Notified of the 
Policy of Centralization 

[Msg, WD to Theater Comdrs, 6 Mar 43, CAD files, 321 
(j-j-43) (1). sec. 1] 

The following radio is being dispatched to the 
Commander of the North African Theater and to 
all theater commanders likely to participate in 
capture and occupation of enemy territory or 
enemy controlled territory: In response to a need 
in the War Department for a centralized organi- 
zation for co-ordinating matters pertaining to 
civil affairs which arise in the North African 

theater and which will also be present in any 
territory captured from the enemy there is being 
established in the War Department reporting 
directly to the Secretary of War a Division of 
Civil Affairs. This Division will provide a central 
point for funneling such matters to the various 
operating agencies of the War Department for 
action and will provide a means for following up 
and co-ordinating action taken. It will also pro- 
vide a means for liaison and co-operative action 
with other agencies of the Government and in- 
sure that such action is co-ordinated with the 
military effort. To this Division will be routed 
communications on strictly civil affairs matters as 
differentiated from those where the interest is 
solely military and arrangements will be made 
for it to receive copies of pertinent communica- 
tions received or dispatched through State De- 
partment or other channels. All communications 
on purely civil affairs matters sent by the War 
Department to theater commanders will be proc- 
essed by the Division of Civil Affairs through 
the Operations Division War Department Gen- 
eral Staff to insure co-ordination with military 
operations. It is considered essential that you 
establish at the appropriate time an agency on 
your staff headed by a suitably qualified individ- 
ual and staffed with specialists competent to ad- 
vise and handle matters pertaining to functions 
listed below. The War Department stands ready 
to assist in procuring necessary specialists on 
request. . . . 


British Propose That Combined Civilian 
Agencies Plan Ahead for Civil Affairs 

[IncI A, Memo, CCS Secy's (CCS-190), 22 Mar 43,' 
CAD files, 092 (3-27-43), sec. 1] 

Comprehensive and detailed plans for the 
handling of civil affairs in areas where military 
operations are contemplated should be given im- 
mediate and continued attention by the appro- 
priate agencies of Government so that military 
operations will be supported by the population of 
areas occupied rather than be hindered thereby. 
Such planning can be made without undue risk 

7 Only so much of the JCS and CCS discussions of 
the issue is included in this chapter as pertains to the 
decision to entrust to CAD the civil affairs planning 
responsibility for JCS. For other portions of the discussions 
concerni ng the crea tion of combined civil affairs agen- 
cies, see |Chapter "v| 


to the security of information regarding military 
strategic plans. * * * 

By handling this planning in a very general 
way at the outset, it is hoped to maintain the 
security of the information. Instead of asking 
specifically for plans for any one area that will be 
invaded it is proposed that the civilian agencies 
charged with this responsibility be asked to de- 
velop plans on a number of areas, any one or two 
or three of which might be a real scene of military 
operations within, say, the next year. 

It is suggested that the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff request the Committee of Combined Boards 
to have outline plans prepared covering the fol- 
lowing areas: Norway, Northern France, and the 
Low Countries, Southern France, Italy, Greece, 
Yugoslavia, Burma, and Indo-China; the plans 
to be in the hands of CCS by May 10. . . . 


The U.S. Joint Chiefs Oppose Assignment of 
Future Planning to Civilian Agencies 

[Memo, U.S. JCS (JCS 250), 31 Mar 43, CAD files, 092 
(3-22-43), sec. 1] 

II Discussion 

1. The Committee of Combined Boards was 
created November 27, 1942, as a procedural 
convenience in dealing with civil affairs in North 
Africa (see CCS 126). In connection with mat- 
ters referred to the various agencies by the North 
African Economic Board, which is attached to 
General Eisenhower's staff, the Committee exists 
with the acquiescence of the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff. It does not exist as a delegated authority 
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It has no charter. 
It has no staff. The secretariat is furnished by the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly, this 
agency as such is not in a position to make or to 
direct the studies which are in effect proposed in 
CCS 190. 

2. To extend the field of COB to the problems 
of civil administration in areas still enemy-held 
but expected to be occupied in the future would 
involve enlargement of the field of COB in two 
main respects: (1) geographically to areas other 
than North Africa; and (2) functionally to future 
military operations rather than, as now, to civil 
affairs problems consequent upon past military 
operations. While COB is a co-ordinating agency 
of great usefulness, and while there would be 
no objection to geographical extension of its field 
to other territory after military occupation, there 
are objections to the proposal to use COB for 
advance planning for future operations. 

3. In any consideration of future military oper- 
ations the question of security is seriously and 
necessarily involved. The Committee of Com- 
bined Boards is not now so organized as to assure 
proper safeguards in this respect. While these 
agencies should participate in comprehensive, 
over-all planning as far as their own functions 
are concerned for the handling of civil affairs in 
areas where military operations are contemplated, 
this planning should not include any specific 
operations by these agencies until stabilized con- 
ditions have been attained in the areas involved. 

III. Recommendations 

1. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend 
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that CCS 190 be 
dropped from the agenda. 

2. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff assign to the 
War and/or the Navy Department responsibility 
for the preparation of plans for civil affairs as an 
integral part of planning for any specific opera- 

tion, and that such planning be conducted by the 
Army and/or the Navy direcdy with the civilian 
agencies concerned. 

3. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend 
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that representa- 
tives of the War and/or the Navy Departments 
consult appropriate British agencies with respect 
to plans and policies to be followed in handling 
civil affairs in specific combined operations. 

CAD To Be Planning Agency for the Joint 

[Ltr, JCS to SW and SN (JCS 250/2), 10 Apr 43, CAD 
files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1] 

As long as military occupation exists, civil affairs 
are a responsibility of the commander concerned. 
In meeting local problems within his theater the 
commander is assisted by the Civil Affairs Divi- 
sion of his staff. However, there is much planning 
to be done in advance of the operation and con- 
siderable operating to be done in the United 
States regarding civil affairs in occupied terri- 
tories. This must be accomplished or at least co- 
ordinated by some agency in Washington. 

While many of the matters pertaining to civil 
affairs can be handled by civilian agencies, the 
requirements of secrecy and security prevent 
giving civilian agencies the information in ad- 
vance of the operation which would be necessary 
for them to have in order to make advanced 
plans. It is therefore necessary to charge some 
military agency with this duty. 

The War Department has recently established 
a Civil Affairs Division which is closely related 
to the Operations Division of the War Depart- 
ment General Staff. This appears to be the logical 
agency to plan and co-ordinate the handling of 
Civil Affairs in nearly all of the occupied terri- 
tories. Inasmuch, however, as the military occu- 
pation is by joint forces and certain aspects of 
civil administration are of interest to the Navy, 
the Navy should be represented on the War De- 
partment's Civil Affairs Division and be fully 

This Civil Affairs Division in the War Depart- 
ment can well be given jurisdiction in certain 
theaters in which the commander is a naval offi- 
cer but in which the actual occupying troops 
are Army. 

There will be cases, of course, of occupation 
by naval or Marine personnel of areas of small 
extent in which civil affairs matters would be 
of minor importance. In such cases the civil affairs 
can be handled by existing agencies in the Navy 


In instances where the invasion of enemy terri- 
tory is a combined operation with one or more 
allies, the Civil Affairs Division will, of course, 
have to be co-ordinated closely with the appro- 
priate authorities of the allies concerned. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to have civil 
affairs handled by civil authorities just as soon as 
the military situation permits subject, of course, 
to the control of the theater commander. As far 
as the United States is concerned, the Office of 
Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, 
State Department, and the Committee of the 
Combined Boards are now set up to take over 
civil matters at the earliest time, which in the 
opinion of the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff, 
as may be appropriate, it can be accomplished 
without interfering with the military purpose of 
the occupation. 

In view of the foregoing the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff recommend that the War Department be 
designated as the agency to plan the handling 
of civil affairs in territory about to be occupied 
and to co-ordinate the activities of civilian agen- 
cies in the United States in administering civil 
affairs in hostile or liberated territory during the 
period of military occupation. They request the 
approval of the Secretary of War and the Secre- 
tary of the Navy to this recommendation [ap- 
proved 17 April 1943 (JCS 250/2)]. 

General Hilldring's Plans Seem Broader 
Than The Scope of CAD's Charter 

[Memo, Dayton, 2d Deputy Dir, OFRRO, to Lehman, 
Dir, OFRRO, 1 May 43, CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-5- 
43), sec. 1] 

On April 28th, Mr. Sayre and I had a conference 
with General Hilldring who has been newly ap- 
pointed the head of the Civil Affairs Division of 
the Army. 

General Hilldring stated that he was charged 
with staff responsibilities for all affairs concern- 
ing military government. . . . 
. . . General Hilldring's jurisdiction is consider- 
ably broader than that suggested to us by the copy 
of the original letter establishing the Civil Affairs 
Division, which seems to make it primarily a 
liaison and information channel with civilian 
agencies. * * * 

CAD Takes Over General Staff Functions 

[Ltr, Hilldring, Dir, CAD, to Dayton, 6 May 43, CAD 
files, 334, OFRRO (2-5-43), sec. 1] 

* * * I apparently didn't make the position 
of CAD clear to you. It is the business of this 

division to handle the general staff functions 
(planning, policy making, the issuance of basic 
directives, co-ordination and supervision) of all 
army responsibilities with respect to military 
government. However, this is not an operating 
agency. ... It will be the responsibility of this 
office to co-ordinate his [General Clay's ASF] 
program with those of all other operating agencies 
in the War Department . . . so far as they pertain 
to military government. . . , General Clay's re- 
sponsibility to procure and make available the 
physical needs of military government is not 
changed in any way by the establishment of this 
division. 8 * * * 

CAD's Planning Responsibility Must Be De- 
fended Against ASF Encroachment 

[Memo, Hilldring for CofS, 10 May 43, AG files, 014.1 
(5-17-43), (1)] 

i. General Somervell has submitted, with his 
concurrence, a memorandum from the Fiscal 
Division, ASF, which recommends: 

a. That the Fiscal Division, ASF, be charged 
with the direct responsibility for all War Depart- 
ment planning of overseas fiscal policy. 

b. That General Eisenhower be advised that 
the initiative for all fiscal planning in reoccupied 
areas is a War Department responsibility rather 
than a Treasury or State Department respon- 
sibility. * * * 

2. In view of the establishment of the Civil 
Affairs Division on March 1, 1943, with a direct 
responsibility for all War Department matters 
in reoccupied areas, other than those of a strictly 
military nature, it is believed inadvisable to dele- 
gate a large part of this responsibility to the Fis- 
cal Division, ASF, as recommended in paragraph 
1a. above. Overseas fiscal policy includes not only 
the financing of Army operations but also the 
very broad civil problems of foreign exchange, 
internal finance, budgets, taxes, currency, finan- 
cial controls, etc., all of which make up an inte- 

8 As Hilldring indicated, and the following documents 
show, he assumed the authority to co-ordinate. He was 
aware that the charter of CAD did not explicitly confer it. 
But he felt justified by the known intentions of the Secre- 
tary and the requirements of the situation. The question 
of broadening the directive to make his authority explicit 
was considered but it was deemed best not make a legal- 
istic issue of the matter which, after some initial difficul- 
ties, seemed to be working out well on a basis of general 
concurrence. (Interv, Weinberg with Maj Gen Hilldring, 
15 Sep 50.) Hilldring came to his new office from a long 
experience in the War Department, including the position 
of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-I, which had familiarized 
him with the processes of interoffice negotiation. He was, 
besides, a resourceful and forceful person. 


gral part of the administration of civil affairs 
in reoccupied areas. 9 

The Director Defines CAD's Function Quite 

[Miii, Mtg in CAD, 5 Jun 43, CAD files, 337 (4-14-43) 

General Hilldring explained that the over-all 
function of the Civil Affairs Division is to ob- 
tain complete synchronization throughout the 
Army on military government problems. Such 
synchronization occurs only where a deliberate 
effort is made for its achievement. It was with 
that purpose in mind that the Civil Affairs Divi- 
sion was established in the War Department, 
thus setting up a single office devoted entirely 
to military government. It is the function of the 
Division to conduct the planning, policy making, 
supervision and co-ordination of all matters con- 
cerning military government. A further function 
is to regulate, in the Army, all operating agen- 
cies concerned with military government. * * * 

No Trouble in Co-Ordinating Army-Navy 

[Min, Mtg in Hilldring's office, 5 Jun 43, CAD files, 337 

(4-M-43). (01 

General Hilldring took advantage of the occa- 
sion to explain the most excellent co-operation 
existing between the Civil Affairs Division of the 
War Department and the Office for Occupied 
Areas in the Navy Department. He explained 
that this co-operation has existed since his arrival 
in Washington, that it is wholehearted, and has 
welded the Army and Navy into a united under- 
standing of the problems which are being faced. 
In no instance has a problem arisen between the 
two Services which has not been solved between 
General Hilldring and Captain Pence, thus ob- 
viating the necessity for reference to higher 

Captain [Harry L.] Pence, representing the 
Navy at the Meeting, stated that co-operation 
between himself and General Hilldring had been 
an easy task in view of the sound and prac- 
tical ideas which had been presented. He fur- 
ther commented on the very excellent and close 
relationship existing in the War Department 
between the Chief of the Civil Affairs Divi- 
sion and the Secretary of War, through Mr. 
McCloy. * * * 

8 This jurisdictional dispute was resolved in CAD's 
favor by order of the Secretary of War on 21 May 1943. 
WD Memo for the Chief, CAD, AG files, 014.1 (5-17- 

The subject then turned to the selection of 
civil affairs personnel for theater commanders. 
General Hilldring stated that he was making a 
deliberate effort to have Navy personnel selected 
for some of the positions in the civil affairs sec- 
tions of the staffs of theater commanders. He 
stated that it was particularly desirable in ports, 
and had added advantage as evidence of a united 
Army-Navy front. * * * 

Arrangements Effected for Army-Navy Co- 

[Memo, Hilldring for Exec to the ASW, 9 Feb 44, CAD 
files, 321 (1-1-43), sec. 1] 

2. CAD and OAS [Occupied Areas Section] 
have responsibility for the administration of civil 
affairs in areas assigned to the Army and Navy, 
respectively. The Navy sphere of responsibility 
includes certain islands in the Pacific. The Army 
sphere of responsibility includes other enemy- 
occupied areas. In the preparation of directives, 
manuals, and communications for the adminis- 
tration of civil affairs in all such areas, CAD 
and OAS collaborate in much the same manner 
as partners in a joint enterprise. 

3. Preliminary to combined U.S.-U.K. discus- 
sions at Combined Civil Affairs Committee 
(CCAC) meetings (or at meetings of the U.S. 
side of CCAC), CAD co-ordinates with OAS in 
formulating the views of the U.S. armed 
forces. . . . 

4. In addition, CAD maintains close liaison 
with OAS in day-to-day operations. Through an 
OAS liaison officer, the CAD secretariat furnishes 
OAS with complete information on civil affairs 
problems currently under consideration. The Ex- 
ecutive Officer, CAD, also furnishes copies of 
cables, letters, and other communications (in- 
coming and outgoing) simultaneously with the 

distribution of such papers to CAD branches. 
# * # 

General Hilldring Assents to the Creation 
of a Joint Civil Affairs Committee 

[Memo, Hilldring for Lt Gen Joseph T. McNarney, 
DCofS, 23 Aug 44, CAD files, 321 (12-21-42) (1), sec. 6] 

i. ... a. With or without a Joint Civil Affairs 
Committee, the real work of planning for civil 
affairs and the real operation of civil affairs will 
have to continue to be done in the Civil Affairs 
Division of the War Department or the Military 
Government Section of the Central Division of 
the Navy Department. 

b. If Admiral [Frederick J.] Home's memo- 


randum [19 August 1944] implies, as it appears 
to, that the Army operates civil affairs in any area 
as a purely Army matter, the memorandum is in 
error. In those areas which the Joint Chiefs have 
assigned as a primary responsibility to the Army, 
civil affairs are co-ordinated in every detail with 
the Navy Department through the Military Gov- 
ernment Section. Vice versa, in areas assigned as 
areas of primary responsibility of the Navy, the 
Navy carefully co-ordinates its civil affairs plans 
and operations with the War Department 
through the Civil Affairs Division. In effect, what 
Admiral Home proposes is that instead of co- 
ordination between these two agencies of the 
Army and Navy, a Joint Committee be formed 
to effect this co-ordination. The point I want to 
make is that this will not bring about any better 
co-ordination than already exists. It will simply 
substitute a committee for the co-ordination now 
being accomplished. . . . 

3. Admiral Home presents one argument, how- 
ever, for a Joint Civil Affairs Committee for 
which I have no answer, and which, in my 
opinion, constitutes sufficient reason for the for- 
mation of such a committee. He says, "Since all 
other phases of joint operations are dealt with in 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff channel by joint com- 
mittees, no reason can be seen why military gov- 
ernment should be an exception." My only reason 
for objecting to the Joint Civil Affairs Committee 
is that it will increase administratively the diffi- 
culties of operation because it is difficult to work 
for a committee. However, if the Navy insists on 
having a Joint Committee, I can think of no valid 
grounds on which the Army can object, if the 
Navy chooses to disregard the obvious fact that 
the Committee is unnecessary. 

4. However, the formula proposed by the Navy 
for a purely military Joint Civil Affairs Commit- 
tee should not under any circumstances be con- 
curred in by the Army, for the following reasons: 
\a. There is no merit whatever to the state- 
ment: made in paragraph 6, which would author- 
ize "representative of the State Department to be 
appointed as associate member of the JCAC who 
would be available for discussions on the political 
aspects of joint military government operations, 
but would be excluded from discussions of purely 
military problems." Civil Affairs is 70% on the 
civilian side. We never have a problem in civil 
affairs which is purely military. 

b. I am sure that the State Department, Mr. 
Stimson, Mr. McCloy, and, from what I have 
recently heard, Mr. [James V.] Forrestal himself, 
would violendy oppose a civil affairs committee 
that did not accord full membership to the civil- 
ian authorities. Within recent weeks Mr. Stimson 
and Mr. Forrestal have complained to the Secre- 
tary of State because of the political questions 
which Mr. Hull is submitting to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. Within the War Department I have 
kept this condition under control by repeatedly 
pointing out to Mr. Stimson and Mr. McCloy 
that these projects, through present procedures, 
either come to the Combined Civil Affairs Com- 
mittee where Mr. McCloy and Mr. [James C] 
Dunn are present, or are presented by General 
Hull or by me to Mr. McCloy. . . . 10 

10 A Joint Civil Affairs Committee was created on 3 
April 1944. Its charter incorporated the provision for a 
purely military membership as desired by the Navy. 
Hilldring's contention that such a committee was not 
needed seems to receive confirmation in the relative in- 
activity of the Committee, which held very few meetings. 


General Clay Thinks War Department 
Should Map Out Its Role in Civilian Supply 

[Memo, Clay, ACofS for Materiel, SOS, for ACofS, OPD, 
11 Feb 43, OPD files, 014. 1, Civil Govt, sec. 1] 

2. The meeting [with Governor Lehman, 10 
February] as a whole demonstrated that the sev- 
eral civilian agencies concerned are approaching 
the problem for the "idealistic" viewpoint of im- 
proving conditions throughout the world rather 
than from a realistic viewpoint. Governor 
Lehman was realistic in his approach. He pro- 
pounded as his thesis that we could not 

maintain our own war economy and help occu- 
pied countries except for these relief measures 
essential to prevent starvation and extreme suf- 
fering from exposure. He was particularly upset 
over the extent of civilian supply shipments to 
North Africa which he believed in excess of 
absolute needs. He was further concerned by the 
apparent lack of single economic direction in 
North Africa with Lend-Lease, BEW, and other 
agencies possibly working at cross-purposes. He 
believed it essential that a top committee be 
formed in Washington composed of representa- 
tives of the various agencies to establish definite 


policies for the future and to direct advance plan- 
ning. He did not believe that existing combined 
committees were at a high enough level to be 
effective, referring particularly to the Committee 
of Combined Boards headed by Mr. Finletter of 
the State Department. * * * 

4. It was suggested that a committee be formed 
with representatives of the several agencies pres- 
ent under the chairmanship of Governor Lehman 
to formulate and recommend policies presum- 
ably to the President. It was apparent that those 
agencies having a more "idealistic" approach 
were not in full sympathy with this committee, 
and they countered with the suggestion that the 
committee should be at a sufficiently high level 
to justify the Vice President being its chairman. 

5. Throughout the discussion it was apparent 
that very little thought was being given by any 
of the representatives present to the responsibili- 
ties of the Army in an occupied area, particularly 
in the initial phases of operations, and the pos- 
sible necessity for military government in such 
areas was not introduced or discussed. It did not 
appear an appropriate time for this thought to be 
introduced by the War Department representa- 
tive, particularly as the main theme of discus- 
sion was in the field of supply. . . . 

6. The meeting will undoubtedly stimulate the 
several agencies concerned to obtain high ap- 
proval for their positions in the picture, with a 
strong probability that the State Department, 
prior to the next meeting, may formulate and 
obtain approval for the policy which it believes 
desirable. Therefore, it would appear essential 
for the War Department to formulate a definite 
War Department policy as to its own relation- 
ship to civil affairs in occupied countries at the 
earliest possible date so that its views may be 
presented before a policy which may be con- 
trary thereto has been established. 

Proposal for a Civilian Planning Agency 
Stimulates ASF To Assert Military Control 
of Supply 

[Memo, Somervell CG, ASF, for CofS, 25 Mar 43, ASF, 
ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)] 

1. Reference is made to CCS 190 [sec. 3 above], 
which recommends that the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff request the Committee of Combined 
Boards to have outlined plans prepared cover- 
ing certain areas which may become occupied 
areas as a result of military operations. This pa- 

per is an invitation to other government agencies 
for the handling of Civil Affairs in areas pro- 
posed to be occupied through military operations. 
While these agencies should participate in com- 
prehensive over-all planning in as far as their 
own functions are concerned for the handling of 
Civil Affairs in areas where military operations 
are contemplated, this planning should not in- 
clude any proposed operations by these agencies 
until stabilized conditions have been attained 
in the areas involved. 

2. The planning for the handling of Civil Af- 
fairs during the initial phases of occupation 
should be a direct responsibility of the War De- 
partment, operating through the Theater Com- 
mander, and planning for this purpose should 
be undertaken with the utmost secrecy and full 
security measures. Moreover, the functions of 
the other Government agencies are largely con- 
cerned with supply, and difficulties of transpor- 
tation necessitate that all supply measures be 
under direct military control until conditions 
have stabilized. . . . 

The War Department Agrees To Assume Full 
Initial Supply Responsibility 

[Msg, WD to CG, NATOUSA, 5 Apr 43, OPD Msg 
files, CM-OUT 2451] 

. . . President's directive makes Office of For- 
eign Relief and Rehabilitation an organization to 
facilitate progress of war and relieve suffering 
and provides OFRRO operations in any specific 
areas abroad will be subject approval of United 
States military so long as military occupation 
exists. Prior to Governor Lehman's departure, 
War Department agreed with him to assume full 
procurement, operating and administrative re- 
sponsibility all phases civilian relief, reconstruc- 
tion, sanitation, agricultural development, etc., as 
function of theater commander during initial 
period of operations for sufficient time to permit 
orderly turnover with adequate advance notice. 
For purposes of permitting Governor Lehman to 
plan this period has been estimated minimum 
90 days but will of course vary considerably with 
each operation. 11 

11 The agreement with Governor Lehman was in one 
aspect an outgrowth of OFRRO's concurrence i n Army 
control of civilian relief in Tunisia. (See above, [Ch. 11, | 
sec. 7.) The motives which led Lehman to welcome the 
War Department's co-operation are indicated in Chapter 
IV, below, and, as will be seen, have to do with the diffi- 
culties of OFRRO in coming into operations at an early 


Theater Commanders Are Made Responsible 
For Providing Civilian Supplies 

[Summary of WD Cable of Gen Application to Theater 
Comdrs, 12 Apr 43, CM-OUT 4944, ASF, ID files, Basic 
Policy-Gen (1942-43)] 

The Theater Commander is responsible for the 
provision of any essential civilian supplies in the 
occupied area from the military stocks which 
have been made available to him for a minimum 
period of time after occupation has been effected. 
For planning purposes this period should be 
assumed to be approximately 90 days, but it will 
of course vary with circumstances of each opera- 
tion. The objective should be to discharge this 
responsibility from Army stocks or other supplies 
available to the Theater Commander until on 
adequate notice the civilian agencies are prepared 
to assist the Theater Commander in the discharge 
of this responsibility. All civilian agencies, in- 
cluding the agency responsible for relief and re- 
habilitation, have been advised accordingly. 

The War Department will assume that your 
requisitions include provision for such essential 
civilian supplies as you propose to allocate ship- 
ping and no special provision will be made for 
such supplies except on receipt of special requi- 
sitions from the Theater Commander. Any 
special requisitions for subsistence, medical sup- 
plies, or other special items deemed necessary 
to meet essential civilian needs should be sub- 
mitted to the War Department at the earliest 
possible date to permit advance procurement 
without sudden demands on the market which 
would indicate operations to be contemplated. 

It is further assumed that the Theater Com- 
mander will include in his requisitions for en- 
gineering materials those items deemed essential 
for the rehabilitation of utilities in the occupied 
area if any appear necessary to meet military re- 
quirements and that such work will be under- 
taken by the Theater Commander in supervision 
of troops at his disposal. 

The utilization of military supplies or such 
special supplies as may be obtained to meet essen- 
tial civilian needs through commercial channels 
or as barter goods in payment for labor should 
be incorporated to the fullest possible extent. 

Civilian Supply Problem Is of Huge Scope 

[Summary of Discussion at Mtg of WD Sup Officers, 15 
May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)] 

3. Captain Palmer opened the discussion with a 
summary of the civilian supply problem in occu- 

pied areas and the Army's relationship to it. He 
pointed out that: 

(a) This problem had not until recendy been 
of concern to the War Department; North Africa 
both opened and enormously expanded it; 

(b) The British had all along been more 
aware of it because of their closeness to and poli- 
tical interest in the continent of Europe. British 
planning on the subject reaches back over a 
period of more than one and a half years. They 
are proposing to make civilian welfare in oc- 
cupied countries a matter of Army concern for a 
period of six months and to sustain civilians for 
this period from Army supplies — thereby 
making purchases to meet this supply program 
a matter of military priority. Indeed, there is 
evidence that the British are prepared now to 
purchase such stores; 

(c) Some concept of the scope of the civilian 
supply program may be gleaned from the fact 
that some U.S. estimates contemplate need of at 
least six million tons of material during the first 
year of occupation of Europe. British figures 
run, it is believed, much higher, their estimates 
being based in part upon discussions with the 
governments in exile and may for that reason be 
on too generous a scale. It is in any event prob- 
able that the volume in which supplies must be 
furnished, even when cut to a minimum, can 
exert a serious effect on both the timing and un- 
dertaking of military operations; 

(d) The Army's problem of meeting civilian 
requirements must be geared (in the light of 
purely military necessity) to accomplish the 

Prevent unrest and disease 12 
Restore war production 
Live off the country 

Obtain assistance from the population * * * 

(e) The job over and beyond this was one 
for civilian agencies. * * * 

At First the Job Is Viewed as Primarily One 
of Supplementing the Civilian Agencies 

[Summary of Discussion at Mtg of WD Sup Officers, 15 
May 43] 

7. Captain Palmer pointed out that it was now 
accepted Army policy that responsibility for the 
initial period of occupation would be solely that 
of the military. For planning purposes it is now 
assumed that this period will last for a minimum 
of 90 days, for which time the Army must be 

13 This phrase came to be generally used in character- 
izing the extent of the Army's mission in civilian supply. 


prepared to meet civilian needs from the ASP 
and not necessarily from Lend-Lease or OFRRO 

(a) Further that it was not a matter of dupli- 
cating the work of the above agencies, but rather 
of knowing what they were doing and preparing 
to do in order that the Army could be intelli- 
gently prepared to draw from and/or supplement 
such stockpiles. 

(b) That the British preparations for a six- 
month period in contrast to ours for a 90-day 
period contained the possibility of conflict in the 
determination of items of military priority. 

8. Captain [Donald H.] McLean added that 
the Army's problem was one essentially of pro- 
curing a "hedge" against items difficult to ac- 
quire and not available in occupied territories; 
that this involved a full knowledge of local pecu- 
liarities and eating habits. * * * 

War Department Begins To Plan for Civilian 

[Memo, HiUdring, Chief, CAD, for DCofS, 19 May 43, 
ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)] 

I. Discussion 

1. The War Department has placed the re- 
sponsibility for civilian relief and rehabilitation, 
and for the requisitioning and distribution of es- 
sential civilian supplies, upon the Commander-in- 
Chief, AFHQ, North Africa. No requisitions or 
statements of requirements have as yet been sub- 
mitted by AFHQ. 

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 10 
cabled AFHQ to submit prompdy to CCS for the 
War Department its estimates, even if tentative, 
of total civilian needs by item, quantity, priority, 
desired destination and markings from D Day to 
D Day plus 90. 

3. In order that the War Department may be 
in a position to screen these estimates, when they 
arrive, and to anticipate subsequent requisitions 
by procurement, if necessary, it is desirable that 
independent estimates, based on information 
available in Washington, should be established. 

II. Action Recommended 

The Secretary of War directs: 

1. That the Commanding General, ASF, pre- 
pare an estimate of total civilian requirements 
for Husky; the estimate to provide for food, 
clothing, medical and sanitary supplies, shelter, 
barter goods, engineering equipment and such 
other items as may be required to meet essen- 
tial civilian needs; the estimate, by item, priority 
and destination from D Day to D Day plus 90. 

2. That in the preparation of these estimates 
consideration be given to the importance of pro- 
viding a minimum food ration which, combined 
with supplies locally available, will facilitate the 
maintenance of order, preservation of public 
health and utilization of local labor. 13 

The Country Has Surpluses Only in 
a Few Items 

[Memo, Maj Gen Edmund B. Gregory, QMG, for Dir, 
Opns, ASF, 24 May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen 

a. It is anticipated that there will be a great de- 
mand for food for the civilian population of oc- 
cupied countries. It is believed that the food 
supply now available in the United States, or to 
be produced, will be insufficient to supply all 
requirements unless national policies and allo- 
cations are revised to reduce current consump' 

b. At the present time, the only items of food 
in which surpluses are believed to exist are: 
Wheat and wheat flour 
Durum wheat and alimentary pastes 
Cereal products made from wheat 
Soybean products, principally flour 
This list represents the only unrationed foods in 
the United States, and, indicates the basis of 
those items which we can readily spare after pro- 
viding for the needs of the Armed Forces and the 
civilian population of this country. 

e. Should the Army be required to provide 
supplies for relief or for barter purposes, all 
luxury items should be excluded. In the case of 
North Africa, certain items supplied for barter 
purposes were in the nature of luxury items 
which were difficult to obtain and were subject 
to a high percentage of pilferage. 

/. Quartermaster stocks of food are not suffi- 
cient to undertake the supply of civilians in occu- 
pied territories. If such supplies are taken from 
our stocks, it will be impossible in many instances 
to replenish them even at the expense of our civ- 
ilian population. 

Why Army Supply Program Should 
Be Narrow 

[Notes on Mtg of Sup Officers, 4 Jun 43, ASF, ID files, 
Basic Policy-Gen (Jun— Jul 43)] 

. . . Major [Thomas R.] Taylor questioned the 
limitations placed on types of supply to be in- 

13 The Secretary of War approved the recommendation 
of the Chief of CAD on 20 May. Planning was co-ordi- 
nated by the Civilian Supply Branch of the international 


eluded by the Army in meeting civilian needs, 
pointing out the frequent requests for agricul- 
tural implements, fire-fighting equipment, and 
tools, etc. that came in from theaters. Major 
Palmer said that the purpose of such limitations 
was to place the burden of proof on those who 
wish to expand the already great Army supply 
problem. . . . 

Proposal To Include a Section for Civilian 
Supplies in Army Supply Program 

[Memo, Brig Gen Boy kin C. Wright, Dir, ID, for Dir of 
Materiel, ASF, 7 Jun 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS 

i. To cover the problem of civil supply for the 
first 90 days of an occupation it is proposed to 
include a section in the Army Supply Program, 
based upon Staff plans and Service recommenda- 
tions. 14 To this end it is proposed to consult with 
the several Services as to the character and 
amount of supplies to be provided. . . . 

3. With respect to the U.S. civil agencies, it 
is proposed to take the position that: 

a. The War Department will program and 
procure the supplies needed for military use dur- 
ing the first 90 days, whether U.S. or U.K.; 

b. During the period of military government 
the War Department may requisition against the 
Lend-Lease Administration or any others who 
may have stockpiles, thus, in effect, acting on 
behalf of the foreign territory in question to 
cover needs after the first 90 days; 

c. The War Department, while unwilling 
to endorse relief programs, will be glad to have 
them submitted for such comment as the War 
Department shall deem appropriate. . . . 

Basic Principles of Army Supply Program 

[Memo, Wright, Dir, ID, for QMG and SG, 2 Jul 43, 
ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-63] 

i. As a matter of policy it has been determined 
that the War Department shall be responsible 
for the supply of essential minimum needs of 
civilian populations in occupied areas during the 
initial phases of a military operation and the 
period of Military Government. Such supplies 
will be provided on requisition of the theater 

1. The War Department will itself provide 

14 The proposal for a civilian supply section in the Army 
Supply Program was first made at an ASF staff conference 
on 4 June. Acceptance of the proposal was influenced 
largely by recent experience appearing to show that the 
procurement efforts of civilian agencies could not be 
counted upon. 

from military stores the minimum essential sup- 
plies necessary for an initial period, until other 
agencies concerned with civilian relief become a 
source of supply. For planning purposes, it has 
been determined that this initial period shall be 
a minimum of at least 90 days and that all Axis- 
occupied areas together with Italy and her Medi- 
terranean possessions will be involved. The extent 
of provision for civilian supply from military 
stores must be limited to requirements necessary 
to prevent prejudice to military operations. The 
basic objectives to be attained are: 

a. to prevent civil unrest which would en- 
danger lines of communication and channels of 

b. to prevent disease which would endanger 

3. To make provision for supply of civilian 
populations in occupied areas, requirements for 
this purpose will be included in the Army Sup- 
ply Program and appropriate budget and finan- 
cial arrangements will be made. 

4. In determining the kind of materials to be 
provided consideration should be given, on the 
one hand, to the advisability of having such mate- 
rial be similar or identical to the customary 
commercial supplies of the area in question to 
facilitate distribution and, on the other hand, to 
the advisability of having such material conform 
to Army standards to make it interchangeable 
with Army supplies. Consideration must be also 
given to the problem of mass feeding and sup- 
plies appropriate therefor. 

Procedure for Handling Supply Procurement 

[Memo, Clay for Dir, ID, ASF, 22 Jul 43, ASF, ID files, 
Basic Policy-Gen (Jun-Jul 43)] 

1. The following procedure for the establishment 
and procurement by the War Department of cer- 
tain requirements for civilian populations in 
areas occupied by U.S., or combined U.S. and 
other forces is hereby adopted: 

a. Requirements for civilian supply in the 
several areas will be determined by International 
Aid Division, Army Service Forces, upon the 
basis of operational plans received from Planning 
Division, Army Service Forces. In the case of 
combined operations, International Aid Division 
will also determine the proportion of combined 
Allied responsibility for furnishing civilian sup- 
plies in such areas which will be furnished from 
U.S. resources. In the determination of such 
requirements and the determination of such pro- 
portionate responsibility, International Aid Di- 
vision will obtain recommendations from the 


appropriate Technical Services and such addi- 
tional information and assistance as may be ap- 
propriate. Also concurrences will be obtained 
by International Aid Division from Civil Affairs 
Division, OCS; Operations Division, WDGS; 
Director of Operations, ASF; and Requirement 
and Production Division, ASF. 

b. The requirements so determined will be 
included in the Army Supply Program as U.S. 
military requirements in a new Section to be 
known as Section VI. The International Aid Di- 
vision will transmit the proposed Section VI to 
the Director of the Requirements Division for 
publication by Requirements Division. 

c. Supplies for the civilian population of oc- 
cupied areas which are procured by the War 
Department will be delivered against requisition 
of the U.S. Theater Commander of the area in 

Handling of Requests for Supplies not in 
Army Supply Program 

[Memo, Maj Edward M. Conklin, Jr., ASF, on Remarks 
of Clay, Dir of Materiel, ASF, at Mtg of 4 Sep 43, ASF, 
ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-125] 

2. General Clay outlined the policy of the War 
Department in respect to providing relief and 
supplies for occupied and liberated territories as 

a. The War Department will procure and 
stockpile the following items as military require- 
ments for relief of civil population in occupied 

Basic ration 

Medical and Sanitary Supplies 

(This is in consonance with CCS 324/1 which 
was approved by the CCS at their 115 meeting, 
23 August 1943. ) 15 

3. General Clay stated further that any sup- 
plies beyond those which come within the cate- 
gories indicated in paragraph 2 a above would 
not as a rule be procured as military items. How- 
ever, in the event supplies beyond the scope of 
the categories indicated above were requested 
and such request bore the endorsement of ap- 
proval of the U.S. Theater Commander, the War 
Department will submit such requests to the 
appropriate civil agency . . . and the War De- 
partment will obtain therefrom the necessary sup- 
plies. Such supplies, however, will not be pro- 
grammed nor procured by the War Department 
unless not otherwise obtainable. General Clay 
stated further that if supplies beyond the scope 
indicated in the categories of paragraph 2 a above, 
were submitted for fulfillment but did not bear 
the endorsement of the Theater Commander, 
the War Department will submit such requests 
to the appropriate civil agencies for procure- 
ment. At the same time the ASF, through Pro- 
duction Division, will make a study as to the 
effect the procurement of such supplies would 
have on articles to be procured for the Army 
from the standpoint of materials, facilities and 
manpower and advise the WPB of the effect 
that filling such civilian requirements would 
have on the articles of supply programmed by 
and to be procured for the Armed Forces. 

13 CCS 324/1 laid down the principles of the com- 
bined British and Am erican supply program. See below, 
Chapter V, Section 4. 1 


Opposition to Large Military Government 

[Memo, Col Thomas North, Chief, Current Sec, OPD, 
for the Theater Gp, OPD, 10 Aug 42, OPD files, 352 (3- 
24-42), sec. 1] 

i. Your comments and recommendations are re- 
quested on the enclosed paper from the Assist- 
ant Chief of Staff, G-i. This matter pertains to 
the establishment of a general policy to guide the 
assignment of officers, trained in the administra- 
tion of civil affairs by graduation from the School 
of Military Government, to appropriate units in 
the theaters and the continental United States. 

3. a. It is the opinion of this section that: 

(1) The immediate need for large special staffs 
for administering military governments overseas 
is not indicated. 

(2) The requirements for each theater for a 
civil affairs staff section will vary to such an ex- 
tent that a general policy concerning the detail- 
ing of officers to theaters and task forces for this 
purpose will prove impractical. 

(3) Premature assignment of officers to such a 
detail might result in insufficient employment of 
trained manpower. 

b. Pending the receipt of recommendations 
from the various theater commanders at the time 


military governments in occupied territories are 
contemplated, it is believed that graduates of the 
School of Military Government can be given 
other assignments appropriate to their military 
qualifications. 16 

[Memo, Clay, Dir of Materiel, ASF, for the Dir of Per- 
sonnel, ASF, 3 1 May 43, PMGO files, 200, MG] 

i. The primary concern of this office in civil af- 
fairs lies in the supply field. In this field the per- 
sonnel required in any specific area will be 
comparatively small. It is our view that key 
personnel in this field can be trained most 
advantageously through actual staff work in the 
Headquarters, Army Service Forces. We believe 
that a small group of officers should be main- 
tained to provide the nucleus of supply personnel 
for each occupied area, and that still further 
training can be obtained through actual experi- 
ence in these occupied areas to form units for 
other occupied areas. 

2. In general we are somewhat of the same 
opinion with respect to the over-all training of 
officers for duty in the occupied countries. It 
would be a mistake to train a large number of 
officers for this purpose if these officers were to 
be returned to civil life pending their assignment 
to active duty or if they were to be kept in active 
service without a specific assignment of duties. It 
would appear almost impossible to train enough 
men in units in the United States to provide for 
the administration of the occupied countries and 
much dependence must be placed on officers and 
men to be made available from the occupying 
forces. It would seem, therefore, that the train- 
ing objectives in this country should be devoted 
to developing the very high-grade administrators 
to occupy key positions. We are not likely to 
occupy very large areas concurrendy, hence each 
area in which we establish a military government 
will become a training ground in itself where able 
and experienced administrators can be developed 
for use in other areas. Such a system taken into 
conjunction with the training which we now 
have under way would appear to be logical and 
would require a minimum of personnel in train- 

"*G-i, on 23 November 1942, approved the Provost 
Marshal General's request for the appointment of "2,500 
individuals in the Specialist Reserve Section of the Officers 
Reserve Corps." The officers appointed were to be "as- 
signed to a course in Military Government, upon the com- 
pletion of which they shall revert to an inactive status." 
Memo, ACofS, G-i, to PMG, 23 Nov 42, in PMGO 
files, Hist of MGT. 

Recommendation That Specialists Be Trained 
at Colleges 

[Memo, Gullion for the ACofS, G-3, 11 Ian 43, PMGO 
files, Hist of MG Tng, Tab 18] 

i. The procurement authority of November 23, 
1942 . . . as amended by authority of November 
27, 1942 . . . authorizes the Provost Marshal 
General to recommend for commissions 20 lieu- 
tenant colonels, 30 majors and 2450 captains and 
lieutenants (a total of 2500) in the Specialists 
Reserve Section, Officers Reserve Corps, at a rate 
of not to exceed 300 per month. 17 

3. As above indicated, not in excess of 375 of 
the 2500 authorized officers will attend the Char- 
lottesville School. As to the remaining officers, 
it is intended to earmark each for probable even- 
tual duty in some general overseas area and then 
to call each temporarily to active duty for some 
brief instruction in military government and the 
background of the general area for which he will 
have been earmarked. Such instruction would 
in each instance be for a period not to exceed 
six weeks. Not only is such instruction indi- 
cated by the procurement authority, but without 
it these officers would enter upon important ac- 
tive service overseas without any special training 

4. As already pointed out, it will not be possi- 
ble to provide training at the Charlottesville 
School for more than 375 of these officers dur- 
ing the year 1943. It will be feasible, however, to 
arrange with a group of colleges and universi- 
ties to furnish such training by farming out these 
officers in small groups from time to time for 
instruction in military government and back- 
grounds of the general areas involved. 
Recommendations : 

(a) That the principle of "farming out" 
these reserve officers to a group of colleges and 
universities for periods not to exceed six weeks 
be approved and 

(b) That the Provost Marshal General be 
authorized to engage in the necessary prelimi- 
nary discussions to accomplish this objective, all 
final arrangements and agreements to be con- 
summated by the duly authorized agencies of the 
War Department. 

11 Authority for commissioning from civil life was 
first given on 12 October 1942. But this authorization 
applied to the Army Specialist Corps, which was dis- 
solved on 1 November 1942. Thus it became necessary 
to approve commissioning the Specialists in the Special- 
ists Reserve Section, Officers Reserve Corps. 


Curriculum for Specialists 

[Memo, Gullion,' PMG, lorthe ACofS, G-i, 6 Feb 43, 
PMGO files, Hist of MG Tng, Tab 19] 

. . . Two curricula must be provided, viz. for 
(a) Fort Custer and (i>) civilian colleges. 18 Inas- 
much as the training program is a novel venture, 
sufficient flexibility should be retained at this 
time to make possible such minor adjustments as 
experience may prove to be desirable. 

The Charlottesville School has developed a 
general pattern of instruction that, it is believed, 
should be followed as nearly as possible in the 
new training program. This should be done not 
only because the Charlottesville method is be- 
lieved to be sound, but because the adaptation of 
its essentials to the present program will create 
a desirable uniformity in all instruction given to 
military government personnel. 

The Charlottesville instruction is divided gen- 
erally into two parts — (I) that relating to the 
general principles of military government which 
are applicable and important regardless of the 
particular area of occupation and (II) the study 
of the backgrounds of areas of potential occupa- 
tion. Under (I) are included such topics as Army 
organization and staff functions, the interna- 
tional law and American regulations relating to 
military government, the experiences and prac- 
tices of the United States and other nations in 
the actual operation of military governments and 
the general principles of public administration. 
Included under (II) are matters concerning the 
institutions, customs and practices of particular 
areas and the language thereof [see above, Chap- 
|ter 1, Section 2.]| 

It is proposed to allocate to the Fort Custer 
training those portions of the instruction em- 
braced in (I) above and to the civilian colleges 
and universities those portions embraced in (II). 

A brief explanation for the desirability of such 
an allocation should be made. In the first place, 
it will be very difficult to establish in six separate 
colleges a satisfactory course of instruction em- 
bracing the general principles making up Part I 
of the Charlottesville curriculum inasmuch as 
persons trained in certain of the topics are not 
usually found on college faculties. On the other 
hand, there is already in operation at Fort Custer 
a Department of Military Government, which is 
furnishing the instruction in its two schools for 
occupational police (officers and enlisted) upon 
the same topics which should be included in the 
present curriculum. It will be an easy matter 

"The specialists commissioned in the ORC were sent 
for four weeks to Fort Custer before being farmed out 
to the colleges. 

to augment the existing faculty at Fort Custer 
and to furnish the instruction in that way. Fur- 
thermore, this procedure should result in a 
betterment of the existing Military Government 
faculty at Fort Custer. Finally, since only one 
hour per day, or a total of 48 hours for each 
course, will be devoted to this instruction, it will 
not materially reduce the time allotted to basic 
military training. * * * 

Training Program in Current Form Is Sum- 

[Memo, Miller, Dir, MGD, for Actg Dir, CAD, 2 Apr 43, 
PMGO files, 337, Confs (MG and CAD Staff Officers] 

2. General. The objective of the total program is 
to recruit and train, during the period ending 
December 31, 1944, between 5500 and 6000 offi- 
cers for military government duties in occupied 
areas. . . . 

The training program, insofar as instru- 
mentalities are concerned, may be divided into 
three parts, namely (1) The School of Military 
Government, (2) The Fort Custer-college setup 
and (3) The Occupational Police Schools. The 
trainees at the School of Military Government 
are prepared for the planning and top general 
administrative levels in military governments. 
The Fort Custer-college program is for officers 
of the Specialists pool who will constitute the 
technical and advisory personnel in military gov- 
ernment organizations, below the organizational 
level of the SMG graduates. Both groups must be 
viewed as staff officers whose activities are to be 
supplemented to a very large extent by drafts 
upon tactical and special service troops and also 
by the utilization of civilian population to the 
greatest extent possible. The occupational police 
personnel is designed to furnish officers and en- 
listed cadres for a considerable force of occupa- 
tional police and, at the same time, to produce 
a surplus of occupational police officers for duty 
as junior administrative officers in military 
government. 19 

With these general observations in view, the 
three activities indicated above may be separately 

3. The School of Military Government. The 
School of Military Government was opened at 
Charlottesville, Virginia, on May 9, 1942, for the 
purpose of giving a series of 16 weeks' courses 
to selected groups of highly qualified student- 

19 The program for training occupational police is 
omitted since it was not long afterward abandoned. It 
was believed that the program imposed an excessive per- 
sonnel commitment and that combat troops could be 
used as occupational police. 


officers. The first course was attended by 50 
officers, the second course by 115 officers and the 
third (present) course by 133 officers. It is con- 
templated that succeeding courses (the fourth 
course begins on or about May 15, 1943) will 
contain approximately 150 officers, which is the 
authorized strength of the School. 

The student-officers are divided into two 
categories, (a) officers already commissioned in 
the military service and (b) officers commis- 
sioned directly from civil life for the purpose of 
attending the School. Officers in group (a) have 
heretofore been secured from nominations sub- 
mitted by the several Service Commands and 
Armies and by the staff branches; for the fourth 
and subsequent courses these sources of supply 
have been enlarged to include all Army Group 
Forces and the Army Air Forces, as well as offi- 
cers from the various staff branches. Group (b) 
in the present course consists of 44 officers; all 
subsequent courses will contain from 50 to 75 
each, depending upon the number required to 
bring the course to full authorized strength. This 
group will be drawn from reserve officers com- 
missioned in the specialists pool presently to be 

The student groups at the Charlottesville 
School are selected to represent, in the aggregate, 
all the general and special skills requisite to a 
complete Civil Affairs organization, namely, pub- 
lice works and utilities, public safety, fiscal, econ- 
omics, public health and sanitation, public 
welfare, education, public relations, communica- 
tions, legal and government administration. The 
training being directed at producing officers on a 
top planning and general administrative level, 
the curriculum of the School is designed to pro- 
duce this result. 

4. Specialists Pool. The Provost Marshal Gen- 
eral has been authorized to select and recommend 
for commissions a pool of 150 Lieutenant Colo- 
nels, 600 Majors and 1750 Captains and Lieu- 
tenants, a total of 2500, from civil life in the 
Specialists Reserve Section, Officers Reserve 
Corps. Each officer must possess one or more of 
the functional skills indicated in the next pre- 
ceding paragraph. From this pool, certain of- 
ficers will be selected to attend the School of 
Military Government, as already pointed out. 
The remaining officers in the pool will be given, 
in comparatively small groups, beginning on or 
about June 1, 1943, a period of training at 
Fort Custer, Michigan, to be followed by train- 
ing in seven to ten civilian colleges and univer- 
sities. . . . 

6. The Provost Marshal General's procure- 
ment authority provides that all persons com- 

missioned in the Specialists pool will revert to an 
inactive status upon the completion of the train- 
ing period, whether at the SMG or in the Fort 
Custer-college program. This provision is en- 
tirely satisfactory to certain persons eligible for 
appointment; in the majority of cases, however, 
it is quite unsatisfactory and seriously impedes 
the recruitment of the most desirable personnel. 
The procurement authority should, it is believed, 
be amended to provide for a return to an inac- 
tive status only for those persons desiring such 
procedure, and to provide for the continuance 
on active duty of those officers who desire re- 
tention in the service. Since the training program 
will extend over a period of more than 18 months 
and the monthly increments will be comparatively 
small, it is believed that they can be absorbed into 
useful and relevant military duties without 
any serious difficulty. This will be particularly 
true if occupations on any considerable scale 
can be expected within the next twelve 
months. * * * 

Why Colleges Are Preferable to Army Posts 
for CA Training 

[Memo, Gullion, PMG, f r the Dir, CAD, 17 Apr 44, 
PMGO files, 008, Policy] 20 

2. . . . 

a. . . . The use of colleges makes available 
the most modern, up-to-date plant and equipment 
and the most competent civilian instructional per- 
sonnel in the United States. The excellent results 
that can be accomplished by employing such fa- 
cilities have been fully demonstrated in the prior 
training programs; a different course should not 
be pursued unless a clear advantage is apparent. 

The principal difficulty in any army post setup 
will be in creating a proper faculty. In the Civil 
Affairs Training Schools previously in operation, 
staff, faculty and occasional lecturers ranged from 
30 to 50 at each School; a minimum staff and 
faculty at an army school, with a maximum load 
of 1500 student officers, would have to be well 
over 100 plus a considerable number of outside 

It is not believed that an adequate number of 
qualified faculty members can be found in the 
Army; if available, their assignment to such duty 
is exceedingly doubtful. It is understood that the 
whole Far Eastern Program was once jeopardized 

20 This memorandum was written in response to Gen- 
eral Hilldring's request for a statement of the reasons 
why it was proposed to conduct the specialist training pro- 
gram in colleges rather than in Army posts. By this time 
PMGO military government training had come under the 
jurisdiction of the newly established Civil Affairs Division. 


because it was thought in certain quarters that a 
small increase in the faculty of the School of Mili- 
tary Government, Charlottesville, Virginia, might 
be involved; any request for a large military over- 
head at a Far Eastern School would probably be 

Consequently, the faculty would have to be re- 
cruited principally from civilian sources. There 
is little hope of attracting to any army post the 
numbers and quality of experts who are readily 
available on university campuses or their vicinity. 
As a result, any faculty recruited for an army 
school would be inadequate in numbers or 
mediocre in ability. 

Furthermore, an army post is ill-fitted for the 
peculiar type of instruction required in Civil Af- 
fairs training. Instruction is very largely aca- 
demic, with a minimum of the military training 
for which the ordinary army post is primarily 
designed. One pivotal item — an extensive li- 
brary — is always entirely lacking. Lecture halls, 
class, conference and study rooms, if con- 
structed originally for such purposes, are usually 
bleak, badly lit and ill-heated and ventilated; if 
(as is more usual) they are converted from mess 
halls or barracks, they soon become depressing 
and a definite morale-destroying factor. The Pro- 
vost Marshall General's School at Fort Custer is 
one of the better equipped army post schools; 
anyone who has observed the reaction of a stu- 
dent officer coming, after a four weeks' stay at 
Fort Custer, to the campus of a modern univer- 
sity will readily understand the comparison. 

Without protracting the comparisons further, 
it is perfectly obvious that the efficiency and qual- 
ity of Civil Affairs instruction at an army post 
would be far below that easily possible in any 
high grade university. * * * 

War Department Is Criticized for Too Much 
Trust in Universities 

[Ltr, Thomson, Univ of Colorado, to Hyneman, Dir of 
Tng, MGD, 10 Jul 43, PMGO files, 330.14, Criticisms] 

I do not feel that you have gone about the con- 
tracting with the six universities for training Civil 
Affairs Specialists in a satisfactory manner. You 
do not know who is going to teach what. The 
content of the courses that are to be given has 
not been gone over in any detailed fashion. You 
have left up to the universities both personnel 
and content. You have taken their word for it 
that they could find some one to do the job. That 
means hurried improvisation and competition be- 
tween these schools for outside help, and you will 
find, in the event, that they have not been able 
to get the "experts" they have so glibly promised. 

If you rely on the resident faculties of these in- 
stitutions it seems to me you are being more trust- 
ing and unbusinesslike than you have any right 
to be. The men are simply not to be found on 
these faculties in adequate quality or quantity. I 
know the men in these fields. That is my busi- 
ness. But with adequate foresight and a little 
imagination, a constructive and satisfactory pro- 
gram could have been worked out. A job like 
this cannot be done by correspondence from 

The Field Considers Quality of Personnel 
Its Most Important Problem 

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 13 Jul 43. CAD Msg files, CM-IN 

Most important problem Military Government 
subsequent operations is quality of personnel. All 
here emphasize need for experienced general ad- 
ministrators, organizer and operator type, for 
direct contact local officials and people. Higher 
standards and more detailed individual attention 
in selection of even lower echelons essential. . . . 

Pride and Misgivings Over Progress of 

[Memo, Gullion, PMG, for CofS, CG, ASF, and the Chief, 
CAD, 24 Aug 43, CAD files, 353 (3-8-43), sec. 2] 

6. Presidential resistance found some counterpart 
within the War Department itself where there 
appeared to be some feeling that any extensive 
military government training program should be 
discouraged because of (a) the uncertainties of 
time and place of future occupation and (b) the 
undesirability of creating any considerable pool 
of officers for whom no fairly immediate civil af- 
fairs duties were apparent. 

7. In the face of remarks made by the Presi- 
dent, and the criticisms by civilian agencies and 
the War Department itself this office proceeded 
with a twofold design — a. to recruit and train the 
greatest number of officers possible under the cir- 
cumstances in order that at least a sufficient sup- 
ply will be on hand as soon as the inevitable 
emergency demand for it should arrive and b. at 
the same time, to erect a recruiting and training 
mechanism capable of immediate and unlimited 
expansion when the need for civil affairs officer 
personnel has become more apparent to those 

9. In the light of the foregoing, I felt that we 
have accomplished our self-imposed mission with 
a considerable degree of success and under some- 
what severe handicaps. Requisitions (completely 
filled, pending and for which we have been 


alerted to 30 September 43) from CAD for civil 
affairs personnel for overseas duty total approxi- 
mately 600. Against these demands, there are 
approximately 1200 officers trained or in training. 
By 30 September, this total will have increased to 
1800. At the same time, we have erected a series 
of co-ordinated training programs that are, as 
above pointed out, capable of immediate and un- 
limited expansion, circumscribed only by the abil- 
ity of qualified officers for student groups. 

Nevertheless, in view of increasing demands, 
the lack of success in obtaining the approval for 
occupational police organizations, and the actual 
threat of deactivation of existing military police 
organizations, I am quite disturbed over the 

11. In summary, I am of the opinion that the 
importance of trained personnel in handling the 
difficult military government problem is not gen- 
erally recognized. 

Training Program Is Accelerated After Oper- 
ations Begin 

[Memo, Hilldring, Chief, CAD, for the PMG, 27 Aug 43, 
PMO files, 200, MG] 

i. Secretary of War directs: 

a. That inasmuch as not to exceed 40 gradu- 
ates of SMG and the Custer-CATS 21 program 
will be available for civil affairs assignment after 
the current NATOUSA requisition is filled: 

(1) Plans be made immediately to bring 
2500 additional officers into civil affairs training 
programs by the end of the calendar year 
1943. . . . 

The Lessons of Two Years Are Borne in Mind 
in Planning Far East Program 

[Memo, Gullion for Chief, CAD, 31 Dec 43, PMGO files, 
Hist ofMGTng, Tab 22] 

1. By directive of 10 December 1943 the Provost 
Marshal General was ordered to prepare and sub- 
mit to the Civil Affairs Division a detailed train- 
ing program for Civil Affairs officers for duty in 
the Asiatic theater. The directive prescribes these 
bases for the program: (a) that 1500 officers (25 
percent Navy, the remainder Army) be trained; 

(b) that approximately 10 percent of the total 
become available for occupational duties in Oc- 
tober 1945 and the total number by March 1946; 

(c) that the training program follow the pattern 
of the Fort Custer-college (CATS [Civil Affairs 
Training School]) courses employed in training 
for the North African and European theaters 

=1 Civil Affairs Training Schools in the colleges. 

and (d) that not less than six months of training 
be spent in area and Japanese language studies, 
(e) to be preceded by an indoctrination course in 
military government. 

The following plan has been formulated 
within the foregoing prescription and in the light 
of the general situations and overriding objectives 
discussed below. 

2. General. It is hoped that the lessons of 
American experience in the past two years will 
not be forgotten in the present venture. Two 
years ago and until recently it was urged that 
the control of occupied areas was a civilian, not 
a military, responsibility; that American forces 
might never be in occupation of any consider- 
able areas; that, in any event, preparation for 
such possible tasks might be deferred until their 
emergence had become more apparent. These 
identical views may be aired again; if so, they 
must be beaten down as they have been in the 

For it is infinitely more important in a 
program for the Far East than for the Mediter- 
ranean-European theaters that recruitment and 
training for occupation be initiated well in ad- 
vance of the event. Familiarity in America with 
European languages and backgrounds, while not 
widespread, is nonetheless considerable; acquaint- 
ance with Far Eastern languages, institutions and 
points of view is practically nonexistent. 

Furthermore, the difficulties of imparting 
useful language and other relevant knowledge 
of the Far East are many times those of similar 
preparation for European areas. Whereas a use- 
ful basic conversational knowledge of Italian and 
German can be imparted to a student officer in 
three months, a corresponding proficiency in 
Japanese cannot be achieved in six to eight 
months. Six months of intensive work in conver- 
sational Japanese is a bare minimum of useful 
instruction — a fact fully recognized in the direc- 
tive itself. 

Finally, it is feared that a certain amount 
of inevitable war-weariness may, in the end, ad- 
versely affect the Far Eastern program. With the 
conclusion of European hostilities, it is easy 
enough to visualize a diminishing interest in Far 
Eastern occupations, a fact that may seriously 
increase the difficulties of recruiting desirable 
student officers and of maintaining a necessary 
degree of zeal in their studies. 

These situations combine to point out the 
first of two overriding objectives in the following 
plan, i.e., to begin training at the earliest possible 
moment consistent with the provisions of the 
directive. The second major objective relates to 


the disposition of the School of Military Govern- 
ment, Charlottesville, Virginia. These two mat- 
ters will now be discussed. * * * 
Recommendations : 

a. That the plan be generally approved. 

b. That the training of the first group of stu- 
dent officers for the Far East begin at the School 
of Military Government, Charlottesville, Vir- 
ginia, on i July 1944; that a directive, calling 
upon all Forces to furnish nominations for this 
and five succeeding courses, be published not 
later than 1 April 1944. 

c. That the School of Military Government be 
authorized to conduct two courses in military 
government of six (6) to seven (7) weeks each 
during the period 1 March 1944 to 15 June 1944; 
that each of these two student groups consist 
of not to exceed one hundred (100) officers of 
field grade to be secured by allotments to the 
several Forces; that a directive establishing quotas 
for these two courses be published not later that 
1 February 1944. 

d. That contracts with not less than five (5) 
nor more than ten (10) universities, to be se- 

lected by the Provost Marshal General, be au- 
thorized for the purpose of furnishing instruc- 
tion for periods of not less than six (6) months 
nor more than eight (8) months in Japanese 
language, backgrounds and related subjects, to 
groups of Army and Navy officers not to exceed 
two hundred and fifty (250) in each group. 

e. That the Provost Marshal General be au- 
thorized to employ not to exceed one hundred 
and fifty (150) persons speaking the Japanese 
language for periods not to exceed three (3) 
months for any one person, during which time 
they will be instructed in modern methods of 
language instruction. 

f. That a contract with the University of Chi- 
cago be authorized for the purpose of securing 
the services of said University in instructing not 
to exceed one hundred and fifty (150) Japanese 
language informants and not to exceed five (5) 
supervisors in modern methods of language 
instruction. 22 

13 The program recommended was authorized by WD 
directive o£ 3t March 1944. 


American Learned Societies Urge Protection 
and Salvage of Works of Art and Historical 

[Ltr, William Bell Dinsmoor, President Archaeological 
Institute of America, Columbia Univ, to SW, 15 Mar 43, 
CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43 (1)] 

As the writer of one of the preliminary memo- 
randa on the matter of a proposal for the protec- 
tion of cultural monuments in the war zones and 
as one who has had this problem under consider- 
ation for the past several months, I wish most 
strongly to endorse the enclosed memorandum 
which Mr. Francis H. Taylor of the Metropolitan 
Museum, with whom I am collaborating, has 
drawn up on this subject. 23 

... I am representing a group which at present 
constitutes an informal committee, of which I 

M From the outbreak of war, George L. Stout of the 
Fogg Museum of Fine Arts had been studying the prob- 
lem of safeguarding works of art under war conditions 
and in March 1942, largely on his initiative, a conference 
to discuss these matters was held at Harvard University 
by the Department of Conservation of the Fogg Art 
Museum. In November of the same year concerted ef- 
forts were made by Taylor and Dinsmoor to interest the 
Government in salvage and restitution of works of art in 
Europe. The draft of a petition to the Government to 

am chairman, and includes the heads of the de- 
partments of art and archaeology at Princeton and 
Harvard, who are most emphatically in favor of 
urging that steps be taken at the earliest possible 
moment. The matter was also brought before 
the American Council of Learned Societies, which 
approved of such action and asked me to assume 
the chairmanship of such a committee. I had pre- 
viously, as President of the Archeological Insti- 
tute of America, discussed the matter with the 
Board of Trustees and the Executive Committee 
of the body; and recently, at a meeting of the 
Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees of 
the American Academy in Rome, of which I am 
Secretary, I brought up the same matter. On 
all of these occasions, always with men who 
thoroughly know Europe and its cultural heri- 
tage, I was impressed by their earnest feeling 

create a commission for this purpose, drawn up in Janu- 
ary 1943 under the direction of Mr. Stout, met with the 
approval of Taylor, Dinsmoor, the Director of the Ameri- 
can Council of Learned Societies, and the Director of the 
American Association of Museums and American Defense- 
Harvard Group, with the result as indicated by docu- 
ments herein. Further details will be found in G— 5 
(Civil Affairs Division of SHAEF) SHAEF files, 130, 
Jkt 1. 


that something must be done to protect and sal- 
vage it. . . . 

In view of the fact that the proposal is now 
being presented to you for your consideration 
and, " ^nture to hope, approval, I wish ... to 
offer xiiy own services in any capacity in which 
they may be useful . . . particularly in connec- 
tion with the organization and execution of the 
project. ... 

[Memo, Taylor, Dir, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New 
York, 15 Mar 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3 _2 5-43) (')] 

(1) The United States Government has been 
party to a series of conventions for the protection 
of monuments, missions, works of art, and cul- 
tural property generally in time of war, as fol- 
lows: a. Convention (II) with respect to the Law 
and Customs of War on Land, signed at The 
Hague, July 29, 1899. 

b. Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, signed at The Hague, 
October 18, 1907. 

c. Convention (II) concerning Bombardment by 
Naval Forces in Time of War, signed at The 
Hague, October 18, 1907. 

d. Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Sci- 
entific Institutions and Historic Monuments 
(Roerich Pact), opened for signature at Wash- 
ington, April 15, 1935. 

(2) The War Department has implemented 
the diplomatic conventions in the Rules of Land 
Warfare, published in the Basic Field Manual 
(FM 27-10) prepared under the direction of the 
Judge Advocate General's Office, October 1, 1940, 
under the articles dealing with instructions for 
officials in occupied territory for the care of pub- 
lic .. . and . . . private property. . . . 

(3) In view of the above, there is a body of 
precedent clearly established according to the 
rules of international law and of military proce- 
dure for dealing with these matters, but the great 
scale of destruction in the present war has ex- 
ceeded anything imagined or provided for by 
previous declarations, and it is therefore impera- 
tive that certain additional measures be under- 
taken by the War Department which will not 
be in conflict with any military strategy or ob- 
jective, but which will give added consideration 
to salvaging whatever may be possible of the 
civilization now being wrecked upon the conti- 
nent of Europe. 

Information which has been received 
through our channels indicates that through loot- 
ing, forced sale and other forms of sequestration, 
the Nazis have stolen more than a billion and 
a half dollars worth of movable works of art. 

Many of the great monuments of Europe have 
been pillaged or destroyed. . . . 

More recently, the air offensive upon the 
countries occupied by the enemy has created a 
new problem in regard to the bombing of cul- 
tural monuments by forces of the United Na- 
tions. In Nuremberg, Berlin, and Munich some 
of the greatest museums of the world have, we 
understand, been totally destroyed. While we 
realize that part of the tragedy of the war lies 
in the necessary bombing of cultural centers if 
they lie within the orbit of military objectives, 
we nevertheless feel that there should be attached 
to the general staffs in each area qualified officers 
who not only are competent to indicate what 
monuments should preferably be avoided, but 
also to direct operations of salvage and protection 
of partially damaged monuments and the care 
of movable objects in damaged buildings at the 
very moment that such devastated areas are oc- 
cupied by our troops. 

(4) There are today more than fifty museum 
directors, curators, archaeologists and historians 
of distinction and competence who hold com- 
missions in the armed forces. The great majority 
are doing routine desk jobs as intelligence offi- 
cers. . . . 

It is suggested that a special detail be formed 
where, by executive order, these officers could be 
brought together. Similarly by application to the 
Secretary of the Navy, such Naval and Marine 
Corps officers could be transferred to this de- 
tail. After a brief period of a few weeks' discus- 
sion of policy and procedure, they could be as- 
signed to staff headquarters in various theaters 
of operation ... to work in conjunction with 
personnel now being trained for military govern- 
ment. . . . 

The function of these officers would be to 
advise Commanding Officers in regard to the 
principal monuments under their care, so that 
the actual operation of salvage and protection 
might be carried out under the direction of junior 
officers assigned to the troops. 

Protecting Europe's Cultural Heritage 
Should Be a Function of the Civil Affairs 

[Memo, Comdt, SMG, to Actg Dir, CAD, Through PMG, 
1 Apr 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)] 

1. The attached papers 24 and our own studies in- 
dicate that special measures will be required in 

81 Correspondence of the SW with Dr. Francis Taylor 
and Dinsmoor which had been referred to Wickersham on 
30 March. 


occupied territory for the protection and preser- 
vation of historical monuments and art treas- 
ures, and also to prevent black markets in 
historical paintings, objects of art, and similar 
articles stolen by the enemy. 
,3. ... special measures should be taken for 
the protection of the cultural heritage of Europe 
and other appropriate areas. Clearly the matter 
is of great importance, and it is believed that the 
Army will gain in good will if adequate steps 
are taken. 

4. For this reason, the protection and preserva- 
tion of historical monuments and art treasures 
in occupied territory should be specifically in- 
cluded in the functions of the civil affairs section. 
Experienced personnel should be trained in order 
to assist the commanding general and the officer 
in charge of civil affairs in adequate advance 
planning and to act as advisers on technical 

5. The objectives would include museums, li- 
braries, archives, monuments, collections, univer- 
sities, colleges, churches, convents and similar 

7. The following recommendations are sub- 

a. That four of five carefully selected experts 
having maximum knowledge and experience in 
the field of fine arts and archaeology be com- 
missioned for the purpose of taking the course 
at the School of Military Government. . . . 

b. That the civil affairs section of each theater 
commander include one or two such experts. . . . 

c. That an appropriate number of experts be in- 
cluded in the pool of technicians and specialists 
now being formed by the Provost Marshal Gen- 
eral to be available when needed for operating 
functions in the field. . . . 

d. That FM 27-5 be amended or supplemented 
by appropriate reference to the subject. . . . 

National Gallery of Art Appeals to the 
President Concerning Creation of an Organi- 
zation to Protect Cultural Objects 

[Ltr, Dir, National Gallery of Art, to the President, 20 Apr 
43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43 (1)] 

I refer to a letter addressed to you by the Honor- 
able Harlan F. Stone, the Chief Justice of the 
United States, dated December 8, 1942, concern- 
ing the creation of an organization to function 
under the auspices of the Government for the 
protection and conservation of works of art and 
of artistic or historic monuments and records in 
Europe, and to aid in salvaging and returning 
to the lawful owners such objects as have been 

appropriated by the Axis powers or by individ- 
uals acting under their authority. . . . 

In your reply to the Chief Justice, dated De- 
cember 28, 1942, you advised him of your interest 
. . . and stated that his letter had been referred to 
the appropriate agencies of the Government. . . . 

I now have to inform you that this matter has 
been given careful consideration by the Depart- 
ment of State and that the governments of the 
United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Social- 
istic Republics have been approached with the 
suggestion that a similar organization might be 
set up in each of these countries. 

In the meanwhile, under the auspices of the 
War Department, a special section has been 
formed in the School of Military Govern- 
ment . . . with the idea of training certain offi- 
cers in the Specialist Branch ... so that they 
could be attached to the staffs of our armies 
which . . . will occupy European countries and 
thus be able to advise the commanding officers as 
to the location of and the care to be given to the 
various artistic and historic objects in these oc- 
cupied territories. . . . 

It would seem therefore that it would now be 
appropriate to appoint a commission to be known 
as the American Commission for the Protection 
and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments 
in Europe, such Commission to advise and to 
work with the School of Military Government at 
Charlottesville and subsequent organizations of 
civilian character which may take over control 
of occupied territories when it is possible to re- 
linquish military control. * * * 

The Commission should be authorized to se- 
cure, on a volunteer basis, the services of a com- 
mittee of experts composed of museum directors 
and other qualified persons to advise on the above 
project and to furnish information required for 
carrying it out. * * * 

I have consulted with Secretary Stimson con- 
cerning this matter and he is in accord with these 
suggestions. 25 

War Department Is in Agreement 

[Memo, Hilldring to SW, 27 Apr 43, CAD files, 000.4 
(3-25-43) (1)] 

I. Colonels Haskell and C. H. S. Townsend of 
this Division conferred April 19th with Colonel 
H. [Harry] A. McBride, Mr. David Finley, Di- 
rector and Messrs. Walker, Shepard, and James, 
all of the National Gallery of Art, for the pur- 

25 That part of the letter containing suggestions concern- 
ing membership of the Commission, its location and func- 
tions is omitted. 


pose of considering measures to be taken for the 
protection of cultural monuments and works of 
art in enemy-held territory now or hereafter 
subject to military operations. 

2. It was agreed that this Division would be 
furnished a comprehensive list of officers now 
on other duty but especially qualified by train- 
ing and experience for duties in connection with 
the protection of works of art and historic monu- 
ments, and a further list of men so qualified but 
not now in the military service. It was tentatively 
agreed that certain officers should be assigned for 
both staff and field duty in this connection. The- 
suggestion that some instruction on this subject 
be given at the school of Military Government 
was accepted by the War Department. 

3. With regard to the committee mentioned 
in Mr. Dinsmoor 's letter of April 7th, 29 it has 
been agreed that a committee be formed with 
such a membership as to make it national in 
scope, and further that the proposed membership 
of the committee should be submitted to the 
President for his approval. 

School of Military Government Will Con- 
sider Suggestions From Civilian Organizations 

[Ltr, SW to Dinsmoor, 24 May 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3- 
25-43) (1)] 

With your letter you inclose, in draft form, a 
statement and questionnaire which, I observe 
from your letter, are "now being considered by 
the American Council of Learned Societies' Com- 
mittee on Preservation of European Cultural 
Material for printing and distribution among 
those particularly concerned with the salvage 
and preservation of such material." 

As you know, I am deeply interested in the 
preservation of the cultural heritage of Europe 
and desire to promote all practicable steps looking 
toward the accomplishment of this purpose. 

The School of Military Government ... is 
giving special attention to this problem and for 
that reason I am sending the proposed statement 
and questionnaire to the Commandant, Brig. 
Gen. Wickersham, for his information. As the 
statement might be interpreted to contain certain 
implications of a tactical nature, it would be 
inappropriate for me to comment upon it 

w With this letter to Wickersham on the subject which 
had been brought to the attention of the Secretary of War 
on 15 March (above), Dinsmoor submitted an Outline 
of Preliminary Processes for initial utilization of resources 
available at Princeton, Harvard, Columbia, the Metropoli- 
tan Museum of Art, Dumbarton Oaks, the Library of 
Congress and the Frick Art Reference Library. For fur- 
ther details, see CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1). 

The British Also Call Attention to Desira- 
bility of Protecting European Art 

[Ltr, First Secy, Br Embassy, to Secy of State, 25 Jun 43, 
CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)] 

. . . the Embassy has been approached by cer- 
tain interested British officials on the subject of 
the protection of works of art and ancient monu- 
ments in any projected invasion of the European 
Continent. . . . 
The real objective is twofold: 

(a) To see that precautions are taken to prevent 
unnecessary damage to works of art after the 
actual fighting is over. 

(b) To see that measures are taken at the first 
possible moment to save pardy destroyed build- 
ings from further damage. . . . 

This matter has already been brought to the 
attention of Lt. Col. David Bruce, Chief of the 
Office of Strategic Services in London. . . . 

Inasmuch as the British authorities are already 
taking measures looking to the protection of 
artistic works and ancient monuments during 
operations on the Continent, it is believed that the 
Department may wish to study this matter and 
take appropriate action with the American Mili- 
tary authorities in Washington. 

Specialists on Historic Monuments and Ob- 
jects of Art Assigned 

[Memo, Hilldring for ASW, 21 Jul 43, CAD files, 000.4 
(3-25-43) (1)] 

i. There follows . . . action taken by the Civil 
Affairs Division to make available to General 
Eisenhower trained personnel . . . concerning 
historic monuments in Italy: 

a. The Directive for Husky made reference to 
the preservation of historic monuments. 

b. Captain Mason Hammond, AC [Allied Com- 
mission], a specialist in planning for protection 
of historic monuments, was sent to General Eisen- 
hower's headquarters under orders dated 26 May 
1943. In addition, it is understood that an officer 
of qualifications similar to those of Captain 
Hammond was furnished by the British. 27 

" British experiences in North Africa had pinpointed 
the necessity of appointing in advance specialist officers 
for conservation and protection of monuments and fine 
arts in Sicily and Italy. Therefore, in May 1943 the 
Office of the Adviser on Fine Arts and Monuments to 
the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of Allied Military Gov- 
ernment was set up by the War Department with a 
lieutenant colonel and a major. Hammond was ordered 
from Air Force Headquarters in Washington to fill the 
major's slot. The British agreed to assign an adviser 
and, on 6 September 1943, Capt. F. H. J. Maxse reported 


President Approves an American Commission 

[State Dept Press Release No. 348, 20 Aug 43, CAD files, 
000.4 (3-25-43) (01 

The President has approved the establishment of 
an American Commission for the Protection and 
Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in 
Europe, 28 with the Honorable Owen J. Roberts, 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
as Chairman. Mr. David E. Finley, Director of 
the National Gallery and a member of the Com- 
mfssion of Fine Arts, has been appointed Vice- 
Chairman, and Mr. Huntington Cairns, Secre- 
tary-Treasurer of the Gallery, will serve as Secre- 
tary-Treasurer of the Commission. The other 
members of the Commission are: The Honorable 
Herbert Lehman, Director of Foreign Relief and 
Rehabilitation Operations; the Honorable Archi- 
bald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress; Dr. 
William Bell Dinsmoor, President of the 
Archaeological Institute of America; Dr. Francis 
Henry Taylor, Director of the Metropolitan 
Museum in New York, and President of the 
Association of Art Museum Directors, and Dr. 
Paul J. Sachs, Associate Director of the Fogg 
Museum of Fine Arts of Harvard University. The 
members will serve for three years. 

The headquarters of the Commission will be 
in the National Gallery of Art. The Commission 
will cooperate with the appropriate branches of 
the Army and of the Department of State, in- 
cluding the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabil- 
itation Operations, as well as with appropriate 
civilian agencies. The Commission will also 
advise and work with the School of Military Gov- 
ernment at Charlottesville, Virginia, and subse- 
quent organizations of civilian character which 
may take over control of occupied territory when 
it is possible to relinquish military control. 

The Commission may be called upon to fur- 
nish museum officials and art historians to the 
General Staff of the Army, so that, so far as is 
consistent with military necessity, works of cul- 
tural value may be protected in countries occupied 
by the armies of the United Nations. One of the 
principal functions of the Commission will be 
to act as a channel of communications between 
the Army and the various unversities, museums 
and other scholarly institutions, organizations and 

as Deputy to Captain Hammond. Activities of this 
office /Were centered in the Subcommission on Education 
until the Subcommission on Monuments, Fine Arts and 
rchives (MFA&A) was established. See CAD files, 
000.4 (3-25-43) (1) and CCAC files, 314.8 (10-30-43) 

. " Frequently referred to as the Presidential Commission 
and the Roberts Commission. 

individuals from whom information and services 
are desired. . . . 

The Commission will function under the aus- 
pices of the United States Government and in 
conjunction with similar groups in other coun- 
tries for the protection and conservation of works 
of art and of artistic and historic records in 
Europe, and to aid in salvaging and restoring to 
the lawful owners such objects as have been ap- 
propriated by the Axis Powers or individuals 
acting under their authority or consent. * * * 

Allied Military Governments Act To Shield 
Art Objects 

[WD Press Release, 25 Aug 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25- 
43) d)l 

Every effort consistent with military expediency 
is being made to preserve such art objects as 
come within the scope of Allied military opera- 
tions. . . . 

Military personnel whose backgrounds include 
a knowledge of art are being assigned to the 
Allied Military Governments to counsel and 
guide commanding officers of various units on 
the value of the art objects. * * # 

Maps showing the locations of widely known 
art objects, including statues, museums and 
other structures containing both public and pri- 
vate collections, are being furnished combat com- 
manders, including those officers directing aerial 
attacks. Commanders are doing everything prac- 
ticable to keep these objects out of direct 
range. * * * 

In addition to preserving these art objects in- 
tact whenever possible, the duties of the AMG 
museums and monuments officers include advis- 
ing on minor repair projects, and preservation 
of such fragments as are found after an oc- 
cupation so that it may be possible for the objects 
to be completely restored after the war. 

Archives Specialists Needed 

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 Oct 43, CM-IN 18164 
(MAT-70), CCAC files, 314.8 (10-30-43), sec. 1] 

Already this headquarters is receiving requests 
for procurement of Italian documents and other 
material of war. Note Hilldring's letter of 8 Sep- 
tember inclosing request of Librarian of Con- 
gress. Systematic collection of archives and 
documents . . . requires organized and directed 
effort by competent archivist. Suggest if two gov- 
ernments desire such collection to be carried out 
that they make initial designation of one archivist 
with small staff each from United States and 
United Kingdom. They would be attached to 


Subcommission in Education, Fine Arts and 
Archives of the Allied Control Commission. Not 
necessary that they be in uniform. . . . 

[Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 5 Nov 43, CM-OUT 2457 
[TAM-74], CCAC files, 314.8 (10-30-43), sec. 1] 

. . . We agree with your statement of prob- 
lem . . . and suggestion made in your MAT 
70. . . . Action to accomplish above being 
initiated immediately. . . . 20 

War Department Policy and Plans for Pre- 
serving Artistic Treasures 

[Memo, Lt Col Charles P. Burnett, Jr., Chief, Govt 
Branch, CAD, to Chief, CAD, 26 Oct 43, CAD files, ooq.4 
(3-25-43) (1)] 

I. Determination of Policy. The War Depart- 
ment has adopted the policy of protecting artistic 
treasures to the fullest extent consistent with 
military operations. 30 This policy is emphasized 
in the forthcoming Revised Civil Affairs Manual 
(FM 27-5), which states: "It is the policy of 
the United States, except where military neces- 
sity makes it impossible, to preserve all historical 
and cultural monuments and works of art, re- 
ligious shrines and objects of art." In carrying 
out this policy, the War Department, through 
the Civil Affairs Division, works in close col- 
laboration with the American Commission for 
the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and His- 
toric Monuments in Europe. . . . 

2. Formulation of Plans. Directives for mili- 
tary operations issued by the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff have provided that, so far as consistent 
with military necessity, all efforts should be made 
to preserve local archives, historic and classical 
monuments and objects of art. ... In the same 
connection, General Marshall cabled to the Com- 
manding Generals of U.S. Army Forces through- 
out the world that by direction of the President 

"With the approval of Eisenhower, on 10 December 
1943 the Librarian of Congress directed Manuel Sanchez 
of his staff, who was then in Algiers, to report to the 
Military Government Section, AFHQ, as the head of the 
United States Staff for the collection of archives and 
library material. On 27 December, the Archivist of the 
United States recommended that Fred Shipman, Director 
of the Hyde Park Library, be attached to the Military 
Government Section for three months to collaborate with 
Sanchez. However, Shipman did not arrive at AFHQ 
Headquarters until 30 March 1944. For his reports on 
the activities of archives specialists in Mediterranean and 
European Theaters see ACC files, 10000/145/321 and 
CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1), sec. 6. 

80 Chapters XIV, Section 7, and XXXI cover briefly the 
procedure in Sicily, Italy, Northwest Europe and Southern 

all possible steps should be taken to preserve 
archives. . . . 

In the theater of operations, AMG General 
Administrati ve Instructions [GAI] No. 8 [Ch. 
|XIV, sec. y\ contained detailed instructions to 
Civil Affairs officers concerning the steps neces- 
sary to implement these directives. AMG Plan- 
ning Instructions No. 12 also emphasized the 
policy of protection for ancient monuments and 
prohibited the purchase of export of souvenirs of 
artistic value. 

Notices have also been posted at historic 
ruins to safeguard them from damage by troops. 

3. Procurement of Personnel. Provision was 
made in tables of organization of AMG for 
museums and monuments officers. Those officers 
are now serving overseas in the Education and 
Fine Arts Division of AMG. Their function is 
to make plans for precautions to prevent unneces- 
sary damage to artistic treasures and to furnish 
advice and assistance regarding partially dam- 
aged monuments, museums, and other artistic 
treasures. * * * 

4. Distribution of Maps. . . . there has been 
prepared under the general supervision of the 
American Commission and the Committee of 
the American Council a series of maps of Euro- 
pean cities and towns. These maps contain a 
brief history and description of the chief 
museums and monuments in each locality and 
other information concerning artistic and historic 
monuments therein. 

The maps are furnished to the War Depart- 
ment for use by museums and monuments offi- 
cers in performing their functions and by the 
U.S. Army Air Forces in planning their own 
aerial operations. * * * 

5. Coordination with Operations. General 
Eisenhower had been requested by OPD to com- 
ment on (a) the practicability of declaring spe- 
cific cities and towns throughout Italy to be open 
by agreement and consequently safe storage for 
movable works of art . . . and (b) the possibility 
of using radio broadcasts and pamphlets to advise 
Italians to remove such works from cities and 
towns which may be subjected to future military 
operations. . . . [See below, Chapter XIVj Sec- 
tion 7.] 

General Marshall also submitted for Gen- 
eral Eisenhower's consideration the policy of 
avoiding destruction of immovable works of art 
insofar as possible without handicapping mili- 
tary operations and General Eisenhower replied 
this policy was already in effect. * * * 


[FM 27-5, 22 Dec 43, sec. 1] 
Archives and Records. Archives and records, 
both current and historical, of all branches of 
the government of the occupied territory are of 
immediate and continuing use to military gov- 
ernment. It is therefore essential to seize and 

protect such archives and records. * • • 

Shrines and Art. It is the policy of the United 
States, except where military necessity makes it 
impossible, to preserve all historical and cultural 
monuments and works, religious shrines and 
objects of art. * * * 



The Army Is Assigned Leadership in an 
Indefinite Initial Phase 

What of the civilian agencies in the 
months when the War Department was 
preparing for a broader role in civil affairs ? 
The question is very pertinent for, while 
preparation for civil affairs was an Army 
duty by tradition, this was a war in which 
many traditions were being upset, and the 
President could be expected to support the 
civilian agencies if they were still of a mind 
to contest the tradition of military control. 
In February 1943 the Provost Marshal 
General complained to General Clay that 
the civilian agencies were "preparing to 
duplicate what we are doing." These 
agencies did not, to be sure, protest when, 
in ensuing months, the War Department 
not only planned for a purely military ad- 
ministration in the initial phase of the 
occupation of Sicily but also, in negotia- 
tions with the British over combined con- 
trol machinery, enunciated a general prin- 
ciple of initial military control both of 
planning and of administration. But such 
acquiescence meant nothing as the neces- 
sity of military control at the outset had 
never been disputed. The real issues were 
whether such control should be brief or 
long, and whether it should be coextensive 
only with the duration of active hostilities 
in a restricted locale or with the continued 
predominance of tactical and logistical 
needs in a broad area. In the months 
when civilian control in French North 
Africa was being evaluated, the civilian 
agencies gave no indication that they had 

changed their dogmas on this issue except 
in one respect — the recognition that if 
early civilian control was to be instituted 
in enemy territory the departments of gov- 
ernment would have to act less as contest- 
ants with each other. In March 1943 the 
President defined the powers of Governor 
Lehman in civilian relief broadly enough 
to imply a co-ordinating authority in the 
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation 
Operations (OFRRO), but three months 
later it seemed necessary to create in the 
Department of State a new organizational 
framework of interagency co-operation — 
the Office of Foreign Economic Coordina- 
tion (OFEC). In announcing the OFEC 
plan in early June the President made it 
clear that if anyone was guilty of duplica- 
tion of effort it was the War Department, 
for his letters to the Secretaries of State 
and War constituted the fullest and strong- 
est defense of early civilian control of mili- 
tary government that he or anyone had as 
yet made. 

The plan, set forth in one of the docu- 
ments to follow, was in respect to details 
rather complicated but its underlying 
principle was simple — the same, the Presi- 
dent wrote to Mr. Hull, as he had had in 
mind with regard to French North Africa. 
At a presumably early date, as soon as con- 
ditions in the field allowed, civilian agen- 
cies would send to the theaters teams of ex- 
perts whose functions, while characterized 
as economic, would in fact be coextensive 


with all the nonmilitary responsibilities 
of civil affairs. The one notable deviation 
from the pattern in French North Africa 
was that the civilian agencies would be 
more closely co-ordinated than in that 
area; OFEC, headed by an Assistant Secre- 
tary of State, would be a kind of federal 
union into which they would be brought 
for purposes of co-operation in civil affairs. 
By the Area Director Plan, as the plan for 
operations was known, the civilian agen- 
cies would be integrated in the theaters 
under mission chiefs who reported to 
corresponding Area Directors of OFEC in 
Washington. Though the mission chiefs 
were ultimately to be given complete 
civilian authority, the plan included a 
recognition, just as in French North 
Africa, that during the military period the 
theater commander's authority must be 
paramount; when Assistant Secretary 
McCloy pressed the issue, OFEC acknowl- 
edged that this authority would include the 
right of the theater commander not only 
to decide the time when civilian agencies 
would begin operations but also to keep 
the chain of command and communica- 
tions within the military framework. All 
this sounded very well but under any 
realistic calculation of probabilities no 
theater commander would be in a position, 
without the strongest cause, either to defer 
for very long the beginning of OFEC's 
operations or, once it had started, to exer- 
cise very much influence on its policies. 
His attempt to do so would be contrary 
to the spirit if not the letter of the Presi- 
dent's pronouncement — in effect that the 
sooner and the more fully the Army got 
out of the civil affairs business the better 
it would be for all concerned. General 
Eisenhower was apprised of this attitude 
by General Marshall when the Allied 
Commander in Chief in August discour- 
aged the belief that civilian agencies would 
soon be able to begin effective operations in 
Sicily. [See Chapter Vim] Once having 

begun, their activities, according to proba- 
bilities, would tend to bring about not 
only early demilitarization of the soldier 
Civil Affairs Officers (CAO's) in the field 
but also a relatively speedy ending of 
military control of civilian supply procure- 
ment and of civil affairs planning in 

As of the beginning of September 1943 
the prospect, then, was one of early transi- 
tion to civilian control both in Sicily and 
in other areas as they should be successively 
occupied. But three months after the 
trend toward civilian control was at its 
apex the entire situation changed to an 
almost incredible degree. In November 
the Army and not the civilian agencies was 
assigned the primary role in civil affairs — 
one much greater than the War Depart- 
ment had either expected or wished. And 
this time the Army was in the saddle to 

To take the liberty of presenting a de- 
nouement before its background, on 10 
November 1943 President Roosevelt, 
despite his previous dictum that occupa- 
tion was in most aspects a civilian task, 
directed the Secretary of War to assume 
the major burden of civilian supply. The 
War Department was to undertake the 
planning and implementation of the 
civilian supply program not only in areas 
of military operations but also in the areas 
which might be occupied without fighting 
as the result of a German surrender or 
collapse which was then seen as relatively 
imminent. The Army was to have the 
mission of civilian supply until civilian 
agencies completed their preparations — 
in other words, for an indefinite time. 
While the President said nothing explicitly 
about the Area Director plan for general 
civilian control, his reference to the un- 
readiness of civilian agencies for the sup- 
ply task was a reminder of what was too 
well known to need saying — that the 
civilian agencies had failed not only to take 


over civilian supply but also to put into 
effect the plan first enunciated in June for 
assumption of responsibility in civil affairs 
in general. 

Something had gone wrong with the 
entire plan for civilian control, and the 
cause of the miscarriage, not being re- 
vealed in the President's brief pronounce- 
ment of 10 November, must be searched 
for in the three preceding mondis. The 
reader of this chapter will not find in the 
documents an entirely clarifying answer. 
This is due in part to the fact that the files 
of the War Department only partially 
reflect the developments among the civilian 
agencies. However, both in the War De- 
partment and in the civilian agencies in- 
formal high-level developments were not, 
of course, always recorded. Although a 
most important episode of organizational 
history must in part remain a mystery, the 
basic causes of the shift may be discerned 
from War Department records. At least 
these records permit one to dispose of the 
first hypothesis which may suggest itself — ■ 
namely that the War Department, adopt- 
ing tactics of a jurisdictional battle, had 
deliberately made an aggressive comeback. 

With regard first to the miscarriage of 
the plan for civilian agencies to enter the 
theaters, the documentary record does not 
show that the War Department did any- 
thing to bring this about beyond com- 
plaining to the civilian agencies them- 
selves that they were not effecting the co- 
ordination with each other and with the 
military that was necessary in order to put 
the plan satisfactorily into operation. It 
was the British who dealt the first blow to 
OFEC's Area Director plan; though their 
own practice favored early assumption of 
responsibility by civilian agencies, they saw 
the matter in an entirely different light 
when the question was one of introducing 
American civilians who might be expected 
to be more sensitive than the U.S. Army 
to questionable tendencies in British polit- 

ical and economic policies. Mr. McCloy 
and General Hilldring, far from favoring 
abandonment of the OFEC plan when the 
British expressed opposition, proposed that 
high-level efforts be made to overcome 
the opposition. These efforts might pos- 
sibly have succeeded had not a second blow 
been dealt to the plan by the civilian agen- 
cies themselves. While OFEC had been 
counted on to improve co-ordination 
among component agencies, several of 
these agencies felt that the required co- 
ordination with each other and with the 
military organization would mean an un- 
due sacrifice of their freedom of action. 
As a result OFEC had to be replaced by the 
Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), 
wherein several civilian organizations lost 
their legal individuality and were thus 
compelled to act as one. But, if the obser- 
vations of the Civil Affairs Division were 
correct, FEA failed to achieve— partly be- 
cause of uncertainties over the boundary 
line between its jurisdiction and that of 
the State Department — the co-ordination 
and stability which it was created to 
achieve. Moreover, by this time the 
civilian agencies had received reports from 
the representatives whom they had sent to 
the field to reconnoiter, and the reports 
were most discouraging. Innumerable 
conferences had been held in Washington 
on such abstruse issues as the relative 
merits of centralization and decentraliza- 
tion in foreign economic reconstruction; 
now the reports revealed that for all prac- 
tical purposes it would have been better 
to consider such simple questions as how, 
under conditions of war devastation, it 
would be possible to obtain for civilians 
offices, jeeps, and lodging. At a certain 
point the civilian agencies themselves seem 
to have decided that the Area Director 
plan should be deferred; though never 
formally abandoned, it soon perished from 

Meanwhile, in the more limited sphere 


of civilian relief, OFRRO had been ex- 
periencing great difficulties in procuring 
supplies and had appealed to the War De- 
partment for a partnership which would 
have involved the Army in an expensive 
and precarious entanglement. When 
OFRRO personnel became the American 
component of the United Nations Re- 
lief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA) the prospect for an early 
civilian relief program was scarcely im- 
proved; UNRRA would have to wait not 
only for funds but also for the creation of 
elaborate machinery for international 
collaboration. The Army thus did not 
need to press for the supply responsibility 
which the' President assigned; it received 
the assignment, and indeed a much larger 
mission in other civil affairs matters, sim- 
ply by default. 

The default of the civilian agencies re- 
sulted in more than a deferment of their 
control. There is a tide in the affairs of 
organizations which if taken at the flood 
leads on to fortune, and the civilian agen- 
cies missed this tide in the fall of 1943, with 
the result that opportunity never beckoned 
again with the same degree of appeal. 
Operational conditions in Italy and other 
areas continued to be difficult much longer 
than had been expected, and, though the 
Army again and again invited the civilian 
agencies to assume varying degrees of 
responsibility, they appear to have lost full 
belief in their own destiny in civil affairs— 
at least as far as concerned field operations. 

It would be wrong to conclude — the later 
achievements of the UNRRA alone made 
this clear — that the civilian agencies could 
not have prepared themselves adequately 
to handle civil affairs in Italy and else- 
where if they had had the time and the re- 
sources. American organizational and 
administrative genius is known best in the 

accomplishments of civilians, and some of 
these accomplishments have been those of 
governmental civilian agencies in war as 
well as in peace. From the point of view 
of the nation, and even more that of the 
Army itself, it was not a matter for gratifi- 
cation that the plan for early transfer of 
civil affairs responsibilities to civilians did 
not materialize. The case for maximum 
civilian control of civil affairs is much 
stronger than many of the arguments ad- 
vanced for it indicate. This case does not 
rest upon possible Army imperialism or 
other ambitions, and it is a pity that a 
number of underlings in civilian agencies, 
and even a few persons high enough in 
position to have known better, tended to 
discredit a sensible thesis by somewhat 
nonsensical arguments. The case for 
civilian control rests upon the advisability 
of a proper division of labor in wartime, as 
President Roosevelt pointed out in present- 
ing the OFEC plan. His letter of 3 June 
1943 to Secretary Stimson emphasized that 
modern war requires maximum utiliza- 
tion of the nation's civilian as well as 
military resources, that the assignment of 
the essentially political and economic func- 
tions of civil affairs to civilian agencies 
places the functions where there is pre- 
sumably most aptitude for them, and that 
this division of labor leaves the Army free 
to concentrate upon its primary mission. 
The Army itself accepted these concepts 
subject only to the understanding that dur- 
ing the period of military operations the 
authority of the theater commander would 
remain paramount and civilian agencies 
would be integrated with military organ- 
ization in such a manner as to ensure har- 
mony of their activities. These provisos 
the responsible leaders of the civilian agen- 
cies came also to accept, and the plan for 
control in its final form was thus one which 


gave appropriate recognition both to mili- 
tary and to civilian interests. 

Had the plan been carried out, the his- 
tory of American participation in civil 
affairs would have provided a most inter- 
esting test of a novel scheme of control 
peculiarly appropriate for a democracy. 
The failure to carry it out meant placing 
undue tax upon the Army's administrative 

energies. And, since the control of ad- 
ministration necessarily entails an involve- 
ment in problems of policy, the failure also 
placed upon soldiers the responsibility of 
political and economic judgments which 
often were outside their normal sphere 
and, though not necessarily beyond their 
competence, certainly beyond their 


State Department Favors a Military Admin- 
istration in Enemy Territory 

[Memo, State Dept, on a plan for MG in Sicily, Mar 43, 
CAD files, Husky, prior to 1 Jun 43] 

i. There should be a joint United States- 
British military administration under the orders 
of General Eisenhower as the United Nations 
Commander in Chief in the area involved. Since 
these operations will involve military occupation 
of enemy territory, in contrast to the operations 
in North Africa and will be conducted under 
the unconditional surrender principle, the ad- 
ministration should be definitely military in 
character as a part of the progressive military 

2. b. Any appointments of specially qualified 
persons from agencies other than the military 
establishments of the two Governments should 
become part of, and under the direct orders of 
the military administration, and should not func- 
tion as representatives of their respective 
agencies. * * * 

War Department Views on Initial Military 
Control Seem To Be Gaining Ground 

[Memo, Haskell, Actg Dir, CAD, for the ACofS for 
Opns, 1 Apr 43, CAD files, 321 (12-21-42) (1)] 

3. ... War Department views as to the necessity 
of administering occupied areas under firm mili- 
tary command, and assuming full responsibility 
for all matters of civilian supply, public health, 
repair of utilities and economic measures, espe- 
cially during the early stages of an operation, are 
gaining ground as a result of experience of these 
[civilian] agencies with practical operating diffi- 
culties even in North Africa. * * * 

President Approves Plan For Military 
Administration in Sicily 

[Memo, Haskell, for McCloy, 16 Apr 43, CAD files, 
300.01 (2-26-43)] 

I am returning your note of April 13 with . . . 
memorandum for Mr. [McGeorge] Bundy re- 
garding State Department's position in military 

I know of no Executive Order or Presidential 
Directive setting forth the present position of the 
President which, as you know, represents a 
change from his views of last fall. 

This altered viewpoint, at least for one area, 
has been expressed in security control cable to 
General Eisenhower, approving a military gov- 
ernment for that area and in the President's re- 
cent memorandum outlining policy for military 
government and his approval for Colonel 
Holmes' plan. . . The State Department 
would guide the War Department in determin- 
ing policy in political matters for the military 
governor but will have no administrative re- 
sponsibility in the occupied area as long as mili- 
tary occupation continues. * * * 

State Department Wants a Military Chan- 
nel of Communications in Sicily 

[Msg, WD to AFHQ, 7 May 43, OPD Msg files, CM- 
OUT 3020] 

. . . State Department in complete accord with 
our views that British proposal should not be 
accepted since it is directly opposed to United 
States Government's considered decision that 
Combined Chiefs of Staff be sole channel of com- 

1 The alteration in the President's views had not be- 
come far-reaching by this time. See Ltr, Roosevelt to 
Stimson, 3 Jun 43, in sec. 3, below. 


municating directives to Commander in Chief 
and that the views of British and American Gov- 
ernments should be reconciled here and not in 
Allied Headquarters. . . . 2 

President Approves a Military Chain of Com- 
munications for European Theater 

[Msg, JCS to CG, ETOUSA [European Theater of Op- 
erations, U.S. Army], 31 Aug 43, OPD Msg files, CM- 
OUT 12905] 

The President has approved the following mes- 
sage . . .: "The appointment of Political Ad- 
visers to COSSAC [Chief of Staff, Supreme Al- 
lied Command] Staff is believed to be inadvis- 
able. The United States prefers pattern being 
followed in Italian campaign, where Allied Com- 
mander receives co-ordinated and agreed politi- 
cal decisions of the two governments through 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Diplomatic rep- 
resentatives are present only as observers for 
respective governments." 3 

a The British had proposed that their Resident Minis- 
ter, Harold Macmillan, be attached to Eisenhower's 
headquarters to be in a position to advise him on the 

President Is Inclined Toward a Military Ad- 
ministration in France 

[Paraphrase of Msg, Roosevelt to Hull, 26 Nov 43, CAD 
014. Fr (3-8-43) <i), sec. 2] 

I am convinced that no final decisions or plans 
concerning Civil Affairs for France should be 
made at this time. Entire North African situation 
is complicated but the Lebanon affair illustrates 
the general attitude of the Committee and espe- 
cially De Gaulle. The latter now claims the 
right to speak for all France and talks openly of 
plans to set up his government in France as soon 
as the Allies get in. 

The thought that the occupation when it oc- 
curs should be wholly military is one to which 
I am increasingly inclined. [ ^>ee l-'art lhree| 
Soldiers and Statesmen Plan for Liberated 
Countries of Western Europe.] * * * 

political issues which would arise during operations in 
Sicily. Detailed plans for Military Government control 
during initial phase in Sicily will be found in Chapter 

3 See Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, 
ington, 1954), Chapter II. 


French North Africa Shows Need for Co- 
ordination of Political Planning 

[Memo, Eugene V. Rostow, OFT, Dept of State, for Paul 
Appleby, Dir, OFT, 22 Dec 42, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ 
Sup, N. Africa, vol. I] 

I. ... The great issue there [in French North 
Africa] is political, and its primary importance 
emphasizes, in my view, the greatest lack in our 
present organization, a mechanism for constant 
and advance planning with the War Department 
on the conduct of political affairs in the field. 
I do not regard an overall interdepartmental ad- 
visory committee as an appropriate mechanism 
for considering these issues. In my judgment a 
working group should exist — the North African 
Committee — consisting of you, Mr. McCloy, and, 
from time to time, one or two British delegates, 
with suitable assistants and advisers, to create 
recommendations for Messrs. Hull and Stimson, 
and the President, both on immediate and long 
range problems. . . . There are issues of political 
organization, personnel, security, education, in- 
formation, the liberation of prisoners and refu- 

gees, communications, etc., which are of immense 
consequence to us, and to the conduct of the 
war. . . . 

2. ... This proposal for a North African 
Committee to guide the conduct of political 
events during the period of warfare and occupa- 
tion I regard as the first order of business for 
the broader job of the Office of Foreign Terri- 
tories. These should be like working groups, 
with you and Mr. McCloy aided by different 
advisers, for Italy, Norway, France proper, Ger- 
many, and perhaps Burma. Such groups would 
not only lay down broad lines of policy, which 
might be followed or not during the battles; they 
would prepare instructions for the men in the 
field, recruit the Chief Civil Affairs Officer and 
his staff for the Commanding General in each 
case, and see to it that those men became a sin- 
gle combat team, adequately organized for the 
particular job in hand. In short, they would do 
what would compare in this field to the work 
of a general staff for a purely military operation. 
The job here is para-military, with strong politi- 
cal and military aspects. To make it an effective 


combined operation there must be an effective 
and closely knit combined military and political 
staff. 4 

War Department Excludes Most Civilian 
Agencies From Advance Planning for Sicily 

[Msg, CAD to AFHQ, 24 Apr 43, OPD Msg files, CM- 
OUT 10097] 

The War Department for security and other rea- 
sons has determined upon policy including only 
high State and Treasury Department officials in 
present advance planning stage for Husky 

Assume you are following some procedure of 
excluding NAEB and local representatives of 
Lend-Lease, BEW, OFRRO, OWI, etc. from all 
planning and administrative responsibility out- 
side N.A. [North Africa]. 5 

OFRRO Favors Joint Planning of Supply Re- 

[Note by Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, 5 May 43, CAD files, 
400.38 (2-20-43), sec - 

... In the discussions which I held with Lieu- 
tenant General [Frank M.] Andrews and other 
representatives of our military forces in London, 
as well as in discussion with representatives of 
the War Department here, we have considered 
the advisability of joint planning of requirements 
by military authorities and this office, even for 
the initial military period, on the ground that 
no one can perceive the precise period of direct 
military administration or the precise areas 
which may fall immediately under civilian re- 
sponsibility by virute of the withdrawal of the 
enemy after a military operation is begun. . . . 

Board of Economic Warfare Concedes Army's 
Primacy in Military Government Planning 

[Memo, Miller for PMG, re Conf With Representatives 
of BEW, 21 May 43, PMGO files, 014.13, Relations 
Between Civ and Mil Auths] 

The conferees explored and discussed the fol- 
lowing general principles: 

1 As regards French North Africa, the War Depart- 
ment's planning role was secondary to that of civilian 
agencies. The proposal of Mr. Rostow is striking because 
of its suggestion that the Interdepartmental Advisory 
Committee, in which the War Department was but one 
of a number of interested agencies, was less appropriate 
than a tightly knit planning relationship between the 
State and War Departments. When planning began for 
new areas something like this was, in fact, to eventuate. 

'The proposal of the civilian agencies for systematic 
joint planning was thus not adopted by the War Depart- 
ment, except for the two agencies noted above. 

1. That the War Department has complete con- 
trol and direction of all planning and adminis- 
tration in the field of military government and 
in all training in connection therewith. This was 
conceded by all. 

2. That, upon certain economic matters and the 
techniques incident thereto, the Board may be 
in a position to make useful contributions to the 
activities of the School. * * * 

State Department Agrees That CAD Now 
Has a Right to the Final Word 

[Min, WD Gen Council, 31 May 43, OCMH files, WD 

General Hilldring stated that in the first weeks 
of the organization of the Civil Affairs Division 
the primary purpose had been to bring the State 
Department to a realization that they would 
have to take second place to the War Depart- 
ment in questions of military government. [See 
CAD notes below.] They have been brought in 
line on this view, and it has been agreed that 
the War Department will have the final word in 
such matters. Then it was necessary to bring 
other government agencies into agreement on 
this matter. Progress is being made on a general 
acceptance of this theory. * * * 

How CAD Prepared Plans 

[Ltr, AG to Theater Comdrs, 29 Jul 43, CAD files, 321 
(12-21-42) (1)] 

a. In carrying out its mission for the broad 
civil affairs planning and the direction in Wash- 
ington of civil affairs problems presented to it by 
theater commanders, the Civil Affairs Division 
will prepare broad plans for each enemy or en- 
emy-held area occupied or to-be-occupied, and 
will co-ordinate these plans with the appropriate 
civilian agencies and where possible with our 
allies. Following agreement by all concerned in 
Washington, the Civil Affairs Division will 
transmit the plan in the form of a tentative direc- 
tive to the theater commander concerned for his 
views and recommendations. 

b. The Civil Affairs Division will reconsider 
the tentative directive in the light of the ex- 
pressed views of the theater commander and will 
issue a directive as a basis upon which the theater 
commander will prepare a detailed plan for mili- 
tary government in enemy or enemy-held areas 
within his theater. 

c. This detailed plan will then be forwarded to 
the War Department for submission to the Joint 
or Combined Chiefs of Staff for final ap- 
proval. * * * 


Difficulties of Planning Without Knowing 
State Department's Political Premises 

[Rpt, Maj Sidney C. Sufrin, ASF Hq, on Mtg with Rep- 
resentatives of State Depc, 26 Jul 43, CAD files, 091.1, 
MG (10-6-42) (1)] 

3. The question of the relation between the civil- 
ian (teams) and military government was dis- 
cussed very briefly — no one knowing exacdy the 
administrative plan which would be followed. 

4. Mr. Stinebower [State] expressed the view 
that it would be wise if arrangements were made 
for the transfer of information and pooling of 
ideas by persons in the War Department and in 
the State Department who were doing the basic 
work. It was also suggested by Mr. Stinebower 
that it might be wise if War Department repre- 
sentatives in OFEC raised the question of the 
political preconceptions which would be de- 
manded of military government. Were such a 
question raised, it would do much to force the 
State Department to answer questions which it 
finds difficult to answer. 6 

State Department Is Willing for CAD To 
Take the Initiative in Drafting Directives 

[Undated CAD Notes Relating to a Con£ Attended by 
Hull, James Dunn, Maj Gen Ray W. Barker, and Hill- 
dring, Transmitted to CofS, 3 Sep 43, CofS files, 337, 
Staff Conf ] 

6. a. General Hilldring pointed out to Mr. Hull 
that time was pressing with respect to civil affairs 

' One difficulty in the State Department planning was 
apparently the multiplicity of levels and desks concerned. 
Not until the creation of the State- War-Navy Co-ordinat- 
ing Committee (SWNCC) in late 1944 was a mechanism 

planning for Europe. He suggested, in view of the 
fact that the pressure was largely upon the War 
Department, that the War Department initiate 
civil affairs directives for Axis-occupied areas of 
Europe, including political, economic, and finan- 
cial sections, and that the War Department then 
submit them to the State Department for com- 
ment, and with respect to the political and eco- 
nomic sections, for approval. General Hilldring's 
suggestion followed a statement by Mr. Hull that 
for the time being the State Department would 
not reduce its political policy for Axis-occupied 
countries to specific terms for any single country. 

b. Mr. Hull approved General Hilldring's sug- 
gestions. * * * 

An Example of Delay in Political Directives 

[Msg, McCloy to Hilldring, 22 Nov 43, CAD Msg files, 
CM-IN 13754] 

On way over suggestion was made that Rankin 
C plan be completely reversed. 7 That is, that we 
take northwest area supplying through northern 
ports and our partners take southern area supply- 
ing through the ports that were allocated to U.S. 
in CCS 320/2. Thus far we have had no guidance 
from State Department on any of Rankin sub- 
divisions. As guide to planning here will you 
consult Dunn and wire summary of State Depart- 
ment views on all Rankin proposals. . . . 

found which would bring about quick interdepartmental 
decisions. This committee was composed only of repre- 
sentatives on the higher levels. 

'One of he three plans, generally known as Rankin 
I, H, III, for return to the Continent in event of deteriora- 
tion of the German position. See Pogue, The Supreme 
Command, Chapter V. 


President Gives OFRRO a Charter for 
Civilian Relief 

[Ltr, Roosevelt to Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, 19 Mar 43, CAD 
files, 334, OFRRO (2-5-43X1)] 

Pending the working out of final plans with 
our allies, I should like to define the scope and 
duties of your work as director of Office of For- 
eign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations. 

You are authorized to plan, co-ordinate, and 
arrange for the administration of this govern- 
ment's activities for the relief of victims of the 
war in areas liberated from Nazi control through 
the provision of food, clothing, and other basic 

necessities, housing facilities, medical and es- 
sential services; and to facilitate in areas receiv- 
ing relief the production and transportation of 
these articles and the furnishing of these 
services. * * * 

Your operations in any specific area abroad 
will, of course, be subject to the approval of U.S. 
Military Commander in that area so long as 
military operations continue, and in matters of 
general foreign policies you will be guided by 
directives of the Secretary of State. 8 

'These directives were in response to Governor Leh- 
man's request for more definitive instruction. 


Civilian Agencies Do Not Agree With War 
Department on Limitations of Their Role 

[Memo for Info No. 56, app. to Memo from Brig Gen 
William J. Donovan, Dir, OSS, for Secy, JCS, 12 Apr 43, 
CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1] 

In defining its mission in military government, 
the War Department holds it to be mainly ad- 
ministrative and expects that underlying policy 
in matters political, economic, fiscal, etc. will be 
determined by other agencies of the government. 
(Synopsis, September r, 1942) It invites these 
agencies to supply lists of personnel qualified to 
deal with such matters, but it reserves to itself 
the right of appointment and insists that in all 
departments military government will be under 
military direction and control. 

It is not at all clear that other departments of 
the government have accepted the War Depart- 
ment's definition of their relation to military gov- 
ernment. The State Department is taking an ac- 
tive interest not only in matters of policy but also 
in matters of administrative control. The Office 
of Relief and Rehabilitation (Governor Lehman) 
appears to be making its own plans quite outside 
the War Department's frame of reference. Both 
Lend-Lease and BEW are plan-making in the 
economic field. The Department of Interior is 
staking out a claim for participation in the oc- 
cupation of the Philippines. And there are doubt- 
less others. * * * 

Governor Lehman Proposes a Statement of 
Policy for OFRRO 

[Incl " to Ltr, Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, to SW, 8 May 43, 
CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-5-43) (1)] 

11. With respect to operations in the field, the 
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Op- 
erations must and does assume responsibility for 
the selection and direction of the Chief and mem- 
bers of the relief and rehabilitation mission in 
each liberated area. The mission chief will be 
answerable to me, as Director of the Office of 
Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, 
and his charter of operations will come from me. 

In matters of general foreign policy the mis- 
sion chief will be guided by the directives of the 
Secretary of State and the chief political officer of 
this government assigned to the liberated area. 

When relief and rehabilitation operations are 
being administered by the military authorities, he 

9 Statement of Policy for Relief and Rehabilitation in 
Future Liberated Areas. Copies were also sent to State, 
Treasury, Navy, Agriculture, War Food Administration, 
Board of Economic Warfare, War Production Board, and 
the Bureau of the Budget. 

will function under the immediate direction and 
supervision of the commanding military officer in 
the field; and thereafter, so long as military occu- 
pation continues, his operation shall be subject to 
the approval of the military commander in that 

Throughout the period of civilian administra- 
tion of relief and rehabilitation, the mission chief 
will be directly responsible to this office for the 
preparation of requirements, the formulation of 
plans, and the control of the reception, transpor- 
tation and distribution of goods imported under 
United States auspices for civilian use, and for 
all rehabilitation operations. 10 

War Department Expects OFRRO To Recog- 
nize the Principle of Military Control Dur- 
ing the Period of Military Government 

[Ltr, Stimson to Lehman, 2 Jun 43, CAD files, 334, 
OFRRO (2-5-43) (1)] 

. . . there were several statements in your mem- 
orandum in respect of matters in which the War 
Department has a primary interest that might 
be misinterpreted. Informal conversations be- 
tween members of the War Department and your 
organization resulted in the conclusion that there 
were no differences of opinion in fact and seem- 
ingly obviated the possibility of future mis- 
understandings. The following two specific ob- 
servations, however, would seem to be pertinent. 

It is recognized that during the period of mili- 
tary government complete responsibility for all 
matters within the theater of operation is neces- 
sarily vested in the Commanding General of the 
theater. This does not, however, preclude dele- 
gation by the Commanding General, at any time 
in his discretion, of administrative authority to 
civilian agencies; it being understood that the 
civilian agencies would not be called upon to 
exercise that authority unless and until they 
are fully prepared to do so. 

In regard to supply, transportation and dis- 
tribution arrangements, there is full appreciation 
of the fact that these must come under the con- 
trol of the military, and that all communications 
during the period of military government must 
pass through military channels. 11 * * * 

10 Governor Lehman, it will be remembered, had early 
in April agreed that the War Department would assume 
responsibility for t he first ninety days (see above, Chap- 
|ter III, Section 4"^ . This paragraph, in particular, was 
responsible tor the concern in the War Department which 
led to Secretary Stimson's letter to Governor Lehman on 
2 June. 

11 Governor Lehman promptly expressed agreement 
with Secretary Stimson's observations. 


President Has a New Plan for Ensuring Early 
Control by Civilian Agencies 

fLtr, Roosevelt to Stimson, 3 Jun 43, CAD files, 334, 
OFEC (5-29-43) (1)] 

I am enclosing a "Plan for Co-ordinating the 
Economic Activities of U.S. Civilian Agencies in 
Liberated Areas" drawn up by the Bureau of the 
Budget after extensive discussion with various 
interested agencies. It has my approval as a 
positive approach to the establishment of ade- 
quate interdepartmental machinery, and I am 
sure I can count on your wholehearted assistance 
in its prompt and effective operation. 12 

In order to facilitate the functioning of the 
plan, I have written the Secretary of State asking 
him to undertake full leadership in the co- 
ordination here and abroad of the relevant civil- 
ian agency activities, and amplifying certain of 
the functions assigned to the agencies. A copy 
of that letter is enclosed for your guidance. 13 

I am making these arrangements so that we 
can plan for greater participation of the civilian 
agencies in the economic affairs of liberated areas 
than has heretofore been feasible. I am convinced 
that they should be brought into operations at 
the earliest stage of occupation consistent with 
military considerations and that maximum re- 
liance should be placed in their work. 

Total war, as our enemy has demonstrated, 
involves full use of military and civilian re- 
sources. The civilian agencies have considerable 
experience and talent that it would be difficult 
and undesirable for the Army to duplicate. The 
military operations of our Army should not be 
unnecessarily diluted or diverted by the ques- 
tions affecting relief, rehabilitation, reconstruc- 
tion, restoration of trade, strategic procurement 
and development, repatriation, property rights, 
legal systems, political warfare, political organ- 

u The Director of the Bureau of the Budget had been 
working on such a plan ever since, in the French North 
African operation, it became evident that civilian agency 
operations were sadly in need of co-ordination. For 
memoranda of the Bureau of the Budget ^nd-others-giving 
the background of the plan, see above . 1 Chapter TTl 

u In his letter to Secretary Hull of 3 June, the President 
described the plan as ". . . similar to what I had in 
mind when we discussed the problems arising from the 
invasion of North Africa. . . . The job in Washington 
will demand a large part of the time and energy of the 
Assistant Secretary you name to co-ordinate these activ- 
ities . . ." CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1). To 
carry out the plan, the Office of Foreign Economic Co- 
ordination (OFEC) was created. Though the State De- 
partment also had had leadership in North Africa, no 
machinery had been provided for co-ordinating the dif- 
ferent civilian agencies in Washington or, except for the 
North African Economic Board, in the theater. 

ization, and other essentially civilian problems. 

Accordingly, I want your Civil Affairs Di- 
vision and other parts of the Service, to work 
with these agencies in closest co-operation and 
to use them to the maximum extent possible. 
This will leave you free to carry on the primary 
task which you are facing — the execution of 
military operations against the enemy. 

Plan for Co-ordinating the Economic Activities 
of U.S. Civilian Agencies in Liberated Areas 
The plan herein oudined for co-ordinating in 

this country and abroad, the activities of U.S. 

civilian agencies relative to economic affairs in 

liberated areas is based on the following premises: 

1. Premises 

a. There must be one central point in Wash- 
ington for the co-ordination of interrelated ac- 
tivities of the several U.S. agencies operating 
abroad. Leadership in providing this co-ordina- 
tion rests with the Department of State. 

b. There must likewise be in each liberated 
area a central point of leadership and co-ordi- 
nation similar to that in Washington. \ 

c. The attainment of unity in policy and 
operations requires the participation of all agen- 
cies concerned through interdepartmental ma- 
chinery which provides a setting for close and 
continuous working relationships. 

d. Such provision for co-ordination shall not 
remove the responsibility or authority of each 
agency for carrying out its own functions. 

e. A major objective of the interdepart- 
mental machinery should be that of relating the 
economic plans and operations of U.S. civilian 
agencies for liberated areas to those of officials 
responsible for foreign policies, and to those of 
the armed services and members of the United 

f. Exempted fiom the scope of this memo- 
randum are the territories and possessions of 
the United States now occupied by enemy forces, 
such as Guam and the Philippine Islands. 

g. At all levels of interagency operations in 
Washington, the military and the political policy 
representatives of our government should work 
with the civilian operating agencies to afford 
proper guidance, to obviate excessive clearance, 
and to provide the information essential to effec- 
tive planning and operations. 

2. Interdepartmental Policy Committee 

In order to develop a unified policy and to 
facilitate the co-ordination of agency activities, 
there is hereby established an Interdepartmental 
Committee for Economic Policy in Liberated 
Areas (Policy Committee). The Chairman of this 


Committee shall be an Assistant Secretary of 
State whose designation is provided for in Sec- 
tion 3 of this plan. In addition to the Chairman, 
the Committee shall consist of the heads, or their 
deputies, of the following: 
State Department (Political Policy) 
Treasury Department 
War Department 
Navy Department 
Board of Economic Warfare 
Office of Lend-Lease Administration 
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation 

This Committee will provide a means for 
bringing together responsible officials of the agen- 
cies to consider policies, programs, and other 
matters of concern to such a group. The Com- 
mittee will give final resolution, subject to the 
decisions of the President, to over-all policies and 
programs of interagency concern which have not 
been resolved in the Co-ordinating Committee (to 
be established). * * * 

3. Assistant Secretary for Foreign Economic 

The Secretary of State shall designate an 
Assistant Secretary of State who shall co-ordinate 
our economic activities related to liberated areas 
and facilitate military-civilian co-operation. 

In connection with these duties, he shall act 
as Chairman of the Policy Committee and of the 
Co-ordinating Committee to co-ordinate the 
activities of the interested agencies. To this end 
he shall provide a secretariat and necessary staff 
to serve the Policy Committee, the Co-ordinating 
Committee, and any subcommittees. 

4. Co-ordinating and other Subordinate Com- 

The Policy Committee shall establish as a 
working committee a Co-ordinating Committee 
composed of representatives of the same agencies 
as those in the former group. 

Subject to appeal to the Policy Committee, the 
Co-ordinating Committee shall review and co- 
ordinate area plans, and take such steps as may 
be necessary to adjust policy and area operations 
to meet the changing needs of the military serv- 
ices and to comply with working arrangements 
set up with our allies. 

Area subcommittees, covering territories to be 
liberated as well as territories already liberated, 
may be set up, based on administrative areas de- 
termined in consultation with military offi- 
cials. * * * 

5. Area Directors 

For each of the areas liberated, the Secretary 
of State shall appoint with approval of the Policy 

Committee, an Area Director. These Directors 
will provide over-all direction and co-ordination 
to the economic activities of U.S. civilian agencies 
in their respective areas. 

It is recognized that the emergency problems 
faced and delay of detailed Washington clear- 
ances make it necessary to give Area Directors 
wide latitude in operations and ample authority 
to act "on the spot." It is likewise evident that 
the pattern for each area must be modified ac- 
cording to the military theatre arrangements and 
agreements with our allies. 

In general, however, the following pattern shall 
obtain where a major part of economic operations 
are under U.S. agencies : 

The Area Director will be subject to orders of 
the Military commander of the area, and of the 
Assistant Secretary in accordance with policies es- 
tablished by the Policy or Co-ordinating Commit- 
tees. In the field the Area Director will keep the 
political representative of the State Department 
advised of his activities and will be guided by him 
on matters of general political policy. That rep- 
resentative, however, shall intervene only when 
definite political policies are involved. Clearance 
"bottlenecks" in this respect shall be avoided 

Within these limits, the Area Director shall 
have all the powers necessary to co-ordinate the 
field activities of the various U.S. civilian agencies 
concerned with the economic affairs of the area. 
In case of emergency, threatened breakdown of 
activities, or serious difficulties, these powers shall 
extend to directing specific operations and shift- 
ing functions and personnel, pending other ar- 
rangements in Washington to meet the situation. 

The Area Director will act as the major channel 
of contact for the civilian economic agencies with 
the military and our allies in the field. He will 
likewise channel all communications of these 
agencies from the field to the Assistant Secretary 
in Washington for proper handling. * * * 

The War Department Seems To Have Some 
Misgivings But Will Co-Operate 

[Memo, ID for Red, 5 Jun 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy- 
Gen, Jun 43-Jul 43] 

1. The proposed plan is of vital interest to the 
Army as well as to the State Department and 
other civilian agencies. 

2. It is not believed that the State Department 
and the various civil agencies are in a proper 
position to evaluate or estimate the importance of 
this matter to the Army. 


3. The plan has not been discussed with the 

4. In essence the plan appears to contemplate, 
although it is not clear, that during a period of 
military government there will be no final author- 
ity in any one department or agency in the mili- 
tary theater. Instead, there will be a theater com- 
mander whose responsibility will be "military," 
and who will report to the Combined or Joint 
Chiefs of Staff as the case might be. There will be 
a State Department representative who will have 
authority as to "political'' matters. He will report 
both to the Department of State and presumably 
to the President. There will also be an area di- 
rector whose duties wiU be "economic matters." 
He will act under the direction of the State De- 
partment from Washington and will report to the 
theater commander, the State Department repre- 
sentative in the theater, and to the State Depart- 
ment in Washington. 

5. It is clear that such a system can produce 
only confusion and cannot be productive of good 
results. It is fundamental that at any given time 
there is one source of authority in the area. Ini- 
tially it must be the military commander. . . . 

8. The danger is, of course, that the military 

will devote too much attention to military prob- 
lems and too little attention to civil problems. 
Yet it is recognized that the primary task is that 
of military victory. It seemed safer to subordinate 
civil matters to military operations than to confuse 
both the civil matter and the military operations 
by a scheme which is neither fish, flesh, nor 

[Ltr, Stimson to Roosevelt, 11 Jun 43, CAD files, 334 
OFEC (5-29-43) (1)] 

. . . You can be sure that it will be the purpose 
of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Depart- 
ment to do all that it can to make the plan effec- 
tive and in this connection, of course, will seek 
closest assistance and co-operation of the civilian 

I feel that the government of an occupied area 
should initially be entirely military and that there 
is real unwisdom, if not danger, in moving too 
promptly from military to civilian authority in a 
sensitive area. However, I can assure you that 
there will be the greatest disposition to call on 
the civilian agencies for all the help they can 
render as promptly as possible. * * * 


Treasury Demurs at Loss of Separate Com- 
munication With Its Field Employees 

[Min, 13th Mtg of OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 10 Aug 
43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1)] 

II. Organization of Anglo-American Team in 
Sicily and other Liberated Areas. 

1. The Chairman laid before the Committee 
for discussion and action the following resolu- 

"The economic representatives of the United 
States and Great Britain in Sicily and other ter- 
ritory hereafter liberated shall be combined into 
a single integrated organization following the 
pattern of integration established by AMGOT 
[Allied Military Government of Occupied Ter- 
ritory], i.e., — There shall be a single Area Di- 
rector chosen by the U.S. and U.K. governments 
who shall have as his deputy a person of the 
opposite nationality; all other economic repre- 
sentatives in the area shall be responsible to the 
Area Director regardless of nationality and any 
sections of such divisions shall be organized in 
like manner from top to bottom so that each 
person reports to his superior in the organization 

regardless of nationality and not to the chief 
of mission; every effort shall be made to preserve 
an even balance between the U.S. and U.K. 

"Inasmuch as differences of opinion may 
arise between U.S. and U.K. representatives it 
is understood that such differences shall in the 
discretion of the Area Director and his deputy 
be referred for instructions to the Co-ordinating 
Committee in Washington. . . ." 

2. Mr. Taylor of the Treasury requested that 
the means of communication of the agency repre- 
sentatives in the field should be clarified. He 
said that it was the desire of the Treasury that 
it be made clear that Treasury representatives 
in the field could communicate to the Treasury 
in Washington. . . . 

3. General Hilldring agreed that the Army is 
strongly opposed to a repetition of the communi- 
cations pattern as adopted by NAEB. He stated 
that for the sake of clarity and efficiency it was 
essential that all cables should come to a com- 
bined OFEC. 14 This agency would then resolve 

14 A proposed committee for combining the civilian 
economic agencies of the United States and Great Britain. 


such differences of opinion as might exist. By 
so doing, opposing views would be settled in 
Washington and conflicts of policy would not 
exist to trouble the Area Commander. He pointed 
out that conflicting communications to London 
and Washington are exactly what the Army 
wishes to avoid. 

5. Mr. Taylor said that the Treasury insisted 
on the right to ask Treasury representatives in 
the field for reports from the field. Governor 
Lehman agreed on this point. The Treasury also 
suggested that agency representatives report not 
to the Area Director but to the highest officer 
of his own nationality. General Hilldring pointed 
out that in the organization of AMGOT each 
man reported to his immediate superior regard- 
less of nationality and that in fact the chain 
of command alternated between British and 

6. The Chairman requested that the Commit- 
tee come to a decision on the Resolution and 
OLLA, OFRRO, OEW [Office of Economic 
Warfare], and the Army agreed that it should 
be adopted as an expression of policy by the Com- 
mittee. Mr. Taylor . . . said he would have to 
clear the Resolution with other members of his 
agency and agreed to notify the Chairman of the 
Treasury decision. 

OFRRO Opposed to Loss of Full Power Over 
Its Field Employees 

[Min, 16th Mtg OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 20 Aug 
43, CAD files, 334. OFEC (5-39-43) 0)] 

Governor Lehman explained, as the basis for 
OFRRO's unwillingness to accept the proposed 
pattern for the Sicilian Team, that in his judg- 
ment, the agencies have certain responsibilities 
placed on them by statute or Presidential order 
and that under the pattern of the Revised Re- 
solution the agencies' authority is taken from 
them but the responsibility remains. The Chair- 
man said that it was not the desire of the 
Co-ordinating Committee to shear the civilian 
agencies of authority but that an integrated team 
was necessary to fit into the existing pattern of 
AMG in Sicily, and, since the Army would not 
for military reasons change its pattern to fit plans 
of the civilian agencies, that it was necessary for 
the civilians to adapt themselves to the Army 
pattern. * * * 

Governor Lehman said that as he visualized 
the pattern of the civilian agency teams for Sicily, 
the Area Director would act merely as co-ordina- 
tor, but that he feared that under the plan ex- 
pressed in the Revised Resolution the Area 

Director will not only be a co-ordinator but also 
the man giving orders to the civilian agencies on 
what they are to do and how it is to be done. 

The Chairman said that the issue was clear. 
It was whether the Area Director had general 
powers or whether he had powers only in an 
emergency. The Chairman expressed his opinion 
that mere emergency powers were not sufficient 
for proper supervision of civilian work and that 
he felt that it was essential that the Area Director 
must be in general charge of the field team. Of 
course, he explained, it is clear that the Area Di- 
rector cannot on his own authority order a civilian 
agency to adopt a certain course without being 
subject to the agency's right to have the 
entire matter brought up to the Co-ordinating 

British Do Not Seem To Be Preparing Them- 
selves For the New Plan 

[Memo, Col Samuel F. Clabaugh, Chief, Econ Branch, 
CAD, for Col David Marcus, ExecO, CAD, 25 Aug 43, 
CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43) (01 

2. The plan ... is still not sufficiently definite, 
complete and articulate in its fundamentals to 
work out the details to any degree of exactness. 
For instance it is our understanding that the 
British do not have any comparable organiza- 
tion to the Office of Foreign Economic Co-ordina- 
tion or the area teams. We are attempting to 
integrate two components when one component 
is not organized, or so far as we know, not pro- 
posed. * * * 

U.S. Civilian Agencies Do Not Seem To Be 
Co-Ordinating or Preparing Adequately 

[CAD Notes Relating to a Conf Attended by Hull, Dunn, 
Barker, and Hilldring, transmitted to CofS, 3 Sep 43, 
CofS, 337, Staff Conf, 1943] 

i. a. Mr. Hull opened the conference by stating 
that Mr. James [F.] Byrnes in a. recent confer- 
ence had expressed the fear that the Services and 
the United States civilian agencies had not 
reached a clear understanding as to what part 
each was to play in liberated and occupied areas, 
and that there was no firm understanding as to 
how the military and civilian agencies would be 
integrated in these foreign fields. 

b. General Hilldring replied that there was 
no foundation for Mr. Byrnes' fears. The Army 
and the Navy are thoroughly integrated, and 
there is, so far as understanding of the military 
and civilian roles is concerned, complete agree- 
ment between the Services and OFEC. General 


Hilldring agreed to present to Secretary Hull 
in the near future, convincing evidence that 
this agreement did exist. (There may be, on the 
part of Mr. Byrnes, some concern about the 
progress of OFEC in resolving difference be- 
tween its member agencies and in preparing it- 
self to function in the field. There is some 
justification for this concern.) * * * 

Views on Introduction of Civilian Agencies 
Into Sicily 

[Min, ioth Mtg CCAC, 16 Sep 43, ABC files, CCAC 
files, 334 (8-9-43)] 

General Hilldring . . . read the following from 
a paper prepared by the British members: 

"London are [sic] of the opinion that, so far 
as ex-enemy territory is concerned, and at any 
rate for so long as military control is necessary, 
there is no place for a separate civilian agency. 
They consider that if the personnel of the OFEC 
team is to be employed in Italy, it must be merged 
in the personnel of the Control Commission. 
They consider that American civilian experts 
appointed to the economic and administrative 
section would, like their British colleagues, act 
as integral members of the Control Commission 
staff, and not as a civilian team or civilian teams 
under the Deputy Vice-President. It is their view 
that, if this is done, there would be grave risk 
of duplication between military and civilians, 
and of an "independent organization" acting in 
economic affairs without being properly respon- 
sible to the CinC as President of the Control 

[Lt.] .General [G. N.] Macready stated that 
the foregoing is a correct representation of the 
British views. 

US. Views 

Mr. Finletter stated his views as follows: That, 
during the strictly military period of occupation, 
economic problems would be handled by AMG 
personnel, and no civilians would be present at 
all; that, upon invitation from the CinC, civilians 
would gradually be brought into the area and 
given the task of handling economic problems; 
that the civilians would be fitted into the organi- 
zational pattern of AMG or the Control Com- 
mission, as the case might be, without in any 
way disrupting this organizational pattern, or 
in any way impinging upon the full control of 
the military authorities; that, on this basis, U.S. 
civilians would be integrated with either British 
civilians or British military personnel performing 
similar functions; that there should be a U.S. 

civilian director, or chief, of all U.S. civilian 
personnel, purely for internal administrative pur- 
poses, and not for the purpose of changing the 
organizational structure of either AMG or the 
Control Commission, or depriving the military 
personnel of control; that the time may come 
when instructions to sections of either AMG or 
the Control Commission, manned by civilians, 
will flow directly from a combined OFEC, rather 
than through military channels, even though the 
military will retain complete, though unexer- 
cised, control of all activities in the area, just 
as was the case in North Africa. In expressing 
these views, Mr. Finletter said that he assumed 
that the Control Commission would exercise con- 
trol over as wide a field as was covered by 

General Hilldring stated that the position of 
OFEC, as outlined by Mr. Finletter, is satisfac- 
tory to the War Department. 15 

British Opposition Stalls the Plan For 
Civilian Agency Operations During the Mili- 
tary Period 

[Memo, Hilldring for Col Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., 
Secy, CAD, 21 Sep 43, CAD files, 337, Conf, Hilldring 
and Finletter (5-14-43) (1)] 

2. On the British side, the complete control of all 
British activity in Axis countries is going to be 
under the War Office until the termination of 
military control, the British War Office does not 
intend to relinquish any part of its control until 
military control in an area is completely termi- 
nated. For this reason, America's expectation for 
turning over the control of economic functions 
during the period of military control to OFEC 
could not be accomplished. 16 

OFEC Found Wanting and Is Succeeded by 
Foreign Economic Administration 

[Exec Order 9380, 25 Sep 43, Dept of State Bull IX (13 
Nov 43), 205] 

i. There is established, in the Office for Emer- 
gency Management of the Executive Office of the 

16 This position was also satisfactory to General Eisen- 
hower, who had cabled that civilian agencies might soon 
send their personnel into Sicily. The issue insofar as it 
pertained to Sicily is fully treated below, in Chapter VIII. 

19 In the ensuing paragraph of the memorandum Gen- 
eral Hilldring instructs Hammond to try further to win 
British acceptance of the concept of civilian economic 
control laid down in the President's letter of 3 June. How- 
ever, nothing came of these efforts. The Area Director 
Plan was never formally abandoned; it simply withered 
away owing not only to British opposition but also to 
the continuation of difficult conditions for the operation 
of civilian agencies. 


President, the Foreign Economic Administra- 
tion [FEA]. . . . 

4. The powers and functions of the adminis- 
tration shall be exercised in conformity with the 
foreign policy of the United States as defined by 
the Secretary of State. As soon as military opera- 
tions permit, the administration shall assume re- 
sponsibility for the control of all activities of the 
United States Government in liberated areas with 
respect to supplying the requirements of and pro- 
curing materials in such areas. 17 

New Setup Also Disappoints War Depart- 

[Ltr, Hilldring to McCloy, 21 Oct 43, CAD files, 334, 
OFEC (5-29-43) (01 

1. The establishment of respective jurisdiction in 
economic matters of the State Department and 
FEA is not making any progress. . . . 

17 While the charter of FEA incorporated the same mis- 
sion as that of OFEC (sec. 3, above), abolished by the 
same Executive Order, the new organization was in one 
respect quite different. Whereas OFEC was merely to 
co-ordinate a number of independent agencies, FEA con- 
solidated them within its own framework. The agencies 
brought together in FEA were the BEW, OFRRO, OLLA, 
and the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) so far as 
concerned its foreign procurement activities. OFEC is gen- 
erally supposed to have failed because independent civil- 
ian agencies were unwilling to sacrifice sufficiently their 
freedom of action. FEA would not have this difficulty. 
However, it was to be impeded by other difficulties, chief 
of which seems to have been the lack of adequate prepara- 
tions for entering upon civilian economic activities under 
difficult conditions. 

3. All signs indicate to me that the new set up 
is even more hopelessly confused than the old 
one. Certainly no one is assuming leadership in 
the establishment of an orderly organization for 
handling of foreign economic questions. 

CAD's Difficulty Is Obtaining Prompt 
Co-ordinated Answers From the Civilian 

[Memo, Maj Donald H. McLean, Jr., CAD, for the Chief, 
CAD, 8 Nov. 43, CAD files, 334, FEA (10-16-43) (01 

I. As a result of a recent suggestion which you 
made to Mr. Yost of the State Department, I met 
on Friday with Mr. Herman Wells who has been 
designated by Mr. [Dean] Acheson as Advisor on 
Liberated Areas. . . . Mr. Wells and his staff 
were primarily interested in learning how we 
desired the Adviser on Liberated Areas to work 
with the War Department. In this connection, 
he also raised the specific question of the type of 
foreign economic policy directive the War De- 
partment desired the State Department to 

2. I advised Mr. Wells^ that our immediate 
problem was to have at our disposal a civilian 
machinery which would enable the War Depart- 
ment to obtain prompt answers to the increasing 
number of foreign economic problems which are 
presented by theater commanders and that in re- 
cent weeks we have had considerable difficulty in 
obtaining prompt coordinated answers to such 
questions. * * * 


Difficulties of OFRRO in Procuring Sup- 

[Notes, ID on Mtg of WD Sup Authorities, 4 Jun 43, 
ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (Jun 43-Jul 43)] 

b. Conversations have been held with Gover- 
nor Lehman. He is relieved to know that he will 
not be expected to support operations until they 
have become publicly known. His position is 
largely dependent on the Army. He has, in fact, 
no authority, save letter from President, and no 
funds. 18 The Army, in short, must support his 

18 OFRRO obtained its funds from the Office of Lend- 
Lease Administration. There were varying points of view 
among civilian agencies as to the proper placement of 
relief functions, and it was uncertain at the time whether 

program of requirements, but it is doubtful 
whether the War Department can undertake to 
certify his needs while doubt remains as to ulti- 
mate responsibility. . . . 

OFRRO Proposes Joint Supply Program to the 
War Department 

[Ltr, Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, to Hilldring, Chief, CAD, 
22 Jun 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 1] 

In the various conversations there has been gen- 
eral agreement as to the necessity for continuity 

OFRRO would continue in its desired role. This was 
perhaps one of the reasons why the War Department did 
not count too greatly on OFRRO's procurement of civil- 
ian supplies or wish to extend it aid. 


of supply and administration during the periods 
of military and civilian administration. There has 
also been a recognition of the impossibility of de- 
fining precisely the period of original military 
administration, prior to the development of spe- 
cific military operations. There has likewise been 
a recognition of the fact that military operations 
may result in the withdrawal of the enemy from 
certain areas without the waging of an active 
campaign by our forces, thus resulting in the 
necessity for immediate action by the civilian 
relief agency in areas which cannot be pre- 
cisely planned for as a civilian agency respon- 
sibility prior to the occurrence of the event 

In view of the indivisibility of the supply 
problem as between the periods of military and 
civilian administration, I therefore suggest for 
your consideration the following as a basis for 
co-operation in meeting these problems: 

(1) The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabili- 
tation Operations, after appropriate clearance 
with the War Department, should submit total 
relief requirements for the military and civilian 
periods of administration of relief to the appro- 
priate control agencies and seek one allocation 
for both such periods. 

(2) The War Department should support the 
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Op- 
erations in its requests before the appropriate 
control agencies, and otherwise as may be neces- 
sary. As I have frequently pointed out, it will be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain 
adequate supplies without such support. 

(3) The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabili- 
tation Operations will immediately seek to pro- 
cure a stockpile of basic necessities for use, by 
either military or civilian administrators as occa- 
sion may require, in any area that may be opened 

(4) The War Department may requisition sup- 
plies held or acquired by the Office of Foreign 
Relief and Rehabilitation Operations for relief 
purposes during the period of military adminis- 
tration. To the extent that security reasons re- 
quire, such supplies will be called forward by 
them without notification to the Office of For- 
eign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations of the 
destination of such supplies. 

(5) The War Department will arrange for rep- 
resentatives of the Office of Foreign Relief and 
Rehabilitation Operations to enter reoccupied 
areas during the period of direct military ad- 
ministration for the purpose of making plans for 
the later period of civilian relief administration 
when the Army is ready to turn over the work 

wholly or in part to the Office of Foreign Relief 
and Rehabilitation Operations. 19 

War Department Feels Proposed Partnership 
Unnecessary for OFRRO and Undesirable for 
the Army 

[Ltr, Hilldring to Lehman, 7 Jul 43, CAD files, 400.38 
(2-20-43), sec. 1] 

... I would like to establish as a general prem- 
ise the thought that the War Department will 
provide the absolutely essential supplies to meet 
the urgent needs of an occupied area for the 
period which is necessary to permit the full ex- 
ploitation of military operations and until you 
have sufficient time after the start of an opera- 
tion to procure the supplies which will enable 
you to discharge your responsibilities. 

Our reason for the adoption of this premise 
is that wc regard supplies for the support of 
civilian population as an integral part of our 
troop equipment. Procurement and distribution 
plans and procedures have been developed ac- 
cordingly. Military personnel in this country and 
overseas have been carefully trained and have 
had extensive experience in the handling of sup- 
plies pursuant to established standards of operat- 
ing procedures. We feel that it would be un- 
wise at this stage of military plans to adopt the 
machinery you suggest for the separate handling 
of this most important phase of our military 
supply problem. Accordingly, it is our view that 
we must continue to carry these supplies in our 
Army procurement program. 

Your letter raises the question of stockpiling 
by the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilita- 
tion Operations. We recognize that it is very 
difficult to determine with precision the time 
schedule of military operations, as the success of 
even a minor operation may lead to unexepected 
developments. However, going back to our gen- 
eral premise, with the acceptance of the above 
responsibility by the War Department for meet- 
ing minimum essential requirements until you 
have had sufficient time to procure such supplies, 
it would appear to be unnecessary for you to 
stockpile such supplies prior to the start of mili- 
tary operation except in those instances in which 
it can be shown that procurement in small quan- 
tities over a considerable period of time would 
prevent a drastic impingement on our own econ- 

w OFRRO was, in effect, requesting the War Depart- 
ment to help it out of its troubles. In return it was offer- 
ing little or nothing since the concession of paragraph 4 — 
the right of the War Department to requisition OFRRO 
supplies during the military period — was one which the 
Army already took for granted. 


omy which might result from emergency large 
scale procurement. 

We agree that the War Department should 
support the Office of Foreign Relief and Reha- 
bilitation Operations in its requests before ap- 
propriate control agencies for those supplies 
deemed a necessary part of any specific military 
occupation. In such instances, we believe that 
we should reach an agreement with you in ad- 
vance of the presentation of your require- 
ments. * * * 

I might add that upon the cessation of hostili- 
ties, substantial stocks of military equipment 
should be available for other uses. It seems rea- 
sonable to expect that as the military require- 
ments, which now severely tax our resources, are 
reduced, substantial supplies can be made avail- 
able for your needs. 

The War Department fully appreciates the 
necessity for a continuity of supply and adminis- 
tration in enemy-occupied areas and for the clos- 
est co-operation and the clearest understanding 
between our offices if we on our part are to meet 
our military responsibilities and you on your part 
to be prepared for the problems of civilian relief 
which will develop as a result of our military 
operations. Accordingly, I should be very glad to 
meet with you at your convenience to discuss 
these matters in further detail. 20 

Governor Lehman Feels War Department's 
Policies Are Impeding His Efforts 

[Ltr, Lehman to Hilldring, 9 July 43, CAD files, 400.38 
(2-20-43), sec. 1] 

On first reading the policies outlined, if I under- 
stand them correctly, appear to me to make it 
impossible for this Office to be prepared to dis- 
charge the responsibilities placed on it by the 
President and will, I believe, lead to confusion 
and inadequate provision for the relief needs of 
liberated areas. . . . 21 

20 One can easily see other and more fundamental rea- 
sons than those cited in this letter for declining Governor 
Lehman's proposal. The Army had tremendous difficul- 
ties even in fulfilling its supply responsibilities for the 
military period. There was a risk that these would be 
greatly increased if it also underwrote the program of a 
civilian agency whose charter was doubtful, whose stand- 
ing with Congress was unknown, and whose competence 
for its task was as yet untried. An additional source of 
apprehension was the fact that a joint program with 
OFRRO might carry over and entangle the War Depart- 
ment in the postwar period, contrary to all its inclina- 

a Without underestimating the difficulties faced by 
OFRRO, one may still find it difficult to accept the view 
that the War Department's rejection of Governor Leh- 
man's proposal made OFRRO's fulfillment of its task im- 

Army's Supply Responsibility Must Be Ex- 
tended to Six Months 

[Memo, Maj Maulsby Forrest, CAD, on a Mtg between 
Wright, Dir, ID, ASF, and Finletter, Spec Asst to Secy 
of State, 1 Jul 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 1] 

It was Mr. Finletter's opinion that the proposed 
90-day planning period was too short and that a 
period of six months (the British period) would 
be preferable. He based his opinion upon two 
considerations: 1. That 90 days would be insuf- 
ficient for the civilian agencies to complete the 
necessary procurement and to make deliveries 
to the operational or base areas, and 2. That the 
typical military campaign would not have made 
sufficient progress to permit civilian agencies to 
take over. . . . 

[Min, 10th Mtg OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 27 Jul 43, 
CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) 0)] 

V. 1. The Chairman proposed and the com- 
mittee agreed that for the purpose of program- 
ming supplies the Army should be responsible 
for civilian supply in each area for six months 
plus the period of confusion after invasion, 
which would vary, but was estimated at 42 days. 
It was understood, however, that the Army 
might call on the civilian agencies at an earlier 
time to take over the actual distribution of civil- 
ian supplies, and also that if the civilian agen- 
cies should find six months too short the Army 
would retain responsibility for a longer period. 22 

OFRRO Feels It Can Get Nowhere Without 
Army Backing 

[Min, 5th Mtg OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 15 Jul 43, 
CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1)] 

V. 1. ... Governor Lehman . . . stated, that 
the minutes should record it, that OFRRO "has 
not been able to secure the allocations or the 
goods." He attributed this to the lack of backing 
from the War Department. General Hilldring 
repeated his statement made at previous meet- 
ings that the Army never opposed allocations or 

possible. Later UNRRA experience showed that a civil- 
ian agency can best obtain relief and rehabilitation sup- 
plies when war is over. (See George Woodbridge, com- 
piler, UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration, 3 vols. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1950). 

23 According to the History of the Civilian Supply 
Branch, I, p. 90, prepared by International Division, 
ASF, it was General Hilldring's letter of 7 July to Gov- 
ernor Lehman which led the civilian agencies to request 
an extension of the period of military responsibility to 
six months. 


took any interest unless they interfered with an 
Army procurement program or with shipping. 23 

War Department Completes Preparation of 
an Enlarged Supply Program 

[Notes on a Conf of WD Sup Officers, 4 Nov 43, a revi- 
sion of sec. VI Army Supply Program, ASF, ID, Hist of 
Civ Sup, DS-114] 

. . . [Major S. R. Waters] explained that . . . 
it was a program providing for the needs of 101 
million people for a period of 180 days, as op- 
posed to the former edition which provided for 
70 millions for a period of 135 days after includ- 
ing a 45-day contingency reserve. * * * 

Provision of civilian supply is in no sense in- 
tended to keep OFRRO out of the picture, but 
to back up the responsibility of the Theater 
Commander and to meet Theater requisitions 
until, on the one hand the civilian agencies are 
prepared to act and on the other hand are re- 
quested by the Theater Commander to act. 24 

M Governor Lehman, however, was asking the War 
Department not merely to abstain from opposition but 
for active support. This the War Department felt it in- 
appropriate to give, except when OFRRO's requests were 
for items of military necessity. General Clay indicated 
this to Governor Lehman at a conference of 21 July when 
the latter again aired his procurement difficulties. General 
Clay stated that "the Army would not oppose, nor active- 
ly support OFRRO's requests for allocations of food- 
stuffs over and above the Army basic ration." ID files, 
Civ Sup, DS-80. At the same conference General Clay 
expressed his opposition to OFRRO's program of agri- 
cultural machinery since any advance stockpiling could 
only be at the expense of essential military equipment. 
The situation points up the difficulties of a civilian agency 
in procuring relief supplies independently in the face of 
military priorities. 

M The upward revision was brought about by two de- 
velopments. The first was the request of the civilian 
agencies in July that the military authorities extend their 
responsibility from 90 (plus 45 days of the "pack-ration" 
or assault period) to six months. The second was the 
approval by the Combined Chiefs of a comb ined sup ply 
program for all of liberated Europe. See below fchapter Vj 
Section 4. 

A Broad Commitment to All Liberated 

[Preamble to the Agreement of the UNRRA, quoted in 
address by the President, upon signature of agreement, 
9 Nov 43, Dept of State Bull IX (13 Nov 43), 317] 

. . . Immediately upon the liberation of any 
area . . . the population thereof shall receive 
aid and relief from their sufferings, food, cloth- 
ing, and shelter, aid in the prevention of pesti- 
lence and in the recovery of the health of the 
people. . . r 5 

But UNRRA Cannot Fulfill Commitment 
Until Funds Are Available 

[Min, Mtg in McCIoy's office, 23 Mar 44, ASF, ID, Hist 
of Civ Sup, DS-i 14] 

. . . Mr. Acheson [Assistant Secretary of State] 
stated that the difficulties with UNRRA were that 
the UNRRA resolution had just been approved by 
the Congress, that no appropriations would be 
forthcoming until June 1 at the earliest, that 
under the UNRRA charter an amendment by the 
Council would be necessary to go into Italy which 
is an enemy country and that this might not be 
possible for various political reasons, as indicated 
by the fact that the Senate had proposed an 
amendment prohibiting UNRRA from entering 
enemy countries and that even if these difficulties 
were overcome, UNRRA could not be ready to 
operate for several months after it had received 
its appropriations. 

85 For months before UNRRA came into existence, its 
organizational and personnel problems were under con- 
sideration in OFRRO. Policies were drafted and approval 
secured. Also, the section of the UNRRA Handbook on 
international organization was prepared for the First 
Session of the UNRRA Council. When the new organiza- 
tion was set up, OFRRO personnel became the American 
component. Woodbridge, UNRRA, vol. I. 


President Gives Army the Entire Initial 
Burden of Civilian Supply 

[Ltr, Roosevelt to Stimson, 10 Nov 43, WDSCA files, 014 

Although other agencies of the Government are 
preparing themselves for the work that must be 
done in connection with the relief and rehabilita- 
tion of liberated areas, it is quite apparent if 


prompt results are to be obtained the Army will 
have to assume the initial burden of shipping and 
distributing relief supplies. This will not only be 
the case in the event that active military opera- 
tions are under way, but also in the event of a 
German collapse. I envisage that in the event of a 
German collapse, the need for the Army to under- 
take this work will be all the more apparent. 
Therefore, I direct that you have the Army 

undertake the planning necessary to enable it 
to carry out this task to the end that it shall be 
prepared to perform, this function, pending such 
time as civilian agencies must be prepared to 
carry out the longer range program of relief. 

You may take this letter as my authority to you 
to call upon all other agencies of the Government 
for such plans and assistance as you may need. 
For all matters of policy that have to be deter- 
mined in connection with this work, you will con- 
sult with the State Department for any political 
advice; and upon the Treasury for such economic 
and fiscal direction as you may need. 

Interpretation of the Additional Responsi- 
bilities Imposed by President's Letter 

[Rpt, ID, ASF, European Relief Report on Supply and 
Administration in Event of Unconditional Surrender, to 
CG, ASF, 13 Nov 43, CAD files, 014, Balkans (11-13- 
43), Bulky file] 

i. The President by letter of 10 November, 1943, 
to the Secretary of War . . . directed that the 
Army assume the initial burden of shipping and 
distribution of relief supplies for liberated areas, 
and undertake the planning necessary to enable 
it to carry out this task. . . . 

4. The problem arising from gradual libera- 
tion of the Continent by military operations is 
covered by plans currently under preparation in 
Washington and in the European Theater. These 
plans are being prepared on a combined basis 
and provide, for planning purposes, that the mil- 
itary authorities will for the initial six months 
period of liberation supply the civilian popula- 
tions with the minimum essential amounts of 
food, fuel, and medical and sanitary supplies nec- 
essary to prevent prejudice to military operations. 
Supplies of this nature are in fact being forwarded 
now to Sicily and Italy. Under present plans it 
is also contemplated that the military authorities 
will, when circumstances permit and the theater 
so requests, ship to the theater additional relief 
supplies procured by the civilian agencies of the 
government. It is not believed that the President's 
letter is designed to increase the responsibility of 
the Army for minimum relief in connection with 
military operations. 

5. Responsibility in the Event of German Col- 
lapse. It is, however, believed that the President's 
letter now places upon the Army, in the event of 
German collapse, the added responsibility of or- 
ganizing and commencing the shipping and dis- 
tribution of relief supplies in liberated areas as 
promptly as possible after their liberation, wheth- 
er or not the areas are occupied by military forces. 
The criterion is not to be the necessity of support- 

ing a military operation, but is to be the initial 
implementation of relief and rehabilitation pro- 
grams devised by civilian agencies. Therefore the 
relief supplies to he considered will not only in- 
clude the basic essentials referred to in para- 
graph 4 above (food, fuel, and medical and 
sanitary supplies) but, in addition, those further 
relief supplies necessary for the re-establishment 
of agricultural production, manufacture of tex- 
tiles and clothing, and the restoration and main- 
tenance of essential utilities. 

6. Responsibility for shipment and distribution 
of relief supplies clearly includes necessary pro- 
vision for operation of essential transport facil- 
ities. Consequendy, Army planning must provide 
for supplementing transportation equipment 
available in the area to the extent necessary to 
move traffic essential to the initial phase of the re- 
establishment of the area. This will be the case 
particularly where there are no occupying forces 
to make available the necessary transporta- 
tion. * * * 

An Interpretation of President's About-Face 

[Draft of Memo for Red, OCS, 18 Dec 43, CAD files, 
400.38 (2-20-43) (O.sec-3] 

3. The instability of the civilian organization for 
relief . . . made it most difficult for CAD to 
work in close co-operation as directed, and Mr. 
McCloy on 7 November 1943 had a showdown 
conference with Mr. Stettinius and Mr. [Leo T.] 
Crowley. As a result of this conference the Pres- 
ident on 10 November 1943, in a letter to the Sec- 
retary of War, stated that the Army would have 
to assume the initial burden of shipping and dis- 
tribution of relief supplies in liberated areas, par- 
ticularly in event of a German collapse; directed 
the Army to undertake necessary plans to be pre- 
pared to perform this task until such time as 
civilian agencies were prepared to carry out the 
longer range program of relief; and authorized 
the War Department to call on other government 
agencies for any needed assistance. 

4. On 15 November 1943, the Secretary of War 
held a conference with General McNarney, Dep- 
uty Chief of Staff, General Hilldring, CAD, and 
General Clay, ASF, at which it was stated that 
the Secretary of War and Secretary of State had 
agreed that initial responsibility for civilian relief 
in occupied areas should rest with the Army, and 
that civilian agencies would concern themselves 
with the long-range program afterwards. This 
gave the War Department for the first time a 
firm definition of its responsibilities in connec- 
tion with relief and rehabilitation of liberated 


President's Reasoning as Interpreted by 
McCloy and Acheson 

[Min, Mtg in McCloy's office, 14 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of 
Civ Sup, DS-171] 

Mr. McCloy stated that the genesis of the Presi- 
dent's letter was that since in invasion or col- 
lapse, there would probably not be extant an 
organization with personnel, equipment or 
know-how which would be qualified to procure, 
lay down and distribute goods for relief purposes, 
the War Department had been charged with this 
responsibility. 26 * * * 

Mr. Acheson stated that the point of the Presi- 
dent's letter was that insofar as the U.S. Govern- 
ment was called upon to furnish supplies for 
broad areas in which troops operate (not neces- 
sarily confined to the combat zone) this Govern- 
ment looked to the War Department to prepare, 
organize, and give direction for the whole civil 
relief job initially. 

Army's Sphere of Responsibility Now Extends 
Beyond the Combat Zone 

[Ltr, Hilldring to Col Karl R. Bendetsen, DACofS, G-5, 
COSSAC, 17 Nov 43, CAD files, 370.21, COSSAC (7-22- 
43). sec. 1] 

Our estimate of the situation . . . will probably 
have to be considerably revised. Under date of 13 
November 1943, 1 sent you a copy of a letter dated 
10 November 1943 from the President to the Sec- 
retary of War. This letter enlarges substantially 
the responsibility of the Army in shipping and 
distributing relief supplies in liberated areas in 
Europe. * * * 

The military commander will have the full 
responsibility and plenary power, in the early 

M The explanation given in the documents quoted above 
is the only one that has been found. Participants inter- 
viewed could add no information about the background 
of the President's 10 November letter. Notwithstanding 
the reference to McCloy's presence at the 7 November 
meeting with Stettinius and Crowley, no evidence has 
turned up that the War Department appealed to the Presi- 
dent for additional responsibility. The President had 
taken almost two years to come to the view attributed 
to him by McCloy in the 14 January meeting with Ache- 
son. The 10 November letter was not a repudiation of 
the idea that civilians should, in principle, undertake these 
tasks but rested upon a recognition that civilians had not 
yet made themselves ready and were not likely to do so 
for a considerable time. 

stages of liberation, and this now carries with it 
the direct supervision over relief and rehabilita- 
tion operations everywhere within the geographi- 
cal boundaries of his command, even though this 
includes areas beyond "the width of our fronts 
and the depth of our rear" as you describe such 
areas in your letter. Consequently, all the Euro- 
pean theater of operations outside the combat 
zone should be considered the communication 
zone for COSSAC civil affairs planning pur- 
poses, including the distribution of relief. . . . 27 

General Hilldring Explains the Broader 
Civil Affairs Mission Imposed by the Presi- 

[Ltr, Hilldring to Bendetsen, 8 Dec 43, CAD files, 370.21, 
COSSAC (7-22-43) (1)] 

... It is my impression that you have oversim- 
plified your civil affairs problem. For instance, in 
your words "the entire objective of our military 
operations in France under Rankin C or Over- 
lord is the entrance into and the deployment of 
our forces for an effective occupation of Ger- 
many." I, of course, can't and don't argue with 
that statement. It is entirely true. However, if you 
accept that military objective without reservation 
as a basis for your civil affairs policy, you will go 
astray, because the civil affairs mission of an 
Army is compounded of political, economic, fis- 
cal, relief, and social considerations that do not 
enter into the determination of the military mis- 
sion. It appears to me from this and from previ- 
ous letters that you are attempting to confine your 
responsibilities to the zones through which our 
troops advance. The proper conception, in my 
opinion, of the civil affairs mission is to state 
simply that we civil affairs fellows are responsible 
for the wake of battle. Any other conception will 
lead us into trouble. It is, in my opinion, highly 
erroneous to feel that we are only responsible for 
those acres of ground on which a combat soldier 
has previously set foot. We are responsible for the 
areas liberated as a result of military operations or 
by the voluntary withdrawal of hostile forces 
under the threat of military operations. * * * 

"It is noteworthy that General Hilldring was discuss- 
ing not merely Germany, but areas that would be liber- 
ated such as France, where an indigenous government 
would presumably be allowed to assume administrative 
responsibility as soon as possible. 



War Department Creates and Heads a Com- 
mittee To Co-Ordinate Civilian Relief 

[Min, 1st Mtg of Ad Hoc Econ Comm., 14 Dec 43, ASF, 
ID files, 014, Civ Sup, vol. 4] 

A meeting of the ad hoc Economic Committee 
was held in Mr. McCloy's office on 14 December 
1943. General Hilldring presided. The following 
individuals were present: Messrs. Acheson and 
Wells, representing the Department of State; 
Messrs. [Lauchlin] Currie, [Francis M.] Mc- 
Goldrick, McCamy, Coe, representing the For- 
eign Economic Administration; Captain Pence 
and Commanders Puck, Gluckstadt, representing 
the Navy Department; General Wright, Major 
Palmer and Major McLean. 28 

General Hilldring stated that the purpose of 
the meeting was to consider a list of questions 
which had been submitted to the Committee by 
the Foreign Economic Administration. He stated 
that he would conduct the meeting by first read- 
ing a question and then a proposed answer which 
had been prepared by the War Department. . . . 

Question 1. Is it advisable to consider the cre- 
ation of a top committee of the U.S. government 
most directly concerned in relief and rehabilita- 
tion work in order to develop, present, and ex- 
ecute a uniform U.S. program in this field? If 
so, what agencies should be involved, what should 
be the functions of this committee and how 
should it organize its relation with Governor 

Answer. The ad hoc Economics Committee 
is the War Department answer to this question. 
Its function is to have one U.S. forum for the 
consideration and co-ordination of initial U.S. 
relief policy in enemy and enemy-occupied coun- 
tries which may be the subject of military opera- 
tions in which the U.S. Army will participate. 

Discussion, The Committee agreed on this 
answer. Consideration was given to the desir- 
ability of adding additional agencies to the 
membership. It was agreed that this would not 
be necessary since other agencies, such as the 
Treasury, could be consulted on questions in 
which they had an interest. 

Question 2. Specifically, how does the Army 
plan to co-ordinate its work with UNRRA with 
respect to the development of requirements, the 

M General Wright and Major Palmer represented the 
International Aid Division of the War Department; Major 
McLean was the ASF working member of CAD. 

procurement of materials and the distribution 
thereof for the period during which military 
authorities are in control ? 

Answer. War Department will be respon- 
sible among U.S. agencies for developing and 
having developed relief figures for all enemy and 
enemy-occupied countries of Europe for a period 
of six months immediately following liberation. 
These estimates will be developed in collabora- 
tion with the State Department and FEA to 
obtain the best U.S. view. In the case of coun- 
tries to be the subject of combined operations, 
these figures will be used as a basis for discus- 
sion with the British military in reaching agree- 
ment on a combined relief program for proposed 
operational areas. 

It is our present understanding that UNRRA 
will not be involved in the military period with- 
out invitation of the military — insofar as the plan- 
ning of requirements, procurement and distribu- 
tion are concerned. If UNRRA should desire to 
present its views for the military period to the 
War Department, it should do so through the 
ad hoc committee. 29 

McCloy's Summary of the New Duties As- 
sumed by the Army 

[Ind to McCloy's Ltr to Sidney Stein, Jr., Asst Chief, Div 
of Admin Mgt, Budget Bur, 11 Feb 44, CAD files, 400.38 
(2-20-43), sec. 4] 

In implementing the President's letter, the War 
Department has accepted responsibility among 
U.S. agencies for (a) developing initial relief re- 
quirements, in collaboration with the Foreign 
Economic Administration and the State Depart- 
ment for enemy-occupied and enemy countries, 
(b) the shipment and distribution during the 
initial period of relief supplies in such areas as 
may be designated, (c) presenting such require- 
ments to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee 
for agreement with the British and (d) procuring 
against such established requirements those items 
included in the categories of food, fuel, medical 
and sanitary supplies, transportation equipment 
and public utility repair equipment which are 
agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff through 
the Combined Civil Affairs Committee as being 

" This understanding as to the dependence of UNRRA 
operations upon invitation by the military was later con- 
firmed by formal agreement with the international or- 


a U.S. responsibility. The procurement of all 
other relief items to be furnished by the U.S. is 
a responsibility of the Foreign Economic Ad- 
ministration. * * * 

Some Steps Taken by War Department in 
Pursuance of the President's Directive 

[Memo, Wright, ASF, ID, for the Dir of Materiel, ASF, 
16 Feb 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 5] 

2. The War Department was directed by the 
President on 10 November 1943 to plan and pre- 
pare to administer a relief program. 


3. On 13 November the War Department is- 
sued its first tentative plan for discharging this 
responsibility. This plan included an estimate 
of probable minimum requirements for all Axis- 
held areas of Europe, and a proposed administra- 
tive organization and procedures for implement- 
ing the plan. 30 

4. This plan also included an analysis of cer- 
tain basic problems requiring decision by other 
departments of the government which required 
an answer before further progress could be made. 
Action on certain of these problems required de- 
cisions by the State and Treasury Departments. 
These decisions have not yet been fully made. 
They include (a) a definition of the financial as- 
pects of the problem and (b) policy with respect 
to the Balkans. 

5. In the meanwhile the War Department has 
continued its planning and has obtained concur- 
rence of State, FEA and the British to an estimate 
of relief needs for all of Europe under "un- 
scorched" conditions. This plan was approved 
yesterday, 17 February, by the Combined Civil 
Affairs Committee and may now be circulated 
to the interested governmental agencies. The 
War Department had also prepared for discussion 
with the British and with interested U.S. agencies 
an estimate of relief needs for all of Europe under 
"scorched'' conditions and has completed several 
operational plans which are in process of being 
extended to cover all of Europe. . . . S1 

"That the plan could be prepared with such speed 
after the President's directive was due to the efforts al- 
ready put into revising the Army Supply Program on 
an assumption of broad responsibility (see above, Sections 

81 "Scorched" and "unscorched" conditions refer re- 
spectively to the assumption of great damage or of rela- 
tively little damage by the enemy. See also |p. 6M2J 
below, and Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics, 1943- 
45, Chapters XXI and XXII. 

Procurement Responsibility 

6. The relief program has prese nted the firs t 
truly combined supply program \ see l Chapter V|l 
that has been undertaken by the U.S. or U.K. 
governments. As such, it has required the estab- 
lishment of new administrative procedures in 
the U.S. government to make possible the co- 
ordinated action which is necessary to determine 
supply responsibility as between the U.S. and the 
U.K. This requires co-ordination of the following 
governmental interests on both a U.S. and a com- 
bined basis: (a) Military, (b) Supply, (c) Ship- 
ping, (d) Political and (e) Financial. 


16. All of the foregoing has required consid- 
erable work with the various interested U.S. gov- 
ernmental agencies and it now appears that no 
small part of the Army's task is to act as a co- 
ordinating or focal point to enable it to discharge 
the responsibilities which the President directed 
it to assume. No small part of the problem has 
been directly due to the shifting responsibilities 
and organization of the U.S. agencies, which has 
made it difficult and at times impossible to know 
which agency was, or considered itself, respon- 
sible on particular questions. 

CCAC Cannot Include Representatives of 
All the Civilian Agencies 

[Dir, CAD, for JCS, Rpt, Membership of Foreign Eco- 
nomic Administration on Combined Civil Affairs Com- 
mittee, 14 Mar 44, CAD files, JCS 744/1] 

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have heretofore des- 
ignated the War Department as the agency re- 
sponsible to them for the handling of civil affairs 
in territory about to be occupied and to coordi- 
nate the activities of the U.S. civilian agencies in 
administering civil affairs in hostile and liberated 
territory during the period of military occupation 
(JCS 250/2). . . . Since the War Department is 
primarily responsible for the development of an 
agreed American policy with regard to all civil 
affairs problems, including economic matters, it 
is vitally interested in the size and membership 
of CCAC [Combined Civil Affairs Committee] 
where combined policy is formulated with the 

4. The War Department relies on the Depart- 
ment of State for guidance on all questions of 
U.S. foreign policy. The Executive Order which 
established the FEA provides that its powers and 
functions shall be exercised in conformity with 
the foreign policy of the United States as defined 
by the Secretary of State. The Department of 


State has membership on the CCAC FEA, on the 
other hand, is one of several civilian agencies 
which are called upon by the War Department in 
the discharge of one of the several phases of civil 
affairs activity. ... All of these agencies, in- 
cluding the FEA, are consulted frequently in the 
development of an American position. However, 
if the War Department were required to obtain 
the formal concurrences of all of these agencies 
on every civil affairs question, it would be in the 
position of having been charged by the President 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with complete re- 
sponsibility but with its power to act subject to 
the concurrence and possible veto by agencies 
which the President has designated as the assist- 
ants of the War Department. To grant formal 
membership on the Committee to the FEA 
would set a precedent for other agencies of the 
U.S. and British Governments, whose assistance 
to the military is no less important than the inter- 
est which has been expressed by the FEA. . . . 

5. The CCAC . . . consists of a small group 
of men with power to act promptly on any given 
subject. Its members are not authorities on every 
subject which is presented for decision. On the 
other hand, a committee of members of all U.S. 
and British agencies having an interest in the 
various aspects of civil affairs problems would be 
completely unwieldy. . . . 

War Department Enters Into a Joint Relief 

[Incl to Ltr, Stein, Bur of Budget, 10 Apr 44, to FEA, 
on Agreement with WD in Conf in McCloy's Office, 4 
Apr 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-196] 

(r) The State Department, the War Department, 
and FEA will present to Congress jointly one 
over-all relief program. The State Department, 
the War Department, and FEA will defend this 
program jointly as a political-military necessity, 
related to general military objectives even where 
American troops are not directly engaged. 32 

12 This marks the first time the War Department was 
willing to join formally with the civilian agencies in a 
supply program. It had previously felt unable to accept 
OFRRO's overtures to this effect, evidently because, as 
already noted, of the fear that joint effort would entangle 
the Army unduly in the programs of the civilian agencies. 

As segments of the total program: 

(2) The War Department will present the esti- 
mates for the basic essentials for Western Europe 
for a period of six months. This will include 
non-standard as well as standard items, and is to 
include provision for Norway. So-called non- 
standard items will be procured by FEA on re- 
quest of the War Department from allocation of 
funds by the War Department. 

Even After UNRRA Is Ready the Army May 
Have To Retain Broad Responsibilities 

[Jt Statement of WD, State Dept, and FEA to Subcomm. 
of House Comm. on Appropriations, 9 May 44, ASF, 
ID, Hist of Civ Sup, I, 219] 

If the opening of the second front precipitates 
the collapse of Axis resistance, the armies may 
be able to turn over the control of large sections 
of Europe to the indigenous governments. In such 
event the United Nations Relief and Rehabilita- 
tion Administation, in co-operation with those 
governments or, in certain appropriate cases those 
governments alone, should be able to shoulder 
the burden of civilian supply. 

On the other hand, the Germans may with- 
draw from certain parts of Europe but continue 
fighting elsewhere. Military control may be neces- 
sary initially, and it will not be possible in practice 
for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration to assume responsibility at the be- 
ginning, although it may be called upon at the 
outset by the military to assist in certain supply 
activities where the use of its trained personnel 
is advantageous. Furthermore, in certain areas 
the necessary military control authorities may not 
include any substantial body of United States 
troops. Where these conditions prevail, it is pro- 
posed to procure essential civilian supplies for 
such areas out of funds appropriated to the For- 
eign Economic Administration for lend-lease pur- 
poses. Under these conditions and upon the re- 
quest of the War Department, these supplies 
will be turned over to the War Department, 
which will assume the responsibility of ship- 
ment, and the goods will be distributed under 
the direction of a responsible allied military 
authority. . . . 



Washington or London? 

In no war of American history were 
preparations for civil affairs as energetic 
as in World War II and yet in none was 
as long a time required for their com- 
pletion. That more than two years 
elapsed before all the major national and 
combined control agencies had been estab- 
lished and their basic functions defined is 
partly explained by the fact that the civil 
affairs mission was of unprecedented scope. 
But the cause of the delay lay also in the 
novelty of the approach taken in impor- 
tant phases of the organizational problem. 
Firm decisions on this problem could not 
be made until issues more controversial 
than any of previous wars had been settled 
to the satisfaction of all whose jurisdiction 
was involved. Even preparations on the 
purely national level were enormously 
complicated, as has been seen, by the 
initial intention of departing from the 
tradition of exclusive Army control; only 
after primary responsibility had been en- 
trusted to civilian agencies in French 
North Africa and, after long debate, the 
effort adjudged unsatisfactory could the 
Army begin to shape its organization to a 
task of known responsibilities. 

This delay on the national level in turn 
tended to postpone the attempt to come 
to close quarters with the even more com- 
plicated problem of organizing civil affairs 
control on the combined level. Aside 
from the ad hoc and rather loose agencies 
required for the limited problems of civil 
affairs co-operation in French North 

Africa, combined machinery could not be 
established until the United States as well 
as Great Britain had created an agency to 
centralize its control of civil affairs both 
nationally and in international relations. 
The problem of combined organization 
also involved an inherent difficulty for, 
with the decision to dispense with the 
separate zones that had usually character- 
ized international military government of 
the past, it became necessary to provide for 
reconciliation of national policies by 
creating tightly knit control organs on the 
highest level. The greatest difficulty of 
all came into view when it was discovered, 
as soon as discussions began, that Great 
Britain and the United States were ap- 
proaching the problem of combined con- 
trol from premises as divergent as those 
which had separated American military 
and civilian agencies on the question of 
national control. Thus a second great 
debate was necessary — one which if only 
because of international comity was con- 
ducted with more restraint than the first 
but with scarcely less strength of feeling. 
Once again the issue was the U.S. Army's 
share in control but in this case the Army 
was the sole representative of the nation. 

With both governments desirous of 
instituting full collaboration as early as 
possible, it is evident that only a matter of 
such major moment as control could have 
protracted debate on the basic issues from 
March 1943 till the early part of 1944. 
Many minor differences in civil affairs 


procedure existed and, in addition, a major 
divergence in administrative philosophy. 
These issues could probably have been 
compromised rather quickly if the organi- 
zational question alone had been involved. 
But the nature of combined control ma- 
chinery would have an important bearing 
upon the major problem of Allied mili- 
tary government and in fact of all inter- 
national collaboration — the problem of 
how to reconcile common with national 
interests. On the one hand, it was hoped 
that conflicting views of this problem 
would be reduced to a minimum if, instead 
of being left to take place haphazardly in 
every phase of operations, they were con- 
sidered as early as possible by a high-level 
policy body whose familiarity with the 
basic facts of the civil affairs task as a whole 
would give the best promise of compro- 
mise. On the other hand, it was feared 
that if the combined body placed either 
partner in a position of advantage it would 
be able under the guise of compromise to 
shape civil affairs policy unduly in its own 

The hopes were greater than the fears 
because the two countries had common 
political values, including a common re- 
gard for equitable dealing on differences 
that required reconciliation. The caution 
evinced was prompted in large measure 
by the duty of every governmental agent 
to consult his apprehensions more than his 
hopes in representing his country's inter- 
est, but it rested also upon concrete experi- 
ence in the initial phase of Anglo- 
American civil affairs relations. Thus all 
had not been harmonious in the family 
when the United States, which wanted to 
leave the French people free to determine 
eventually their own political destiny, at 
first favored excluding the de Gaullists 
from control in French North Africa 
despite earlier British support of General 
de Gaulle. Later, when planning for 
Sicily began, British authorities had argued 

that the paramountcy of their country's 
strategic interests in the Mediterranean 
entitled it to the senior role in military 
government rather than merely the equal 
partnership recommended by General 
Eisenhower. Continuing differences in 
point of view could be expected from the 
general background of the two partners: 
on the one hand a country which, because 
its involvements in foreign power politics 
were occasional rather than constant, could 
afford to identify its primary interests with 
broad principles of international order; on 
the other hand a nation which, forced to 
consider short-range as well as long-range 
interests, tended to alternate unpredictably 
between pious international declarations 
and the position that until a better world 
was actually at hand some of the pre- 
cautions of traditional power politics could 
not be safely dispensed with. 

It may at first appear that each govern- 
ment could have expected adequate pro- 
tection for its interests in the principle of 
concurrent decisions, which had been 
taken for granted in Anglo-American col- 
laboration from the beginning. But this 
principle, while ensuring that each gov- 
ernment would have freedom of action in 
any issue wherein agreement could not be 
reached, came really to very little because 
during military government in the thea- 
ters every major operational issue would 
have demanded eventually some sort of 
agreement whether for better or for worse. 
Thus the only meaningful protection of 
national interests would lie in ensuring 
that negotiations took place on terms of 
complete equality, and, since equality was 
theoretically already assured by the prin- 
ciple of concurrent decision, what was still 
needed may be designated as practical 
equality. This more tenuous kind of equal- 
ity has probably been sought in every at- 
tempt at international organization but 
the record of the Anglo-American negotia- 
tions is of unique value to the student of 


international relations in its clear indica- 
tion of both the nature and the motivating 
force of the concept. Practical equality has 
to do with the relative degree of power or 
influence acquired by each partner in an 
enterprise through all the terms or circum- 
stances under which it is conducted. It is 
not something which is specified in the 
charter of an international enterprise but 
an objective in the light of which the entire 
charter is drawn. 

To illustrate the intricate calculus of 
practical equality as worked out by Amer- 
icans, the site of the proposed combined 
committee was of major importance be- 
cause government agents stationed in a 
foreign country are under the disadvantage 
of being away from their own principals 
and of being exposed, even if only uncon- 
sciously, to the subtle but powerful influ- 
ences arising from the presence of high- 
level authorities of the other country as also 
of its entire body of technical experts. This 
consideration applied to the assumption 
that only a single combined committee 
would be created; if control were divided 
between a committee in Washington and a 
committee in London it would be impor- 
tant to note the distribution of functions 
lest the major areas of responsibility were 
assigned to the latter. But perhaps more 
important than anything — and pertinent 
even if civil affairs policy were entrusted to 
a single committee located in Washing- 
ton — was the avoidance of any stipulation 
which would tend to obligate the commit- 
tee to give special weight to the objectives 
of previous British planning, which es- 
pecially in the British civilian economic 
agencies had gone much farther than that 
of their American counterparts. 

The truth is that American civil affairs 
authorities did not start out with any hy- 
pernervous approach to Anglo-American 
relations but became cautious only after 
receiving British proposals which from the 
American point of view were almost 


wholly on the wrong tack. The British 
opened the discussion with a proposal to 
begin the transfer of the combined control 
of civil affairs to British and American 
civilian agencies at an early stage. This 
not only seemed to entail divided control 
in the theater before the theater com- 
mander could consider it safe but appeared 
also to give the British the advantage of 
being represented by civil affairs agencies 
which had achieved a far more elaborate 
organization than the American civilian 
agencies had as yet developed. As the dis- 
cussions progressed further, London met 
American views on the duration of mili- 
tary responsibility and proposed a scheme 
of control which was, indeed, on an equal 
basis insofar as it envisaged one combined 
agency in Washington and another in Lon- 
don. But the committee in London, which 
was to be formed by adding Amer- 
ican representatives to the Administra- 
tion of Territories Committee (Europe) 
(AT(E)), was to have jurisdiction over 
the European Theater, which, aside from 
Italy, comprised the most important areas 
of Europe. American misgivings became 
still greater when the British pressed the 
thesis that combined supply planning for 
northwest Europe should be based upon 
planning which had already been accom- 
plished for that area by their own agencies. 
It was not difficult to presume the in- 
formed character of British planning but 
Americans could not overlook the fact that 
the premises of this planning were largely 
different from their own, especially in in- 
cluding in the military supply program 
categories of supplies which in the United 
States were the responsibility of civilian 

Among American civilian as well as 
military authorities there was general 
agreement that these proposals would have 
the effect of entrenching British leadership 
and policy in civil affairs relations with the 
countries of northwest Europe, and there 

were more than a few Americans who be- 
lieved that the British had presented them 
with this aim in view. If the British had 
such an ambition it would not have been 
an unnatural one in view of their strong 
political interests in the adjacent European 
areas. But the fact remained that the 
United States had never consented to play 
the game under the rule of spheres of spe- 
cial influence, and such a rule seemed the 
less equitable because the huge civilian 
supply program would have to be sus- 
tained chiefly by American resources. It is 
true that the British position had in its 
favor administrative expediency— the ad- 
vantage of so dividing civil affairs func- 
tions as to utilize as much as possible the 
greater proximity of London to the Euro- 
pean governments in exile and the longer 
and fuller experience of British planners 
in respect to the problems of northwest 
Europe. But it seemed feasible to make 
adequate use of these British advantages 
only at the expense of carrying division of 
functions to the extreme of bifurcating the 
control of civil affairs policy making. 
American military leaders saw in the Brit- 
ish proposal a revival of the same evil of 
divided control that they had finally suc- 
ceeded in terminating in their relations 
with civilian agencies. They considered that 
the existence of two major civil affairs com- 
mittees separated by the ocean would mean 
the artificial division of a problem that was 
essentially unitary, would result in dupli- 
cation and waste of effort, and would en- 
tail the risk of impasse when the two com- 
mittees pursued different policies on com- 
mon problems. While in theory unified 
control would not completely satisfy the 
principle of equality — for one control or- 
gan could not be in two capitals — yet, 
realistically considered, the proper site of 
the senior civil affairs committee seemed 
to be dictated by the location of the Com- 
bined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). Thus Amer- 
ican authorities proposed a civil affairs 

committee situated in Washington, sub- 
ordinated to the CCS and primarily mili- 
tary in its composition, and possessing 
general jurisdiction though assisted (as 
was added in a later recommendation) by 
a subcommittee for civilian supply. Both 
committees would be free either to accept 
or to reject the conclusions of previous Brit- 
ish planning but the special facilities in 
London for detailed planning for the Eu- 
ropean Theater would be recognized by 
the addition of American representatives 
to the AT(E) Committee. 

British formal acceptance of the Amer- 
ican proposals for the Combined Civil Af- 
fairs Committee came only after months 
of negotiations so tortuous and finespun 
that a single article of the draft CCAC 
charter, such as that giving special rights 
with respect to liberated Pacific islands to 
whichever government enjoyed previous 
possession, might go through revision after 
revision until each party was satisfied that 
every punctilio of phrasing took proper 
care of its just interests. The selections 
from the documentary record of the nego- 
tiations reflect the inexhaustible patience 
and semantic ingenuity required of nego- 
tiators if a close international partnership 
is to get started. One learns also that how- 
ever careful the preparations, the formal 
beginning of the partnership gives no as- 
surance that it will continue if its charter 
compromises disagreements with such 
vague wording as to be subject to different 
interpretations. One can imagine the 
discouragement of American authorities 
when they learned, after an interval so 
short that the birth pains of CCAC were 
still fresh in memory, that they and the 
British had completely different ideas 
about what the newly created CCAC was. 

The Americans believed that the CCAC 
was the senior combined civil affairs 
agency but the British, as they made clear 
in objecting to the American proposal to 

Norway before the CCAC, believed that it 
was merely the partner of a combined 
agency in London which had jurisdiction 
over civil affairs in the European Theater. 
Thus the issue of unified versus divided 
control had not been settled at all, and 
Americans in their struggle for maximum 
freedom of action had merely worked 
themselves into a trap unless they should 
now make their own interpretation of the 
agreement prevail. The American nego- 
tiators had not foreseen that, despite the 
absence of any express limitation upon the 
jurisdiction of CCAC, the acknowledg- 
ment of a role for the London committee 
would be interpreted as an implicit limita- 
tion upon the seniority of the former 
rather than as the assignment of a minor 
function to the latter. The British repre- 
sentatives in Washington had not fore- 
shadowed such an interpretation, and 
probably the cause of the misunderstand- 
ing — a confirmation of American fears on 
the separation of principals and agents — 
was that London took or came to take a 
different view of the CCAC charter from 
that of its representatives. Americans could 
argue that London's interpretation was 
farfetched but could not prove that it was 
wrong. With each side convinced that its 
own legal argument was correct and the 
other's the rationalization of a desire for 
seniority, it was impossible to avoid the 
spectacle of a partnership set up for the 
control of others turning into one in which 
there was passive resistance of each part- 
ner to the other. For several months 
neither the Washington committee nor the 
London committee could function because, 
pending settlement of the jurisdictional 
issue, the British withheld their co-opera- 
tion in the former and the Americans their 
collaboration in the latter. At this stage, 
even though the impasse did not become 
publicly known, there were doubtless 
those on both sides who questioned the 


wisdom of having attempted so intimate a 

How the Americans and British found 
their way out of this seeming impasse illus- 
trates the necessity of persistent hope and 
effort in seeking international compro- 
mise. This is, to be sure, itself a business 
not without danger, and it has been a com- 
mon assumption among Americans — 
though not among Europeans who have 
dealt with representatives of the United 
States — that American negotiators tend, 
out of either excessive kindness of heart or 
sheer naivete, to give up much more than 
they obtain. The present case is of peculiar 
interest in that the principal responsibility 
in negotiation was carried by American 
military authorities who, because this was 
their first intensive experience in the inter- 
national politics of civil affairs, might have 
been expected to err somewhat on the side 
of concession. Yet, however cordial their 
personal relations with their British col- 
leagues, their intransigence in the issue 
ended only when it became possible to 
effect a settlement in which no major 
American objective was abandoned. But 
the art of successful compromise demands 
that one attempt to avoid the appearance 
of a victory for either side, and matters 
were so arranged that no substantial Brit- 
ish interest or point of prestige was sacri- 
ficed. The United States, victorious in its 
claim as to the jurisdiction of CCAC, as- 
sented to the creation of a face-saving but 
scarcely very important subcommittee of 
CCAC in London (CCAC/L), and agreed 
to appoint military representatives to as- 
sist the European Advisory Commission, 
for which the British desired the broadest 
possible jurisdiction over surrender and 
posthostilities problems. In return the Brit- 
ish recognized the seniority and general 
jurisdiction of CCAC in civil affairs dur- 
ing the period of military responsibility. 
This was, indeed, the American goal from 

the beginning, but it is doubtful that the 
British would have acquiesced in it had 
they not finally come to feel that far from 
being incompatible with British interest 
the location of the major civil affairs 
agency in Washington could possibly even 
serve it. Nothing would be a greater ob- 
stacle to Great Britain in securing sympa- 
thetic American consideration of British 
requirements than any residual American 
isolationism, a characteristic of which had 
been the distrust of decisions arrived at in 
foreign capitals even though American 
representatives had participated in making 
them. There is evidence in any case of 
eventual British awareness of the greater 
understanding which could be expected of 
the American component of CCS if the 
problems and views of the combined civil 
affairs committee could be personally ex- 

plained to them by its members. General 
Hilldring has stated that the crisis with the 
British ended when it became possible to 
point out face-to-face to their high-level 
representatives the practical advantages 
which location of the senior civil affairs 
committee in Washington would offer 
in relations with the CCS. 1 This decided 
the question whether Washington or Lon- 
don should be the principal scene of the 
combined control machinery for civil af- 
fairs. Still open was the question whether 
Washington or London would achieve 
greater weight in the scales of civil affairs 
policy if, unfortunately, operations should 
prove to involve too many conflicts of na- 
tional interests. 

Mnterv, Weinberg With Gen Hilldring, Dec 50. 


British Chiefs of Staff Propose Formation of 
a Combined Civil Affairs Committee Under 
Leadership of Civilian Authorities 

[Memo, Representatives of Br CofS (CCS 190/1), 11 Apr 
43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1] 

r. The representatives of the British Chiefs of 
Staff welcome the basic principles underlying 
the proposals contained in CCS 190 1 and re- 
gard this initiative as particularly opportune, 
since a considerable amount of work has lately 
been done in London on the problem of the 
provision of essential supplies for the local popu- 
lation in territories which may be liberated or 
conquered as a result of military operations. It is 
clearly very desirable that this work should be 

'CCS 190 (see above, ! Chapter III, Section 3! initiated 
the entire discussion over the formation of a combined civil 
affairs committee. It proposed that such a committee be 
created by extending to all occupied areas the jurisdiction 
of the Committee of Combined Boards (Chapter II, Section 
3) a combined civilian agency established in 1942 to 
handle the supply and economic problems of French North 
Africa. This proposal was rejected by the U.S. Joint Chiefs 
on 31 March (JCS 250) (Chapter III, Section 3) because of 
the difficulties which, they felt, were inherent in civilian 
control during the initial period of military operations. 

pursued and developed on a fully combined 

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will doubt- 
less agree with the principle of an initial military 
period during which the responsibility for the 
conduct of all civilian affairs in the area con- 
cerned (including supplies, finances, etc.) must 
rest solely with the military authorities and that 
that this initial military period should be fol- 
lowed by a period during which an increasing 
degree of responsibility will be transferred — to 
appropriate civilian agencies. 

4. It is appreciated that the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA) when created, may be called upon 
to carry out some of the functions with which 
this memorandum is concerned. As, however, a 
considerable time must necessarily elapse before 
that organization is fully operative, as the exact 
role and status of UNRRA have still to be 
worked out, and as some of the functions in 
question may in any case fall outside the scope 
of UNRRA, it is considered that immediate 
steps should be taken to harmonize the work 
already in progress in London with any similar 


planning that may be in progress or in prepara- 
tion in Washington. 

5. The representatives of the British Chiefs of 
Staff therefore propose in regard to the problem 
of providing essential supplies for liberated or 
conquered territories: 

(a) That the principle of an initial military 
period (as defined in paragraph 3 above) should 
be formally recognized and that full liaison 
should be established between the War Office 
Directorate of Civil Affairs in London and the 
Civil Affairs Section of the War Department 
in Washington by the appointment of special 
representatives of the latter to sit on the London 
Administration of Territories (Europe) Com- 
mittee. 2 

(b) The co-ordination of planning of civil- 
ian supplies for the period subsequent to the 
period of initial military responsibility (see para- 
graph FJ above J| should be conducted on a com- 
bined basis in Washington by the appointment 
of a Committee of representatives of the inter- 
ested U.S. and U.K. agencies which would work 
in parallel with the appropriate Committee in 
London — at present the Shipping and Supply 
Subcommittee, 8 on which the U.S. Government 
are represented. This Washington Committee 
should, it is suggested, be composed not only of 
representatives of the Combined Food Board, 
Combined Production and Resources Board, 
Combined Raw Materials Board and Combined 
Shipping Adjustment Board and the appropri- 
ate U.S. and U.K. civil agencies, but also of 
representatives of the War and Navy Depart- 
ments. Its secretariat should include representa- 
tives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff secretar- 
iat.* * * * 

If the foregoing principles are accepted, it is 
suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
should address a letter to the Secretary of State 
in the sense of the attached draft, asking him 
in consultation with the British Embassy to ar- 
range for the organization of the Committee 
referred to in paragraph 5(t) ) above. 

5 A committee, including British civilian economic 
agencies, which had been set up by the War Office in 
June 1942, largely for the purpose of estimating the re- 
quirements of civilian supply in liberated areas during the 
military period. The committe e was most commonly re- 
f erred to as AT(E). See also |Chapter XXVII, section~i] 

a A British committee which had the function or recon- 
ciling military and civilian supply policies and of pro- 
viding for the transition from the military period of sup- 
ply responsibility to the civilian. 

1 The British were thus proposing two combined civil 
affairs committees — one in London, the other in 

U.S. Joint Chiefs Propose A Combined Civil 
Affairs Committee .Under Leadership of 
Military Authorities 

[JCS 250/4, U.S. Chiefs of Staff, 19 Apr 43, CAD files, 
092 (3-22-43), sec. 1] 

2. c. ... Both British and the United States 
Chiefs of Staff agree with the principle of an 
initial military period during which the respon- 
sibility for the conduct of all civilian affairs in 
occupied areas (including supplies, finances, 
etc.) must rest solely with the military authori- 
ties. Both United States and British Joint Chiefs 
of Staff also agree that upon the termination of 
the period of military occupation responsibility 
of all phases of local government will be returned 
either to a liberated local government or some 
form of territorial government, and at such time 
the matter ceases to be of concern to the military. 
This leaves only the period between the initial 
military operation and the termination of the 
military occupation and government where the 
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . and those 
of the British are somewhat at variance. 

d. During this transitory period the plan 
proposed under CCS 190/1 would establish a 
Combined Committee of Boards, governmental 
agencies, and War and Navy Departments in 
Washington and in London under leadership 
of the Department of State and Foreign Office 
as the controlling and administrative body for 
the civilian affairs of occupied enemy and 
liberated areas. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not 
favor this procedure because it would result in 
a dual chain of command and require the Theater 
Commander in his role of military governor to 
report to two Chiefs. It would result in the par- 
ticipation in the administration of occupied areas 
of civilian agencies or representatives of civilian 
agencies having two loyalties: the first and great- 
est to the particular governmental department 
or agency by whom they are employed and, 
second, to the military governor or Theater Com- 
mander by virtue of his local position. It would 
be apt to lead to the establishment of a civilian 
Economic Board or shadow government in the 
local area in parallel to and duplicating the func- 
tions of the divisions of the established military 
government. 5 * * * 
3. Recommendations: 

a. That the planning, co-ordination and ad- 
ministration of civil affairs in occupied enemy or 
liberated areas be conducted in a combined opera- 
tion in accordance with the general policies stated 

"In other words, a repetition of the North African 
pattern with its aggregation of civilian agencies. 


in the letter included herewith as Appendix "A" 
[JCS 250, in Chapter III, Section 3]. 

b. That this general policy of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff be implemented for combined 
operations by the immediate designation by the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff of a Combined Civil 
Affairs Committee under the co-chairmanship 
of United States and British military represen- 
tatives consisting of representatives of the U.S. 
and British Chiefs of Staff with authority to con- 
sult with such United States and British govern- 
mental departments, agencies and combined 
boards as may be necessary (CCS 190/2). 

c. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
through the medium of its Combined Civil 
Affairs Committee have primary responsibility 
for the planning and administration of civil af- 
fairs in areas occupied as a result of combined 
operations, including the co-ordination of the 
activities of the United States and United King- 
dom civilian agencies, and the issuance of all 
directives to the Commanders in Chief in the 

d. That a letter be addressed to the Presi- 
dent and the Prime Minister requesting their con- 
currence in the recommendations set forth above. 

British Consent to JCS Proposal on Condition 
That Certain British Interests Are Recog- 

[Paraphrase of Msg (84391), War Office to British Joint 
Staff Mission (BJSM) in Washington, 28 May 43, CAD 
files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1] 

2. We are . . . in agreement that the War De- 
partment should in consultation with you pro- 
ceed with a redraft of their paper for the CCS 
[CCS 190/1 above] on the basis that we accept 
a Washington Combined Civil Affairs Commit- 
tee. There are a number of points which we 
require you to cover when negotiating the redraft 
of this paper with the War Department and 
in discussions later at the CCS. You are in- 
structed to obtain express agreement in two of 
these points as a condition of our accepting the 
American proposal. These two points are elab- 
orated in paragraphs 4 and 5 below. You have 
authority to agree the exact form of words with 
which to secure the satisfactory safeguarding of 
these provisos. * * * 

4. Our first proviso covers the question of Brit- 
ish territories under enemy occupation, such as 
Burma, Malaya, Channel Islands and other Far 
Eastern and Pacific territories, including those 
such as New Guinea the government of which 
is an Australian responsibility. The interests of 
New Zealand might possibly be affected also. 
Future developments may result in the CCS 

controlling combined operations in countries 
which are at present included in areas where 
the responsibility is purely British under the con- 
trol of the British Chiefs of Staff. The corollary 
of the proposal which the Americans have made 
would be that the Washington Committee would 
handle all civil affairs questions which might 
arise out of the combined operations referred to 
above, but obviously in enemy occupied British 
territories His Majesty's Governments in the U.K. 
and Dominions have special interest and respon- 
sibilities just as the U.S. Government has in U.S. 
enemy occupied territories like the Philippines. 
Accordingly, we require you to obtain express ac- 
ceptance from the Americans of the principle that 
final decisions on all civil affairs matters must lie 
with His Majesty's Government in the U.K. or 
in the Dominions in the case of enemy occupied 
British territories, with similar provision for the 
U.S. Government and U.S. enemy occupied ter- 

5. Our second proviso is that we want the ex- 
isting A.T.(E) London Committee to be ex- 
panded into a fully combined committee with 
strong U.S. representation which must be fully 
authorized to speak for the U.S. Government. 6 
The Committee could, if desired, have a com- 
bined secretariat. U.S. representation on this 
committee would include State Department, 
Service Departments, and any other representa- 
tives the Americans may desire. It is difficult to 
emphasize too much the important nature of this 
proviso. At the present the U.S. representatives 
are hardly better than observers. Thus, even on 
minor points on which disagreement is most un- 
likely, it is impossible for us to feel that the War 
Department are in agreement or even advised of 
our decisions. For your information, we have 
been advised by the U.S. representatives that, in 
spite of the fact that we have at their request 
given them copies of A.T.(E) papers for transmis- 
sion to the War Department, none has yet been 
sent. We must rectify this situation; otherwise 
the Washington Committee will be burdened 
with a mass of detail which you and the War De- 
partment deprecate, and the final result would be 
the worst form of remote control. 7 

"The British Chiefs of Staff wished the AT(E) Com- 
mittee to have the primary responsibility for operations 
based upon the United Kingdom, that is, for northwest 
Europe. This became clear to Americans only after the 
Washington committee had begun to function. 

7 The War Department from the beginning had been 
reluctant to become involved with the decisions of the 
London committee. It had felt that it could not become 
bound by decisions into the making of which it could not 
enter on any basis equal to that of the British with their 
elaborate on-the-spot organization. 


In addition we have in London the Allied Gov- 
ernments in whose countries future operations 
will take place based on the U.K. and it is essen- 
tial that detailed consultation should be carried 
on with them on questions of liaison officers, 
jurisdiction, knowledge of local conditions and 
of administration, etc. It is also fair to say that 
there is in London a mass of information and a 
body of experience which are elsewhere unob- 
tainable. If the A.T.(E) Committee becomes fully 
combined it will make possible a thorough and 
efficient use of these factors. 8 * * * 

CAD Recommends Qualified Acceptance of 
British Conditions for a CCS Committee 

[Memo, Hilldring for CofS, i Jun 43, CAD files, 092 
(3-22-43), sec. 1] 

I. Discussion. 

1. The War Department and the British Joint 
Staff Mission are considering a proposal for the 
establishment of a Combined Civil Affairs Com- 
mittee under the Combined Chiefs of Staff for 
the planning, co-ordination and administration 
of Civil Affairs in occupied areas. 

2. The British Joint Staff Mission advise that 
the War Department proposal will be accepted 
provided (a) that a representative of the United 
States Government be designated to act as a mem- 
ber of the London A.T.(E) Committee with 
authority to speak for the United States and (b) 
that the United States or the United Kingdom, 
as the case may be, will control any decisions on 
Civil Affairs which are made with respect to any 
enemy occupied territories of the respective gov- 
ernments, such as Burma and the Philip- 
pines. . . . 

3. a. Although it does not appear to be desir- 
able to have the War Department recognize and 
be a part of any agreements which are made by 
the War Office Committee, it does seem desirable 
to designate an officer to serve as a member of the 
A.T.(E) Committee with authority: 

(1) To negotiate for the United States 
with respect to Civil Affairs matters in the Euro- 
pean Theater. 

(2) To transmit to the War Department 
studies and problems relating to other American 
theaters of operations. 

b. The State Department concurs. 

4. There does not appear to be any objection 
to the condition that final decisions on civil affairs 

"As the other provisos were not assented to they are 
not quoted. They concern principally the functions and 
authority which the British desired to see accepted with 
respect to the AT(E) Committee. 

matters in occupied territories of either the United 
States or Great Britain be the primary respon- 
sibility of the Government with the primary 
interest. The State Department concurs. 

II. Action Recommended 

The Secretary of War directs: 

a. That the Commanding General, European 
Theater of Operations, designate an officer from 
his staff to serve as a member of the A.T.(E) 
London Committee, with authority to negotiate 
with respect to the planning of civil affairs in 
areas in the European Theater which are presently 
subject to enemy occupation, and to transmit to 
the War Department studies and problems relat- 
ing to other American theaters of operation. 

b. That the proposal of the British Government 
as to the control of decisions on civil affairs in 
enemy occupied territories of the United King- 
dom and United States be accepted. 

CAD Plan for a Combined Committee Largely 
Solves Difficult Problem 

[Min, 97th Mtg CCS, 4 Jun 43, ABC files, 334, CCS Min 
(1-23-43), sec. 4] 

Sir John Dill [Br Representative, CCS] said that 
it seemed that the Civil Affairs Division of the 
War Department had gone a long way in solving 
a difficult problem. He thought it possible to ap- 
prove in principle the recommendations of the 
paper, subject to a few minor drafting alterations, 
one of which dealt with the important subject of 
U.S. representation on the A.T.(E) Committee 
in London. 

General Hilldring explained that the Civil 
Affairs Division of the War Department had 
achieved complete understanding with the U.S. 
Civil Agencies concerned. 9 The British Govern- 
ment had for some time been operating a most 
successful system of military government. The 
War Department had now set up a comparable 
organization. The proposals set out in the paper 
aimed at bridging the gap between the U.S. and 
British organizations, by setting up a Combined 
Civil Affairs Committee responsible to the Com- 
bined Chiefs of Staff. This would, in fact, legiti- 
mize an existing arrangement since the Husky 

' General Hilldring had actually had little difficulty in 
securing their concurrence. They had apparently been 
concerned lest the British proposal for a combined com- 
mittee of civilian agencies be accepted. This would have 
meant an entanglement with British agencies which 
threatened too great a loss of freedom of action. See 
I Chapter IV, Section 2J note by Governor Lehman, 5 May 
1943, protesting the proposal of CCS 190 on the ground 
that it infringed upon the mission assigned to him. 


directive had been negotiated by an unofficial 
combined committee composed of members of 
the War and Navy Departments, State Depart- 
ment, Treasury, the British Embassy and the 
British Army Staff. The Civil Affairs Division 
had established a mechanism of linking in to 
their organization the interested U.S. Civil Agen- 
cies, such as the State Department, Treasury, 
Board of Economic Warfare, O.S.S. and 
Governor Lehman's organization. It was now 
hoped to use the British and U.S. organiza- 
tions. * * * 

President Wants the New Committee Set Up 

[Draft of Note from Roosevelt to Leahy, 10 Jun 43, CAD 
files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1] 

I have considered the arrangement whereby the 
Combined Civil Affairs Committee is to act as 
the planning and co-ordinating group for Mili- 
tary Government under the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff and have approved it. I understand it meets 
with the approval of the State Department and 
has been drawn up with the intention of meet- 
ing the expressed views of the British to whom 
it has not been officially submitted. I feel it 
should be instituted as promptly as possible. 10 

But a Moot Paragraph Is Destined To Keep 
the Committee From Functioning Promptly 

[Par. 6 of the Proposed Charter of the Combined Civil 
Affairs Committee (CCS 190/4), 12 Jun 43, CAD files, 
092 (3-22-43), sec. 1] 

Where an enemy-occupied territory of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, or one of the Domin- 
ions is recovered as a result of an operation by 
forces of either the United States, United King- 
dom or one of the Dominions, acting alone or on 
a combined basis, final decision with regard to 
civil affairs policies to be followed in the area 
after the capture will be determined by the gov- 
ernment which formerly had sovereignty over 
the territory. 11 

10 The proposed CCAC, as a subcommittee of the Com- 
bined Chiefs of Staff, did not conflict with the civilian 
Area Director Plan which the President was espousing 
at this time for operations within the theater. See 
I pp. 1 00-101 J above. 

"This paragraph, after considerable debate, had been 
accepted by both the British Joint Staff Mission and CAD. 
But opposition to the draft arose in the U.S. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. McNarney objected to the fact that the words 
"after the capture" enabled the United Kingdom to im- 
pose its policies upon an American commander before 
the exigencies of military occupation had ended. 

The Americans Rewrite Paragraph 6 To Pro- 
tect Their Military Commander's Freedom of 

[Min, 98th Mtg CCS, 18 Jun 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22- 
43), sec. 1] 

General Hilldring explained that there was a 
difference in substance between the U.S. and 
British proposals with regard to the wording of 
paragraph 6. Briefly, the point at issue was 
whether the military commander, if British and 
occupying U.S. territory, or vice versa, must ac- 
cept the views on civil affairs of the government 
originally owning the territory immediately it 
was liberated; or whether he should plan his civil 
affairs in the light of the situation at the time 
of the occupation. In his own view the primary 
interest of the commander concerned must be 
to rid the area of the enemy and to achieve this 
most easily he should have no over-all restric- 
tions with regard to civil affairs imposed on 
him. . . . 

The CCS Tentatively Approves Charter of a 
Combined Civil Affairs Committee 

[Charter of the CCAC (CCS 190/6/D) 3 Jul 43, Ap- 
proved by CCS 25 Jun 43 with proviso that par. 6 was 
subject to revision, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2] 


1. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee 
(C.C.A.C.) is hereby established in Washington 
as an agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 


2. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee will 
consist of: One representative each of the U.S. 
Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. State Department, 
the British Foreign Office, two representatives of 
the British Joint Staff Mission, and two addi- 
tional civilian members, one of whom shall be 
designated by the United States and the other by 
the United Kingdom. 


3. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee 
shall with respect to enemy or enemy-held areas 
occupied or to be occupied as a result of com- 
bined (U.S.-U.K.) operations: 

a. Recommend to the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff general policies which should be adopted 
for civil affairs, including supply and related 

b. Under the direction of the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff, be responsible for the broad civil 


affairs planning and the direction in Washington 
of civil affairs problems presented to the Com- 
bined Chiefs of Staff by theater commanders; and 
c. Under the direction of the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff, be responsible for the co-ordina- 
tion of the British and American military and 
naval establishments with the appropriate civilian 
departments and agencies of the respective gov- 
ernments which are concerned with civil affairs 


4. a. Complete plans for a military operation 
must anticipate the problems which will be pre- 
sented by local populations. Planning and admin- 
istration of civil affairs are an integral part of 
military operations and cannot be separated. 

b. The administration of civil affairs should 
be delegated to appropriate civilian departments 
and agencies just as soon as the military situation 
permits. This may be accomplished gradually, 
even though the area is still the subject of mili- 
tary control. The decision as to when and to 
what extent civilian departments and agencies 
will assist the military in the administration of 
civil affairs will be determined by the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff, upon recommendation of the 
military commander in the area. Generally, re- 
sponsibility for the handling of civil affairs 
should be relinquished by the military as quickly 
as this can be accomplished without interference 
with the military purposes of the occupation. 12 

London Committee 

5. At the present time there is established in 
London an Administration of Territories 
(Europe) Committee which is engaged in ad- 
vance planning for civil affairs in areas which 
are occupied by the enemy. The Commanding 
General, European Theater of Operations, 
U.S.A., has been authorized to designate an 
officer from his staff to serve on the London Com- 
mittee with authority (a) to negotiate for the 
United States with regard to the planning of civil 
affairs in the European Theater, U.S.A., (b) to 
transmit to the War Department studies and 
problems relating to other theaters of operation 
and (c) to transmit to the Committee the views 
of the War Department, co-ordinated, where 
necessary, with those of other United States De- 

partments and agencies. [See sec. 5 for revision 
of 29 Jan 1944.] 

Reoccupation of US. or U.K. Territory 

6. a. Combined Operations 
Where an enemy occupied territory of the 
United States the United Kingdom or one of 
the Dominions is to be recovered as a result of 
an operation combined or otherwise, the govern- 
ment which formerly had sovereignty over the 
territory may prepare and submit to the Com- 
bined Chiefs of Staff an outline of policies de- 
sired for the handling of civil affairs. So much 
of this outline will be accepted by the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff as they determine, upon the recom- 
mendation of the force commander concerned, 
will not interfere with the military purposes of 
the operation. 

b. Other Operations 
For use in other than combined operations 
in enemy occupied territories of the U.S., the 
U.K. or one of the Dominions, the government 
which formerly had sovereignty over the terri- 
tory may prepare and submit through the Com- 
bined Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate Chiefs 
of Staff an outline of policies desired for the 
handling of civil affairs. This outline will be 
accepted by the Chiefs of Staff (U.S. or U.K.), 
unless it will interfere with the military purposes 
of the operation, in which case reference will be 
made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a 
decision. 13 

The Debate Is Still Not Ended: The British 
Amend Paragraph 6 

[Par. 6, CCS 190/7, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2] 

"When an enemy occupied territory of the U. 
States, U. Kingdom, or one of the Dominions is 
to be recovered as a result of an operation com- 
bined or otherwise the directive to be given to 
the Force Commander concerned will include 
policies to be followed in handling of Civil Af- 
fairs as formulated by the Government which 
exercised authority over the territory before ene- 

u This paragraph reflected American insistence upon 
the principle o£ military control pending determination by 
military commanders that relinquishment of control to 
civilian agencies was safe. However, the paragraph also 
met the British position insofar as it made possible such 
relinquishment before the end of military occupation. 

11 This paragraph was a compromise between CCS 
190/4, favored by the British and CCS 190/5, which 
substituted the words "upon the relinquishment of mili- 
tary government" for the phrase "after the capture" in 
the former. At the CCS meeting of 25 June, Dill pro- 
posed that CCS accept the new draft tentatively pending 
London's opportunity to express its views upon the revi- 
sion. This was done and the new committee, which 
became known as the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 
was ready to function. Under these conditions, the 
Charter was approved by the President on 9 July and 
by the Secretary of State, 10 July 1943. 


my occupation. If the Chiefs of Staff or Force 
Commander consider that such civil affairs poli- 
cies will impede or are impeding military pur- 
poses of the operation the matter will be referred 
to aforesaid Government with recommenda- 

Washington, D.C. 
3rd July 1943 

3 July 

Above is reply from London (Colonial Office) 
in commenting on P6 as approved by CCS 99th 

TWH [Col. Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., 

sec, CAD] 

Americans Amend British Amendment 

[Min, 117th Mtg CCS, 3 Sep 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22- 
43) sec. 2] 

General Marshall suggested that the word "mili- 
tary" should be inserted before the word "direc- 
tive" in the new paragraph 6 of the directive to 
the Combined Civil Affairs Committee con- 
tained in CCS 190/7. He explained that this 
word was in order to ensure that directives to 
the theater commanders should be passed 


British Claim That a London and Not the 
Washington Committee Should Plan for 

[Memo by Representatives of Br CofS (CCS 274/1), 
10 Jul 43, CAD files, 014, Norway (5-13-43) (1)] 

We are concerned over the question of procedure 
in this matter. The situation regarding this paper 
is that it was prepared in London at AT(E) 
Committee, has been considered by the British 
Chiefs of Staff and approved by them, and now 
has been brought over here by a representative 
of [Lt.] General [Jacob L.] Devers [CG 
ETOUSA] for necessary approval by the U.S. 
Chiefs of Staff. 15 

ls The paper referred to was the British-Norwegian 
Agreement, CCS 274, which Devers recommended on 10 
June for favorable consideration as suitable for Norway 
and as a guide for future similar arrangements for civil 
administration and jurisdiction in liberated territories. 
The War Department took the view that ". . . inasmuch 
as the Trident decisions directed combined planning for 

through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not 
through political channels. . . . 

Paragraph on Reoccupation of U.S. and Brit- 
ish Territories as Finally Accepted 

[Rev par. 6, Charter of CCAC (190/8/D), 1 Oct 43, 
CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2] 

6. When an enemy occupied territory of the 
United States, the United Kingdom or one of 
the Dominions is to be recovered as the result 
of an operation combined or otherwise, the mili- 
tary directive to be given the Force Commander 
concerned will include the policies to be fol- 
lowed in the handling of civil affairs as formu- 
lated by the government which exercised author- 
ity over the territory before enemy occupation. 
If paramount military requirements as deter- 
mined by Force Commander necessitate a de- 
parture from those policies he will take action 
and report through the Chiefs of Staff to the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff. 14 

11 The above-quoted paragraph 6 proved acceptable to 
the British Government and was incorporated in the 
Charter. But before this happened, another paragraph 
had given rise to divergent interpretations, on an issue 
so serious as to prevent CCAC from functioning for some 
time (see below, Section 2). 


In accordance with the charter in CCS 
190/6/D, paragraph 5 [sec. 1, this chapter], it is 
the London "ATE" Committee which engages 
in advance planning for civil affairs in the Euro- 
pean Theater, in close touch with U.S. repre- 
sentatives. We feel, therefore, that this paper, 
after consideration by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, 
should be referred to the London Committee and 
not to the CCAC, Washington, and that the 
American representatives in London should be 
fully briefed to negotiate. 16 

occupation of Norway, it is essential that a combined 
agreement be made. . . ." CAD files, 014, Norway 
(5-13-43) (1); ABC files, 014, Norway (4 Jul 43), sec. 

"The British here base their claim in behalf of AT(E)'s 
jurisdiction upon a legal ground — the charter of CCAC. 
However, the paragraph referred to concerning the status 
of the London committee was, like so many provisions 
of international agreements, inherently vague — perhaps 
intentionally so. While both sides were to use legal argu- 
ments in the long debate which followed, the really im- 
pelling motivations were of course nonlegal. Each coun- 


U.S. Chiefs of Staff Maintain CCAC Has 
General Jurisdiction Over ETO 

[CCS 274/2, U.S. Chiefs of Staff, 13 Jul 43, CCAC files, 
014, Norway (8-16-43), sec. 1] 

1. In CCS. 274/1, the British Chiefs of Staff 
raise two questions : 

a. General procedure to be followed regarding 
Civil Affairs matters handled by the AT(E) 
Committee in London and the Combined Civil 
Affairs Committee in Washington. 

b. Immediate procedure to be followed in 
handling CCS. 274, the projected Norwegian- 
British agreements. 

2. With reference to paragraph 1a above: 
Paragraph 5 of the Charter (CCS. 190/6/D) 

contemplates that, in the main, advance planning 
with respect to the European Theater of opera- 
tions (U.S.) will probably be carried on by the 
AT(E) Committee in London. However, there 
is nothing in that paragraph, nor in paragraph 3 
(establishing the Civil Affairs Committee), 
which restricts the authority of the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff nor of its Combined Civil Affairs 
Committee with respect to civil affairs matters in 
the European Theater of operations to the extent 
that the Combined Chiefs of Staff desire to in- 
fluence the course of that planning. 

3. With respect to ib above: 

a. The Norwegian agreement is a most impor- 
tant international document. It was prepared be- 
tween Great Britain and the Norwegian Govern- 
ment-in-Exile without participation by the 
United States and without prior commitment by 
the United States. This document has been sub- 
mitted by the British War Office to the United 
States Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of ascertain- 
ing whether or not the agreements reached by 

try felt that it could best safeguard its interests if issues 
most directly touching them were decided by a combined 
committee located in its own capital. Each country, thus, 
felt that political as well as legal justice was on its side. 
The case of the Americans is, unfortunately, more fully 
stated in the documents which follow than that of the 
British. The feeling of the British that the AT(E) Com- 
mittee should have had primary jurisdiction over civil 
affairs planning for Europe is expressed in strong though 
good-tempered fashion by Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick E. Mor- 
gan, former Chief of Staff, COSSAC, in his Overture to 
Overlord (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950), 
pp. 234 ff. He points out that the British had been en- 
gaged in this liberation and conquest business already for 
some years, and had been at great pains to set up an 
elaborate civil affairs organization. It seemed difficult to 
make sense out of duplicating the British efforts by giving 
the Washington committee primary jurisdiction over the 
very area which the British had been studying and pre- 
paring for so long. 

the British are acceptable to the United States in 
the event that U.S. troops participate in the lib- 
eration of Norway. 

b. The joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff have exam- 
ined the agreement and found it acceptable with 
several minor exceptions. However, before reach- 
ing final agreement, the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff 
desire to assure themselves that the exceptions 
they have made are acceptable to the British 
Chiefs of Staff. 

c. In view of the fact that the document and 
the deliberations concerning it are now centered 
in Washington, and since the Civil Affairs Char- 
ter obviously permits such action, the Joint U.S. 
Chiefs of Staff desire that their attitude, with re- 
spect to the British-Norwegian agreement, be 
referred by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the 
Combined Civil Affairs Committee for study and 
recommendation. * * * 

CAD Believes U.S. Should Consider With- 
drawing From the London Committee 

[Memo, Hilldring for Barker, DCofS, COSSAC, 13 Sep 
43, CAD files, 334, AT(E) Comm. (1) London (2-27- 

2. I believe there is no longer any real function 
to be performed by the AT(E) Committee with 
regard to the military phases of civil affairs. 
Consideration should be given for the withdraw- 
al of Colonel Ryan's membership in it, if Gen- 
eral Devers and you consider such a move to be 
politically expedient. 17 

U.K. and U.S. Disagree on Who Has Juris- 
diction Over Norwegian Agreement 

[Memo, Wing Comdr T. E. H. Birley, Br Member CCAC 
Secretariat for Col Thomas Hammond, U.S. Member, 
24 Sep 43, CCAC files, 014, Norway (8-16-43) (1)] 

... I think the correct procedure would be for 
the agreed London paper to be forwarded from 
the CCAC Secretariat to the CCS with the state- 
ment that it has been agreed by the AT(E) 
Committee in London, and has been cleared by 
the British and US authorities concerned. It 
should not be brought up at the CCAC meeting 
but I think that as a matter of procedure the 
document should be forwarded to CCS through 
CCAC. . . . 

17 In the preceding portion of the memorandum Gen- 
eral Hilldring had expressed the view that COSSAC 
headquarters was the proper and expedient instrumen- 
tality for combined civil affairs planning in the United 
Kingdom. COSSAC, he pointed out, had been designated 
by CCS as the agency for this purpose. 


[Memo, Hilldring, Dir, CAD, for U.S. Secy, CCS, 5 Oct 
43, CAD files, 014, Norway (5-13-43) (0] 

2. As a result of completing the discussions in 
London the present paper (CCS 274/4) is now 
being submitted to the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff for final approval. 

3. As the paper will be considered at today's 
meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would 
like to suggest that they recommend that the 
document be referred to the Combined Civil 
Affairs Committee for comment. This will be 
consistent with the intended procedure to be 
followed in the case of not only the Norwegian 
Agreement but all subsequent similar agree- 
ments which will be concluded with govern- 

4. One important reason for referring the 
matter to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee 
is that the State Department can thus comment 
officially on the contents for the first time, which 
is most essential as the US Government will 
undoubtedly desire to conclude a similar separate 
agreement with the Norwegian Government. 
The State Department was not officially repre- 
sented during the London discussions. 

[Memo, Hilldring for CofS, 4 Oct 43, CCAC files, 334 
(7-3-43). sec. 1] 

2. At a recent meeting of the Combined Civil 
Affairs Committee, the U.S. members presented 
for consideration a draft of a directive for the 
administration of civil affairs in France during 
the period of military necessity. ... [Discus- 
sions on a directive and decision reached will 
be found below, in Chapter XXII, Sections 3-5.] 

3. The British view appears to be that the 
War Office AT(E) Committee in London, which 
derives no authority from the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff, should have jurisdiction to determine 
policy and to make broad plans for the adminis- 
tration of civil affairs in combined operations, 
particularly as to operations based on the United 
Kingdom. The AT(E) Committee has no in- 
dependent jurisdiction to formulate policies on 
the administration of civil affairs on parallel with, 
or to the exclusion of, the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff or their Combined Civil Affairs Committee. 

4. The U.S. members of the Committee are 
clear that since civil affairs are an inseparable 
part of military operations, broad plans and pol- 
icies must be established for all combined oper- 
ations by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, acting 
on the recommendation of the Combined Civil 
Affairs Committee. This procedure has been fol- 
lowed, with the concurrence of the British, for 

operations based on Algiers [MTO]. It is con- 
sistent with the charter of the Combined Civil 
Affairs Committee and the purpose for which it 
was established. 

5. If a decision should be made on a political 
level to transfer jurisdiction over these problems 
to a British Committee which has been operating 
in close collaboration with the exiled govern- 
ments, the War Department and the agencies 
of this government which have an interest in 
the political and economic phases of civil affairs 
may be placed in the position of having to accept 
policy decisions on military and post military 
issues which have already been reached by the 
British through this Committee. * * * 

CCAC Unable To Resolve Disagreement 

[Memo, CAD, CCAC 33, 15 Oct 43, CCAC files, 014, 
Norway (8-16-43), sec. 1] 


1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, at their i22d 
meeting held on 8 October 1943, agreed that the 
Combined Civil Affairs Committee be directed 
to make recommendations to the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff as to the procedure to be followed 
with respect to future papers of this nature (Nor- 
wegian Agreement). . . . 


6. a. Basic papers relating to civil affairs in 
combined operations based on the United King- 
dom dealing with law, order and security be sub- 
mitted to the CCS for final action through either 
the British or the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 
CCS may, at their discretion, refer any such di- 
rective to their established agency for recom- 
mendation prior to final action. 

b. With respect to planning or operations 
under the broad directives mentioned in para- 
graph 6a above it shall be normal procedure to 
refer these questions to the War Department for 
action of the U.S. interested departments and 

c. This arrangement is applicable only to 
combined operations based on the U.K. 

TMin, 14th Mtg CCAC, 16 Oct 43, CCAC files, 014, 
Norway (8-16-43), se c 1] 

2. Procedure for Civil Affairs in operations 
based on the United Kingdom (CCAC 33) 
Mr. McCloy stated . . . that CCAC 33 contains 
a suggested procedure to be followed with respect 
to papers similar to the Norwegian Agreement. 
After considerable discussion, 


The Committee: 

a. Took note that the British members 
would convey the views of the U.S. members to 
London, where discussions on the subject matter 
of the paper were already in progress. 

b. Agreed to postpone action on the paper 
until such time as the British members had re- 
ceived a reply. 

The Disagreement Having a Stultifying Ef- 
fect on Both CCAC and COSSAC 

[Ltr, Barker, DCOSSAC, to Hilldring, Chief, CAD, 23 
Nov 43, CAD files, 370.21, COSSAC (7-22-43) (1)] 

. . . things require a great deal of clarification 
with regard to our relationship with the British 
agencies. . . . The difficulties arise through our 
relationship with the War Office and its related 
establishments, including the AT(E) which, un- 
happily, is not as defunct as we had thought 
it was. 

... As you know, there has always been a con- 
siderable degree of resentment in the War Office 
because we declined to participate in AT(E)'s 
activities. I was informed yesterday that there is 
a disinclination on the British part to participate 
in Civil Affairs matters through the agency of 
the CCAC. 

The last named disinclination stems, appar- 
ently, from two causes: 

a. The aforementioned resentment about our 
nonparticipation in AT(E); 

b. A desire, and this is very marked, to have 
all Civil Affairs matters pertaining to COSSAC 
transferred from the Washington CCAC to a 
similar body here in London. 

All this tends to have a stultifying effect on 
Civil Affairs in COSSAC. For example, Major 
General Sir Roger Lumley, head of the British 
side of Civil Affairs in COSSAC, has been in- 
structed by the War Office that he is not to be 
party to any transactions as between COSSAC 
and the CCAC. * * * 


British Prefer To Divide Supply Responsi- 
bility According to Area of Primary Strategic 

[Ltr, Sir Robert J. Sinclair, Ministry of Production, to 
Sir Frederick C. Bovenschen, USW (Br), 5 Apr 43, ASF, 
ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-86] 

. . . the responsibility as regards territory 
should be divided as between U.K. and U.S., pre- 
ferably according to agreed areas of strategic re- 
sponsibility or, if not on that basis, on such other 
basis as might be determined. 18 * * * 

18 The British felt that, as regards civilian supply, the 
United States should assume primary planning and pro- 
curement responsibility for Italy while they themselves 
should assume it for the European Theater. The dis- 
tinction suggested itself because operations in northwest 
Europe would be based on the United Kingdom and also 
because the British were carrying the main burden of 
negotiations with the governments in exile. One difficulty 
for the Americans in accepting the British view was that, 
while the British wished to reserve to themselves the main 
planning for the European Theater, they by no means 
proposed to relieve the United States of furnishing a 
large part of the supplies. Plans eventually agreed upon 
for northwest Europe supply requirements will be found in 
Chapter XXIII, of this volume. 

Need for British-American Co-ordination of 
Supply Is Recognized in Planning for Sicily 

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 10 May 43, OPD Msg files, CM- 
OUT 41 10] 

... In view of previous cables on this subject 
... it is evident that a definitive procedure to 
handle all categories civilian supply for AMGOT 
must be established on a combined basis and 
clearly understood to avoid duplication of bidding 
here and in U.K. In view of urgency Husky 
Operation and without prejudice to future ar- 
rangements between U.S. and U.K. Governments 
and decisions of Combined Chiefs of Staff, CCS 
took note at 80th meeting that War Department 
would expedite planning and necessary co-ordi- 
nation with British with regard to supply of 
civilian population and administration civil af- 
fairs necessary immediately upon occupation 
enemy territory Huskyland. 

Therefore Allied Forces Headquarters should 
submit promptly to CCS for War Department 
its estimate even if tentative of total AMGOT 
civilian needs by item quantity, priority desired, 
destination, and markings in 15 day cycles from 


D Day to D plus 90 including medical and 
sanitary supplies and barter goods required to 
supplement local supplies and production. Upon 
receipt and consideration your requirements by 
War Department source of supply as between 
U.S. and U.K. will be discussed with appropriate 
U.S. and U.K. authorities and requirements 
which U.K. is unable to supply which we assume 
to be the majority will be rilled by War Depart- 
ment. In connection with requirements, studies 
being made by War Department which should 
enable us to make suggestions which may be 
helpful. * * * 

British Propose Drawing Some Food Supplies 
From U.S. in Preparing for Supply Require- 
ments of Northwest Europe 

[Msg, Br Ministry of Food to Br Food Mission to the 
United States, 8 May 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS- 

. . . Minister has approved following proposals: 

a. To import immediately for arrival before 
end June so far as possible 130,000 tons of flour 
from North America over and above present pro- 
gramme of flour shipments. 

b. To place orders immediately in North 
America for 180,000 tons of flour with intention 
of having it ready for immediate shipment when 
offensive begins. 

c. To ship from North America immediately 
offensive begins wheat at the rate of 20,000 tons 
per month or 120,000 tons in all being balance 
of War Office requirements for the 6 months. 19 

British Supply Proposal Arouses Suspicions 

[Memo, Arthur B. Van Buskirk, OLLA, for Stettinius, 
Dir, OLLA, 26 May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, 

(4) In our opinion, the United States should 
not agree to the British proposal. In the first 
place, if there is to be any stockpiling in the 
United States of American supplies for reoc- 
cupied areas these should be under the control 
of the United States Government in the same 
way that we control munitions or other war 
supplies. . . . 

19 A copy of this message was given to the Chief of the 
Civilian Supply Branch, ASF, by the British Joint Staff 
Mission, with the request that the War Department aid in 
executing its proposals. The Mission stated that this was 
but one of numerous similar matters which would be 
arising in increasing number. 

The British should not be allowed to become 
intermediaries between the United States and 
the reoccupied territories. The supply arrange- 
ments for United States products should be direct 
with the territory concerned and the United States 
should be free to make its own arrangements, 
if it desires, with the country concerned as is 
done in North Africa. . . . 

Unwillingness To Accept British Determi- 
nation of U.S. Relief Responsibilities 

[Min, Conf in Office of Wright, Dir, ID, 27 May 43, ASF, 
ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, 1942-43] 

Dunn of State Department says that State does 
not propose to recognize any relief requirements 
unless they have been approved by the Army. 
The worry of State is that London might other- 
wise become the final arena of requirements, 
even though the Combined Chiefs are in Wash- 
ington. To date, Leith-Ross Committee 20 and 
AT(E) Committee have, consequently, not been 
recognized by State, just as they have not been 
recognized by War. 

General Wright. It seems clear that determi- 
nation of U.S. relief requirements should be 
made, for the military period of supply, the re- 
sponsibility of the U.S. Army, and that the place 
for determining over-all military requirements 
should be in Washington, under the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff. . . . 

Great Britain Will Not Be Allowed To 
Stockpile Civilian Supplies Drawn From U.S. 

[Ltr, Wright to Birley, BJSM, 15 Jun 43, ASF, ID files, 
Basic Policy-Gen, Jun-Jul 43] 

With respect to your specific inquiry as to flour, 
we believe that the stockpiling of supplies against 
requirements for civil population of occupied 
areas is a proper responsibility of this govern- 
ment in all cases where the supplies are to be 
drawn from U.S. resources. 

The above has been discussed with and ap- 
proved by the Office of Lend-Lease Administra- 
tion, Governor Lehman, and the Food Adminis- 
tration for War, who concur in this letter. 

20 The Inter-Allied Post-War Requirements Committee, 
established in September 1941 under Sir Frederick Leith- 


British Ask American Underwriting of Their 
Supply Plans for Europe 

[Memo, ID on Staff Mtg, 5 Jul 43, to Discuss Proposals 
of Lt Col Mocatta, Br Sup Representative, 81 ASF, ID 
files, Basic Policy-Gen, Jun-Jul 43] 

Mocatta's position was summarized as follows: 

a. U.S. and U.K. would agree on total re- 
quirements for areas. 

b. U.K. would furnish supplies regardless of 
source as it chooses and would come to U.S. for 
balance to supplement such supplies. All relief 
for Continent would presumably be based on 

c. This leaves initiative wholly in U.K. hands. 
Further complications are: 

(1) Starts U.S. Army furnishing U.K. mili- 
tary with food, etc., which at present it does not 

(2) Involves allocation machinery with ex- 
isting combined boards which in turn confuses 
military responsibility with nonmilitary agen- 
cies. 22 

(3) Commits us to AT(E) estimates (cal- 
ories, etc.). . . . 

U.S. To Reject Entanglement in British Sup- 
ply Procedure 

[Memo, Wright for Dir of Materiel, ASF, 13 Jul 43, ASF, 
ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, Jan-Jul 43] 83 

4. The U.K. has advised the War Department 
that its basic interest is assurance that: 

(a) Supply requirements shall be reviewed 
by the appropriate combined boards, and 

(b) That the U.S. will furnish the sup- 
plies not available from U.K. sources. 

5. As you know, the U.S. has not participated 
in the A.T.E. proceedings except as observers. 

"Mocatta arrived from England the middle of June 
and held a series of conferences with War Department 
supply authorities beginning 19 June. In addition to re- 
questing a definite commitment of U.S. wheat shipments, 
he sought full acceptance by the War Department of the 
London AT(E) Committee's supply estimates for Europe. 
(ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, I, 102.) The War Depart- 
ment representatives informally took the negative posi- 
tion outlined by Wright in the memorandum for Clay 
which follows. 

""It was British practice to submit military as well as 
civilian requirements formally to the Combined Boards, 
a civilian agency. 

M A postscript on a copy of the memorandum stated 

Actual operational planning is now being under- 
taken at COSSAC headquarters in London in 
which the U.S. will fully participate. Conse- 
quently, the War Department should not agree 
except on the recommendations of E.T.O. as to 
the details of supplies to be furnished beyond 
food, medical supplies and fuel, but should agree 
only to the basic principle that minimum essen- 
tial supplies shall be furnished. 

6. As to supply procedure, the method pro- 
posed by the U.K. contemplates that after re- 
quirements are agreed in the Theater, the U.K. 
will designate which items they can supply from 
U.K. sources, and will ask our support for U.K. 
acquisitions in this country of the unfilled 

7. It seems more appropriate to have the U.S. 
Theater Commander present to the War De- 
partment requirements to be drawn from U.S. 
sources along with his recommendations. The 
War Department would then procure all U.S. 
supplies necessary for the combined operation, 
and forward them to the U.S. Theater Com- 
mander to be made available by him for joint 
use as he deems necessary. This procedure 
should meet the basic problems of the U.K. out- 
lined in paragraph 4 above, and yet avoid the 
possible repercussions of having the U.S. turn 
its supplies over to the U.K. for relief purposes 
except as the final need is determined. In con- 
sidering this aspect of the problem it should be 
realized that supplies for civilian populations, 
if furnished as suggested by the U.K., would in 
due course come under Lend-Lease. 

8. On the basis of the foregoing it is recom- 
mended that: 

(a) The U.K. be advised that requirements 
for relief of civilians will be accepted only on 
basis of recommendation of U.S. Theater Com- 

(b) Supplies to be furnished from the U.S. 
will be furnished through our Theater Com- 
mander on his requisition. 

(c) Such supplies will, as appropriate, be 
available for joint use, in the discretion of the 
U.S. Theater Commander. 

that General Clay had agreed with its proposals. Wright 
informed the British Joint Staff Mission on 24 July that 
questions of the type, amount, and time of supplies for 
Europe should be agreed upon in Washington on the 
basis of the U.S. theater commander's recommendations 
together with those of the British. 



The Issue Before Us 

[Notes by Maj Palmer, Civ Sup Branch, on Discussions 
of WD Supply Authorities at Mtg of 31 May 43, ASF, ID 
files, Basic Policy-Gen, 1942-43] 

3. U.S. must decide to conduct relief as a sole 
or joint operation, as the case is to be. Present 
indications are that U.S. favors combined action 
and U.K. is dragging feet on it. . . . 

The International Division Favors American 
Seniority in Combined Planning 

[Memo, Wright for Chief, CAD, Jun 43, ASF, ID, files, 
014, Civ Sup, vol. I] 

As to matters of supply it seems clear to me that 
the War Department should be designated as 
the executive agency of the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff and the Theater Commander during 
the period of military occupation. Within the 
War Department the supply responsibility would 
then be ultimately discharged by the Army 
Service Forces with the concurrence of your 
office. * * * 

. . . Mechanically the plan would work out as 
a. As to Planning 

The Army Service Forces, with your con- 
currence and after consultation with the B.A.S. 
[British Army Staff], will recommend the basic 
provisions to be made for each potential area of 
occupation, subject, in the event of disagreement, 
to review by the Combined Committee. Simi- 
larly, after consultation with the British Army 
Staff, a recommendation will be made as to the 
sources of supply for such requirements. As a 
result of the foregoing there will be established 
appropriate procurement objectives for the Army 
Supply Program to provide the necessary Army 
stores to fulfill civil requirements to be drawn 
from United States resources. In the case of a 
particular operation the Army Service Forces 
will, again in consultation with the British Army 
Staff, recommend the supply requirements, the 
sources and the method of operation for final 
adoption by the Combined Board. * * * 

Support in CAD for Coequal Partnership 

[Memo, Lt Col J. H. Hynes, Chief, Civ Relief Branch, 
CAD, for Chief, CAD, 24 Jun 43, CAD files, 334, CCAC 
(6-12-43) (1)] 

1. ... It is obvious that joint Anglo-American 
planning, procurement and stockpiling is essen- 

tial if duplication and inefficiency are to be 
avoided. * * * 

2. . . . the British viewpoint in the matter ap- 
pears to be in substantial agreement with con- 
clusions previously reached by the Civilian Relief 
Branch. . . . 

4. In order to facilitate the co-ordination of 
British-American estimates of requirements the 
[British] memorandum proposes that agreement 
be reached on the standardization of time periods 
and uniformity of terminology. 

7. In regard to the above proposals, the fol- 
lowing observations are made: 

a. The principle of combined planning in 
combined operations in the strategic sphere was 
fully accepted with the establishment of CCS. It 
is no less important that the same principle of 
co-equal partnership be accepted and imple- 
mented in the sphere of civil affairs. . . . 

b. The six months military period has the ad- 
vantage of insuring against under-procurement 
of supply requirements. In the event of over- 
procurement, supplies thereby released would be 
available for future operations, or could be turned 
over to the civilian agencies in the succeeding 
civilian phase. 

c. if the principle of co-partnership in com- 
bined civil affairs is accepted, the War Depart- 
ment and the War Office should, as a natural 
corollary, prepare and submit joint requirements 
and procurements schedules to the appropriate 
combined boards. 

d. The proposal that responsibility for sup- 
ply planning and procurement should be dele- 
gated by the proposed Combined Civil Affairs 
Committee to a Supply Subcommittee would 
provide the necessary machinery to deal with 
these important questions. It would not appear 
necessary however to include in the Subcommit- 
tee all the elements represented on the main 
CCAC. It is suggested that membership in the 
case of planning and procurement for the mili- 
tary period should be confined to representatives 
of the U.K. and U.S. Armed Forces. . . . 

Anglo-American Supply Subcommittee — A 
Coequal Partnership — -Created 

[CCAC 9/1/D, 9 Aug 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, 


1. The Supply Subcommittee is hereby estab- 
lished as an agency of the Combined Civil Affairs 



2. The Supply Subcommittee will consist of: 

a. One U.S. Army Officer 

b. One U.S. Navy Officer 

c. One British Military or Naval member 

d. One British civilian member 

e. One U.S. and one British Secretary. 21 


3. The Supply Subcommittee shall: 

a. Study and make recommendations on sup- 
ply matters referred to it by the combined Civil 
Affairs Committee. 

b. Review for the Combined Civil Affairs 
Committee and advise them in regard to action 
to be taken on recommendations of other agen- 
cies referred to it by the Combined Civil Affairs 


4. The Supply Subcommittee shall: 

a. Establish its own method of procedure. 

b. Form such working groups as are neces- 
sary to assist it in the performance of its duties. 

c. Consult formally or informally with such 
U.S. and British authorities in Washington as 
necessary to be sure that supply matters under 
its cognizance are adequately co-ordinated. 

d. The U.S. members of the Subcommittee 
will be responsible for maintaining close liaison 
with the interested U.S. civilian supply agencies 
on all matters which are of concern to them. 

Americans Ask British To Separate Military 
From Civilian Agency Responsibilities 

[Msg, Clay, Dir of Materiel, ASF, at Quebec Conf, to 
Brig Gen Walter A. Wood, Dir of Requirements, ASF, 
18 Aug 43, CAD Msg files, BOSCO-IN 113] 

. . . Our policy is at variance with proposed 
British policy in which A.T.E. apparently com- 
bined the military requirements with the type of 
requirements computed by Governor Lehman's 
office. We have asked the British to separate es- 
sential military from their requirements so that 
we may reach an agreement. We feel strongly 
that the War Department using military priori- 
ties for procurement must limit its procurement 
to the basic ration, soap, medical and sanitary 

21 It will be noted that the U.S. membership did not 
include any civilians while the British included one civil- 
ian representative. The British were led to include civilian 
representation because of the interlinking of civilian agen- 
cies with their supply procedure for the military period. 
McCloy stated at the second meeting of CCAC that 
American civilians would attend those meetings to which 
they were specially invited. The supply subcommittee 
came to be known as CCAC/S. 

supplies and fuel essential to military operations 
at variance from a more generous relief standard 
or from rehabilitation measures. 

Basic Principles of a Combined Supply Pro- 
gram Agreed Upon by CCS 

[CCS 324/1, Rehabilitation of Occupied and Liberated 
Territories, 22 Aug 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, 
DS-98] 26 


5. It is recommended that an over-all combined 
program of requirements covering the minimum 
economic relief for the population of occupied 
areas that must be furnished by the military dur- 
ing the period of military operations and for some 
time thereafter, be developed in accordance with 
the following principles: 

a. The quantities incorporated in the program 
to be confined to the provision of the basic ration, 
soap, medical, sanitary supplies, fuel (coal and 
petroleum products), and other agreed articles 
considered essential to military operations. The 
basic ration should be as nearly as possible the 
same whether supplied by United States or 
United Kingdom. 

b. Stockpiling should be limited to the smallest 
possible amount. 

c. A statement of requirements will be pre- _ 
pared indicating the quantities of each category 
which will be supplied by the United Kingdom 
and the United States. 

d. Responsibility for arranging for shipment 
will rest with the country procuring the supplies. 

e. In the provision of coal and other supplies 
required for relief of civil populations in re- 
occupied countries, maximum use will be made 
of supplies, stockpiles and resources locally avail- 
able within such reoccupied countries. Where 
possible and where a surplus of coal or other 
supplies exists within any particular reoccupied 
country over and above the requirements for 
such commodities by that country, such surpluses 
will be used to fill the requirements of other re- 
occupied countries. 

/. The monthly requirements for the various 
countries which it is anticipated may be re- 
occupied, will be a matter for recommendation 
by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. 

g. It is agreed that for a period of three months 
subsequent to the occupation of Italy, the United 

28 This document embodies CCS decisions reached at 
the First Quebec Conference (Quadrant) in August 
1943 and became the future guide for combined civilian 
supply planning. For further details see Coakley and 
Leighton, Global Logistics, 1943-45, Chapters XXI 
and XXII. 


Kingdom will deliver up to 100,000 tons of coal 
to Italy each month if the Italian stock position 
and the need require it. Deliveries after the first 
three months will be the subject of further nego- 
tiation. Subsequent to the occupation of Italy 
within the strategic plan, the United States will 
make available the equivalent of two ships each 
month for the purpose of supplying the Italian 
civilian population with the essential dry cargo 
imports other than coal if the need requires it. 
Should it be agreed that essential civilian require- 
ments exceed the capacity set forth above ad- 
ditional shipping will be provided as may be 
agreed upon. This paragraph is subject to the 
provision that Italian ships are not available for 
the purposes herein stated. 

Content of the Basic Ration Is Still 

[Min, Remarks o£ Col G. A. Rickards, Br member at 
Mtg of CCAC Sup Subcomm., 28 Sep 43, ASF, ID, Hist 

2. Italian Requirements 

A. C.C.A.C. (S) 1/3 

b. Colonel Rickards [British member] . . . 
stated . . . that the following appeared to con- 
stitute the present status of agreement and dis- 
agreement between the US and UK: 

(1) Both U.S. and U.K. were agreed on the 
six-month period of military responsibility and 
the desirability of achieving a 2,000 calorie level 
of food relief. 

(2) U.K. differed with U.S. on the composition 
of items required as a military necessity to 
achieve 2,000 calories, the U.K. feeling strongly 
that fats, meats, and sugar should be added, with 
a corresponding reduction in cheese, pulses, and 
soup, and that coffee was not to be regarded as a 
luxury item. 

(3) U.K. regarded provisions to be made for re- 
lief rather as a supplement to locally available 
supplies so as to raise the level of consumption in 
any given area to one of 2,000 calories, than as a 
standard ration. 

c. General Wright, referring to paragraph, 
CCS 324/1 [above] indicated that he felt that the 
Committee was obligated under that directive to 
agree on a basic ration, which, however, did not 
preclude consideration of further items to be 
added to or substituted for the ration proposed by 
the U.S. 

d. Colonel Rickards urged that the U.S. 
study with care the Sinclair- Young estimates, 26 

x Estimates of European supply requirements arrived 
at by working parties of the AT(E) Shipping and Supply 

which, he assured the Committee, had been pre- 
pared with extreme pains as to accuracy and 
which should be accepted as setting forth the 
scale on which the U.K. felt all liberated areas 
should be fed during the first six months. He 
added that it was the U.K. view that any lesser 
scale would fail in meeting the mutually agreed 
end of preventing disease and unrest. 

e. Colonel [William A.] Rounds stated that 
there were two primary considerations behind 
items proposed by the U.S. for the basic ration: 

(1) That where items were in short supply, such 
as fat, the decision as to whether the needs of 
European or U.S. civilians were to be met must 
be made politically and in the open and not be 
concealed by the processes of military priority 
procurement; 27 

(2) That provision for civilian feeding by the 
military must be on the basis of additional pro- 
vision of normal military stores. 28 

Unsettled Too, the Question of Role of Ci- 
vilian Agencies in Determining Sources of 

[Min, 15th Mtg CCAC, 25 Oct 43, CCAC files, 334 (7- 
15-43), sec. 1] 

Mr. McCloy summarized the respective positions 
of the U.S. and U.K. members of the Supply Sub- 
committee and stated that the sole question is 
whether the Combined Civil Affairs Committee 
shall authorize the Subcommittee to apply for- 
mally to the Combined Boards for their recom- 
mendations concerning appropriate sources of 
supply responsibility, or whether, instead, the 

"General Clay put the matter in the following way: 
"When the War Department goes before the allocating 
authorities of the U.S. Government with the Army Sup- 
ply Program, the Department feels entirely justified in 
using the high Army priority for obtaining the minimum 
essential civilian supply requirements . . . that are in- 
cluded in the Army Supply Program. The War Depart- 
ment, on the other hand, does not feel that it would be 
justified in applying to the allocating authorities for ad- 
vance stockpiling on a large scale of additional civilian 
supplies not absolutely necessary for military operations." 
These, Clay proceeded to explain, were requested, if 
deemed advisable, by civilian agencies such as OFRRO. 
Min, 3d Mtg CCAC, 29 Jul 43, CCAC files, 334 (7-15- 
43), sec. 1. 

28 The disagreement over the content of the basic ration 
was not settled until the eleventh meeting of the Supply 
Subcommittee, 16 November 1943. The ration as finally 
agreed departed from original U.S. view by the in- 
clusion of limited amounts of sugar, fat, and coffee, the 
last for morale purposes. The proportions of these items 
included were not as great as the U.K. members thought 
advisable, but their proposals were referred to civilian 
agencies for consideration as supplements to the military 


Subcommittee shall merely consult informally 
with members of the Combined Boards. 

General Macready [British representative] 
stated that he and Lt. Gen. Somervell had parti- 
cipated in the drafting of CCS 324/1 [above] 
and that, while it was intended that the Combined 
Civil Affairs Committee make recommendations 
concerning monthly requirements of civilian sup- 
plies, it was definitely not intended that the Com- 
mittee determine the division of responsibility 
between the U.S. and the U.K. without prior 
consultation with appropriate civilian boards and 
agencies which are familiar with the entire world 
supply picture. He stated further that since food 
supplies for the British Army are procured not 
by the Army itself but by the British Ministry 
of Food, British military officials must necessarily 
refer problems of food procurement to civilian 

General Wright stated, with reference to Gen- 
eral Macready's last statement, that it was his 
understanding that British civilians had been 
placed on the Supply Committee for the very 
purpose of meeting the point raised by General 
Macready. General Wright further stated that he 
construed CCS 324/1 as placing two responsibil- 
ities on the Combined Civil Affairs Committee; 
first the determination of requirements, and sec- 
ond, the division of supply responsibility between 
the U.S. and the U.K. He stated that therefore 
it does not appear appropriate to make a formal 
submission of this question to the Combined 
Boards; that such formal submission is not neces- 
sary to obtain the benefit of the experience and 
knowledge of the appropriate supply authorities 
of the two governments; and that formal sub- 
mission of such questions to the various Com- 
bined Boards will seriously affect their prompt 

Mr. [A. Dennis] Marris [British representa- 
tive] stated that the British position envisaged the 
obtaining of formal recommendations from the 
Combined Board and not decisions which would 
be binding upon the Combined Civil Affairs 
Committee or its Supply Subcommittee. 

Mr. McCloy suggested that for the time being 
the Supply Subcommittee be authorized to refer 
the pending question formally to the Combined 
Boards, with the understanding that when Gen- 
eral Somervell returns to the U.S. he will be 
consulted and further consideration will be given 
to the entire question. . . . 
After discussion, 
The Committee: — 

Agreed that in order to avoid further delay and 

without prejudice to a decision on a policy to be 
adopted upon the return of General Somervell, 
the CCAC Supply Subcommittee be instructed 
that formal submission of Italian civilian require- 
ments should be made to the appropriate Com- 
bined Boards in order to obtain their recommen- 
dations as to sources of supply for such require- 
ments. 20 

Disagreement Over Role of Civilian Agencies 
Is Compromised 

[Ltr, Maj Palmer, to the Deputy Dir of the Food Distri- 
bution Administration, 11 Dec 43, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ 
Sup, vol. 4] 

The Combined Civil Affairs Committee on 23 
November 1943 agreed to instruct the Supply 
Subcommittee as follows: 

"The Supply Subcommittee shall make recom- 
mendations to the Combined Civil Affairs Com- 
mittee as to the requirements of civilian supplies 
to be provided by the military during the period 
of military control and also as to the respective 
U.S. and U.K. responsibility therefor. In formu- 
lating recommendations as to supply responsibil- 
ity, the U.S. and U.K. members may refer any 
requirement in question to their respective sup- 
ply authorities for suggestions as to the appro- 
priate sources of the necessary supplies. The 
supply authorities for either government may in 
their discretion refer any such question to the 

"Among the factors which influenced the American 
members was the old reluctance to concede a role to civil- 
ian agencies in advance planning for military occupation. 
CCAC 34, dated 19 October 1943, memorandum of the 
U.S. members of CCAC/S, stated: "Reasons of security 
make it inadvisable to delegate to nonmilitary agencies 
the responsibility for schedules of requirements based on 
operational plans. . . ." (CCAC files, 334 Combined 
Boards, 10-19-43). It further stated that the need for 
direct and speedy action is best served by centralizing sup- 
ply responsibility in one combined military agency. On 
the other hand, the British had to take into account the 
fact that any determination of supply responsibility by a 
combined military agency might affect injuriously their 
own civilian economy, much more heavily taxed than that 
of the United States. As their civilian agencies responsible 
for the requirements of their economy were represented 
on the Combined Boards, they wished that requests for 
the requirements of occupied areas "be considered by 
those who have the responsibility for handling the prob- 
lem presented by each individual raw material and food- 
stuff as a whole, and by them fitted into world supply 
and demand picture of which they alone have full knowl- 
edge." Memo, Rickards, British Army Staff, Washington, 
for Wright, Dir, ID, 11 Oct 43, CCAC files, 334, Com- 
bined Bds (10-19-43). This difficult issue was not set- 
tled until 23 November, as indicated in the following 


relevant Combined Board in order to obtain its 
views and advice as to source of supply." 80 

Divergent Policies Regarding Hiatus Areas 
Must Also Be Reconciled 

[Min, Mtg in McCloy's office with Bovenschen, Br Per- 
manent USW, 17 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS- 

Sir Frederick stated that he was interested in dis- 
cussing the effect of the Presidential Directive 
with regard to the responsibility of the War De- 
partment in Civil Affairs matters in liberated 
areas. He stated that before the British Govern- 
ment could agree to accept a similar responsi- 
bility, it would be necessary to ascertain the im- 
plications of the letter as to supply and 
manpower. . . . 

Sir Frederick inquired as to the extent to 
which the U.S. Army contemplated supervision 
over the distribution of relief supplies. He stated 
that the British were anxious about the possible 

M Simply stated, the compromise was that the British 
supply representatives were permitted to refer matters of 
supply responsibility to the Combined Boards as they 
wished to do; the Supply Subcommittee was not obligated 
to do so as a body. 

large commitments in manpower and transport 
if the Army was to be responsible for the distri- 
bution of relief within hiatus areas, 31 or in the 
event of a general collapse of the enemy. . . . 

General Hilldring stated as the U.S. position 
that requirements were being developed in the 
War Department for all enemy and enemy-occu- 
pied countries. . . . He stated that it was not 
possible to plan requirements for operational 
areas alone since in the development of military 
plans, operational areas were constantly chang- 
ing. . . . 

Sir Frederick stated that the War Office had 
hitherto assumed that procurement and distri- 
bution of relief supplies would be undertaken by 
the military only in operational areas and not in 
hiatus areas. He stated that in view of the U.S. 
position, it would be necessary for him to take 
the matter up with the War Office. 82 

31 Areas outside the combat zone and line of communi- 

"The British in February 1944 agreed to the U.S. 
position on hiatus areas when they accepted the so-called 
"Plan A" for combined supply ope rations in Europe. 
See below, fChapter XXIII, Sectiqnj; see also Coakley 
and Leighton, Global Logistics, 1943-45, Chapters XXI 
and XXII. 


British Will Co-operate in CCAC but Expect 
Concessions in Return 

[Msg, ASW to the SW, 27 Nov 43, CAD Msg files, CM- 
IN 16774] 

Had talk yesterday with [Br Foreign Secy An- 
thony] Eden. Quite evident he feels European 
Advisory Commission [EAC] 33 in London im- 
portant achievement and does not wish to dero- 
gate in any way from the authority which he feels 
was given it by the terms of reference and docu- 
ments which were referred to it at Moscow. He 
wants to dignify it and have us send a small but 

83 The establishment of the European Advisory Com- 
mission was agreed upon at the Moscow Conference. The 
Ambassador to Great Britain was the American rep- 
resentative on this body which was to meet in London. 
General Wickersham, formerly Commandant of the School 
of Military Government, was appointed military adviser 
to the U.S. representative and in that capacity was to 
represent the War Department and act as a liaison of- 
ficer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By its terms of ref- 
erence, the Commission was to "study and make joint 
recommendations to the three governments upon Euro- 
pean questions connected with the termination of hostili- 

good staff to London immediately to assist [John 
G.] Winant whom the President has advised 
Prime Minister he intends to appoint to Commis- 
sion. However Eden has agreed and I believe 
favors submission by Advisory Commission of 
their tentative recommendations to Combined 
Chiefs of Staff for comment and suggestion by 
them prior to any final submission of recom- 
mendation by Commission to Governments. Also 
has tentatively agreed to remove further pressure 
for removal of Combined Civil Affairs Commit- 
tee 34 in London and if we are prepared to take 
step one above will agree to permit British rep- 
resentatives CCAC to take full part in all dis- 

ties which the three governments may consider appropriate 
to refer to it." The vagueness of this formulation raised 
the possibility of the EAC's considering questions of 
civil affairs arising in the presurrender period. The rec- 
ommendations of the Joint Chiefs in opposition to this 
(see below) were incorporated in instructions from the 
Secretary of State to the U.S. representative on the Com- 

"That is, elevation of AT(E) to the status of senior 
combined civil affairs committee for Europe. 


cussions relating to U.K. based operations, per- 
haps sending to Washington a man with sub- 
stantial authority to augment or replace existing 
British representation. . . , 35 

[Remarks, Bendetsen, in Telecon with Hilldring, 4 Jan 
44, OPD Msg files, WDTC-120] 

... I have a very brief report to make to you 
in regard to certain action that I thought you 
should know about, if you have not already been 
informed. It is in regard to the action taken 
by the British War Ministry with respect to the 
CCAC. They have agreed that the CCAC shall 
have jurisdiction over all combined civil author- 
ities matters with regard to Northwest Europe. 
I believe they have in mind proposing that there 
be established here in London a Branch of the 
CCAC, a London Echelon, which will have ju- 
risdiction over political matters and the remain- 
der of the questions regarding supply, etc., to 
come before the main CCAC in Washing- 
ton. * * * 

JCS Approves Co-Operation With EAC Pro- 
vided It Does Not Trespass Upon Military 

[Ltr, JCS to Secy of State, 5 Jan 44, OPD files, 334.8, 
sec. 1] 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully consid- 
ered the question of military and naval advisors 
for the European Advisory Commission and have 
directed that adequate military and naval person- 
nel be provided in London and Washington for 
liaison with the Commission. 

Based on military considerations, it is the opin- 
ion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the following 
should be incorporated in the instructions to Mr. 
Winant and should provide the accepted proce- 
dure for handling matters of direct or indirect 
military concern which may arise in connection 
with the work of the Commission: 

a. That the European Advisory Commis- 
sion, from the U.S. point of view, is an important 
body, whose functioning and development should 
be guided and maintained in accordance with the 
U.S. concept as to the scope of its activities and 
the manner of its operation. 

35 The British members of CCAC had for several months 
abstained from discussing matters which their govern- 
ment considered within the proper jurisdiction of the 
London committee. 

On 7 December, the American delegates in AT(E) were 
forbidden active participation pending determination as 
to whether jurisdiction over planning for ETO would fall 
on CCAC in Washington or the London Committee. 

b. That the Commission should keep strictly 
within the letter and spirit of its directive and in 
so doing be particular to avoid problems relating 
to the conduct of military operations, and con- 
cerning civil affairs of liberated or enemy terri- 
tories incident to such operations prior to the end 
of hostilities. * * * 

But OPD Disagrees With CAD's Proposal To 
Accept a Subcommittee of CCAC in London 

[Memo, Handy, ACofS, OPD, for Dir, CAD, 20 Jan 44, 
CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2] 

3. It is understood that this proposal [that a sub- 
committee of CCAC sit in London] is a compro- 
mise designed to avoid the vitiation of the Com- 
bined Civil Affairs Committee in Washington. 
It is, in our opinion, very doubtful whether your 
proposal will not have the opposite effect. The 
Subcommittee in London is empowered to act on 
matters "which do not require reference to the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff" and "do not justify 
reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff." Ap- 
parently the London Subcommittee can under 
the proposed Charter decide what does require 
reference. As far as is known, no other agency of 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff has a sub-agency 
with powers to act in London. It appears that 
your proposal may well eventually place the 
Combined Civil Affairs Committee in a position 
of a figurehead only with all real power in 
London. 36 

Reasons for Creating the London Committee 

[Min, 143d Mtg CCS, 28 Jan 44, G-3 files, ABC, 334, 
CCS Min (1-23-42), sec. 6] 

Admiral Leahy said that while not fully briefed 
on this matter he was naturally averse to any 
proposal which involved the establishment of yet 
another committee in the CCS organization. Per- 
sonally he was unable to see the necessity for the 
new committee as proposed. 

General Macready explained that the agree- 
ment as put forward by the Combined Civil Af- 
fairs Committee had been reached as a result 

30 In an OPD Memo for record, 19 January, it was 
pointed out that the Director of CAD had originally been 
opposed to a London subcommittee. The reason for CAD's 
later acquiescence is indicated by the same OPD Memo. 
A statement made by Colonel Marcus, Executive of CAD, 
to OPD is cited as follows: "He stated that the British 
have refused to take affirmative action in CCAC meetings 
which has resulted in complete frustration with nothing 
having been accomplished for months. He said that the 
London idea was the only remedy and if not accepted, 
the CCAC would cease to exist. . . ." G-3 files, ABC, 
or4 (11-27-42), sec. 2. 


of a special mission from London. There were, 
he thought, good reasons why a subcommittee 
of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee should 
be set up in London to deal with the many day 
to day minor matters on which the Supreme 
Commander would require advice. It was essen- 
tial to have a body closer to the scene of action, 
particularly since it was in London that the exile 
governments were situated, who would have to 
be consulted on many of the points which arose. 
The Supreme Commander himself could not deal 
within his own staff with all these problems. 
It was hoped that the new Committee would 
assist in arriving at rapid decisions on matters 
other than of major policy. 

General Hilldring explained that the subject 
had been under discussion for some three 
months. There had been in London an Ad- 
ministration of Territories Europe Committee 
(A.T.E.) which was a high level British com- 
mittee with one U.S. War Department repre- 
sentative. The present proposal was that this com- 
mittee should be abolished and that its place 
should be taken by a subcommittee of the Com- 
bined Civil Affairs Committee sitting in London 
and dealing with day to day civil affairs problems 
in Northwest Europe. In his opinion this ar- 
rangement would smooth out many difficulties 
and assist in the easy working of the machine. 
There had been a difference of opinion between 
the two governments as to where decisions on 
Northwest European civil affairs should be made. 
As a result of these differences of opinion, dur- 
ing the past three months no guidance had been 
given to the Supreme Commander on these vital 
problems. The setting up of the new committee 
under the terms set out in the Combined Civil 
Affairs proposal would, he felt sure, enable the 
Supreme Commander rapidly to be given the 
much needed directives to enable him to carry 
out his planning for civil affairs in Europe. 37 

CCAC Subcommittee Is Established in London 

[Rev par. 5 (CCAC/Liaison) of CCAC Charter (CCS 
190/10/D), 29 Jan 44, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2] 

A London Subcommittee of CCAC is hereby 
established (CCAC/L) as agency of the Com- 
bined Civil Affairs Committee. 

a. Functions 

(i) To give guidance and make recommen- 
dations within the framework of the directives 

"When the CCS accepted the British proposal for a 
London subcommittee, the British resumed full co-op- 
eration in CCAC. 

issued to the Supreme Allied Commanders 
Northwest European and Mediterranean Thea- 
ters by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with respect 
to the application of such directives to day-to- 
day problems or to detailed civil affairs planning 
which do not require reference to the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff. 

(ii) At the request of the Allied Supreme 
Commanders to resolve such civil affairs ques- 
tions arising within the Northwest European and 
Mediterranean Theaters as do not justify refer- 
ence to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but on 
which the Allied Supreme Commanders desire 

Note: Until adequate machinery is established 
in London, the matters relating to the Mediter- 
ranean Theater under (i) and (ii) above will 
continue to be resolved by the Combined Civil 
Affairs Committee as at present. 

(iii) To make recommendations to the 
Combined Civil Affairs Committee on civil af- 
fairs matters arising within the Northwest Euro- 
pean and Mediterranean Theaters which require 
decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

(iv) With reference to paragraph 6 of this 
Charter to receive from His Majesty's Govern- 
ments the civil affairs policy of His Majesty's 
Governments in regard to territory of the United 
Kingdom or the Dominions (if HMG in the 
Dominions desire to use this channel) which is 
to be recovered from the enemy and to com- 
municate such policy to the Combined Civil Af- 
fairs Committee for them to take note of and 
to transmit to the Combined or Joint Chiefs of 
Staff as may be appropriate. 

(v) Except as provided in subparagraph 
(iv) above, the CCAC/L will not consider civil 
affairs matters arising in the Pacific. 

b. Membership 

CCAC/L will consist of a war office chair- 
man and a representative from the War Office, 
the Foreign Office, the Treasury on the British 
side, and one representative of the U.S. Army, 
one of the U.S. Navy, two civilian members ap- 
pointed by the U.S. Individual persons and rep- 
resentatives of the department or agencies, both 
British and American, may be invited to attend 
as required. 

c. Exchange of Information 

The London Subcommittee will keep CCAC 
currently advised of the suggestions and recom- 
mendations made to SAC and will forward to 
them minutes of all meetings. There will be 
full exchange of information, and papers between 
CCAC and CCAC/L. * * » 


London Subcommittee Will Be Kept in Its 

[Msg, Hilldring to Lt Gen Walter Bedell Smith, Co£S, 
SHAEF, 7 Feb 44, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 3032] 

All of us here agree with you completely that 
SCAEF, unencumbered and uninhibited must 
have complete and absolute authority and re- 
sponsibility with respect to the operation of Civil 
Affairs. ... In recognition of this, both Mr. 
McCloy and I made it clear to Bovenschen when 
he was here that the usefulness and success — as 
a matter of fact, the very existence of the Sub- 
committee — would be dependent upon its ability 
to be of service to the Supreme Commander and 
to perform this advisory service without inter- 
ference with the Civil Affairs operations of 
SCAEF or without annoyance to the people in- 
volved in those operations. I am confident that 
he understands his position, although it may be 
that some bluntness on your part will as you say, 
be necessary to keep this point in focus, and if 
bluntness is necessary it should by all means, as 
you suggest, be applied. . . . This, however, in 
my opinion does not alter the desirability of 
making the people who render advice to SCAEF 
as members of the Subcommittee those individ- 

uals on your staff who are struggling each day 
with the problems that will be discussed in the 
Subcommittee. . . . 

The Washington-London Issue Continues Into 
Posthostilities Planning 

[Ltr, Hilldring to Brig Gen Julius C. Holmes, DACofS, 
G-5 SHAEF, 28 Jul 44, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, 
Jun-Jul 43] 

The British position appears to be that coordina- 
tion on supply matters should be in London. 38 
The State Department, the War Department and 
FEA are opposed to this, primarily because all 
of the combined supply machinery is centered in 
Washington and only confusion and duplication 
can result by transferring responsibility as to this 
phase of the supply business to any combined 
group in London at this time. It is impossible to 
predict when the deadlock will be broken, but 
our position is very clear and we propose to stand 
firm. * * * 

"The issue is now that of co-ordination of combined 
military agencies and combined civilian agencies in supply 
planning for the postmilitary period. This deadlock, like 
all that had gone before, was finally broken. ASF, ID, 
Hist of Civ Sup, I, 263. 



The Army Tries To Limit Its Commitments 

After more than two years of disputa- 
tion and negotiation — with civilian agen- 
cies, with the British, with nationalistically 
sensitive governments in exile, and even 
with hesitant groups in the Army — the 
jurisdictional claims of the military au- 
thorities in civil affairs had all been con- 
firmed. Although there are those who in- 
terpret all organizational history as a cease- 
less struggle for more power, the proba- 
bility is that the Army viewed its expanded 
jurisdiction in civil affairs with as much 
misgiving as gratification. Increase of re- 
sponsibility is wholly gratifying in a sphere 
of a primary interest, but not in that of a 
secondary interest which may draw too 
heavily upon resources needed for more 
important activities. Civil affairs was, un- 
doubtedly, of great importance to the 
Army, but relative to the tactical mission 
it was distinctly secondary. And commit- 
ments to civil affairs gave rise to misgiv- 
ings because the exhausting but thankless 
struggle with the wartime misery of gov- 
erned peoples — a struggle in which the 
accumulation of economic, political, and 
moral commitments could threaten the 
resources required for victory — was like 
some swamp from which a would-be res- 
cuer attempts to save another at the dis- 
tinct risk of becoming bogged down and 
lost himself. 

While without any thought of escaping 
the obligations imposed by international 
law, the Army had felt misgivings over 
the burdens of civil affairs from the begin- 
ning and had been, therefore, the more 

disposed to go along with the President's 
decision that in North Africa primary re- 
sponsibility would be given to civilian 
agencies. It had sought a greater role in 
civil affairs only when it became clear that 
this was necessary in the interest of mili- 
tary operations. The misgivings did not 
cease and were reflected in a care to limit 
the degree of control asked for. However, 
it was not until the Army's claims were 
on the way to general acceptance that cau- 
tion began to vie strongly with organiza- 
tional self-assertion. A close study of the 
trend toward self-limitation is useful not 
primarily because of the psychological in- 
terest of this trend and its refutation of the 
assumption that the Army's rise to control 
in civil affairs was due simply to a success- 
ful power impulse. What is of chief im- 
portance is that, before passing from the 
study of planning to that of operations, the 
reader carefully appraise the validity of the 
Army's advance estimate of its mission. 
Nothing is of greater moment in the prep- 
arations for civil affairs than a correct esti- 
mate of the commitment, and in the study 
of operational experience it will be helpful 
to consider whether the Army's precon- 
ceptions of the scope of its task were con- 
firmed or disproved. 

The documents of this chapter, though 
reflecting in a number of cases hitherto 
unconsidered administrative issues, have 
therefore been presented less for their 
pertinence to organizational history than 
for their bearing on the Army's belief that 
its commitment to civil affairs should and 


could be a limited one. Tifis belief was, as 
will appear, highly venturesome, but it was 
as much an article of faith in the period of 
preparations as the doctrine that the 
Army's role in civil affairs was a substan- 
tial one. While the desire for limitation of 
commitments was expressed in a great va- 
riety of issues, all of these can be subsumed 
under one or the other of two general prob- 
lems. The first involves the extent to which 
the Army could lessen its responsibility by 
partial delegation and ultimately complete 
transfer of civil affairs functions to civilian 
agencies or restored governments (in the 
special case of the Balkans by requiring 
the British to assume sole responsibility 
from the outset). The second involves the 
degree to which military governors, even 
during the period wherein they retained 
complete authority, could curtail their ad- 
ministrative burden by vesting functions 
or responsibilities in the governed peo- 
ple — whether by using local organs and 
officials or by leaving certain politico-eco- 
nomic objectives to local decision and 

In both these considerations dealing 
with the distribution of civil affairs func- 
tions there were, in theory, three alterna- 
tives: that the Army do as little as pos- 
sible, that it do as much as possible, and 
that it undertake something between the 
two extremes on the basis of some prin- 
ciple permitting compromise between 
burdensome responsibility and prudent 
self-interest. Though the emphasis proved 
to be upon limitation of commitment, yet 
the degree of limitation was median rather 
than minimal. The latter would have 
meant merely the acceptance of such re- 
sponsibility as was imposed by interna- 
tional law and as could not be performed 
by any other authority. The idea of mini- 
mal commitment was rejected when the 
military authorities opposed continuation 
of the arrangement for civil affairs control 
as practiced in French North Africa. To 

be sure, it was rejected primarily on the 
ground of military self-interest, that is, 
because civil affairs was found to be too 
closely related to military operations to be 
delegated during the active phase. On the 
same ground the Army rejected a maximal 
commitment, which would have entailed 
doing entirely with military resources the 
tasks called for by the most generous in- 
terpretation of the needs of the governed. 
The median commitment accepted was 
that of limiting the Army's task, in rela- 
tion both to that of other authorities and 
to that of the governed, by the principle 
that military control could no further ex- 
ceed the minimal commitment in civil 
affairs than was required by, or compatible 
with, the interests of the war effort. In 
accordance with this principle, responsi- 
bility was to be accepted only in areas 
where U.S. forces operated and for only as 
long as operationally necessary. It was to 
be mitigated by gradually introducing ci- 
vilian agencies within the military frame- 
work and was not to extend in any degree 
into posthostilities problems. On the same 
principle, the governed people were to be 
drawn upon (as far as was compatible 
with United Nations political and military 
interests) for organs of government and 
local officials, and they were to utilize their 
local resources to the utmost, aided only 
to the extent demanded by minimum sub- 
sistence needs. As regards issues of political 
rehabilitation they were to be guided 
rather through indication that the gates of 
salvation were open to them than by ardu- 
ous effort to prevent them from going 
toward damnation if unfortunately they 
so chose. 

As recorded complaints evidence, cer- 
tain civilians felt that these limitations on 
military responsibility for civil affairs 
placed an undue burden upon nonmilitary 
agencies which had fewer resources than 
the Army for carrying it. Some of the critics 
who at an earlier stage had blamed the 


Army for aiming at too much in civil 
affairs now blamed it for attempting too 
little. Whereas the first trend was attrib- 
uted to overambition, the second was per- 
haps ascribed less to lack of ambition than 
to lack of charitable impulse. The state- 
ments of some Army authorities do seem 
rather considerably less than paternalistic, 
but they are not statements of personal 
philosophy and inclination. They are 
merely statements of the implications of a 
national directive, which, as one of the 
civil affairs authorities observed, had not 
established the Army as a welfare organi- 
zation. While the enunciations of the 
United Nations and national war aims had 
been of vaguely generous tone, no change 
had been made in the Army's mission to 
warrant the assumption that it could com- 
mit the Nation's or its own resources be- 
yond the extent demanded by interna- 
tional law and military expediency. If, for 
example, food was to be supplied to gov- 
erned peoples beyond the amount neces- 
sary to prevent disease and unrest, the 
Army had to assume that this supplement 
would be the responsibility of the civilian 
agencies, either during or after the period 
of military responsibility. The best the 
Army could do would be to end this 
period as soon as possible ; civilian agencies 
could then see what luck they would have 
in obtaining Congressional appropriations 
to finance more lavish programs. 

An erroneous assumption could, indeed, 
be said to underlie most of the Army's ef- 
forts to limit its commitments. But that the 
assumption was an error became apparent 
only after it had been tested by operational 
experience. Planners propose, unforeseen 
events dispose, and, if the history of Allied 
experiences in military government shows 
any one thing more clearly than another, 
it is that military commitments could only 
to a relatively slight degree be limited to 
the extent that the planners considered de- 
sirable. The Army had, indeed, interpreted 

its responsibilities more broadly than tra- 
dition required, and it had foreseen the 
difficulty of these responsibilities more 
clearly than did the civilians who had been 
inclined to apply peacetime standards to 
the civil problems of war. But even so the 
Army erred rather greatly on the side of 
underestimation. It did not foresee that in 
all major areas it would be compelled to 
carry the burden till virtually the conclu- 
sion of hostilities, that civilian agencies 
would be able to share the operative bur- 
den only in relatively small measure, that 
restored governments would cause compli- 
cations largely offsetting their assistance, 
that the Army would be compelled to 
manage civilian relief in nonoperational as 
as well as operational areas (even in Greece 
where Americans were caught in the cross- 
fire of contending political factions), and 
that for years after the conclusion of active 
hostilities military governors would be un- 
able to extricate themselves from Ger- 
many, Austria, Japan, and Korea. The 
Army also did not envisage that both lib- 
erated and enemy peoples would be found 
with capacity for self-help largely de- 
pleted, that the system of indirect control 
would require a supervision almost as ar- 
duous as actually doing the job, and that 
the policies toward the governed would 
have to be fashioned on lines deviating 
from every traditional principle of limita- 
tion — on prodigality rather than economy 
of effort, on economic standards closer to 
rehabilitation than to mere relief, and on 
political principles nearer to radical reform 
than to conservative noninterference. At 
first thought this misapprehension of the 
task that lay ahead may seem to represent 
only an overoptimistic estimate of the 
amount of help the Army expected from 
others. But since it was the enormity of the 
problems which restricted the aid that 
others could extend, the miscalculations 
reflect fundamentally an underestimation 
of the difficulty and scope of the civil af- 

14 r 

fairs mission under the unprecedented 
conditions of World War II, and of the 
impact which every phase of the mission 
would make upon military interest. 

In turning to the history of military gov- 
ernment in Italy, the first and in many 
ways the most surprising of the major 
country operations, the reader, with the 
advantage of hindsight, should try to adopt 
a fair and objective point of view. This 
demands, first, that where the civil affairs 
task appears to have exceeded the planning 
estimates, that he ask whether the under- 
estimation was not simply due to the un- 
avoidable lack of foreknowledge that in 
this war civil affairs would advance for the 
first time from the periphery toward the 
very center of war problems. Fairness de- 
mands also that one place less emphasis 
upon whether the initial estimate was cor- 
rect than upon the question whether the 
military governors were sufficiently flex- 
ible and prompt in adapting their policies 
to unexpected conditions. In favor of their 
capacity for adequate revision were a num- 
ber of factors. First, civil affairs authorities 
were practitioners of the art of war and 
were accustomed to the unpredictability of 

events because war is the most unpredic- 
table of all human experiences, the great 
undoer of the best-laid plans. Second, their 
major plans were more or less tentative, 
and even during the period of preparations 
they had changed these plans as need de- 
manded. Third, they had approached their 
task in a spirit conducive to a sympathetic 
re-examination of human needs; for civil 
affairs was to be regarded, in the words of 
General Marshall in announcing to the 
Director of CAD his appointment, as "the 
most sacred trust of the American peo- 
ple." 1 This did not require that the attempt 
to limit the Army's commitments should 
ever cease — once it did there would be 
danger that victory, the prerequisite of all 
lasting benefits, might itself be imperiled. 
But both humanity and self-interest re- 
quired keeping in mind that the degree to 
which commitments could be limited de- 
pended not only upon the foresight of 
planners but also upon unpredictable for- 
tunes of war, which might dictate extend- 
ing the efforts of governors in behalf of 
the governed in the interest of both. 

1 Interv, Weinberg with Hilldring, Oct. 50. 


CAD Chief Believes Military Government 
Will Succeed Only if Civilian Agencies Take 
Over as Soon as Situation Permits 

[Min, Mtg in CAD, 5 Jun 43, CAD files, 337, CAD (4- 
14-43) (1)] 

General Hilldring . . . explained the necessity 
to tie in closely with those civilian agencies in 
Washington which are concerned with military 
government matters. He stated that military 
government will be a success only if it is recog- 
nized that these civilian agencies will move into 
the liberated areas and take over civil affairs 
functions from the Armed Services as soon as 
the military situation permits. . . . 

Civilian Official Feels Army Leaders Are 
Not Seeking To Retain Jurisdiction 

[Memo, Appleby, Dir, OFT, Dept of State (Undated) 
apparently in Jun 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library] 

I am assuming that it is understood that military 
administration is less desirable than civil ad- 
ministration as soon as civil administration is 
possible. The War Department as a Department 
has seemed rather clearly to lean to this view, 
and several actions of the President have indi- 
cated that it is his view. The War Department 
as a whole has taken a rather broad, imaginative 
view not limited by conventionally military 
thinking. This surely is true of Mr. McCloy, 


General Marshall and General Eisenhower. But 
there has never been any actual determination 
of the general policy I am assuming. And of 
course "as soon as possible" is a very vague policy. 
There can hardly be a hard-and-fast, single, gen- 
eral policy. The very first responsibility must 
be with the military authorities. The transition 
must be gradual, even if it can in places be rapid, 
and the military will have to retain a certain 
authority for a long time, perhaps until the end 
of the war, perhaps until general political ar- 
rangements for government in the respective 
areas are completed. But the military, except pos- 
sibly for one school of thinking, will wish to 
simplify its responsibility as much and as soon 
as possible, and governmental heads will wish 
this to be the case for general, political reasons. 
The military will need to be satisfied that civilian 
governmental arrangements are adequate. The 
government similarly will need to be satis- 
fied. . . . 

General Hilldring Careful To Avoid Sus- 
picions of Army Ambitiousness 

[Min, 9th Mtg OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 23 Jul 43, 
CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43)] 

VII. . . . 

2. . . . General Hilldring . . . reported that 
Anglo-American military authorities were close 
to agreement on all supply matters except the 
length of the period of military responsibility for 
supply. He suggested that this was essentially 
a civilian matter and that CAD had been un- 
willing to agree to the British proposal for a six 
months period of military responsibility for sup- 
plies for fear that civilians would think that CAD 
was seeking to extend its control longer than 
necessary. . . . 

Speed Transition to Civilian Agency Respon- 
sibility for Civilian Supply 

[Draft of WD Responsibilities, submitted by McCloy to 
Asst Chief, Div of Admin Mgt, Bur of Budget, 11 Feb 
44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 4] 

That the military should not retain the job of 
supplying relief and dealing with civil affairs any 
longer than necessary is a thoroughly established 
policy of the Government. In this connection a 
policy statement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
reads in part as follows: "The Administration of 
civil affairs should be delegated to appropriate 
civilian departments and agencies just as soon as 
the military situation permits. This may be ac- 
complished gradually, even though the area is 
still the subject of military control. The decision 

as to when and to what extent civilian depart- 
ments and agencies will assist the military in 
the administration of civil affairs will be deter- 
mined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, upon 
recommendation of the military commander in 
the area. Generally, responsibility for the han- 
dling of civil affairs should be relinquished by 
the military as quickly as this can be accomplished 
without interference with the military purposes 
of the occupation." 1 

Transition from military to civilian control. 
While the Army is assuming for procurement 
planning purposes that it will be responsible for 
civilian supply for a period of six months, the 
duration of military responsibility may be for a 
longer or shorter time depending upon a num- 
ber of unpredictable factors. The military may 
find themselves forced to continue dispensing re- 
lief and handling civil affairs for an undesirably 
long time unless certain steps are taken in advance 
to pave the way for a shift of this responsibility to 
civilians. The following points suggest ways for 
speeding the transition. 

1. There must be a high degree of consist- 
ency between what the Army plans to do in relief 
and rehabilitation and actions which civilian 
agencies plan to take. This requires that the 
military keep the civilian agencies as completely 
advised as possible with respect to the conduct of 
its relief activities during the military period. 
Although retaining full responsibility during the 
initial phase, the Army has expressed its desire to 
receive the advice of civilians on civil affairs. . . . 

2. In order to assist the military in discharg- 
ing its responsibilities and in order to enable the 
civilian agencies to discharge their responsibilities, 
the civilian agencies have detailed certain repre- 
sentatives to work with the War Department. 
This arrangement should be continued. 

3. An identity of field personnel between the 
armed services an l operating civilian agencies in 
the final stages of military responsibility might 
be an important element in easing the shift of 
responsibility. The Army might permit a few 
of its own civil affairs officers to withdraw from 
active duty but remain in the field as employees 
of the appropriate civilian agency. (The persons 
who would be transferred in this manner could 
be selected in advance.) . . . 

1 The British considered civilian agency participation 
unwise at this time (see above, | Chapter IV, Section s| . 
McCloy felt that it would be wise to introduce into cer- 
tain areas individual civilians who could work with 
soldiers and gradually replace them as the occasion war- 
ranted. Ltr to Hopkins, 30 Sep 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC 


War Department Will Not Become En- 
tangled in Posthostilities Planning 

[Ltr, SW Patterson to Secy of State, 8 Aug 44, CAD files, 
014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 7] 

I have your letter of July 31, 1944 advising of the 
formation of a Liberated Areas Committee and a 
Combined Liberated Areas Committee, wherein 
there may be resolved respectively the views of 
the United States agencies and the combined 
views of the United States and United Kingdom 
agencies regarding policies for liberated areas 
during the post-military period. . . . 

I am very glad to designate Major General J. H. 
Hilldring, Director, Civil Affairs Division, War 
Department, as the War Department member of 
the Liberated Areas Committee. . . . 

I . . . desire that the War Department mem- 
bership on the Liberated Areas Committee be 

limited as to time to the military period of re- 
sponsibility for civil affairs, and as to competence 
to furnishing to the committee appropriate in- 
formation as to military plans and programs, and 
to receiving advice and suggestions with respect 

I do not believe it would be wise for the War 
Department to accept a membership upon the 
Combined Liberated Areas Committee. Primarily 
the function of the Combined Liberated Areas 
Committee will be to resolve policy views of His 
Majesty's Government and the Government cf 
the United States in order to achieve a combined 
policy with respect to liberated areas after the 
military period. . . . The resolution of the views 
of the two Governments with respect to policies 
after military responsibility has ended should, in 
my opinion, be accomplished through civilian 
channels. . . . 


Basic Policies of Military Government 

[Memo, Wickersham, Comdt, SMG, for PMG, 17 Jun 
42, PMG files, 321.19, MG] 

8. The points of major policy inherent in the 
total [military government] program may be 
summarized as follows: 2 

a. Military. Military government is essentially 
an army responsibility, except for political and 
certain long range economic features. 

b. Political. The political policy of military 
government cannot be determined by the mili- 
tary command. It is inherently the function of 
the State Department. 

c. Economic. Military necessity can control 
the economic policy of a military government 
only while such necessity exists. The long view 
economic policy will presumably be directed 
either by the State Department or the Board of 
Economic Warfare, or some other governmental 
agency. . . . 

War Department Interested in Economic 
Policy Only if It Directly Affects the 
Military Situation 

[Memo, Miller, Dir, MGD, PMG, 29 Jan 43, ASF, ID 
files, 014 Civ Sup, N. Africa, vol. II] 

The question involved is the determination of 
an economic policy, namely, the price to be paid 

° For Synopsis of War Department Program for Mili- 
tary Government see above, |Chapter I, Section 3TI 

in French North and West Africa for commodi- 
ties purchased by the U.S. or the U.K., the pre- 
cise question being whether world prices are to 
be paid or existing price levels maintained. 

The announced policy of the War Department 
is that the function of the Army in any occupa- 
tion is primarily an administrative one and that 
the determination of economic policy is basically 
a matter for civilian agencies of the government. 
This policy is subject only to the limitation that, 
if such economic policy shall have any direct im- 
pact upon the military situation, the Army re- 
serves the right to object. 

At the present stage of the discussion evidenced 
by the attachment, it does not appear that a 
determination of the question will have any im- 
mediate repercussion on the military situation. 
Consequently, at this time, this office feels that 
it has no interest in the form of the reply to be 
dispatched to the British representative. 

Eisenhower Knows Limits of His Authority 

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 22 Jul 43, CAD Msg 
files, CM-IN 15765] 

Upon my return from the forward areas, I was 
astonished to find a telegram from the President 
stating that he had received a report to the effect 
that I was preparing on my own authority to 
give some form of recognition to the French 
Committee. . . . No such thought has ever en- 


tered my head. While I feel, along with my 
political assistants, that some kind of limited rec- 
ognition of the collective body would be helpful 
here [French North Africa], I have strictly con- 
fined my actions in the case to recommendations 
through proper channels. I am quite well aware 
of the exclusive authority of the President in such 
matters, and I am sometimes disturbed that any 
rumor of such a kind can gain such force or at- 
mosphere of validity as to create an impression 
that I would step out of my own proper sphere 
to this extent, or could impel, as in this case, the 
President himself to send me orders on the sub- 
ject. I am completely ignorant as to how such a 
rumor could have started. I hope that at an 
appropriate time you can make it clear to the 
President that I have never entertained such a 
thought for a moment. 

1943 Manual Enjoins Hands-Off Attitude 
Toward Politics of Occupied Areas 

[U.S. Army-Navy Manual of MG and CA, 22 Dec 43] 

[Sec. 9] (7) Neither local political personalities 
nor organized political groups, however sound 
in sentiment, should have any part in determin- 
ing the policies of the military government. Civil 
affairs officers should avoid any commitments to, 
or negotiations with, any local political elements 
except by directions from higher authority. . . . 

War Department Accepts State Depart- 
ment's Civilian Supply Policies 

[Ltr, Stimson to Hull, 29 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ 

I have read with much interest your letter dated 
1 January in which you express the views of the 
State Department on some of the policy questions 
having to do with the furnishing of civilian sup- 
plies for areas to be liberated from Axis domi- 
nation. Since the State Department is the agency 
of the administrative branch of our Government 
whose function it is to determine, subject to the 
authority of the President, the policy of our 
Government in our dealings with other govern- 
ments or peoples, it necessarily follows that the 
State Department should formulate the policy 
of our Government as to the furnishing of sup- 
plies to the liberated areas. Accordingly, the 
views which you shall express from time to time 
relative to providing civilian supplies will be 
accepted by the War Department as the official 
statement of policy of the administrative branch 
of the Government on this subject. 3 * * * 

Unfortunately It Is Difficult To Draw the 

[Msg, CCS to Gen Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, SAC 
[Supreme Allied Command], MTO [Mediterranean The- 
ater of Operations], 14 Jul 44, FAN 379] 

. . . It is difficult to draw the line between Mili- 
tary and Political subjects. . . . 

3 See helow. rS"e"ction 6. I Ltr. Stimson to Hull, 29 Jan 44. 


Ideal Type of Military Government 

[Prospectus of SMG, March 1942, PMGO files, 352.01 
SMG Establishment] 

The ideal type of military government is one 
which, coming into being amid the utter chaos 
of a civilian population whose armed forces have 
just been subjected to military defeat, can restore 
order and stability with dispatch and at the same 
time integrate the local institutions and psychol- 
ogy of the occupied area and the superimposed 
military authority with a minimum of change in 
the former and a maximum of control by the 
latter. . . . 

OSS Criticizes Principle of Retaining the 
Status Quo 

[Memo for Info No. 56, OSS on MG, pp. 5-8 of app. to 
Memo, Donovan, Dir, OSS, to Deane, Secy, JCS, 12 Apr 
43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-42), sec. 1] 

. . . Both [the Army and the Navy Manuals of 
military government] maintain that in the civil 
government of occupied territory the law en- 
forced at the time of occupation should as far as 
possible be applied, and the civil administration 
in office at the time of occupation, as far as pos- 
sible retained. No provision is made for a situa- 
tion in which the legal status quo would be re- 


pugnant to the conquerors or the administrative 
personnel unacceptable. * * * 

It is . . . quite certain that any planning for 
military government, based on the assumption 
that the legal status quo in the territory occupied 
should be supported and the existing local per- 
sonnel utilized, is on dangerously weak founda- 
tions. It will not always be easy to define the legal 
status quo and it may be highly undesirable to 
support it when it is defined. Shall we, for exam- 
ple, wish to give military sanction to the legal 
status quo in Nazi Germany, which has ridden 
rough shod over private property rights and over 
civil and religious freedom? Shall we want to 
endorse the Nazi educational system? Even in 
countries not obviously hostile which are recov- 
ered from Nazi domination, the problem of the 
legal status quo will be hardly less difficult. In 
France, for example, shall we accept and enforce 
laws imposed under Nazi domination — anti- 
Semitic laws, for example? Analogous questions 
will arise in other countries, some very difficult 
questions in confused areas like Alsace and Lor- 
raine. They will "have to be answered by the 
military governor with the uncomfortable feeling 
that the answer he gives, will itself establish a 
status quo which will tend to perpetuate itself 
and profoundly influence the pattern of ultimate 

The same thing is true with reference to the 
utilization of the local personnel. In Germany 
we shall hardly dare to maintain the Nazi ad- 
ministration. In France we shall have to select 
between conflicting factions. How shall we dis- 
tinguish between friends and seeming friends? 
Where shall we find the administrative person- 
nel to run the country? These are not the kinds 
of problems which can be solved out of military 
government books. The areas likely to be oc- 
cupied must be studied intensively, the local per- 
sonnel must be checked, the realities of the 
status quo as distinguished from the textbook 
version of it must be carefully appraised. . . . 

1943 Manual Restates Principle of Non- 

[Army-Navy Manual of MG and CA, 22 Dec 43] 

[Sec. 9] h. . . . Retention of Existing Laws, 
Customs, and Political Subdivisions. Local offi- 
cials and inhabitants of an occupied territory are 
familiar with its laws, customs, and institutions. 
To avoid confusion and to promote simplicity of 

administration, it is advisable that local laws, 
customs, and institutions of government be re- 
tained, except where they conflict with the aims 
of military government or are inimical to its best 
interests. 4 In general, it is unwise to impose upon 
occupied territory the laws and customs of an- 
other people. Any attempted changes or reforms 
contrary to local custom may result in develop- 
ment of active or passive resistance and thereby 
handicap the operation of military government. 
For similar reasons it is advisable, if possible, to 
retain existing territorial divisions and sub- 
divisions. Laws and customs in one political di- 
vision of a country may differ widely from those 
in another and the inhabitants therefore may be 
accustomed to the decentralization of govern- 
mental authority which usually parallels such 
divisions. . . . 

Manual Calls for Maximum Retention of 
Subordinate Local Officials 

[Army-Navy Manual of MG and CA, 22 Dec 43] 

[Sec. 9i] (4)' So far as practicable, subordinate 
officials and employees of the local government 
should be retained in their offices and made re- 
sponsible for the proper discharge of their duties, 
subject to the direction and supervision of civil 
affairs personnel. . . 

4 The difficulty in departing from noninterference as 
the general rule was not merely one of administrative ex- 
pediency, as indicated in the Manual. It also reflected the 
fact that the international law of belligerent occupation, 
as stated in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, still 
incorporated the doctrine of noninterference. This doctrine 
was no longer adhered to in the expressed political aims 
of the United Nations, but international law as inter- 
preted by conservative jurists had not kept pace with the 
recent changes in ideology and practice. However, the 
Civil Affairs Division did transmit both to Charlottesville 
and the theaters CA Guides, prepared by General Dono- 
van's organization (see above), which suggested a pro- 
gram of defascistization and de-Nazification derived from 
U.S. and U.N. political aims. 

5 This is preceded by paragraphs providing for the dis- 
continuance or suspension of offices unnecessary or detri- 
mental to military government, the suspension of 
legislative bodies, and the removal, in most cases, of high 
ranking political officials. 

° As will be seen in ensuing documents, military lead- 
ers were keenly intent upon minimizing responsibility 
and personnel commitment. In the case of France, polit- 
ical policy led the President to be reluctant to commit 
himself to the FCNL, while the Army urged the neces- 
sity of some arrangement which would permit the civil 
affairs burden to be entrusted primarily to the French. 
For details on civil administration in the countries of 
northwest Europe and southern France, see below, Parts 
Three and [Four] 



Major Responsibility May Be Delegated to 
the Indigenous Government 

[Statement on Liberated Areas, approved by Roosevelt 
and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill at Quebec 
Conf, 22 Aug 43, in Notes on Conf With Hull, CofS 
files, 337, Confs] 

(i) The Governments of the United States and 
the United Kingdom, necessarily by reason of 
their military operations in enemy territory, must 
assume the major responsibility for the adminis- 
tration of enemy territories by their forces in 
pursuance of the war against the Axis. 

(2) a. The Governments of the United States 
and the United Kingdom, while continuing to 
exercise supreme military authority in liberated 
areas pending the defeat of the enemy, will be 
agreeable to the policy of each government and 
constituted authorities of the United Nations in 
their respective liberated countries proceeding 
with its function of maintaining law and order 
with such assistance by the Allied authorities as 
may be necessary, subject always to military 

b. Conversations and arrangements with the 
governments of those countries have already 
been in progress for some time on these aspects 
of the mutual interests involved. . . . 

Director of Civil Affairs Should Be a French 

[Msg, Hilldring to CG, ETO, 11 Oct 43. SHAEF G-5, 
10.02, ETOUSA/CA Sec) 

Civil Affairs directive on France in final draft 
approved by the U.S. and the U.K. reads as 

The Director of Civil Affairs must be a French 
officer appointed by the Supreme Allied Com- 
mander from the French contingent or the 
French Liaison Mission connected with the Mili- 
tary Operations in France. 

. . . Strong feeling here is that as long as final 
authority reposes in Supreme Commander, Chief 
Civil Affairs Officer should be French. Any ar- 
rangement which does not give leadership to 
French would unnecessarily initiate and perhaps 
even provoke French to troublesome counter- 
activity before and after landing. From purely 
military point of view we feel such a gesture 

might help rather than hinder our operations 
and their connection with resistance move- 
ment. . . . 

Police Burdens To Be Entrusted as Far as 
Possible to Indigenous Forces 

[Memo, ACofS, G—3, to Theater Comdrs, 14 Oct 43, 
WDCSA files, 014, 1943] 

b. ... It is not the present intention of the 
War Department to provide occupational Mil- 
itary Police battalions for use in United Nations 
countries such as France, liberated as a result of 
military operations. No provision is being made 
for occupational police battalions in Italy, as it 
is expected that the carabinieri and Italian Army 
will be found satisfactory for local security pur- 
poses. . . . 

Distribution of Relief Supplies To Be Left to 
Indigenous Authorities 

[Min, Mtg held in McCloy's Office, 14 Jan 44, ASF, ID, 
Hist of CivSup,DS-i7i] 

General Clay stated as the U.S. position, that . . . 
it was necessary to separate the supplies into those 
which were to be made available as relief and 
those which were to be sold for cash. As to the 
former, supervision within the area would be re- 
quired to make certain that U.S. assets were not 
exploited. Less supervision would be required in 
the event that goods were sold for cash, since the 
principal U.S. interest would be to make certain 
that items in short supply in the U.S. were not 
exploited. Except for distribution in combat 
zones, it is the War Department intention to make 
deliveries at ports and to leave internal distribu- 
tion within liberated countries to the indigenous 
authorities, subject to the above supervision. . . . 

The Civil Affairs Agreement With Norway 
Delegates Primary Administrative Responsi- 
bility to the Indigenous Government 

[Agreement between CG, ETOUSA, and the Norwegian 
Govt, 29 Jan 44, CAD files, 014, Nor way (5-13-43) (1). 
For Norwegian Agreement see below, Chapter XXII, Sec- 
tion 1.] 

2. As soon as, and to such extent as, in the opin- 
ion of the Commander in Chief, the military situ- 


ation permits, the Norwegian Government will 
be notified in order that they may resume the 
exercise of responsibility for the civil administra- 
tion, subject to such special arrangements as may 
be required in areas of vital importance to the 
Allied forces, . . . 

Deference to Belgian Government in Con- 
duct of Civil Affairs 

[Min, Mtg at Norfolk House, n May 44, to Discuss Liai- 
son With SHAEF, SGS files, 014.1, Belgium, vol. I] 

2. [Lt.] General [Sir A.E.] Grasett [ACofS, 
G-5, SHAEF] wished to make it clear that, dur- 
ing the early stages of operations in Belgium, the 
country would be under military control which 
was quite a different thing from military govern- 
ment. The agreement between the Belgian and 
U.S. and British Governments had been drawn 
up and this would be the basis for SHAEF policy 
in Belgium. General Eisenhower was most 
anxious that during the period of operations the 
Belgian wishes should be met in every way pos- 
sible. It was General Eisenhower's intention to 
hand over the control of Belgium to the Belgian 
Government at the earliest possible moment. For 
this purpose he was desirous of having the best 
possible advice and he therefore hoped that the 
Belgian Government would send him a combined 
mission. That would be the prime object of the 
Belgian Liaison Mission accredited to General 
Eisenhower. . . . He wished to stress that dur- 
ing that period of military control, Supreme 
Headquarters would work through the Belgian 
local authorities. . . . 

Civil Affairs in Southern France Will Nor- 
mally Be Controlled by French 

[Incl "A" to Interim Directive (France), SHAEF to SAC, 
MTO, on CA in Southern Fr, CCAC 54/2, 14 May 44,' 
CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 1] 

r. . . . Except as military necessity may other- 
wise dictate, you will conform to the guides 
herein set forth either under Anvil conditions or 
under any Rankin conditions which may 

2. Within boundaries established by this 
Headquarters (HQ), you will have, de facto, 
supreme responsibility and authority at all times 
and in all areas to the full extent necessitated by 
the military situation. However, Military Govern- 
ment will not be established in liberated France. 
Civil administration in all areas will normally be 
controlled by the French themselves. In order to 
secure uniform civil administration SCAEF 
[Supreme, Commander, Allied Expeditionary 
Forces] will utilize the leadership of French au- 
thorities (other than Vichy) in national admin- 
istration and will maintain communications with 
you regarding policy and decisions in such mat- 
ters. If initial recourse to French authorities fails, 
such executive action as the security of the forces 
or the success of the military operations may re- 
quire is authorized. . . . 

10. a. Initial recourse shall be had to French 
Authorities for necessary legislative enactments 
and for the punishment of civilians committing 
offenses of concern to the Allied Forces. It is not, 
therefore, contemplated that any Proclamations, 
Ordinances or other enactments (except the in- 
tial Proclamation establishing your powers as in 
paragraph 2 above) wil be issued, or that mili- 
tary courts will be established. . . . 

7 The directive was issued on the basis of responsibility 
placed on SHAEF by the CCS for the co-ordination of 
all planning for operati ons to take place in southern 
France. See |Part Three.| 


U.S. Participation in Military Government 
Only Where U.S. Military Operations Take 

[Determination of War Department Responsibility for 
Military Government in the Balkans, 15 Sep 43, CAD files, 
014, Balkans (9-15-43) (1)] 

2. The future status of command responsibility 
in the Balkans has not yet been clearly established 
by CCS directive. It has been accepted as a matter 

of policy by CCAC that the military government 
of an area shall conform to the character of the 
military operation, i.e., unless U.S. armed forces 
participate, the military government in the areas 
occupied will not be a U.S. responsibility. . . . 

5. It is recommended ( 1) that, unless and until 
it is planned that U.S. ground forces will be used 
in an invasion and/or occupation of the Balkans, 
the CCAC and the War Department be relieved 
of responsibility for the establishment and ad- 


ministration of military government, including 
civilian supply, in the areas. (2) That the repre- 
sentatives of the British Chiefs of Staff be advised 
that (1) above is no way to be considered as any 
limitation of the U.S. State Department's interest 
or operation in the area or of any restriction upon 
existing mission of the U.S. forces in the Middle 
East. (3) That this policy be referred to the CCS 
for aproval of the above recommendations. . . . 

Proposal for Use of American Troops 
Is Disapproved 

[Paraphrase o£ Msg, Maj Gen Ralph Royce, CG, U.S. 
Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME), to CofS, 
14 Oct 43, incorporating recommendations of State Dept 
representative, OPD files, 014. 1, sec. II-A] 

The Theater Commander should be authorized 
to employ troops in occupation of these territories 
where maintenance of law and order is necessary, 
and that such occupation, which is not the use of 
troops for warfare, be co-ordinated with British 
C-in-C. Otherwise American civilians partici- 
pating in relief work will be either powerless to 
accomplish political and economic results de- 
sired by U.S., or will be entirely dependent upon 
British forces whose policies may not be entirely 
in consonance with ours. Therefore responsibility 
will be assumed on the civil side, which in ab- 
sence of military support when circumstances 
demand, will be impossible of accomplish- 
ment. . . . 

[Msg, JCS to CG, USAFIME, 26 Oct 43, CAD Msg files, 
CM-OUT 1 1 821] 

... It is contrary to Joint Chiefs of Staff inten- 
tion to divert troops from military operations for 
the purpose of supporting the administration of 
civilian relief. . . . 

War Department Disinclined To Procure Re- 
lief Supplies for Balkans if not the Scene of 
U.S. Military Operations 

[Min, Mtg held in McCloy's office, 14 Jan 44, ASF, ID, 
Hist of Civ Sup, DS-171] 

The U.S. position was set forth by General Clay 
who stated that the War Department was assum- 
ing the same procedures as to requirements and 
procurement as in other areas. He stated that if 
there was an approved military operation, sup- 
plies would be provided. If there was no approved 
operation, the War Department would be guided 
by the advice of the State Department which was 
being sought. . . . 
Sir Frederick [Bovenschen] stated that the 

British Government contemplated the use of ci- 
vilian relief agencies in the distribution of relief 
in the Balkans. He added that he did not consider 
that UNRRA would be in a position to assume 
this responsibility in the event of a collapse. 

Mr. Acheson, on behalf of the State Depart- 
ment, expressed his firm opposition to this pro- 
posal on the grounds that if relief was not to be 
handled by the military, it should be handled 
through UNRRA, which was established for the 
purpose of providing relief to those countries 
which were not in a position to pay for their sup- 
plies. He stated that he thought the Balkans 
presented an excellent example of an area where 
UNRRA was prepared to and should perform 
the type of function which it was organized to 
discharge and that it would be most unwise to use 
any other civil relief agencies. General Clay con- 
curred in this view and added that the War De- 
partment would be averse to a program to procure 
and ship supplies to be distributed by civilian 
relief agencies in the Balkans. 8 

No American Troops but Civil Affairs Offi- 
cers if State Department Insists 

[Memo, McCloy for Roosevelt, 31 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist 
of Civ Sup, DS-190] 

It appears to have been decided that if and when 
military operations are conducted in Greece and 
Yugoslavia they will be under the combined com- 
mand in the Mediterranean [AFHQ] but that 
American troops will not participate in opera- 
tions, at least it is most doubtful if Americans 
will participate. A decision is necessary as to 
whether these Civil Affairs officers supervising 
distribution of supplies under the Commander 
in the field should be solely British or whether 
they should be, as in other theaters, a combined 
group. Presumably the ultimate decision rests 
with the Theater Commander. It is understood 
that he would be agreeable to a combined Civil 
Affairs group if the American Government 
would consent. 

The question is then whether in matters of civil 
relief for these liberated areas pending the in- 
troduction of non-military relief organizations, 
the American Zone should provide their share 
of civil affairs officers and men in combination 
with the British for the distribution in these areas 
of civilian supplies covering the military period. 

8 The British favored turning over the distribution of 
relief supplies in the Balkans to the Middle East Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration, a British civilian 
agency. The State Department considered that political 
influences would be less likely to enter into civilian relief 
if it were entrusted to UNRRA. 


The State Department recommends that such 
consent be given. The War Department takes 
the position that this is a matter of national policy 
rather than a military question but will prepare 
itself to follow whatever decision is made. Pro- 
curement, it is planned, will be on a combined 
basis. 9 

U.S. Army Will Participate Only in Relief 
and Rehabilitation 

[Msg, CAD to CG, NATOUSA, 17 Mar 44, CAD files, 
014, Balkans (9-15-43) (1), CM-OUT 7582] 

U.S. Policies Governing U.S. Army Participa- 
tion [in Balkans]. . . . 

A. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, through the 
Combined Civil Affairs Committee, will deter- 
mine requirements and allocate procurement re- 
sponsibility as between U.S. and U.K. Relief 
supplies will be shipped to Balkan ports as mili- 
tary supplies. 10 

B. UNRRA has been selected by the U.S.-U.K. 
as the agency of the U.S.-U.K. military authori- 
ties in the Balkans to administer relief and re- 
habilitation operations, i.e., relief services such 

"The State Department by this time had recommended 
that U.S. military forces be permitted to participate with 
the British in a combined operation limited, on the Amer- 
ican side, merely to the distribution of relief supplies. 
Since in any case the British would be distributing Ameri- 
can Lend -Lease supplies, it appeared to the State Depart- 
ment better that the United States have a hand in 
controlling policies of civilian relief by contributing civil 
affairs officers. On 31 January, the date of Mr. McCloy's 
memorandum, the President approved the State Depart- 
ment's recommendation that U.S. civil affairs officers 
participate in combined relief activities in the Balkans. 

10 At the meeting of CCAC on 27 February, Mr. McCloy 
stated that it had been decided on the highest United 
States level that both the procurement and the distribu- 
tion of relief supplies in the Balkans should be on a 
combined basis. The views of the War Department and 
the Joint Chiefs were thus overruled by political authori- 
ties. However, the Army succeeded in keeping American 
personnel participation at a minimum. 

as public health, welfare, sanitation; distribu- 
tion of relief supplies; rehabilitation of public 
utilities, agriculture, industry, and transport as 
are essential to relief; assistance to displaced per- 
sons and refugees, and related matters to relief. 

C. U.S. Army participation in the distribu- 
tion of relief supplies will be limited to approxi- 
mately 25 officers, and no enlisted men. 

D. The detailed planning of estimates will 
be carried on in the theater by the U.S.-U.K. 
military authorities, who will submit these esti- 
mates for consideration to the CCAC. 

The U.S. officers, on a 50-50 U.S.-U.K. basis, 
should be placed in such top level positions as to 
make the top direction truly combined insofar 
as relief and rehabilitation operations, and dis- 
tribution of relief supplies are concerned. 

The U.S. Army will not participate in the ad- 
ministration of civil affairs except insofar as 
relief and rehabilitation operations are con- 
cerned. * * * 

No U.S. Participation in a Committee Con- 
cerned Largely With Purely British 

[Msg, Hilldring to CG, liSAFIME, 21 May 44, CAD 
Msg files, CM-OUT 40485] 

. . . State Department has advised the War De- 
partment of formation of Balkan Affairs Com- 
mittee with relief and operations subcommittee. 
Terms of reference indicate this to be largely a 
British Committee having spheres of activity be- 
yond the present U.S. military interest which are 
limited strictly to relief and rehabilitation in 
Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. State Depart- 
ment is opposed to the present constitution and 
terms of reference of the BAC [Balkan Affairs 
Committee] and to the establishment of the sub- 
committees. Pending further instruction, you 
will refrain from sitting as a member or ob- 
server until issues are clarified by the State 
Department. . . . 


No Idea of Reviving Prewar Standards of 
Living Abroad 

[Memo, Handy, ACofS, OPD, for CG, SOS, 19 Feb 43, 
OPD files, 400, Africa, sec. 1] 

7. Present limitations imposed on military op- 
erations by the shortage of shipping and escorts 

are such that it is unlikely that Theater Com- 
manders will be able to allocate more space for 
civilian supply than the minimum necessary to 
maintain local standards of living on a basis 
somewhat lower than normal pre-war standards. 
The diversion of shipping from present essential 
military, lend-lease and war production purposes 


to provide supplies to raise civilian standard of 
living of foreign areas to United States or even 
to local pre-war standards would be a disastrous 
policy at this time. . . . 

Relief but Not Rehabilitation 

[Memo of Discussion at Mtg Between Representatives 
of the ASF Technical Servs and Clay, Dir of Materiel, 
ASF, 1 8 Jun 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, Jun-Jul 

It was re-emphasized that the Army cannot con- 
cern itself with problems of rehabilitation, how- 
ever desirable it might be that plans be dovetailed 
with those of civilian agencies for easing the 
period of transition. . . 

In General Relief Supplies Will Meet Only 
Minimum Essential Needs 

[Memo, Clay for Maj Gen John C. H. Lee, CG, SOS, 
ETOUSA, 31 Aug 43, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, 
vol. 2] 

The activities of ASF with respect to civilian 
supply planning are based upon the premise that 
only the minimum essential needs of the popula- 
tion necessary to prevent prejudice to the military 
operation will be provided. The primary objec- 
tives to be attained are to prevent civil unrest 
which would endanger lines of communication 
and channels of supply and to prevent disease 
which would endanger the health of our troops. 
Planning and advance procurement have been 
confined to certain basic necessities — a basic 
ration of food, medical and sanitation supplies, 
and fuel. It is believed that during the initial 
phase of occupation, civilian requirements, if 
any, for other supplies, such as engineer, signal, 
etc. equipment, may be met by the utilization 
of organizational equipment of troop units, and 
that such supplies would be used only to the 
extent directly necessary for the prosecution of 
military operations. Although no advance plan- 
ning or procurement will be done here for more 
than the basic necessities mentioned above, an 
actual survey of an area after occupation may 
result in a need for additional items. Also, in 
the planning of a particular operation, the theater 
planning group may determine it necessary to 
make provision for a limited amount of additional 
basic necessities. Due consideration would, of 
course, be given to such recommendations. . . . 

" This exclusion of rehabilitation considerations did 
not apply to rehabilitation essential to relief, such as the 
provision of seed. 

Civilian Official Thinks Military Supply 
Program Too Narrow 

[Memo, Harold Stein, Import Div, NAEB, for Philip Reed, 
American Embassy in London, 22 Sep 43, ASF, ID files, 
014, Civ Sup, vol. 3] 

The most notable characteristic of the civilian 
supply program outlined in the CCS paper [CCS 
324/1, Chapter V, Section 4] is its extreme nar- 
rowness of scope. . . . 

The . . . implicit assumption is that broaden- 
ing the range of commodities would pamper the 
populations of liberated areas. Presumably this 
applies particularly to the inclusion of other con- 
sumer goods, most notably clothing. This assump- 
tion is made in the face of a known acute clothing 
shortage throughout the continent. If, as is stated 
in the CCS paper referred to above, it is intended 
to enable the liberated populations to participate 
in the war effort, the people must be sufficiently 
dressed, and as a mere matter of medical pru- 
dence it would appear essential to make some 
provision for footwear for example, for people in 
Northern Europe where the winters are both 
cold and wet. Restricted quantities of other con- 
sumer goods, such as pots and pans and matches, 
are equally important. Careful programming 
would make due allowance for local supplies and 
local production possibilities, but the inclusion 
of some such supplies in the program does not 
imply pampering — rather it implies sober pro- 
vision for a minimum level of health, efficiency 
and security. . . . 

President's Letter of 10 November 1943 Not 
Interpreted as Changing Army's Program 

[European Relief Report on Supply and Administration 
in Event of Unconditional Surrender, Rpt of TD to CG, 
ASF, 13 Nov 43, CAD files, 014, Balkans (11-13-43)] 

7. The President's letter [dated 10 November, 
Chapter IV, Section 6] omits any mention of re- 
sponsibility on behalf of the Army for procuring 
supplies for relief. Consequently, it is apparent 
that no change is intended in the present pro- 
cedure whereby military procurement of relief 
supplies is limited to the essential requirements 
of food, fuel, and medical and sanitary supplies 
needed in support of a military operation. 

In most areas there will no doubt be require- 
ments for industrial and other materials for a 
more permanent rehabilitation of the economy 
of the area, sometimes referred to as "reconstruc- 
tion." It is not envisaged that the President's 
letter is intended to place upon the Army the re- 
sponsibility for considering such requirements. 
This should be the responsibility of an economic 


mission of the Government as part of a longer 
range program of relief. 

[Memo, Handy, ACofS, OPD, for Hilldring, 14 Apr 44, 
OPD files, 014.1, Security] 

4. It is noted that the British members quote the 
President's secret letter directive of 10 November 
to the U.S. War Department presumably as au- 
thority for procurement on the U.S. side for six 
months relief needs for all countries in Europe 
other than Russia and the neutrals in the event of 
collapse. This Division has no knowledge of any 
directive which charges the War Department 
with anything more than the shipping and dis- 
tribution burden during the initial period in the 
event of collapse. . . . 

Secretary of State Asks War Department for 
an Adequate Relief and Rehabilitation Policy 
[Ltr, Hull to Stimson, 1 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ 
Sup, DS-136] 

3. . . . the State Department believes that . . . 
in every liberated area, it is essential that there be 
prompt and equitable distribution of indigenous 
food supplies and the importation of such sup- 
plemental supplies as may be necessary in order 
to assure a minimum diet that is nutritionally 
sound. A more generous diet would be desirable 
wherever food supplies and shipping permit. So 
far as may be practicable, food to be imported 
should be in accordance with the food habits and 
needs of the different areas, even though this may 
result in different amounts or a different compo- 
sition of rations available in different countries. 

4. The State Department believes that it is 
essential not merely to give relief to alleviate 
suffering, but also to help the peoples of liberated 
areas to help themselves. This economic assist- 
ance should be commenced at the very earliest 
possible moment consistent with military opera- 
tions. In addition to the reasons outlined above, 
the Department feels that this policy will lessen 
the demoralization attendant upon a people liv- 
ing on relief. Furthermore, to the extent that the 
peoples can meet their own needs, the demand 
against shipping and the drain upon supplies 
from the United States will be lessened. . . . 

Secretary of War Explains Financial and 
Legal Limitations Upon Army's Supply 
Program 12 

[Ltr, Stimson to Hull, 29 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ 
Sup, DS-135] 

With reference to procurement responsibility, it 
is well to bear in mind that the War Department 

"For additional information on this problem, see 
Lcighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1943-45. 

has been appropriated no funds, and has been 
accorded no congressional or executive authority, 
to procure civilian supplies other than those 
which are deemed necessary or desirable in sup- 
port of military operations. Accordingly, the pro- 
curing of civilian supplies beyond those for which 
there is a military need must be a primary re- 
sponsibility of other Governmental agencies. The 
procurement programs now being developed by 
the War Department with the aid of the Foreign 
Economic Administration, will include all items 
of every character deemed necessary during the 
initial period, but the advance procurement to be 
undertaken by the War Department will cover 
only food, fuel, medical and sanitary supplies, 
transportation equipment and special utility re- 
pair items. It is expected that the Foreign Eco- 
nomic Administration will make appropriate 
arrangements for the necessary advance procure- 
ment of all other supplies and materials included 
in the procurement program approved by the 
War Department, and the War Department will 
actively support the Foreign Economic Adminis- 
tration in obtaining allocations for these items. 
Moreover, it is understood that the Foreign Eco- 
nomic Administration, in accordance with its 
character and subject to whatever arrangements 
may be made between it and the State Depart- 
ment, will be free to program and procure further 
or additional items which it deems desirable. 
However it is to be recognized that regardless of 
the extent of advance programming by the For- 
eign Economic Administration, the military may 
have to determine in the light of shipping and 
transportation limitations what items can be 
brought into the areas in question during the 
period of military responsibility. 

You place emphasis in your letter on the im- 
portance of affording "economic assistance" in 
addition to furnishing actual relief supplies, The 
War Department in preparing its estimates of 
the initial six months' requirements has included 
food, fuel, medical and sanitary supplies, clothing 
and shoes, transportation equipment and repair 
items, public utility repair items, and supplies for 
the rehabilitation of agriculture, but so far as 
concerns other "economic assistance" (such as 
industrial equipment, machinery, hand tools and 
raw materials) the schedules of the War Depart- 
ment up to the present time have been largely 
limited to those items which are designed to effect 
a reasonably direct reduction in the future burden 
of relief and rehabilitation. 

In your letter you refer to the standards to be 
applied to the furnishing of actual relief supplies. 


You state that a nutritionally sound minimum 
diet should be assured and that a more generous 
diet is desirable wherever food supplies and 
shipping permit. The standards which you pro- 
pose are unquestionably desirable. It may, how- 
ever, be impossible because of limitations in 
shipping and supply to furnish even subsistence 
at these standards during the early period, much 
less "economic assistance." What can be supplied 
may depend in large measure upon the destruc- 
tion and scorching inflicted by the retiring enemy. 
Also I wish to emphasize that political and gov- 
ernmental problems which cannot be resolved by 
the War Department, as for example the extent to 
which rationing shall be imposed in this country, 
may be the determining factors as to the extent 
and character of relief to be furnished. . . . 

Eisenhower's Responsibility for Relief in 
Hiatus Areas Has Limitations 

[Msg, CCS to the SCAEF, 27 May 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 
2080, Sup and Econ Branch] 

3. As Supreme Commander, AEF, you will 
assume responsibility under operations Rankin 
and Overlord for the initial provision and dis- 

tribution of relief supplies in all liberated areas 
under your jurisdiction, whether or not such 
areas or territories constitute combat zones or 
lines of communication, subject to the limitations 
and definitions set forth hereafter: 

a. Such distribution must be accomplished 
without hindrance to the successful completion 
of the operation, particularly with respect to the 
logistical and administrative support required to 
sustain the forces allocated to you for the defeat 
of Germany. 

b. Your responsibility does not extend to such 
areas and territories as may now or hereafter be 
decided to be areas which will be occupied by the 
Armies of the USSR. 

c. Your responsibility will not include areas 
or territories outside the combat zones or lines 
of communication, if it is determined by you 
that conditions within such areas or territories 
are not sufficiently stabilized to warrant the pro- 
vision of relief supplies therein. 


What We Would Do if Cold-Bloodedly 

[Memo, Somervell, CG, ASF, for McCloy, 13 Apr 43, 
ABC files, 014 (11-27-42), sec. 1 ] 

For instance, how ruthless are we going to be in 
moving into enemy countries? We are speaking 
now of relief and rehabilitation. Certainly, an 
Italian Army being driven from Italy will be 
more effective if it knows that the United States 
is taking care of the families which it has left 
behind. Equally certainly would it be more effec- 
tive if it can force the responsibility for feeding 
larger portions of its population on us, saving its 
own resources for its military personnel. Per- 
haps, if we are really going to be ruthless, we 
should force populations in large numbers to 
retire with its armies, making the problem of 
feeding those armies a more difficult one. Ger- 
man success in France received great support 
from the difficulties in supply and movement 
occasioned to the French Army by the large 
numbers of Belgian and French refugees flying 
before the advancing German forces. Such a pol- 

icy will not sound pleasing to American ears. It 
is the policy required by total war. . . , 13 

Civilian Affairs Important but Only for 
Military Reasons 

[Ltr, Hilldring to Asst Secy of State Acheson, 9 Nov 43, 
CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43) (■)> sec - 3] 

The Army is not a welfare organization. It is a 
military machine whose mission is to defeat the 
enemy on the field of battle. Its interest and ac- 
tivities in military government and civil affairs 
administration are incidental to the accomplish- 
ment of the military mission. Nevertheless, these 
activities are of paramount importance, as any 
lack of a condition of social stability in an occu- 
pied area would be prejudicial to the success of 
the military effort. 

13 It was precisely this policy which the War Depart- 
ment, including Somervell, decided not to follow— not 
even in Germany, and much less in Italy, where cobellig- 
erency immediately introduced political considerations in 
favor of civilian relief. 


Military Necessity Is the Primary Principle 

[Army and Navy Manual of MG and CA, 22 Dec 43] 
9. . . . 

a. Military Necessity. The first consideration at 
all times is the prosecution of the military opera- 
tion to a successful conclusion. Military necessity 
is the primary underlying principle for the con- 
duct of military government. So long as the 
operation continues, it is the duty of the com- 
manding officer to exercise such control and to 
take such steps in relation to the civil population 
as will attain the paramount objective. 

b. Supremacy of Commanding Officer. It fol- 
lows the basic principle of military necessity that 
the theater commander must always have full 
responsibility for military government. 

c. Civil Affairs jurisdiction. The paramount 
interest of the combat officer is in military opera- 
tions. The paramount interest of the civil affairs 
officer is in dealing with civilian relationships 
of concern to the commander. Such interest will 
be expressed in restoring law and order and in 
returning to the civilian population certain facili- 
ties or services and restoring living conditions to 
normal, insofar as such activities will not lend 
to interfere with military operations. Whether 
interference with military operations will result 
shall be determined by the commanding officer 
after giving consideration to the recommenda- 
tions of his combat and civil affairs officers. . . . 

Military Government Promises Unpopularity 
But Fun 

[Ltr, Lt Comdr Malcolm S. MacLean to Marvin Mcln- 
tyre, White House Secy, 9 Sep. 43, with IncI of Final 
Draft of 1943 Army-Navy Fid Manual for MG and 
CA, Roosevelt Memorial Library] 

Military government as planned and practiced 
by the United States is going to be just about as 
popular on the world front as the Fair Employ- 
ment Practice Committee is here. Hence, it is 
tough, and fun. . . 

Civilian Supply Will Not Be Charity 

[Statement of Maj Gen George J. Richards, Dir, Budget 
Div, WDGS, before Subcomm. of the House Comm. on 
Appropriations, 10 May 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, 

. . . The goods which we expect to distribute in 
Italy are allocated to the Allied Military Govern- 

14 The revised draft of the manual was not particularly 
tough but neither was it notably tender and philanthropic. 
It is, of course, a question whether any military govern- 
ment can be popular. 

ment in Italy, which in turn collects from the 
recipients of those goods as much money as they 
can pay. That portion which they cannot collect 
is charged to the Italian Government. The lira 
[sic] which the Allied Government receives in re- 
turn for food, it holds and acts as a banker. 
We use that lira for engineering expenses, to pur- 
chase small amounts of supplies, and for pay 
of our troops. 

If we desire to buy some things locally, or use 
it to pay troops, we go to the Allied Military 
Government and secure this lira [sic]. . . . 

Military Government's Two Objectives 

[Statement of Hilldring before Subcomm. of the House 
Comm. on Appropriations, 10 May 44, ASF, ID, Hist of 
Civ Sup, DS-203] 

General Hilldring: We have felt for some time 
that in modern war, particularly when we storm 
the fortress of Europe, we would have to do some 
advance planning about what we were going to 
do with the civilian populations when we got 
ashore, so that we might accomplish several ob- 
jectives. One of these objectives is to secure the 
civilian populations to the maximum extent 
possible, which is an obligation under inter- 
national law; and second, to see that the civilian 
populations do not interfere with military opera- 
tions in any important particular; and that they 
are so treated that they will be able to assist the 
forward movement of our troops to the greatest 
extent possible. That is the beginning and the end 
of our involvement in this business. 

When neither of those two objectives any 
longer obtains, in other words, when the batde 
has gotten far enough ahead so that we can lay 
down our obligation under international law and 
so that the populations can no longer interfere 
with the military purposes of the operation, we 
intend to turn this work over to such civilian 
agencies as are designated to take it. . . . IB 

ls The evidence in this chapter makes clear the Army's 
intention to lay down the civil affairs task as soon as 
possible. The irony of the entire history of the U.S. 
Army's participation in civil affairs is that this did not 
prove possible during hostilities — or even for years after 
hostilities had ceased. The explanation of this paradox 
must be sought in the history of operations. 





Planning Joint Military Government 
Proves Highly Political 

When the United States and Britain de- 
cided in January 1943 that the first in- 
vasion of Axis-held Europe would be by 
way of Sicily they ordained that the first 
American experience in belligerent occu- 
pation would be a type for which Ameri- 
cans were least prepared. For civil affairs 
in Italy would inevitably entail complex 
problems of politics, and politics was the 
one phase of civil affairs which American 
military government officers had not been 
adequately taught. 

Italy was a country (unlike enemy coun- 
tries in general) where, whatever the seem- 
ing power of Americans as occupants, they 
would have in fact only such freedom of 
action as was permitted by political dis- 
cretion. This would have been true even if 
Italy had not soon become a cobelligerent 
and thus a desirable subject for political re- 
habilitation. Numerous Americans and 
Italians had ties of blood; Americans had 
never come to look upon Italians, despite 
Fascism, as upon the grim and fanatical 
Nazis; and that Italians could again be 
made true allies of the West and its ideol- 
ogies was one of the cardinal assumptions 
of American opinion. Italians, moreover, 
were a people whose strong political in- 
stincts would be irrepressible; unless prop- 
erly canalized they would make trouble 
even for an occupying army. Finally, joint 
occupation of Italy with Great Britain 
meant that the United States would prob- 

ably have almost as much of a political 
problem with its ally (always on a polite 
plane but still with potential exasperation) 
as with its enemy. For its strategic interests 
in the Mediterranean would inevitably 
lead Great Britain to expect paramount in- 
fluence, while Americans, with a certain 
perversity, would take Italy as the first 
area in which to demonstrate that such 
outdated concepts as spheres of influence 
should not be allowed in the emergent new 
international order. 

With regard to all such problems Amer- 
ican civil affairs officers, as trained by the 
Army, were, if not exactly babes in the 
woods, certainly not highly sophisticated. 
This was basically the fault not of the 
Army, but rather of America's entire cur- 
rent and historical unrealism about the 
Army's employment in civil affairs. The 
implicit contract by which the Army was 
allowed to have initial control of civil af- 
fairs provided that it should leave policy 
making to others. This was altogether 
proper, but, in the atmosphere of suspicion 
surrounding its role in civil affairs, the 
Army felt obliged to interpret this obliga- 
tion in an extreme sense. It appears to have 
felt it should not even encourage its officers 
to give systematic thought to the political 
problems they would have to deal with in 
implementing policy. At Charlottesville 
the faculty doubtless concluded that it 
could not teach politics the way it wanted 


to. It had to remain within the narrow 
limits of a legalistic and administrative 
approach to systems of government. Suffer- 
ing from sufficient suspicion already, the 
School of Military Government could not 
risk incurring more ; for fear that it be ac- 
cused of training Gauleiters it had to as- 
sume the risk that in training administra- 
tors it would produce more of technical 
competence than of political understand- 
ing — much less political wisdom. The 
same inhibition apparently operated on 
higher levels. One can spend months of 
research in the files of the Civil Affairs 
Division and still not know whether it was 
inclined toward liberalism or toward con- 
servatism. This is the more surprising be- 
cause the division was not noted for lack of 
strong convictions or articulateness on the 
administrative problems of civil affairs. To 
be sure, the tremendous pressure of admin- 
istrative responsibilities could lead anyone 
to a temporary preoccupation with means 
rather than ends; the real cause of a sol- 
dier's political neutralism, however, lies 
deeper. The division was quite aware of 
the tenuous nature of the Army's role in 
civil affairs, and it probably felt that the 
slightest betrayal of political predilection 
might destroy its own if not the Army's 
usefulness. To acknowledge conservative 
convictions in a New Deal Washington 
would almost certainly be fatal. To avow 
liberal attitudes could also be fatal — civil- 
ian agencies would probably not like sol- 
diers to steal their thunder and in any case 
would not let them trespass upon their 

The difficulty was that civil affairs per- 
sonnel in the field could not, if they were 
to carry out their mission successfully, ig- 
nore the political factor for a moment. Of 
the initial assumptions concerning civil 
affairs in World War II none was more 
fallacious than the idea that there is a dis- 
tinct boundary line between the military 
and the political. The assumption would 

have been false even if the State Depart- 
ment, as it often did not do, had always 
sent promptly political directives that were 
clear and comprehensive. For in actual ex- 
ecution such directives involve political 
problems and political judgments which 
may be more difficult than any of the ques- 
tions faced by those who draft the vague 
generalities of the directive themselves. 
The only hope for civil affairs officers 
abroad lay in quickly realizing the falsity 
of all the indoctrination about their non- 
political role in Italy and in trying to lift 
themselves by their own bootstraps. Since 
they had not been taught the politics of 
civil affairs they would have to learn it 
themselves, the hard way. 

This is precisely what they did — from 
the highest rank to the lowest. They had, 
to be sure, their own inner resources to fall 
back upon. They had had the political ex- 
perience common to all citizens of a de- 
mocracy. For the novel and unaccustomed 
problems at hand, however, this would not 
have been enough. It was an added help 
that the civil affairs officers who went into 
Italy were by and large an extraordinary 
group of people — politicians, financiers, 
lawyers, inventors, professors, philoso- 
phers, artists, and poets. Gifted with sensi- 
tivity, intuition, and the art of independent 
thinking, as a group they were peculiarly 
well qualified to profit from experience. 
While the Italian operation was still in the 
planning stage, Americans learned much 
of politics from their colleagues, the Brit- 
ish. They learned even more about politics 
in Italy because there every major problem 
which confronted them in that land of ex- 
citable people, including the economic 
problems, had its political element. They 
learned politics in large measure from the 
people they governed, past masters at poli- 
tics, inheritors of the political shrewdness 
of Machiavelli, still including statesmen 
from the pre-Fascist era who even after 
long retirement or hiding remembered 


enough of the game to be a match, and at 
times more than a match, for any Anglo- 
Saxon of the victorious army. 

Of the planning for Sicily, little need 
here be said because the documents tell 
their story of the intermixture of the mili- 
tary and the political so clearly. One notes 
that it was not a civilian statesman but 
General Eisenhower who signed the first 
document to pose the basic political prob- 
lems of Sicily — the question of benevol- 
ence versus severity and the problem of 
joint military government. With respect to 
the latter, the American component 
of Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) 
showed a keen political insight and at the 
same time a certain degree of naivete. It 
was able to foresee that Great Britain 
might wish a senior partnership because of 
its strategic interests, and it was capable of 
recognizing that only a joint and equal 
military government could ensure har- 
mony among the allies and an effective ap- 
proach to the conquered. But the Ameri- 
can planners were naive in assuming that 
it would probably be easy to obtain prompt 
intergovernmental agreement upon this 
principle merely because it was militarily 
and administratively sound. They pre- 
pared and sent to Washington a plan for 
joint military government from which, as 
was correct for soldiers, they excluded 
every political consideration. Months 
passed without the arrival of the combined 
politico-economic directive essential to 
more detailed planning. The delay was due 
to a situation which the theater had per- 
haps failed to foresee: its plan for joint 
military government was not being consid- 
ered in Washington and London merely 
with reference to its efficiency but, even 
more, with reference to its bearing upon 
the political problem of the distribution of 
power between the two nations. 

The very foundation of the plan came 
into question when, first the British, and 
later the Americans (their fighting spirit 

now stirred) desired for their respective 
countries a senior role. Nor, even after the 
President and the Prime Minister finally 
compromised on the AFHQ principle of 
no senior partnership, did the political mis- 
givings and the diplomatic disagreements 
stop. Since the agreement amounted 
merely to the expression of a pious prin- 
ciple, both countries continued to scruti- 
nize every element of the AFHQ plan to 
ensure that it did not give the partner an 
undue advantage. One cause for concern 
in Washington was the fact that the Amer- 
ican planners at AFHQ, believing it a 
good idea to borrow from sound British 
practice, had proposed certain features of 
that practice which, as they evidently had 
failed to realize, were designed to give the 
British Foreign Office ultimate control of 
civil affairs in its later stages. In particular 
AFHQ's proposal to include both minis- 
ters as political advisers aroused misgiv- 
ings. It might well have seemed that if 
soldiers were not to make political judg- 
ments themselves they needed the assist- 
ance of able diplomats, who, as intermedi- 
aries between the theater and the two 
governments, would be helpful in solving 
political issues not covered by the basic 
directives. But from the American point of 
view there was the danger that the British 
Resident Minister, a figure of considerable 
stature, would use his position in the thea- 
ter to inject British political influence into 
its policies. 

Considering that none of the issues 
could have been ignored if it is the duty of 
statesmen to take no chances with their 
country's interests, the remarkable thing is 
not so much the duration of the debates as 
the fact that all the issues were finally set- 
tled before the assault. One interesting 
feature of the CCS directive was that in 
several stipulations it upheld the principle 
of a purely military administration for the 
initial phase. That the President approved 
this feature of the directive at a time when 


he still believed in civilian control is not as 
strange as it may appear. During the 
course of negotiations with the British it 
became clear to all Americans concerned 
that only by adopting such a principle 
would it be possible to exclude political in- 
fluence such as a British Resident Minister 
might exert as part of the administration. 

Aside from its provisions for benevolence 
and defascistization, the directive sug- 
gested a deliberate effort toward avoidance 
of political issues. Even if judged only by 
the immediate background, this flight from 
the political did not, it would seem, have 
altogether bright prospects of success. 


A Recommendation That Policies Be Recon- 
ciled in a Joint Military Government 

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 8 Feb 43, CAD Msg tiles, CM- 
IN 4,74] 

. . . This is the first United States operation in- 
volving the invasion and occupation of enemy 
territory. 1 It is the first British operation involv- 
ing the invasion and occupation of enemy terri- 
tory other than colonial. It is as well the first joint 
operation against enemy territory. It will inevita- 
bly establish precedents far-reaching in scope and 
importance and will set the pattern for later 
operations in Europe. Policies now adopted will 
affect future operations throughout the war. We 
must therefore reconcile American and British 
policy toward Italy in order that there may be a 
joint and single attitude with respect to the civil 
and military authority and the civil population 
of the territory occupied. It must be decided 
whether a benevolent policy or one of strict mili- 
tary occupation in Sicily will contribute more to 
the rapid submission of the balance of the coun- 
try. We must determine whether our attitude is 
to be a benevolent one from the outset or whether 
consideration of the establishment of a friendly 
liberal regime is to be postponed until the entire 
country is occupied. A firm understanding in 
these matters with Great Britain is necessary. 
Divergences of opinion, which for reasons of past 
history or future interest are certain to arise, must 
be definitely resolved well in advance. The British 
may feel that they should have primary responsi- 
bility in this area because of their vital interests 

1 The President and Prime Minister Churchill decided 
at the Casablanca Conference that Sicily should be invaded 
after the end of the Tunisian campaign; in January 1943 
General Eisenhower received from the CCS a directive 
to this effect. The above document is the first to raise the 
problem of military government for the new operation. 

in the Mediterranean. This would presumably 
involve the British form of Military Government 
and British administration thereof. The question 
of responsibility for relief and rehabilitation of 
the occupied territory then arises. I believe that 
we should take care that these matters of policy 
are settled and so clearly understood that oppor- 
tunity for differences of interpretation be reduced 
to an absolute minimum and that this be done 
before the operational planning progresses too 
far. To permit policy to develop and be set by 
the progress of events would, in my opinion, be 
detrimental to the interests of the United States. 

I recommend a firm policy of joint Anglo- 
American responsibility and joint conduct of mil- 
itary government under an agreed system, to 
function under the Allied Commander. This 
would include joint participation in, (1) its polit- 
ical aspects, that is, determining the general and 
special policies to govern the operation and, (2) 
the implementation of those policies by the prep- 
aration in detail of a simple and effective system 
of military government ready for immediate ap- 
plication on landing. . . . 

1 hope I may have a directive on the major 
lines of United States Policy as soon as possible. 
Meanwhile I have designated two qualified 
American officers, who have begun to study these 
problems; one of these I am sending to Tripoli 
for a short visit to observe the operation of British 
Military Government first hand. 2 

2 The officers designated were Colonel Holmes and 
Col. Charles M. Spofford, former members of the Civil 
Affairs Section, AFHQ, which had handled the operation 
in French North Africa. On 1 1 February the War De- 
partment notified AFHQ that the President had approved 
in principle Genera! Eisenhower's proposals. The mes- 
sage indicated the President's view that the joint military 
government should be headed by one British and one 
American officer, that it should be under General Eisen- 
hower's control, and that the policy which it should 
apply toward Italians should be benevolent except that 


British Military Government Practice Found 
Basically Like American 

[Memo, Col Spofford, Liaison Sec, AFHQ, for Holmes, 
Chief Liaison Sec, AFHQ, 2 Mar 43, CAD files, oyi.i, 
Tripolitania (3-2-43) (1)] 

At your suggestion I have spent eleven days (14 
to 25 February) in Tripoli, investigating the 
operation of British Military Government in 
Tripolitania. Herewith is a summary report to 
which I have added certain comments and rec- 
ommendations. . . . 

1. Basis of Military Administration. The basis 
of the military government administered by the 
British is that which we recognize, that is, the 
obligation of the occupying army to restore and 
to insure as far as possible, public order and 
safety. This obligation is stated in the Rules an- 
nexed to the Hague Convention of 1907 (Art. 
43) to which both Great Britain and the United 
States are signatories. 

British military administration, once occupa- 
tion is established, is set up by proclamation in 
the usual manner, the practice being to make 
effective the proclamations of the Commanding 
General by posting them in principal places 
(Court House or Mayor's office) in each munici- 
pality as it is occupied. . . . 

There is nothing new in principle in the basic 
ordinances which cover the subject matter in 
generally the same manner as that prescribed 
in the U.S. Manual of Military Government 
(FM 27-5). . . . 

2. Organization at GHQ — Development. The 
British Army had no developed organization for 
military government at the beginning of this 
war. Such regulations as existed were to be found 
in one chapter of the Manual of Military Law 
(Art. 8, Ch. XIV), in which were set forth gen- 
eral principles governing the occupation of enemy 
territory, based on the Rules annexed to the 
Hague Convention. Shortly before the invasion 
of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland, 
Major General P. E. Mitchell, GHQ, Middle 
East, organized the Enemy Occupied Territory 
Administration (EOTA). 3 According to officers 
who served in these territories and to reports 
which I read, the administration encountered 
great difficulty, especially in its early stages, due 
to lack of preparation, inadequate and untrained 

it should include the arrest of Fascist leaders. General 
Eisenhower was asked to submit an outline plan. (Msg, 
WD to General Eisenhower, 11 Feb 45, OPD Msg files, 
CM-OUT 3847.) 

3 Headquarters of EOTA, known as the Political 
Branch, GHQ, was established at Cairo with General 
Mitchell as chief Political Officer and Advisor to the 
Commander in Chief. 

staffs and more rapid progress of military opera- 
tions than had been contemplated. For example, 
the Military Courts in Somalia were organized 
under a single officer which meant that serious 
offenses were tried by untrained personnel with 
little or no guidance. . . . 

6. Recommendations : Assuming that Britain 
and the United States will be jointly responsible 
for the military government resulting from any 
future occupation of territory by the Allied 
Forces, the following is recommended: 

1. That a plan of allied administration of occu- 
pied enemy territory be prepared, according to 
the following principles: 

a. It should, so far as is practicable, follow 
the directive contained in the United States 
Manual of Military Government [FM 27-5], but 
should give effect to recent British experience as 
illustrated in EOTA [Enemy Occupied Territory 
Administration]. 4 

b. It should provide for British and Amer- 
ican administrative staff and field staff, roughly 
evenly divided; 

c. The staff should be administratively re- 
sponsible to AFHQ on all policy and political 
matters. . . . 

Political Importance of Doing a Good Job 

[Memo, Holmes for CofS, AFHQ, 4 Mar 43, CAD files, 
091.1, Tripolitania (3-2-43) (1)] 

There is suhmitted herewith a report compiled 
by Colonel Spofford after his visit, to study the 
operation of military government in Tripolitania. 
This is a good job which I commend to your care- 
ful attention. . . . 

As this is our first occupation of enemy terri- 
tory, it will fix policy and set the pattern for 
future operations. It is, therefore, essential that 
the job be done with care and efficiency, with its 
effect on the future well in mind. 

* Under the system developed by the British, adminis- 
tration in occupied areas was placed in the hands of a 
Deputy Chief Political Officer (DCPO) who also acted 
as adviser to the military governor — the commanding 
general in each instance. The staff was divided into three 
main sections — legal, finance, and police. When mili- 
tary operations ceased, the DCPO became military gov- 
ernor. In the field, the DCPO was assisted by political 
officers who went forward with the occupying forces. 
As soon as military operations permited, a political officer 
took over the office of the mayor of a designated area and 
acted as chief municipal officer. A police force independent 
of military police was established, staffed at the top 
by an army officer with police training and augmented 
by civilian inspectors while the remainder of the force 
was recruited from local personnel. The civil police force, 
usually disarmed, assumed responsibility for civilian func- 
tions. CAD files, 09 1. 1, Tripolitania. 


The political implications, both immediate and 
potential, of the administration of military gov- 
ernment of occupied enemy territory cannot be 
overemphasized. . . . 

The period of the occupation will be much 
longer than the period of the assault. Final judg- 
ment with respect to the job as a whole will 
probably be determined more by the reaction of 
public opinion throughout the world to the occu- 
pation than to the assault. The average citizen 
has forgotten the German attach on Norway, but 
he is alert to the evils of German occupation. 

This is going to be a hell of a job and we 
want a green light to get on with it. Spofford 
and I would like to outline our plans to you and 
the Commander in Chief orally before we put 
up anything to Force 141. 5 

AFHQ Plans Proposes an Equal Partnership 


{AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan for Military Gov- 
ernment of Sicily, 24 Mar 43, CAD files, Husky Plan, 
Exec Off file, Job 4814] 

(2) This appreciation and outline plan is pre- 
pared on the assumption that responsibility of 
the respective governments will be joint. Joint 
responsibility is taken to mean equal sharing of 
political, legal, and financial responsibility for 
both planning and conduct of the military gov- 
ernment, as well as participation by personnel on 
approximately an equal basis. , . . 

(4) It is clear that military government of 
Sicily must be conducted under a single over-all 
plan. The government will be based on one set 
of military laws applicable throughout the ter- 
ritory, whether occupied by British or American 
forces and administered under the same system, 
whether it be British or American person- 
nel. . . . 6 

As a result of these plans, AFHQ submitted to the 
War Department in early March an Appreciation and 
Outline Plan for Military Government in Sicily. It was to 
go through considerable revision by the two governments 
(see below) before eventuating in the organization known 
as Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory. (A 
copy of General Spofford's detailed report on the British 
system in Tripolitania will be found in the file cited 

'In this respect the planners deviated from the pat- 
tern applied to Germany at the end of World War I; 
in occupied Germany there were different national zones, 
all co-ordinated but free to establish their own laws and 
systems as far as practicable. Nonzonal military gov- 
ernment would entail reconciling British and American 
systems, between which an important difference obtained 
with respect to the higher chain of command. The 
British, while recognizing nominally the paramount au- 
thority of the theater commander, expected the chief 
political officer to be guided primarily by advice from 

Military and Not Civilian Personnel in the 
Initial Phase 

[AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan, 24 Mar 43] 

(63) The plan must be one for effective military 
government, that is, actual administration by 
military personnel of the essential services of 
the territory. In this the situation will be entirely 
different from that which has existed in North 
Africa. . . . 

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 1 May 43, OPD Msg file, CM-IN 

We are in full accord that military government 
for Husky will be staffed entirely by military 
personnel initially. . . . 

The Plan Borrows Some Elements From 
British Practice 

[AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan, 24 Mar 43] 

(8) The U.S. system contemplates that during 
the period of operations Civil Affairs Officers 
will, if present in the theater, act in a planning 
and advisory capacity only. Relations with the 
civil population will, in this phase, be conducted 
by the Provost Marshal and the military police. 
It is not until the phase of operations in which 
organized resistance has ceased that Civil Affairs 
Officers are directed to assume administrative 
functions. . . . 

(64) The military administration should be 
set up as soon as military operations will per- 
mit. This involves following the British practice 
rather than the procedure recommended in the 
American manual. The advantages of this course 
are that it will: 

(a) Shorten or eliminate the period of dis- 
organization of the essential services. . . . 

(b) Relieve combat troops of responsibility 
for civil matters during the period when it is 
most important to do so. . . . 

(c) Obviate confusion arising from change- 
over from combat to civil affairs personnel at 
some later stage. 

(65) The Military Governor will, of course, be 
the Commanding General of the expeditionary 
forces. 7 The military administration should be 

political authorities in London as soon as the fighting 
had ended. The dependence of the British civil affairs 
officers upon political authorities was known to the War 
Department and led it to view the British orientation of 
certain ele ments of th e AFHQ plan with apprehension 
(see below, [Section j\ . 

1 Since General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander was the 
Commanding General of the expedition this meant, as 
Washington was to note, that a British officer was to be 
Military Governor. The proposal made by AFHQ in this 
connection was one called for by the International Law of 
belligerent occupation. 


headed by a Deputy Military Governor with 
functions comparable to the British D.C.P.O. 
or the American Civil Affairs Officer. He should 
be assisted by a staff of experts covering the major 
fields for which the military administration is 
responsible as under both American and British 

(66) Since the Husky operation is the first 
Allied assault on European territory, the manner 
in which the government of the territory is con- 
ducted will have far-reaching consequences. It 
will be followed closely by the respective govern- 
ments who will undoubtedly have occasion to 
communicate directives through the CinC. In 
order to keep the CinC advised on political and 
policy matters there should be established at 
AFHQ a counterpart of the Headquarters or- 
ganization of EOTA at Cairo. For this opera- 
tion this should comprise one or more officers 
and a small executive and advisory staff. . . . 
Major directives should be communicated by the 
CinC to the military governor direcdy. For the 
most part, however, the political section should 
be the channel for political questions and deci- 
sions and should relieve the CinC of as much of 
this administrative burden as possible. . . . 

(78) The CinC will create a Political Section 
of his staff consisting of military personnel, both 
American and British. It will be the function of 
this staff to advise the CinC on questions affect- 
ing the administration of the territory and on 
political questions arising out of military occu- 
pation. It will be responsible for seeing that the 
directives of the CinC are communicated to the 
MG. 8 

The Plan Is Submitted to Washington as a 
Combination of Two Systems 

[Ltr, Gen Smith, CofS, AFHQ, to Marshall, 25 Mar 43, 
OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)] 

In compliance with the instructions from the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colonel Holmes has brought 
with him the outline plan for Allied military 
government of Horrified [Sicily]. This plan rep- 
resents adaptation of our principles of military 
government and those of the British, which are 
identical, and the British administrative system, 
which experience has proved to be successful in 
the Middle East. It is also adapted to joint re- 

8 The chart accompanying this draft failed to place the 
recommended Political Section under the line of authority 
from the Commander in Chief. Though inadvertent, the 
omission became the subject of comment in Washington 
and resulted in modification by the War Department (see 
below fSection 3 J] 

sponsibility by the United States and Great Brit- 
ain, and fits into the framework of AFHQ. . . . 

AFHQ Enters Upon More Detailed Planning 
With Very Few Planners 

[Brig Gen Charles M. Spofford, former Actg Deputy 
Chief, AMGOT, Rpt, Allied Military Government— Sicily 
and Southern Italy, 27 Sep 45 8 [hereafter cited as Spof- 
ford Rpt] , OCMH files] 

The Appreciation and Oudine Plan dated 24 
March 1943 had included a proposed TO/ WE 
calling for 400 officers, evenly divided as between 
British and American. This TO /WE indicated 
tentative assignments of the officers, that is, those 
with specialists qualifications desired and those 
for general civil affairs duty. . . . 

The immediate requirement at that time was 
the assembly of a staff of specialists to carry for- 
ward the detailed planning. The assembling of 
this staff was long delayed due to difficulties of 
procurement and transportation, since virtually 
the entire staff had to be recruited from outside 
the theater. As a basis for determining the re- 
quirements from the U.S. a survey was first made 
of the probable personnel which could be ob- 
tained within the theater. This was estimated at 
approximately 30 officers and the balance was 
requested from the War Department. The same 
procedure was followed in the case of British 
personnel although the position there was some- 
what more satisfactory since a pool had been 
established in Cairo from which a number of 
officers could be drawn. In order to obtain en- 
listed personnel with language qualifications a 
questionnaire was sent to all units in the theater, 
requiring returns of those speaking Italian. These 
returns were screened and several hundred men 
were interviewed by an Italian-speaking officer, 
as a result of which a number of early assign- 
ments were made. 

In order to administer the American person- 
nel, approval for a provisional TO for Head- 
quarters and Headquarters Company was re- 
quested and granted, which TO was approved 
by the War Department. This organization was 
tentative only and was not a complete or satis- 
factory solution of the problem of personnel ad- 
ministration which was later made difficult by the 
extension of the operations beyond those initially 
contemplated, and subsequently by the division 

* Although the report was not submitted to the War 
Department until 1945, it is based upon notes made 
currently by General Spofford while a member of the 
planning staff, Force 141, and, later, Chief Staff Officer, 


of authority over the military government per- 
sonnel in the theater. 

The key personnel for planning were not im- 
mediately available, which delayed the detailed 
planning considerably. By April 15 the planning 
staff consisted of Major General Lord Rennell 10 
and Lt. Col. [A. Terrence] Maxwell on the Brit- 
ish side, together with several administrative 
officers who had been summoned from the Middle 
East. On the American side the staff consisted 
of Spofford and two junior officers who had been 
secured but had not arrived for duty. Col. [A. P.] 
Grafftey Smith, Chief Finance Officer, and Lt. 
Col. Bernstein, Advisor on Currency and Ex- 
change, arrived during the first week in May and 
during the same period Major [Henry T.] Row- 
ell, who had been requested from AGWAR 
from the School of Military Government at Char- 
lottesville to organize the Training Center called 
for by the plan, and Major [Robert N.] Gorman, 
Legal Officer, arrived from the U.S. 

Brig. Gen. Frank J. McSherry (A) 11 arrived 
on 2 June to take up his duties as Deputy Chief 
Civil Affairs Officer. 

The Training Center called for by the plan 
required facilities which were sought by Lord 
Rennell and Col. Spofford in April 1943. Ad- 
ministrative personnel to operate the center was 
secured and arrived in Algiers at the end of the 
first week in May. Approval was obtained at 
the time to establish the center at Chrea, near 
Blida, where this personnel and other adminis- 
trative personnel called forward to arrive about 
15 May assembled during May. The key person- 
nel in supply, public safety, and public health 
did not arrive in the theater until the last week 
in May, when Lt. Col. [John F. R.] Seitz (A), 
Director of Civilian Supply and Resources; Col. 
[D. Gordon] Cheyne (B), Director of Public 
Health; and Col. Lemuel L. Bolles (A), Com- 
missioner of Public Safety, reported at Chrea. 
In addition to the foregoing there arrived by air 
from the U.S. approximately ten officers to be 
assigned to the planning staff and an equal num- 
ber of British officers largely from the Middle 
East. On 2 June the first large installment of no 
American officers arrived ex US. [sic]. During 
the month of June there was a steady arrival of 
small groups of both British and American per- 
sonnel supplemented by a contingent of 94 British 

10 Lord Rennell of Rodd was to become the first chief 
of AMGOT. He had held the senior civil affairs role 
in the British occupation of East Africa. 

a In the documents of the theater "A" and "B" after 
names are used to indicate American and British, 

officers who arrived on 27 June and 38 American 
officers who arrived on 1 July. 

Enlisted personnel was secured in part from 
the theater when approximately 80 EM and 60 
British OR's were assigned early in June for 
Administration of the Training Center at Chrea. 
To these were added 169 EM [Enlisted Men] 
who had been sent forward from the U.S. and 
an additional complement of British personnel. 
At the time Chrea was vacated on 15 July there 
were 285 American EM and 276 British OR's 
assigned to AMG, the largest part of which were 
attached to the contingents going to Sicily with 
the exception of approximately 100 who were 
stationed at the military government holding 
center at Tizi-Ouzou. . . . 

AFHQ Agrees on Exclusion of Civilian 
Agencies From Planning 

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 1 May 43, CAD Msg files, CM-1N 

We are entirely in agreement that matters affect- 
ing future operations in other areas are not the 
concern of the North African Economic Board. 
Neither the Board nor representatives of Lend- 
Lease, BEW or other civilian agencies as such 
have knowledge of operation Husky. . . , 12 

Meanwhile the Two Governments Have Not 
Reached Speedy Agreement 

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 3 May 43, ACC files, 10000/ 

No further word has been received in regard to 
agreement with British Government concerning 
the Military Government of Operation Husky 
since your Fortune 101 of 14 April in which it 
was stated that a reply was being made by the 
State Department to the proposal left by Mister 
Eden. An order has been issued creating 
AMGOT in order that planning may proceed 
[see below fsec. 7|| . However, lack of a final agree- 
ment between the two governments impedes this 
work and an early agreement is urgently desir- 
able. The over-all directive covering political, fi- 
nancial and economic matters is also needed at the 
earliest possible date. Major General Lord Ren- 
nell is now in London and it is hoped that steps 
may be taken to obtain the concurrence of the 
British Government to the plan as agreed on by 
United States authorities. 

,s The War Department had sent AFHQ a cable stating 
that for security and other reasons it was advisable to 
exclude civilian agencies from the planning bo th at 
Washington and in the theater. See |Chapter IVj Sec- 
tion 1. 



Claims and Counterclaims 

[Memo for the President drafted by Haskell, Asst Dir, 
CAD, dated "Early March," CAD files, Husky (prior to 
i Jun 43)]" 

Sir John Dill sent General Marshall the attached 
copy of a telegram from Mr. Eden to Mr. Mac- 
millan in Algiers, which indicates that the British 
are inclined to the view that they should have 
prime responsibility for control of civil affairs in 
Sicily and should therefore institute a British 
administration of military government after this 
area is captured. This telegram attributes to Gen- 
eral Eisenhower the feeling that, owing to vital 
British interests in the Mediterranean, there is 
something to be said for this view. Mr. Eden is 
apparently laboring under a misapprehension in 
attributing such a feeling to General Eisenhower 
himself. In his cable ... of February 8, 1943, 
which was shown to the British, General Eisen- 
hower anticipated that this point would be raised 
and expressed his views on the far-reaching im- 
plications on the future conduct of the war in- 
volved in its determination. In this cable Gen- 
eral Eisenhower stated: "The British may feel 
that they should have primary responsibility 
. . . ," but he recommended a firm policy of 
joint Anglo-American responsibility and joint 
conduct of military government functioning un- 
der the Allied Commander. . . . 

From the beginning of the occupation, the 
character and efficiency of the civil administration 
of this area will influence the will of the Italian 
people and armed forces to resist in subsequent 
operations. I believe that the assignment of prime 
responsibility of civil authority to the United 
States and a United States administration of Sicily 
as it is occupied would contribute most effectively 
to the rapid submission of other Italian areas. 
The United States cannot avoid this responsi- 
bility which stems from the appointment of Gen- 
eral Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander 
in the Theater. 

I recommend that planning should be in the 
hands of a joint Anglo-American body and that 
actual administration of Sicily should likewise be 
joint, with prime responsibility assigned to the 
United States and exercised under General Eisen- 
hower by a joint military government set up in 

11 There is nothing in the files to indicate whether or 
not this memorandum was actually sent. However, Has- 
kell states that it was seen by the JCS, and, according to 
his belief, also by the President. Interv, Epstein with Has- 
kell, 17 Apr 50. 

accordance with United States military law and 
administrative procedure. 

I feel that this is a question for your decision. 
Before either General Marshall or I discuss the 
matter further with the British, your instruc- 
tions are requested. 

Eisenhower Opposes Any Senior Partnership 

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 7 Mar 43, CAD Msg files, CM- 
IN3718] 11 

5. ... I believe it to be essential that the mili- 
tary government for Husky be a joint Anglo- 
American responsibility. I believe that we should 
take this opportunity to emphasize Allied unity 
and that so doing will have political and even 
military advantages in dealing with the Italian 
population and later elsewhere. For either gov- 
ernment to assume primary responsibility could 
invite undesirable speculation with regard to 
imperialistic intentions which could be exploited 
by enemy propaganda. . . . 

Eisenhower's View Accepted by the Joint 

[Msg, JCS to Eisenhower, 10 Mar 43, OPD Msg files, 
CM-OUT 3636] 

It is the opinion of the United States Government 
that the government of Husky should be a joint 
Anglo-American responsibility, under the con- 
trol of the Commander in Chief Allied Forces, 
for both planning and administration, and that 
there should be no "senior partner" in the joint 
government. This is in response to your number 
4962 [sic] of March 7. . . . 

But President Wants the Administration To 
Be Predominantly American 

[Memo, Dept of State as revised by Roosevelt, 15 trans- 
mitted by Leahy to OPD on 9 Apr 43, CAD files, Husky 
(prior to 1 Jun 43)] 

(a) The administration should be so organized 
that in its relations with the local population the 

"This message began by informing the War Depart- 
ment of Eden's proposal to Macmillan, British Resident 
Minister, referred to above, which the latter showed to 
General Eisenhower. Macmillan was informed by Eisen- 
hower that it was not appropriate for him to comment on 
issues which he felt should be decided between the two 

15 The copy of the memorandum in the files is undated 
but, in returning his revision to Leahy on 7 April, the 
President indicated that the memorandum was dated 
1 March. He made no changes in the above-quoted para- 
graphs of the State Department draft. 


greatest emphasis possible is given to the Ameri- 
can character of the undertaking. This is essen- 
tial if full advantage is to be taken of certain 
valuable political and psychological factors which 
might prepare the way for substantial co-operation 
from the civilian population. There are, for ex- 
ample, the strong pro-American feeling in Sicily 
and southern Italy; the surety as to American 
long-range sympathy because of the several mil- 
lion American citizens of Italian origin, and 
the close contact, in normal times, of these ele- 
ments with their families in Italy; and America's 
historical detachment from questions involving 
the relations of European states with each other. 
The propaganda campaign of the Fascist regime 
against the United States has not been as bitter 
or as effective, nor has it left its marks on so many 
elements of the Italian population, as has the 
abusive campaign against England, which has 
continued almost without interruption since 

(b) It is suggested therefore that the Com- 
mander in Chief should appoint on his staff an 
American army officer who, with two adminis- 
trative assistants qualified by previous experience 
in the foreign relations field, one American and 
one British, will be responsible for the adminis- 
tration of the occupied territory. . . . 

Two Cabinet Members Intimate President Has 
Created a Difficult Issue 

[Tc Ltr, Stimson and Hull to Roosevelt, 13 Apr 43, 
OPD files, 01 4. 1, Security (1-38)] 

At the meeting at Casablanca it was agreed that 
the British General Alexander was to be the Force 
Commander of Husky. From this fact it will be 
claimed that under international usage it neces- 
sarily follows that General Alexander will also 
be the Military Governor. If this is accepted, then 
the plan referred to below which has been drawn 
up in Allied Headquarters in North Africa and 
recently brought here is a logical result. . . . 

From discussions with one of Mr. Eden's assist- 
ants who accompanied him, Mr. William Strang, 
as well as from conversations had with Mr. Har- 
old Macmillan in Algiers, it is apparent that the 
British Government feels that because of its 
interests in the Mediterranean in the past and 
future, the character of the administration of the 
Husky territory should be British. 

It will be recalled that in February General Ei- 
senhower sought guidance with respect to this 
matter, and that a telegram [sec. 1, above] was 
dispatched stating that plans should be made for 
a joint military government under his respon- 
sibility as Allied Commander in Chief. General 

Eisenhower has submitted a plan which calls for 
Allied responsibility. 16 This plan is substantially 
as follows: 

General Eisenhower, as Allied Commander in 
Chief, would be responsible to the two Govern- 
ments for the administration of the enemy terri- 
tory concerned in the operation Husky. He 
would be guided by a general policy directive 
covering political, financial, and economic mat- 
ters and transmitted to General Eisenhower 
through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Later 
matters of broad policy would be agreed upon 
between the two Governments and sent to him 
in the same manner. It is believed important that 
in these matters the views of the two Govern- 
ments should be reconciled and given to Gen- 
eral Eisenhower as an agreed directive. 

General Eisenhower would create at Allied 
Force Headquarters a military government sec- 
tion, which would be headed by a Deputy Chief 
of Staff, who would be the Commander in 
Chief's executive in all matters relating to the 
administration of the territory. This officer would 
be American. 17 

As General Alexander has been selected as the 
Commander of the Expeditionary force, he 
would under this plan, by virtue of that com- 
mand, become the Military Governor. The prin- 
cipal administrative officer under General Alex- 
ander would be British. He would have an 
American deputy. There would be a mixed staff 
of American and British officers, divided into 
administrative divisions as follows: legal, finan- 
cial, public safety, enemy property custodian, 
civilian supply and resources, public welfare and 
public health, labor, and public information 
(press, radio, etc). The Administrative staff 
throughout the area would be mixed Anglo- 
American. This organization would be known 
as Allied Military Government of Occupied 
Territory (AMGOT) and would be similar to 
the administrative system developed in recent 
months by the British in enemy territory in Af- 
rica, but adapted to conditions obtaining in a 
metropolitan area and giving it an Allied char- 
acter. This administrative organization would be 
Allied in the same sense as Allied Force Head- 
quarters. The governing principles of both the 
American and British system are based on the 
Notes to the Hague Convention of 1907. 

10 The AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan, 24 March, 
which had by now reached the War Department. 

17 Actually the two secretaries are describing the plan as 
already modified by the War Department. The AFHQ 
plan did not provide for a Deputy Chief of Staff nor 
did it enter into questions of nationality. 


Both the State and War Departments believe 
that this plan as outlined above, which places 
emphasis on an Allied military government, 
would be acceptable to the British. 

This plan for Allied Government does not con- 
form to that outlined in your memorandum 
transmitted by Admiral Leahy which would give 
a preponderant American character to the ad- 
ministration. In the event that you feel it is vital 
to insist on a military government of preponder- 
ant American character, it is recommended that 
steps should be taken to obtain the concurrence 
of the Prime Minister thereto. It is believed that 
any attempt to proceed on a lower level would 
consume time which can be ill afforded and 
that in any event a decision would ultimately 
have to be reached by agreement between you 
and Mr. Churchill. 

President Accepts AFHQ Plan for Coequal 

[Ltr, Leahy to Hull and Stimson, 13 Apr 43, OPD files, 
0.14.1, Security (i-38)] 

Referring to the joint letter dated 13 April 1943 
in regard to the form of an allied military gov- 
ernment to be imposed as a result of the Husky 
operation, signed by the Secretary of State and 
the Secretary of War, I am directed by the Presi- 
dent to inform you that he has this date approved 
the proposed allied military government for 
HusKY-land as outlined therein. . . , 18 

But Churchill Wants His Country To Be 
Senior Partner 

[Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 13 Apr 43, OPD files, 
014. 1, Security (1-38)] 

2. I hope that you may feel in view of the fact 
that the Force Commander under the supreme 
direction of General Eisenhower will be British 
we should be senior partner in the military ad- 
ministration of enemy occupied territory in that 
area. Our proposal will be that under the su- 
preme authority of General Eisenhower a British 
General Officer should be appointed as Military 
Governor of HusKY-land and that he should be 
assisted by a Joint Anglo-American staff. Thus 
there would be no dualism in actual executive 
decisions on the spot. 

3. Such a local arrangement would of course 
in no way affect decisions on major policy being 
taken as usual by agreement between our two 
Governments if convenient by personal corre- 
spondence between you and me. 

" Th e AFHQ plan as m ortified by the War Department 
(see the lfollowing section)] 

Roosevelt Wants as Many American Appoint- 
ments as Practicable 

[Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 14 Apr 43, OPD files, 
014. 1, Security (1-38)] 

Replying to your telegram of April 13th, I have 
given my approval to appointment of General 
Alexander as the Allied Military Governor of 
HusKY-land during occupation and under the 
Supreme Commander General Eisenhower. In 
view of the friendly feeling toward America en- 
tertained by a great number of the citizens of 
the United States who are of Italian descent it 
is my opinion that our military problem will be 
made less difficult by giving to the Allied Mili- 
tary Government as much of an American charac- 
ter as is practicable. 

This can be accomplished at least to some ex- 
tent by appointing to the offices of the Allied 
Military Government a large proportion of Amer- 

I believe that this Military Government should 
be presented to the world as a definitely joint 
Allied control and that there should be no "senior 

Churchill Withdraws Any Implication of 
Senior Partnership 

[Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 15 Apr 43, OPD files, 014. 1, 
Security (1-38)] 

I hoped paragraph 3 of my telegram of April 13th 
made it somehow clear that I contemplated 
Husky as our joint enterprise on terms of per- 
fect equality, with our usual intimacy and confi- 
dence and with no question of a "senior part- 

This impression only applied to actual execu- 
tive work to be done by Military Governor who 
would receive his directive from you and me in 
complete agreement. In executive and adminis- 
trative sphere there ought to be two voices but 
only one voice which will say what you and I 
have agreed. General Alexander would be direct- 
ing military operations under Supreme Com- 
mander and he would delegate powers of Mili- 
tary Governor to a British officer mutually agree- 
able to us both. 

I entirely agree with you that utmost advan- 
tage should be taken of American ties with Italy 
and that at least half of the officers of Allied 
Military Government should be American and 
further if in any case or district it is found that 
American pre-eminence is more useful to the 
common cause this should at once be arranged. 
The two flags should always be displayed to- 
gether and we should present a united and un- 
breakable front in all directions. All the above is 


of course without prejudice to United States be- North Africa and my continuing to be your lieu- 
ing Supreme throughout the whole of French tenant there. I hope I have given satisfaction. . . . 


Misgivings Over Possible British 

[Memo, Haskell for ASW, 7 Apr 43, CAD files, Husky 
(prior to 1 Jun 43) ] 

4. Since the Expeditionary Force Commander 
should be the Military Governor for military rea- 
sons, the government of this particular area is 
already determined. If, in addition, the Military 
Governor's Deputy is also British and if any 
parallel chain of command is accepted which 
would permit the exercise of the authority of 
military government through other than tactical 
command channels, the British flavor of the gov- 
ernment would be further reinforced and unity 
of command handicapped. 19 

U.S. Would Change AFHQ Plan to Safe- 
guard Military Supremacy 

I Msg, WD to AFHQ, 7 Apr 43, OPD files, 01 4.1, Security 
(1-38), CM-OUT 2948] 

The plan for military government has been ap- 
proved by the United States authorities with the 
following modification: 

Page 14, paragraph C to read as follows, quote: 
"The C in C will establish a military gov- 
ernment section of his Staff, consisting of military 
personnel, both American and British. This sec- 
tion will be headed by a Deputy Chief of Staff 
who will be the C in C's executive in all matters 
pertaining to military government of occupied 
enemy territory including political questions aris- 
ing out of military occupation." 

Appendix B-i: political officer changed to 
Deputy Chief of Staff for military government 
and shown under C in C with line of authority 
running to latter. The resident minister shown 
on the right of C in C eliminated. These changes 
were made at the suggestion of OPD and ac- 
cepted by all concerned. 

Page 14 add to paragraph 81 the following, 

"He [Deputy Military Governor] will com- 

19 Colonel Haskell objected to the absence in the plan 
of a sufficiently clear statement of the principle of tactical 
supremacy. His memorandum set forth a number of 
changes which he felt should be made in the AFHQ plan. 
As only a part of these, however, were accepted, they 
are not quoted. 

municate directly with Regional and Provincial 
Military Administrators with respect to the con- 
duct of military government. These latter will 
work in close co-operation with the tactical com- 
manders in the areas of their assignment with a 
view to giving the greatest possible assistance to 
the military operations. In the event that any con- 
flict of opinion should arise between any admin- 
istrator and a tactical commander, the decision of 
the tactical commander will obtain." 

This was added in order to make it clear that 
a tactical commander in any area has final au- 
thority. Your comment or concurrence on the 
proposed changes requested. 

Just before his departure Eden left with Secre- 
tary of State a proposal for military government 
Husky which is not entirely acceptable to Amer- 
ican Government. State Department is being au- 
thorized to negotiate with British Government to 
obtain their agreement to our plan as modified 
above. It will be explained that this plan is pred- 
icated on the theory that in matters of policy the 
views of the two Governments will be reconciled 
and communicated as an agreed directive to the 
CinC by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Steps are 
being taken in Washington to create machinery 
to obtain agreed views on matters of policy. . . . 

War Department Reinforces Its Instruction 
on Tactical Supremacy 

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 13 Apr 43, OPD Msg files, 
CM-OUT 5442] 

It should be clearly understood and set forth in 
the operational plan when it is completed that 
during the assault and initial phases of the opera- 
tion, officers of the Military Government assigned 
to task forces of units will operate as staff officers 
of their commanders. 

It should also be set forth that at all times the 
tactical commanders have final responsibility and 
authority. The establishment of an administrative 
line of communication direcdy from the Deputy 
Military Governor to Provincial or local adminis- 
trations may be established and authority dele- 
gated to these subordinate administrators at the 
discretion of the General Officer Commanding 
Force 141. .. . 


AFHQ Points Out Need for Eventual Civil 
Affairs Chain of Command 

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 May 43, OPD Msg files, 
CM-IN 4959] 

Suggestion your Fortune 101 concurred in. . . . 
We assume however that words "at any time" do 
not exclude the possibility of centralization of au- 
thority for Military Administration at some fu- 
ture time. We have in mind that when operations 
have ceased and the territory is on a garrison 
basis, the general officer commanding Force 141, 
as Military Governor, with the approval of the 
Commander in Chief, should be free to establish 
lines of authority running directly to him and to 
his CCAO [Chief Civil Affairs Officer] to whom 
he might delegate certain of his functions. 

Tactical Supremacy Must Prevail 

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 May 43, OPD Msg files, 
CM-OUT 3586] 

Bigot-Husky words "at all times the tactical 
commanders have final responsibility and author- 
ity" contemplated that even during garrison 
period and after authorization lines of staff com- 
munication from Chief Civil Affairs Officer to 
local administrators senior tactical commanders 
would nevertheless have final responsibility and 
authority over civilian population in their areas. 
. . . We do not like plan which deprives General 
Patton and his subordinate tactical commanders 
from [sic] any authority and responsibility for 
civil affairs as long as their troops are present in 
the area. We do not favor separating command 
channels for military government from normal 
single channel of command. . . . 20 

Eisenhower Still Wants To Be Free To Estab- 
lish Eventual Separate Chain of Authority 

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 19 Apr 43, OPD Msg files, 
CM-IN 11778] 

Agree entirely that final responsibility and au- 
thority over civilian population is inherent in the 
tactical command. However following factors 
must be borne in mind: 

1. The organization for military administra- 
tion of the territory is one that will remain after 
the capture of the island and the task force or- 
ganization has changed to that of a garrison. 

M For the posthostilities period the American manual of 
military government (1940 ed.) provided that tactical 
units be used as organs of military government and that 
the commanding general assume responsibility in the area 
occupied, the boundaries coinciding with existing political 

This phase will continue until the peace treaty or 
recognition of some Italian government. 

2. No central authority now exists in the terri- 
tory, the provincial governments being separately 
responsible to the national capital. Uniformity 
and efficiency require that there be a central au- 
thority for military government. 

3. As the existing administrative framework 
will not be replaced, the machinery for military 
government should be built on present adminis- 
trative divisions and following provincial or terri- 
torial lines. This may or may not correspond to 
the disposition of the tactical commands in the 
area. Districts in the interior where no troops will 
be stationed will have to be administered. 

For the foregoing reasons, even in the first 
phase, there should be an administrative line of 
communication on subjects with which the local 
commander would not wish to be distracted from 
the military governor or his deputy to the local 
military administrator, as proposed in your For- 
tune 101. In the later phase good administration 
and economy of effort and personnel may make it 
desirable to centralize lines of authority in a simi- 
lar manner under the military governor. The 
question has no immediate application, but if and 
when it does arise I wish to be free to consider 
it in the light of conditions then existing. Any de- 
cision then made would, of course, have due re- 
gard to the accepted principle of final responsibil- 
ity of the tactical commander. 

A Political Section Held Inappropriate 
Within Military Chain of Command 

[Memo, Dunn for the Secy of State, 5 May 43, OPD files, 
Old. 1, Security (1-38)] 

Sir Ronald [Campbell] asked for further elucida- 
tion with regard to the suggestion in paragraph 
(a) of his memorandum of today's date which 
suggests that a small political or liaison section 
composed of American and British military offi- 
cers be appointed as preferable to the appoint- 
ment of Deputy Chief of Staff to the Commander 
in Chief of the theater. 21 I said that the position 
of the War Department in this respect was that 

21 Elimination of the Political Section originally rec- 
ommended by AFHQ had been called for in the War 
Department message of 7 April (above). The British Offi- 
cer who was G— 4 at AFHQ on 29 April penned an inter- 
esting note on a chart made by the War Office to depict 
the organizational plan favored by the Americans, i.e., 
inclusion of a deputy chief of staff (American), head of 
a military government section, in the chain of command: 
"The objection to this setup is that the expression of 
higher policy may receive a U.S. twist in transmission to 
the executive authority on the ground. . . ." The remedy, 
he further indicated, was to have a direct chain of com- 


as the Commander in Chief of the theater had 
full responsibility and authority for the new oper- 
ation, it seemed perfectly logical to the War De- 
partment that he should have a Deputy Chief of 
Staff appointed particularly for the purpose, that 
it must be remembered that the Commander in 
Chief of the Theater was an Allied Commander 
in Chief acting under instructions and authority 
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and it would 
not seem advisable, therefore, to the War Depart- 
ment to have a political section on his staff as he, 
the theater commander, was acting under joint 
authority of the two governments and that the 
Force Commander, acting in the particular opera- 
tion, was directly under his authority. There 
would not seem to the War Department to be any 
occasion for confusion in such a situation through 
the appointment of a Deputy Chief of Staff to 
the theater commander for the purpose of dealing 
under his direction with the military government 
phase of this particular operation as such a deputy 
commander would not be interposed in authority 

mand from the British Military Governor and the British 
Deputy Military Governor to the C-in-C. Though General 
Eisenhower was American he would be too much pressed 
with other matters to give military government problems 
much attention. See Memo, Brig. R. G. Lewis to the CAO, 
AFHQ, 29 Apr 43, AFHQ, CAO files, Reel 309A. 

between the Commander in Chief and the Force 
Commander but would be acting in the manner 
of an assistant without any authority of his 
own. . . , 22 

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Dec 43, OPD Msg files, 
CM-OUT 10337] 

You will recall that the acceptance by the War 
Department of the Civil Affairs plan for Sicily, 
submitted by Allied Force Headquarters, was 
contingent upon the establishment at AFHQ of a 
Civil Affairs Section. ... It was felt here that 
the successful execution of such a plan would be 
dependent upon a small, efficient group at your 
headquarters to co-ordinate and supervise this 
important and difficult operation. . . 

23 In a note which the War Department had seen, Mac- 
millan, British Resident Minister, had indicated his ex- 
pectation that if a political section to advise the Allied 
C-in-C was adopted, he would be permitted to extend 
the range of the matters on which he would himself ad- 
vise Eisenhower. Macmillan note, Political Questions at 
AFHQ Arising Out of Operation Husky, CAD files, 
Husky file (prior to 1 Jun 43). 

23 The Americans wished to strengthen General Eisen- 
hower's control over civil affairs and keep the civil affairs 
section free from the political complications which seemed 
to characterize the British system, Interv, Weinberg With 
Maj Gen John E. Hull, former DACofS, OPD, 28 Feb 


Should Allied Oficers Be Used in Some 
Italian Administrative Positions? 

[AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan, 24 Mar 43] 

Local Military Administration 

(67) The question of how far down the scale 
of cities and towns it is necessary or advisable to 
go in providing military personnel for the top 
municipal posts is a matter on which the British 
and American systems differ in their emphasis. 
American planning (as evidenced by the disposi- 
tions for the Torch operation) tends to rely more 
on local personnel. The British practice in colonial 
territory has been to rely very little on local per- 
sonnel in the first phase and to replace municipal 
officials in all centers of importance from either a 
civilian or military standpoint. For the proposed 
operation, it is suggested that the line should be 
drawn at the level of towns with a population of 
12,000 to 15,000 or in smaller towns where special 
conditions exist such as presence of combat troops 
or the existence of a port or airport in the vicinity. 

The proper placing of local administrators is 
important not only for the actual operation of the 
municipal governments and services but for the 
effective enforcement of military law and regula- 
tions. Also, the following factors must be borne 
in mind: 

(a) In many towns the Podestas and other top 
officials will have left. 

(b) In others they will be active fascists who will 
be removed. Replacement with satisfactory local 
personnel is a difficult matter without consider- 
able intelligence as to the local situation. 

(c) Communications will be very limited for 
some time; hence control from the provincial 
capitals will be difficult. 

(d) In many cities there will be no garrison of 
combat troops; the military administrators and 
police officers will be the only evidence of Allied 
occupation and authority. 


(68) The final establishment of the civil police 
is a matter which must be determined later. For 


the first stages of the occupation, though, and if 
the M.P.'s are to be relieved of the civil police 
burden, there seems to be no alternative to creat- 
ing an allied civil police staff of considerable size, 
to supervise and reorganize the existing forces. It 
is therefore suggested that civil police personnel 
should be stationed in centers down to and pos- 
sibly somewhat below the population level for 
which administrative officers will be provided, 
that is, as proposed, towns of around 12,000 to 
15,000. Whether civil police functions should ulti- 
mately be administered by an independent Allied 
force with specially recruited personnel — in line 
with the British colonial practice — or should be 
based on the Carabinieri and the other existing 
forces, must be decided on the basis of further 
study or even on the basis of experience in the 
early stages of the occupation. If the Carabinieri 
organization remains substantially intact and lives 
up to its reputation for training and efficiency, the 
latter course is certainly preferable. 24 

President Proposes Replacing Top Fascists by 
Allied Military Officers 

[Undated Memo, Dept of State, as Revised by Roosevelt 
and Transmitted by Leahy, to OPD, 9 Apr 43, CAD files, 
Husky (prior to 1 Jun 43)] 

5. . . . All prefects (Provincial Governors), al- 
though they arc primarily administrators, should 
be removed, and military officers of the occupying 
forces put in their places. . . . 

Lord Rennell Points Out Advantages in In- 
direct System 

[Memo, Rennell, Br Member of Force 141 Ping Staff, for 
Spofford, American Member, 18 Apr 43, ACC files, 

1. There appears to be some confusion of thought 
in such directives as have been received and in 
documents prepared in Washington on the form 
which the Military Government of Horrified 
is to take. 

2. There are broadly speaking two ways in 
which the Government can be conducted, which 
will be familiar to British Administrative per- 
sonnel as "direct" and "indirect" rule. The broad 

"Although the U.S. Field Manual of 1943 states that 
military government personnel should as far as possible 
deal with the inhabitants through indigenous personnel, 
here the President was favoring direct control. On the 
other hand, Lord Rennell's memorandum (below) out- 
lines a theory of indirect control which was a departure 
from the British colonial practice (see above). The dispute 
was not resolved during the planning period but indirect 
control quickly became Allied policy in operations — a fact 
which supported Lord Rennell's arguments. 

distinction between the two systems for our pur- 
poses in Horrified, is whether the Allied person- 
nel in the Civil Administration is wholly 
executive, or undertakes the role of controlling 
and directing the local administrative machine. 

3. This is perhaps best exemplified by taking 
the case of a provincial administration, which 
comes to a head in the person of a Prefect; and 
let us suppose that the Prefect is well disposed 
and wholly cooperative. For the "direct rule" 
system, the Prefect will be replaced by an Allied 
Administrator, who . . . will, himself, issue 
orders ... to the . . . provincial administra- 
tion, and will replace local personnel in the ap- 
pointments of heads of branches and divisions, 
leaving only very subordinate local personnel to 
conduct non-confidential clerical work, book- 
keeping, etc. In this system, the P.C. is in effec- 
tive executive control, with his Allied Subordi- 
nates, of the whole machine. He gives orders to 
the local subordinate personnel himself and 
through his own officers. 

4. Under the system of "indirect control," the 
local provincial administration continues as nearly 
intact as possible, and when a vacancy such as 
that of a Prefect or head of a branch occurs be- 
cause the incumbent is unsatisfactory, or unwill- 
ing to continue in office, and has to be removed, 
his place is filled not by an Allied Civil Affairs 
Officer, but by another local Civil Servant. In this 
system, the Senior Allied Provincial Administra- 
tor .. . sits, not in the chair of the Prefect, but 
in a chair at his side and tells him what the Mili- 
tary Government wants done. The Prefect then 
issues his own orders, to his own subordinates, in 
his own name, at the direction of the Provincial 
Administrators. Allied personnel lower down the 
scale sit in with and supervise the functioning of 
branches and divisions to ensure that orders given 
by the Prefect at the instance of the Provincial Ad- 
ministrator are, in fact, properly carried out. 

5. While there is a great deal to be said for 
and against the "indirect" system, I am obliged to 
recommend the second system and not that of 
"direct" rule. The principal reasons are given 
below : 

(i) The indirect system of rule economises 
in Allied Civil Affairs personnel. Fewer Officers 
are required to control, supervise and give direc- 
tions, than are necessary for their actual execu- 

(ii) Local subordinate personnel is more 
likely to obey the orders of their own superior 
personnel, than those of Allied Officers, who have 
been put into the shoes of their former superiors. 

(iii) Fewer language difficulties will arise. 
In "direct" rule officers will either have to be 


pretty fluent in the local language, or the subordi- 
nate personnel will have to learn English. 

(iv) There is an incentive to local personnel 
to remain at work and work loyally if they have 
a fair chance of being permitted to fill the vacan- 
cies of their superiors who have been removed 
for political reasons, or left the territory alto- 
gether. If these vacancies are filled by Allied per- 
sonnel, there is less incentive for the subordinate 
personnel to carry on, or carry on zealously. 

(v) There is probably less danger of a gen- 
eral strike or sitdown strike of local administra- 
tive personnel, if they feel that their own admin- 
istrative machine is functioning and is respon- 
sible, under direction, of course, for the well being 
of their own general public. 

(vi) Any Administration breakdown will 
tend to be attributed by the general public, under 
the indirect system, more immediately to their 
own Civil servants, than to the Allied Military 

(vii) The local administrative machine will 
be more readily educated and improved by being 
directed, than by being broken up before local 
substitute personnel can be collected in due 
course. I regard this process of education as par- 
ticularly important and I am, by experience, 
acutely conscious of the difficulties of finding any 
reasonably good local civil service personnel to 
replace existing men, if wholesale dismissals or 
resignations take place under a direct rule system. 

(viii) We do not wish to give the appear- 
ance of instituting a government which either 
looks like a colonial government, or gives the im- 
pression of being a prelude to annexation. We 
wish to build up local government on same 
democratic lines, so that eventually the local 
population will administer its own affairs. We 
do not wish to create a void when the time comes 
for the Allies to leave the territory, such as would 
be created if we walked out from a system of 
direct rule. 

6. A decision on the system is of immediate 
importance, since the two alternatives have a di- 
rect bearing on the mechanics of administration. 
I will only give one instance, in the financial field. 

7. Under the direct system, all taxes collected 
would be paid in to the Allied Military Govern- 
ment Treasury and disbursements would be 
made in respect, for instance, of works, relief, and 
wages, by the Allied Military Government Treas- 
ury. In other words, local personnel would come 
on the Allied Military Government payroll in its 
entirety. The budget would then become a single 
territorial budget covering all local receipts and 
expenditures as well as those of the Allied Mili- 
tary Government for personnel and special works 

expenditures. This system not only means remak- 
ing the whole budget structure, but provides the 
least incentive for the local population to pay or 
collect taxes. 

8. Under the indirect system, there would con- 
tinue in existence a local treasury and treasury 
system, in which revenues collected would be 
paid and from which disbursements would be 
made. The Allied Military Government would 
only be responsible, within the limit of what is 
decided, for any deficit in the local budget by 
way of grants in aid, appropriated to each depart- 
ment at the discretion of the Allied Administra- 
tors. I consider that this system would give more 
effective budgetary control, though perhaps less 
control of theft in tax collection, which however 
we would never have the personnel to undertake 
ourselves. A, to my mind, sufficient safeguard in 
this respect, is provided in access of the local ad- 
ministrative personnel and population to the 
Allied Civil Affairs Staff to file complaints of 
speculation [sic] and dishonesty. The innate 
characteristics of the population will ensure that 
such complaints are filed, and probably to a de- 
gree which will constitute a major nuisance. . . . 

Exchange of Ideas Between Two Planners on 
Indirect Rule 

[Memo, Spofiford for Rennell, 19 Apr 43, ACC files, 


2. There are several points which are not clear 
to me: 

(a) I do not see why the factors of budget, fi- 
nancial control, etc., necessarily are dependent on 
the adoption of one system or the other. Books 
could be kept separately for the military com- 
ponent of the government in any event, and on 
our side will probably have to be. 

(b) While the personnel requirements for direct 
rule will be greater, I don't see that there will be 
any very great difference. . . . 

3. The question is one for high level decision 
and may take some time for discussion here and 
in Washington and London. . . . 

[Memo, Rennell for Spofford, 19 Apr 43, ACC files, 


i. Ref. Financial organization: — Under "direct" 
rule the AMGOT finance officers become person- 
ally accountable for all receipts and disburse- 
ments. Under "indirect rule" the local treasuries 
and paying in/out officers remain personally re- 
sponsible. Books will be separate anyway, but 
the budget and account procedure would be quite 


2. Ref. personnel required: — There appear to 
be 64,000 employees in public administration in 
Horrified at present. 380 Allied personnel in- 
cluding police cannot provide enough staff to 
command — but only to guide. 

3. There is to be a fundamental difference in 
the instruction, as I see it, between commanding 
and directing — indeed the difference between 
staff officers' and a regimental officer's duties — 
according to the system adopted. 

Washington Favors Direct and London In- 
direct Control 

[CCS Directive for Sicily Proposed by WD to the BJSM, 
9 Apr 43, CAD files, Husky (prior to 1 Jun 43)] 

5. All prefects and all mayors of important com- 
munities shall be removed and replaced by mili- 
tary officers of the occupying forces. . . . 

[Msg, War Cabinet Offices to Jt Staff Mission, 9 May 43, 
CAD files, Husky (prior to 1 Jun 43)] 

4B. We should prefer the first sentence of para- 
graph 5 [of proposed directive] to run as follows: 
When senior Italian officials, such as prefects and 
mayors of important communities are to be re- 
moved, they shall be replaced, at the discretion 
of the Commander in Chief, by Italians nomi- 
nated by himself and under such supervision and 
such limitations of powers as he may prescribe. 
Since, in practice, the more senior officials will 
almost certainly be active members of the party 
the CinC will bear in mind the necessity of re- 
placing them at the earliest possible moment. . . 

[Memo, Hilldring, Chief, CAD, for BJSM, 11 May 43, 
CAD files, Husky (prior to 1 Jun 43)] 

3. We feel strongly that your paragraph 4B is 
very inadvisable. Imposing on the Commander 
in Chief the responsibility of selecting new Italian 
officials for high positions will subject the mili- 
tary government to political dangers. It is prefer- 
able to have military officers in positions of au- 
thority and their using, in any way desired, any 
Italian officials. . . . 

Draft Message on Issue Prepared for the 

[Draft Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 10 Jun 43, Prepared 
by McCloy, CAD files, Husky (after 1 Jun 43)] 

Understand we have worked out with your peo- 
ple here directive satisfactory to Eisenhower for 
military government of Husky. Only difference 
of view remaining relates to possible use of Ital- 
ians in high positions such as mayors of large 
towns and prefectures. I feel that in the initial 

stages we should avoid all risk of implications 
arising from attempted selection of suitable 
Italians for these important positions. Believe 
much preferable remove any Italians from these 
positions as they are all prominent Fascists and 
replace them with Army officers for time being 
thus avoiding stirring up factions on the ground 
and repercussions at home. Less important jobs 
can continue without adverse effect to be filled by 
Italians or Italian replacements on good behavior. 
Hope you will agree. Wording can be arranged 
promptly and plans made accordingly. . . . 

Churchill Prefers Indirect Control to Even 
Good Gauleiters 

[Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 10 Jun 43, CAD files, 
Husky (after 1 Jun 43)] 

. . . The second point is the degree of American 
and British administration and control which 
should be imposed on newly conquered regions. 
It seems wise to make them run themselves as 
much as possible. Malignant or prominent Fas- 
cists must be removed and we should be pre- 
pared to replace them with trustworthy adminis- 
trators to the extent that these cannot be found 
for our purposes from the local population. I am 
sure that it would be a mistake to flood all these 
places with hundreds of British and American 
gauleiters, however well meaning and well 
trained they may be. 

Of course, it is impossible to foresee in advance 
the nature of local conditions or the temper of 
the people in the conquered regions. It should 
be left to the Supreme Commander to propose 
to our Governments what British and American 
officers he wants and the degree of infusion into 
local life. My personal feelings are that he should 
wish to interfere as little as possible and allow 
things to run themselves, subject always to the 
paramount interests of armies and operations. 

The President Will Leave Issue to Supreme 
Commander's Discretion 

[Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 14 Jun 43, CAD files, 
Husky (after 1 Jun 43)] 

... I agree that in the territory which is oc- 
cupied in the future by our combined forces, the 
Supreme Commander should during the period 
of occupation inform our two Governments what 
American and British officials he desires and the 
purposes for which he wants to use these officials 
in the local administration, and that no other 
civil officials should be sent to his areas except 
those requested by the Supreme Commander. 



British Exception to Principle of a Military 

[Memo, Campbell for Dunn, Dept of State, 5 May 43, 
OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)] 

His Majesty's Government feel that it would be 
reasonable to provide that Mr. Macmillan as 
British Resident Minister at Allied Headquarters 
should be kept currently informed by the Com- 
mander in Chief of all political matters pertain- 
ing to the military administration of the terri- 
tory involved in the operation of Husky and that 
he should be recognized as the channel between 
General Eisenhower and His Majesty's Govern- 
ment on all political matters, in which capacity 
he would whenever necessary be called into con- 
sultation and entitled to offer advice. 

War and State Departments Oppose Political 
Representatives in Chain of Communications 

[Ltr, Dunn to Hull, 5 May 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security 

Sir Ronald Campbell, Minister Counselor of the 
British Embassy, today handed me the attached 
paper [above] which he said was to be con- 
sidered as a memorandum of our oral conversa- 
tion on the subject of the organization of the 
military government for Husky. 

The War Department had been anxious to re- 
ceive this reply from the British on the subject, 
and I had already arranged to see Mr. McCIoy, 
Assistant Secretary of War, in his office this aft- 
ernoon at 3:30. I took this matter up with the 
War Department at that time. Mr. McCIoy had 
with him when I arrived General Hilldring, 
Colonel Haskell and Lieutenant Colonel 
[Charles] Poletti. After discussing the British 
memorandum, Mr. McCIoy stated that the posi- 
tion of the War Department with regard to the 
lOrganization of the military government for 
Husky was as follows: 

That there was to be no civilian participation in 
the organization of the military government; that 
after agreement between the two governments the 
directives as to policy and operation of the mili- 
tary government were to be conveyed by the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in 
Chief of the Allied forces in North Africa; that 
the Commander in Chief of the Allied forces was 
the officer who was responsible for and who exer- 
cised authority with regard to the military gov- 
ernment of Husky under the authority of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff; that the Force Com- 
mander was to exercise the authority in the par- 
ticular area concerned under the direction and 
authority of the Commander in Chief of the 
theater; that any questions which arose in the 
political field with regard to the operation or with 
regard to the military government were to be 
matters of discussion between the two govern- 
ments and that the channel of communication 
to and from the Commander in Chief of the thea- 
ter with regard to such matters was to be through 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff. There is to be no 
civilian participation in the military government 
aspects of the operation from the time the ques- 
tions were discussed as [sic] between the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff of each government and their 
respective governments. 

Immediately upon returning to my office at 
5:30 today, I telephoned Sir Ronald Campbell 
and gave him the position of this Government as 
stated above after consultation with the War 
Department in the premises. Sir Ronald said 
that his Government was quite clear on the point 
that the directive to the Commander in Chief of 
the theater would be sent to him by the Com- 
bined Chiefs of Staff here after agreement had 
been reached with regard to its terms by the two 
governments, but he inquired what the procedure 
would be in the event of political questions aris- 
ing during the operation which had not been 
foreseen in the directive. I told him that it was 
the position of the War Department that if such 
political questions arose in the field they would, 
if not susceptible of decision by the Commander 
in Chief under his general instructions, be trans- 
mitted by him to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
for further instructions. The Combined Chiefs 
of Staff could in such an instance, if they saw 
the necessity therefor, consult with the respective 
governments with a view to arriving at a settle- 
ment of such questions. . . . 25 

[Memo, McCIoy for Hopkins, 25 May 43, CAD files, 
Husky (prior to 1 Jun 43)] 

We have about come to rest in our discussions 
with the British on policies and procedures to 
guide the combined military government authori- 
ties in Husky. There have been a number of 

23 A difficulty not foreseen by the War Department was 
the frequency with which, as matters developed, the thea- 
ter was compelled to wait a considerable time before 
receiving new instructions from Washington. 


tough questions, but all seems now to be settled 
between us except one — and that is the presence 
of a high political representative on the ground to 
represent and counsel the British Government 
on political matters which may arise from the 

We have taken the position that this is to be a 
military government, that it cannot be part politi- 
cal and part military government if we are to 
avoid the difficulties of our African set-up. The 
presence of Macmillan or a similar figure close 
to Headquarters muddies the picture badly and 
is totally unnecessary in any event because the 
British have appointed a political figure to be 
their Chief Civil Affairs Officer (Lord Rennell) 
with the rank of Major General. 

Our plan contemplates no political figure at all 
with all questions raised and determined with 
and by the Combined Chiefs of Staff through 
which the respective governments may express 
their views. Macmillan, like Casey, is a member 
of the Cabinet. He is not on Eisenhower's staff. 
The Military Governor is British, his Chief Civil 
Affairs Officer is British, and if in addition there 
is a British Cabinet member on the ground to 
'advise on political questions' the whole character 
of the operation is such as to give the thing such 
a strongly British flavor as to destroy the Presi- 
dent's directive for a joint rather than a senior 
partner arrangement. 

The State Department opposes the introduc- 
tion of Macmillan in the Husky scene. They are 
not using Murphy for anything except North 
Africa and do not wish or intend to place any 
political representative in the field. They want to 
deal in the initial stages entirely through the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff. . . . 

The English counter with the statement that 
Macmillan has no official position, is merely on 
the ground so that his Government may get the 
benefit of his first-hand impressions which they 
would want to get in any case by reason of his 
ability and experience. They say that all they ask 
is that he should be able to look at all the cables 
as they come and go and communicate his 
thoughts to his Government or to Eisenhower as 
may seem desirable. While this is all they ask, it 
is a great deal, because you simply cannot have a 
Cabinet Minister on the ground, particularly one 
of Macmillan's character and ability, without his 
taking part in the play. . . . 

Since I feel that the introduction of political 
representatives will prematurely introduce politi- 
cal questions and thus destroy just what we are 
seeking to accomplish, I wish you would see what 
can be done leading to an agreement on the part 
of the British with our position. . . . 

President To Be Requested To Take Up the 
Issue With Churchill 

[Draft Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 10 Jun 43] 

. . . Also think it inadvisable have any political 
officers not in uniform connected with Husky 
operation as it tends to confusion of authority 
and counsels. We can better maintain all deci- 
sions made purely on military basis if no diplo- 
matic or political figures are involved. Under- 
stand urgent necessity keeping Macmillan in 
North Africa but feel that neither of us should 
have representatives in Husky operation in initial 
stages. Agreeable have Macmillan kept in- 
formed by Eisenhower of matters relating to ad- 
ministration of Husky but sole chain of commu- 
nication during military government should be 
from military governor to Eisenhower to Com- 
bined Chiefs of Staff and all instructions from 
respective governments should move solely 
through Combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisen- 

Why All the Dither Over Macmillan? 
[Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 10 Jun 43] 

The first point is about Macmillan. He is my 
personal representative just as Murphy is yours. 
They get on well with each other and with Gen- 
eral Eisenhower in all subjects relating to the 
"Torch" area. I see no reason why precisely the 
same relationship should not continue in the 
Husky period nor why it should not apply to the 
larger areas which might come under our joint 
control. Formal correspondence and orders 
would go through the Combined Staffs, but it is 
essential that the heads of governments have im- 
mediate and intimate information about events 
in the civil and political sphere. All this is work- 
ing easily and smoothly now and all that is 
necessary is a statement from you and me that 
the present relationship of our representatives to 
the Supreme Commander will not be altered by 
new acquisitions of territory and will cover that 
territory. I have the definite impression that this 
will be agreeable to Eisenhower. . . . 

The Two Ministers May Remain but for 
Purely Informational Functions 
[Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 14 Jun 43] 
... I agree that the equal status of Murphy and 
Macmillan should continue without change dur- 
ing the Husky and post-HusKY periods, and also 
that they should continue to communicate early 
and intimate information regarding the political 
and civil sphere to the heads of their respective 
governments, in each case of course informing 
the Supreme Commander. . . . 



British Urge That Political Reform in War- 
time Be Tempered by Realism 

[Msg, War Cabinet Office to BJSM, 9 May 43, Regarding 
29 Apr American Draft of proposed CCS Directive on 
Sicily, 20 CAD files, Husky (prior to 1 Jun 43) ] 

4. As regards Section I, we have the following 

A. ... we suggest that an additional para- 
graph might be inserted after paragraph 6, or in 
whatever other place in the draft is thought ap- 
propriate, on the following lines: — The ideal 
would be to get rid of present office holders . . . 
and set up a complete new local administration, 
definitely anti-Fascist in character while using the 
old framework of machinery and local govern- 
ment. But it would obviously be difficult in prac- 
tice to find and keep a local government working 
smoothly so as to relieve the Commander in Chief 
of all trouble and anxiety as regards civil 
population. 27 . . . 

C. Paragraph 6. For the last sentence we 
should prefer the following to be substituted: — 
No political activity whatsoever shall be counte- 
nanced. 28 . . . 

E. Paragraph 8. We think the last sentence 
should be omitted. It is dangerous at so early a 
stage in the occupation of hostile territory to lay 
down as a principle that the enemy is to have 
freedom of speech and press. 29 

26 The American draft had been prepared by repre- 
sentatives of. the State, Treasury, and War Departments. 
Its basic principles were taken chiefly from the State De- 
partment's March memorandum on a plan for military 
government in Sicily (Note 15 and sec. 2, above). The 
draft has not been reproduced inasmuch as, except for 
some changes brought about by discussions with the 
British, it is identical with the final CCS directive given 

37 The supplement suggested was to the paragraphs 
concerning defascistization. After some debate the British 
proposal, including a distinction between beneficial and 
nonbeneficial Fascist organizations, was accepted in the 
form represented by paragraph 6a of the final directive. 

M The American draft had stated simply that no politi- 
cal activity was to be countenanced prior to the issuance 
of a further directive. The British modification was 

29 General Hilldring disagreed with the British on this 
issue, pointing out that the American draft included the 
safeguard phrase "consistent with military necessity." 
Memo, Hilldring for BJSM, it May 43, CAD files, 
Husky (prior to 1 Jun 43.) In this case the British de- 
ferred to the American view, see final directive, par. 8, 

Divergent Views on the Exchange Rate 

[Memo, Poletti, CAD, for the Chief, CAD, 10 May 43, 
CAD files, Husky (prior to 1 Jun 43)] 

The British contend that the rate should be 480 
lire per pound sterling or 120 per dollar. 


1. The rate should be realistic — one that can be 
maintained for a substantial period without the 
necessity of having the local currency insulated 
from the currency on the mainland. 

2. Black market quotations range from 526 to 
789 per pound. London believes lire will fall 
below 1000 in case of our invasion. 

3. While the official prices of staple commodi- 
ties show a rise of 50 to 100% over 1939, these 
have limited significance because a black market 
exists, although to what extent is not known. 

4. It would be unfair to the friendly Arab 
population in Tripolitania to maintain the pres- 
ent 480 rate while giving a more favorable rate to 
enemy territory. 

5. If the rate is too favorable, the local popula- 
tion will jump to the conclusion the rate cannot 
be maintained and it will hoard dollar and ster- 
ling currency thereby bringing about a fall in the 

The United States contends the rate should be 
240 lire per pound or 60 per dollar or on the out- 
side 300 per pound and 75 per dollar. 


1. We believe the decision of the President that 
the military administration of the area be predi- 
cated upon a reasonable benevolent attitude to- 
ward the people dictates the rate we propose. 
Such a benevolent attitude will facilitate military 
operations and save lives of soldiers. 

2. The rate in HusKY-land can be a different 
rate from the one eventually fixed by us for the 
mainland. . . . 

3. The lire in the eyes of the local population is 
still considered as worth more than five cents 
(official rate is $.0526). Hence 60 or 75 lire per 
dollar will be a tremendous jolt as it is. . . . 

4. We desire to impress on the people in 
HusKY-land, as well as those on the Italian main- 
land and in the occupied countries that the 
United Nations do not intend to destroy property 
values. . . . 


5- When the British fixed a 480 rate in Tripoli- 
tania, they advised us that it was not to be taken 
as a precedent. We desire a rate which is not as 
favorable as the French rate in North Africa and 
yet not too far away from it. . . . We think the 
friendly Arabs will not be too greatly upset by our 
proposed rate. 

6. We do not believe British reason #5 is 
sound. Whatever dollar and sterling currency 
gets into the hands of the people, it will be 
hoarded regardless of the rate. Of course, there 
will be only a limited use of yellow seal dollars 
spearhead currency and no sterling at all. 

CCS Finally Ends Debates With 
a Directive for Sicily 

[CCS Directive, Organization and Operation of Military 
Government for Husky, CCS 24, 7/5/D, 28 Jun 43,*° 
CAD files, CCS Papers, Opn Husky] 

This directive has been agreed upon by the gov- 
ernments of the United States and Great Britain 
and is transmitted for your guidance in the or- 
ganization and operation of military govern- 
ment in the territory involved in operation 
Husky. You will be guided in all matters of gen- 
eral policy, such as those of a political, fiscal or 
economic nature, solely by the directives you will 
receive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Con- 
sistent with military necessity, you will conform 
to the guides herein set forth. 

Section I 
Political Guides 

1. There shall be a military administration 
which will show every characteristic of an Allied 
undertaking. Both the American and British 
flags shall be displayed at headquarters and posts 
of the military government. The administration 
shall be identical throughout the area. 

2. The military administration of Horrified 
shall contain no political agencies or political rep- 
resentatives of either government. 

3. Other representatives of civilian agencies of 
either government shall not participate in the ini- 
tial stages. Their later participation will be sub- 

30 Because of the length of time consumed in Anglo- 
American discussions on unsettled points, the directive 
was sent to AFHQ in installments to avoid unnecessary 
delay. The bulk of it went forward on 31 May; on 
10 June paragraph 6a was dispatched; finally on 28 June, 
after paragraphs 2 and 5 had been agreed upon by the 
two governments, the complete directive as given above 
was sent to Eisenhower. The CCS directive is of basic im- 
portance for Allied policy not only in Sicily but also in 
mainland Italy, to which it was later extended. 

ject, as to time and extent, to decision by the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

4. The administration shall be benevolent with 
respect to the civilian population so far as con- 
sistent with strict military requirements. The 
civilian population is tired of war, resentful of 
German overlordship, and demoralized by the 
Fascist regime, and will therefore be responsive 
to a just and efficient administration. It should 
be made clear to the local population that mili- 
tary occupation is intended: (1) to deliver the 
people from the Fascist regime which led them 
into the war; and (2.) to restore Italy as a free 

5. The replacement of any prefects and mayors 
of important communities who may be removed 
vvill rest with the military commander. He will 
decide whether the functioning of the military 
government is better serviced by the appointment 
of officers of the occupation forces or by the use 
of the services of Italian officials. No actual ap- 
pointment of Italians to important posts, as dis- 
tinct from their temporary use, will be made until 
it has been approved by the two governments 
through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

It shall be made clear to any Italians who 
may eventually be appointed to important posts 
and to all other governmental officials and em- 
ployees that their continued employment is solely 
on the basis of satisfactory co-operation, perform- 
ance and behavior. 

6. The Fascist Party organization shall be im- 
mediately dissolved. The entire Fascist Party 
leadership (the "hierarchy") from the top down 
to the local secretaries shall be removed from any 
post of authority. The Fascist militia and all 
Fascist youth organizations shall be abolished. 
Fascist leaders and pro-Nazi partisans shall be 
arrested. Fascist doctrine and propaganda in 
any form shall be prohibited. No political ac- 
tivity whatsoever shall be countenanced. 

a. The first objective must be to get and keep 
a local government working smoothly so as to 
relieve the Commander in Chief of all trouble and 
anxiety as regards civil population. The following 
may serve as guidance: 

A distinction should be drawn between (a) such 
organizations as do not exist for the benefit and 
security of the people, e.g., the party organization 
itself and all purely Fascist accretions which have 
been grafted onto the local government system, 
and (b) those organizations which are of direct 
benefit to the people and whose removal would 
adversely affect the efficiency of the administra- 
tion. The former should be suppressed, while 


there is a prima facie case for maintaining the 

7. War criminals charged by the United Na- 
tions (names will appear on list to be furnished 
by you) shall be imprisoned and held subject to 
further directive. 

8. All laws which discriminate on the basis of 
race, color or creed shall be forthwith annulled. 
Freedom of religious worship shall be promul- 
gated. To the extent that military interests are 
not prejudiced, freedom of speech and press shall 
be instituted. 

9. Measures shall be taken for the prompt re- 
lease of political prisoners. Upon their release, 
they shall be cautioned that political activity on 
their part, during that period of military govern- 
ment, will not be tolerated. The Special Tribunal 
for the Defense of the State shall be abolished. 

10. Neither local political personalities nor or- 
ganized political groups, however sound in senti- 
ment, shall have any part in determining the 
policies of the administration. It is essential to 
avoid any commitments to, or negotiations with, 
any local political elements. Italian political lead- 
ers in exile shall have no part in the administra- 

11. The exercise of the powers of the Crown 
shall be suspended during the period of military 

12. Consistent with military necessity, the posi- 
tion of the Church and of all religious institutions 
shall be respected and all efforts made to preserve 
the local Archives, Historical and Classical Mon- 
uments and objects of Art. 

13. A plan shall be prepared by you to prevent 
transfer of title of valuable real and personal 
pro$srty which are intended to defeat, evade or 
avoid the responsibilities, fines or punishments 
imposed or to be imposed on present owners or 
the national^overnment. 

14. Propaganda will be in accordance with 
directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

Section II 
Monetary and Fiscal Guides 

1. During the initial period of operations, the 
United States task force will use yellow seal dol- 
lars and regular United States coins. The British 
military forces will use British Military Authority 
[B.M.A.] notes and British coins, as well as local 
currency in their possession. Yellow seal dollars 
and B.M.A. notes are available in NATOUSA 
and additional shipments can be procured when 
desired from the United States Treasury and the 
British Treasury. Records shall be kept of the 

amount of currencies used by the United and 
British forces. 

2. The use of yellow seal dollars and B.M.A, 
notes for army payments to troops and for local 
procurement shall cease and Allied military 
[A.M.] lire shall be used in their place as soon 
as available, unless the military government de- 
cides that the time is not propitious for such 
change. The United States Treasury will have 
this A.M. lire currency ready for shipment to any 
point desired within four days after zero hour. 
Records shall be kept of the amount of A.M. lire 

3. A.M. lire currency is not intended to replace 
local lire currency already in circulation, but is 
designed to supplement it. 

4. The rate of exchange between the U.S. dol- 
lar and the B.M.A. note shall be four dollars to 
one pound and both currencies shall be made in- 
terchangeable at that rate. The United States 
Treasury will make the necessary arrangements 
with the British Treasury. 

5. The U.S. yellow seal currency and the 
B.M.A. notes shall be withdrawn from circula- 
tion as soon as it can be satisfactorily accom- 
plished. The date for this withdrawal shall be 
determined by the military government after the 
operation has begun. 

6. The rate of exchange to be decreed on D 
Day shall be 100 lire to the dollar and 400 lire 
to the pound sterling. A proclamation shall be 
issued requiring all persons to accept the U.S. 
yellow seal dollars and B.M.A. notes at the de- 
creed rate. Transactions at any other rate shall be 
prohibited. Holders of local and A.M. lire notes 
or deposits are not entitled to obtain dollar or 
pound notes without special permission. They 
shall obtain dollars or pound notes or any other 
foreign currency or foreign exchange credits only 
in accordance with exchange regulations issued 
by the military government. 

7. All foreign financial and foreign trade 
transactions and all exports and imports of cur- 
rency shall be prohibited except as permitted 
under regulations to be issued by the military 

8. Under the military government there shall 
be established within the area an A.M. Financial 
Agency. It may establish sub-agencies where 
deemed desirable. 

Insofar as its operations relate to the provi- 
sion of currencies for the pay and other cash 
requirements of military formations of either 
Army, it shall draw the necessary resources from 
the military government currency reserve and 
will record the debit against the Army concerned 


in the currency of issue. It is authorized to accept 
deposits from finance officers and from military 
personnel of the Allied Armies. Insofar as its op- 
erations relate to civil administration, it shall 
draw on the currency reserve and debit against 
the military government. 

If found practicable, and desirable, the Bank 
of Sicily under the direct control of the Military 
Governor will be designated as agent for the A.M. 
Financial Agency. The Military Governor and 
other Allied Military Authorities, when satisfied 
that the Bank of Sicily is under adequate control, 
may use that bank for official business, and by 
making credits available to it by providing it 
with A.M. lire notes, place that bank in a position 
to finance other banks and branches for the con- 
duct of their business as approved by the military 
government. When other effective banking facili- 
ties are not available, the A.M. Financial Agency 
shall be empowered to make loans. Those shall 
be restricted to lire loans except in very special 

The military government will control and 
direct all receipts and disbursements for civil ad- 
ministration purposes, whether by U.S. or British 
civil affairs officers, and through the A.M. Finan- 
cial Agency, will provide all funds of whatever 
currency and receive all revenues and cash re- 
ceipts. Thus all civil affairs officers will draw 
funds only from the A.M. Financial Agency. 

The records of the A.M. Financial Agency 
shall indicate in all cases in what currency receipts 
were obtained or disbursement made. 

9. Upon taking over an area the military au- 
thorities shall proceed immediately to: 

a. Close all banks and financial institutions and 
place them under military custody. 

b. Declare a general moratorium. 

c. Impound or block for future disposal the funds 
of enemy government agencies, including govern- 
ment banks. 

d. Seal all vaults and safety deposit boxes. 

e. Obtain an inventory of the assets of the banks 
as quickly as practicable. 

10. Holdings of gold, foreign currencies and 
foreign securities, all national funds and the 
funds of Fascist political organizations shall be 
taken into custody as quickly as possible, and 
shall be deposited with the A.M. Financial 
Agency or banks designated by the military 

11. Banks should be encouraged to reopen for 
business under the military government if and 
when it deems such action desirable. No gov- 
ernment or private bank or agency shall be au- 
thorized to issue bank notes or lire currency. 

Access to safety deposit boxes or vaults will be 
allowed only when a proper system of supervision 
has been instituted. Gold, foreign currencies and 
foreign securities, and valuable papers, shall be 
withheld from the owner against accredited 

12. Before banks are reopened, it should be 
made possible for them to arrange loans from 
banks or agencies designated by the military 
government. The lending bank may require as 
collateral any or all of the assets of the borrowing 
bank or of the directors thereof, and may accept, 
as collateral, obligations of the national govern- 
ment or of its subdivisions. 

13. Except where special permission is granted, 
local banks shall be permitted only lire accounts, 
but may accept, at the decreed rate of exchange, 
yellow seal dollars and B.M.A. notes which they 
shall turn in as directed in exchange for local or 
A.M. lire at the decreed rate of exchange. 

14. The military government shall have au- 
thority to maintain the existing tax laws and to 
raise such contributions for the administration of 
the country as are consistent with international 
custom and usage. All national tax receipts shall 
be deposited in the A.M. Financial Agency or in 
banks designated by the military government. 

15. All branches of the National Insurance In- 
stitute shall be placed under military control and 
its revenues made available to the military 

16. The railways, postal, telegraph and tele- 
phone services, radio and all government mo- 
nopolies shall be placed under military control 
and their revenues made available to the military 

17. None of the tax or other revenues shall be 
used for the payment of principal or interest on 
national government obligations. 

Section III 
Economic Guides 

1. Measures shall prompdy be undertaken to 
enable the country's own services of production 
and supply to assure as far as possible the provi- 
sioning of the local population. You are author- 
ized to furnish from all stocks available to you 
such supplies to the civilian population as mili- 
tary requirements may permit. These supplies, 
in so far as feasible, shall be introduced for sale 
through existing commercial channels under 
rigid military control. Direct relief shall be em- 
ployed only where necessary. 

2. You will have the responsibility for the 
procurement of materials deemed essential to re- 


establish the various utilities and maintain agri- 
cultural production. You will also have the re- 
sponsibility for the procurement of such strategic 
materials as may be needed for export for the use 
of the United Nations. No provisions for such 
materials will be made except on requisitions 
from AFHQ. 

3. Maximum prices and rationing of impor- 
tant staple commodities shall be quickly estab- 
lished. Black market practices and hoarding shall 
be severely punished. 

4. If found necessary by the military authori- 
ties in order to avoid the sudden disruption of 
internal economy, provincial and interprovincial 
associations of employers and employees may be 
temporarily continued, except that Fascist or 

otherwise objectionable officers thereof shall be 
removed, and except that objectionable features 
thereof shall be abolished. The Fascist corpora- 
tions and their councils shall be abolished. The 
military government should give careful atten- 
tion to the matter of sound, fair and voluntary 
labor relations and shall, if necessary, fix hours 
and wages of labor. 

5. A system of control shall immediately be 
established for the import and export of goods by 
local business concerns and a license required for 
such shipments. In determining what exports 
shall be permitted, paramount consideration shall 
be granted to the needs of the military forces and 
the local population. Exports shall be permitted 
only to friendly countries. 


Detailed Planninc and Further Problems of 
Reconciling Two Systems 

[Spofford Rpt] 

Detailed Planning 

Approval of the basic plan had been obtained, 
subject to . . . reservations . . . , by April 15 
and the nucleus planning staff, consisting of 
Lord Rennell, Lt. Col. Maxwell and Lt. Col. 
Spofford, commenced amplification of the de- 
tailed plan. The first step consisted in adapting 
the plan (excluding the Appreciation) to the 
form of an instrument which could be promul- 
gated as an order from Force 141 to the two task 
forces. This involved conferences with the other 
sections of the planning staff at 141 Force, in 
the course of which the division of functions be- 
tween military government and the service 
units was discussed, elaborated and agreed upon. 
For example, it was agreed at conference with 
Gen. McClure, INC [Information and Censor- 
ship Section], that press, propaganda and censor- 
ship, would be handled by INC in close liaison, 
however, with AMG. It was also agreed that 
signal communications would be the sole re- 
sponsibility of the signal units until a date to be 
determined after the invasion. Similar decisions 
were reached in the case of electric utilities, engi- 
neering, railways and transportation and like 

With the removal of the planning staff from 
Ecole Normale at Bouzarea to Chrea, liaison of- 
ficers were left at 141 Force to continue the neces- 
sary close contacts with the planning staff at 141 


Force. It was found necessary for members of 
the planning staff, particularly on the supply side, 
to maintain offices at Bouzarea in order to be 
present at the planning conferences. 

As a result of these discussions a plan was 
drafted and approved by the various branches at 
141 Force and was published as an order of Gen- 
eral Alexander on 1 May 1943. . . . 31 

The two task forces, known as 343 Force (A) 
and 545 Force (B), had established headquarters 
at Mostaganem and Cairo. In order to acquaint 
their planning and operating staffs with the pro- 
posed military government plans Col. Thome 
Thorne (B) went to Cairo early in May where he 
discussed the plan and Lt. Col. Maxwell and 
Lt. Col. Spofford went to Mostaganem with the 
draft plan at the same time. These discussions 
were, of course, preliminary since the SCAO's 
[Senior Civil Affairs Officers] and staffs attached 
to the task forces went to the task force head- 
quarters as soon as possible and developed task 
force plans within the framework of the basic 
plan in consultation with the task force staffs. 
Lt. Col. Charles Poletti, designated as SCAO 
7th Army [U.S. Seventh Army, Lt. Gen. George 
S. Patton, Jr., Comdg], arrived in Mostaganem 
on approximately 15 June and immediately un- 
dertook the job of task force planning while 
Group Capt. [C. E.] Benson, designated as 
SCAO 8th Army, undertook the same function 
at 545 Force Headquarters in Cairo. 

31 The plan was incorporated into a manual entitled 
AMGOT Plan, Proclamation, and Instructions. The 
September 1943 edition has been used in this volume. 

Concerning the detailed planning which was 
conducted largely at Chrea several important gen- 
eralizations can be made: 

(a) Every effort was made so that the instruc- 
tions issued would be as simple as possible and 
would involve a workable compromise between 
British and American practice in those cases 
where the practice was different. 

(b) Only so much of the detailed plans could be 
disclosed, for security reasons, to the officers in- 
tended to carry them out as was absolutely 

(c) Each division developed its plans and then 
prepared detailed and specific instructions for 
the guidance of its staff and the CAO's who, at 
least in the first instance, would have to carry 
those instructions out. All of these instructions 
together with the proclamations were then in- 
corporated in a so-called AMG Manual, a copy 
of which was issued to each CAO. . . . Subse- 
quendy the AMG plan, the proclamations issued 
by the Military Governor, general orders issued 
by the CCAO, and the instructions to field per- 
sonnel as amended were printed and incorporated 
in an AMG Manual. . . . 

Legal Planning 

. . . During the planning stage a very large 
share of the work fell to the Legal Division un- 
der the very able leadership of Lt. Col. Wil- 
liam C. Chanler. The divisions dealing with 
economic, financial, police, medical and other 
problems of government were on solid ground 
because of the more or less international and uni- 
versally recognized means for dealing with these 
problems. However, in the field of international 
law and the procedures relating to military gov- 
ernment, there could be considerable difference 
of opinion as to the proper or desirable course to 
follow. It was for the Legal Division to assure 
unified planning, unified action and satisfactory 
results in these matters. The Legal Division com- 
menced its work at the end of April. It first ex- 
plored the legal procedures in use in England 
and the United States and compared them with 
a view to the preparation of the proclamations 
and general orders which were required to legis- 
late in Sicily. It was found, particularly in con- 
nection with the Anglo-Saxon system of justice, 
that the fundamental concepts were the same in 
each country. Since this was the first time in 
history that a single administration formed of 
officers of separate armies belonging to separate 
powers was attempting to conduct military gov- 
ernment it was most important that all points of 
view should be considered before the proclama- 
tions were drafted and that thorough training 

should be given to officers of both nationalities 
in the directives that they were to administer and 
follow because of the possibility that these might 
vary from ideas with which they were familiar. It 
was also found at the outset that British and 
American practice was very similar concerning 
problems of international law and the rights and 
obligations of an occupying power. 

It was found by all divisions, including the 
Legal Division, that the amount of intelligence 
available about the country to be occupied was 
extremely meager and inaccurate and that much 
of that which was available could not readily be 
passed on to the officers who were going to ad- 
minister military government for security rea- 
sons. However, as a result of continuous delibera- 
tions during the months of May and June by 
D Day 12 proclamations had been prepared and 
printed. . . , 32 

Owing to the limited amount of equipment 
which officers attached to the combat troops could 
carry, it was decided that only three proclama- 
tions would be taken ashore by them in the first 
instance; i.e., the announcement of occupation, 
the definition of crimes against the Allied Mili- 
tary Government and the creation of the cur- 
rency carried by the troops as legal tender. The 
remainder of the proclamations were issued and 
posted after the assault wave had passed each 

While the proclamations were being written 
by some officers, others set up a system of mili- 
tary courts together with simple but comprehen- 
sive rules of procedure. These rules of procedure 
formed a compromise between American and 
British practice. After they had been agreed upon 
a period of training was given to the legal officers 
at Chrea in the newly established procedure so 
that the operation of the courts would be uniform 
and would not only do justice to those coming 
before them but would give the public the im- 
pression that justice was being done. . . . 

The First Organization for Allied Military 

[AFHQ Admin Memo 35, 1 May 43, CAD files, Husky 
(prior to 1 Jun 43), Bk. 2] 

I Establishment of Allied Military Government 
of Occupied Territory {AMGOT) 

Announcement is made of the establishment of 
an organization for Allied Military Government 
of Occupied Territory (AMGOT). Functions of 

82 These proclamations formed the basic legislative 
structure under which occupied territory was to be gov- 
erned. Spofford Rpt. 


AMGOT are placed under the direct supervision 
of the Commanding General, Force 141. 

II Functions and Objectives 

The purpose of AMGOT will be to adminis- 
ter the Allied Military Government of Horrified 
under the Military Governor of the territory in 
accordance with rules and usage of international 

The objectives of AMGOT will be: 

a. To insure the security of the occupying forces 
and their lines of communication; and to facilitate 
this operation. 

b. To restore law and order and normal condi- 
tions among the civil population as soon as pos- 
sible, procure the necessary food supplies for them 
and where necessary provide relief and mainte- 
nance for destitutes within available resources. 

c. To relieve combat troops of the necessity of 
providing for civil administration. 

d. To assist in making available to the occupying 
forces the economic resources of the occupied 

e. Through efficient government of the territory 
and the application of the policies toward the civil 
population laid down by the Commander in 
Chief, to promote political and military objectives 
of the Allied Forces in connection with future 

III Military Governor 

General Sir Harold Alexander, as Command- 
ing General, Force 141, is hereby designated 
Military Governor of Horrified. He will be re- 
sponsible to the Commander in Chief for the con- 
duct of the military government of the territory 
which will be administered through AMGOT. 

IV Amgot Organization 

a. Chief Civil Affairs Officer %i and Deputy 
Chief Civil Affairs Officer. Chief Civil Affairs 
Officer will advise the Military Governor on ques- 
tions relating to the military government of 
Horrified. He will be Chief of AMGOT, and as 
such will be responsible to the Military Governor 
for the military administration of the territory. 

There will be a Deputy Chief Civil Affairs 
Officer (DCCAO) who will be Deputy Chief 
of AMGOT. 

b. Special Divisions. There will be initially 
six special divisions as follows: 

" The original plan had used the title Deputy Military 
Governor. At the suggestion of Lord Rennell this was 
changed to Chief Civil Affairs Officer to accord with a 
recent change in British terminology. Other changes were 
also made at his suggestion. Msg, AFHQ/CAD, 11 Apr 
43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 6633. 

Legal Division 
Financial Division 
Civilian Supply Division 
Public Health Division 
Public Safety Division 
Enemy Property Division 

The general functions of these divisions will be 
to give advice to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer on 
questions in their respective fields; to furnish 
special personnel for the existing administrative 
organizations in the territory; to provide advisers 
and assistants to local Civil Affairs Officers as di- 
rected by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer; and, as 
far as they are called on to do so by the Chief 
Civil Affairs Officer, to execute the functions per- 
taining to their subjects. The particular functions 
of the special divisions and the organization 
thereof will be as determined by the Military 
Governor and included in the detailed opera- 
tional plan hereinafter referred to. 

c. Advisers. Advisers on special subjects will 
be appointed as required by the Military 

d. Civil Affairs Officers. The local military 
administration of the territory will be conducted 
through Civil Affairs Officers who will be sta- 
tioned in important cities and towns in the terri- 
tory. The general functions of the Civil Affairs 
Officers will be: to continue in operation provin- 
cial and municipal administration and essential 
local services, utilizing existing personnel wher- 
ever possible; to publish proclamations and ordi- 
nances, and in conjunction with Civil Police Offi- 
cers to enforce proclamations, orders, etc., of 
military authority and to ensure that civil laws 
are respected; to issue local regulations to ensure 
security and local order; to organize and hold 
military courts; to co-ordinate with combat units 
in requisitioning, procurement, and billeting in 
the local area; and to assist local unit com- 
manders in any other matters involving the civil 

For purposes of administration, there may 
be created regions and provinces, the boundaries 
of which shall be according to the existing terri- 
torial subdivisions or otherwise, as may be 

e. Civil Police. All civil police functions in 
the territory shall be exercised by the Civil Police 
Officers (C.P.O.'s) who will be stationed in 
important cities and towns in the territory. The 
general functions of the C.P.O.'s will be: to take 
over and supervise the administration and con- 
trol of the existing police forces; to set up patrols 
for security in conjunction with combat units 
where necessary; to co-ordinate with military in- 


telligence and military police officers; and to as- 
sist the Civil Affairs Officers in enforcing military 
law locally. 

V Relation of AMGOT Personnel to Command- 
ers, Combat Units, or Formations 

During the assault and initial phases of any 
operations in which AMGOT is concerned, 
AMGOT personnel assigned to Task Forces will 
operate as staff officers of their commanders. Tac- 
tical commanders shall have final responsibility 
and authority; provided however, that an ad- 
ministrative line of communication directly from 
the Chief Civil Affairs Officer to local military 
administrators may be established and authority 
delegated to such administrators at the discretion 
of the G.O.C. [General Officer Commanding], 
Force 141. 

VI Plan of Operations 

Subject to the provisions of this Memoran- 
dum, the organization of AMGOT and its 
method of operation shall be as determined by 
the Military Governor who shall cause to be pre- 
pared an operational plan for submission to the 
Commander in Chief for approval.. 

VII Assignment of Chief and Deputy Chief of 

Announcement is made of the assignment of 
Major General Lord Rennell to be Chief Civil 
Affairs Officer of Horrified and Chief of 
AMGOT: and Lt. Col. Charles M. Spofford to 
be Acting Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer of 
Horrified and Acting Deputy Chief of AMGOT. 

A Question of Semantics 

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 27 May 43, OPD files, 311.23, 
Security, sec. 1] 

. . . U.S. Authorities object to use of word 
"AMGOT" for psychological reasons. U.S. and 
British Army Staff here suggest some other ab- 
breviation such as "AMG" be used in future or- 
ders correspondence and markings of sup- 
plies. . . , 34 

[Memo, Rennell, Chief, AMGOT, for Liaison Sec, AFHQ, 
31 May 43, ACC files, 10000/100/593] 

i. I refer to the objection . . . which has been 
raised to the term AMGOT which is an abbre- 
viation of "Allied Military Government of the 
Occupied Territory of ." This descrip- 

54 The abbrevi ation "AMG" was adopted in October 
1943. See below, Chapt e~X, note f!| 

tion is accurate and the organization cannot as 
well be described by any other title. I dislike ab- 
breviations myself anyhow, and propose to give 
instructions to use the full description which 
will so far as possible obviate the use of the 
abbreviation. . . . 

6. ... I feel obliged to oppose strongly any 
change and ask you to make my views known in 
the right quarters. 

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 3 Jun 43, AFHQ Msg files, CM-IN 

Withdraw objection to use of name AMGOT. 

Organization of MG Personnel for Initial 

[Force 141 Opn Instr 3, 22 May 43, OPD files, 014.1, 
Security (1-38)] 

5. At the outset there will be two AMGOT 
(Civil Affairs) headquarters organizations, one 
with each Task Force headquarters, as well as the 
main AMGOT headquarters, which will remain 
with Headquarters Force 141. As soon as circum- 
stances permit the two AMGOT Task Force Civil 
Affairs Headquarters will merge and when the 
whole of Horrified, or a substantial part of 
it, has been occupied there will be only one 
Civil Administration Headquarters, under the 
C.C.A.O., for the whole territory. 

The Civil Affairs administration in the prov- 
inces will then function direcdy under the central 

6. A small number of Civil Affairs officers will 
be attached to the Headquarters of the forma- 
tion or unit commander of each assault force. 
Subject to the discretion of the formation (unit) 
commander, these officers will be sent ashore 
as soon as possible after the assault has consoli- 
dated any territory containing inhabited centres. 
These Civil Affairs officers will be in touch 
with the local administrative authorities, and 
relations with them should thereafter be con- 
ducted, whenever practicable, through these offi- 

/cers by formation (unit) and unit (organization) 
commanders. . . . 

7. The Civil Affairs officers with the assault 
forces are destined as soon as feasible to form the 
provincial administrations of the areas in which 
the assault troops deploy. . . . 

8. The Civil Affairs officers of the assault par- 
ties, as well as those with Task Force Head- 
quarters will be attached to, form part of, and be 
under the direct orders of the formation (unit) 
commanders concerned. Subject only to direc- 
tives which they and the formation (unit) com- 


manders will receive on the policy to be followed 
during the initial phase, these Civil Affairs of- 
ficers will not receive direct instructions from 
their superior Civil Affairs officers until such 
time as they can make proper contact with the 
latter, and the task force commander determines 
that the Civil Affairs (Task Force) headquarters 
can properly take charge of them. 

During the assault and initial phases of the 
operation the officers of the Civil Administration 
assigned to task forces or assaulting units will 
operate as Staff Officers to the commanders. 
The formation (unit) and assaulting unit (orga- 
nization) Commanders will have final responsi- 
bility and authority. 

9. It is anticipated that the Civil Affairs officers 
with the assault formations will only be provided 
with a nominal scale of transport. The balance of 
transport will arrive in the follow-up convoys. 
These officers will therefore have to depend in 
the initial phase on locally requisitioned MT 
[Military Transport] and the use of the combat 
units' MT. The object of landing with few ve- 
hicles is to avoid encumbering the assaulting 
troops with any MT which is not stricdy neces- 

Assault commanders will be made aware of 
this and be given instructions to assist Civil Af- 
fairs officers in the execution of their duties. . . . 

Creation of a Military Government Section 
Directly Responsible to Chief of Staff 

[AFHQ Staff Memo 50, 18 Jun 43, MTO, HS files] 

I. Establishment of Military Government Section. 

Announcement is made of the establishment of 
a MG Section, this Headquarters, responsible 
directly to the Chief of Staff. 

II. Responsibilities and Functions of the Military 
Government Section. 

a. This will be the executive section for the 
CinC and CofS in matters pertaining to Military 
Government of occupied territory, including po- 
litical questions arising out of military occupa- 

b. This Section will be the channel of com- 
munication in matters of Military Government 
for Force 141 and other task forces which may 
become concerned in Military Government in 
enemy territory. 

III. Composition of Section. 

This section will be composed of a Chief and 
deputy chief and a mixed British and American 

IV. . . . Announcement is made of the assign- 
ment of Col. Julius C. Holmes, GSC, as Chief, 
Military Government Section. 

V. . . . Announcement is made of the assign- 
ment of Lt. Col. A. Terrence Maxwell, King's 
Royal Rifle Corps, as Deputy Chief, Military Gov- 
ernment Section. 

Allied Military Financial Agency Created 
[AMGOT GAI No. 15, 35 AGO files, AMGOT Plan] 

1. In pursuance of a Directive issued by the Com- 
bined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, there has 
been created an organ of AMGOT known as the 
Allied Military Financial Agency (AMFA). 
AMFA forms part of the Finance Division of 
AMGOT and is under the command of the Chief 
Financial Officer. 

2. AMFA has been established for the follow- 
ing purposes: 

(a) To provide a depository, clearing house and 
chief office of financial transactions for the con- 
venience of the Allied Military Forces. 

(b) To provide a depository, where necessary, 
for funds which may be impounded. 

(c) To facilitate control by AMGOT of finan- 
cial and property transactions in the occupied 

(d) To provide a source of funds from which 
to make loans to and through local banks, mu- 
nicipalities, public utilities, private businesses, 
and individual persons. 

(e) To, maintain a complete accounting of all 
financial transactions entered into by AMGOT. 

3. In view of the need to control the volume 
of currency so as to prevent inflation (which 
might have serious consequences for AMGOT 
as a whole) loans will be restricted to the mini- 
mum necessary for achieving their purpose. They 
will be made only in cases where they will assist 
in the restoration of order and rehabilitation of 
essential activities and are desirable from the 
point of view of the military effort and where 
local banks are not in a position to provide such 
financial assistance. AMFA is not intended to 
function as a competing agency to existing com- 
mercial banks. AMGOT officers should use every 
opportunity to discourage any impression (which 
will be only too likely to arise) that AMFA is to 
be regarded as an unlimited source of funds for 
all and sundry ( tee 7 below \ . 

38 General Administrative Instructions (GAI), sixteen in 
all, were a part of the AMGOT Plan published on 1 May 
1943. These instructions, copies of which were issued to 
field personnel, deal with general policy and attitude to- 
ward civilians and the immediate duties of civil affairs 
officers upon entering occupied areas. 


4. AMGOT officers, whether with the Task 
Forces or at Headquarters, will draw funds from 
AMGOT Finance Officers, who may be obliged 
in the early stages of occupation, to draw the 
money needed to carry out their official duties 
from Army Finance Officers or paymasters in the 
form of Yellow Seal Dollars or B.M.A. Pounds. 
However, it is planned to provide currency in 
terms of the local monetary unit as early as possi- 
ble, preferably before the first phase of any 

5. The procedure described in paragraph 4 
need only be employed in cases where, through 
lack of communications or for any other reason, 
AMFA cannot provide all the currency needed 
by AMGOT and the Army. As soon as AMFA 
can provide such currency, both Army paymasters 
and AMGOT Officers will draw funds from 

6. All moneys drawn by AMGOT Officers 
must be accounted for in the way described in 
General Administrative Instructions No. 12, 
dated 10 September 1943. 

7. One of the major tasks of AMFA (subject 
to the C.F.O. [Chief Finance Officer]) is that of 
planning and assisting in the maintaining of con- 
trols over the credit and price structures of the 
occupied territory in an effort to hold inflationary 
forces in check. This danger of an excessive cir- 
culation of currency should be in the minds of all 
AMGOT Officers who are under the necessity of 
spending or advancing sums of money in the 
course of their official duties. 

With a view to preventing any such inflation 
all AMGOT Officers should restrict issues of cash 
to the minimum required to serve Allied Military 

8. It is intended that in general all revenues 
and expenditures of AMGOT, as distinct from 
those of the local governmental authorities, shall 
pass through AMFA. This may make it necessary 
for certain AMGOT Officers to maintain current 
accounts with AMFA, while others may main- 
tain accounts in local banks, through which re- 
mittances can be made to and from AMFA. 

Any instructions which may be necessary in 
this connection will be issued in due course to all 

9. As need arises, it is hoped that AMFA will 
establish sub-agencies possibly to the extent of 
placing one in the principal city of each occupied 


[Ltr, Remit.-!!, Chief, AMGOT, to Col. A. Terrence Max- 
well, Deputy Chief, MGS, AFHQ, 3 Jul 43, ACC files, 


I think we seem likely to be headed for a con- 
siderable amount of trouble in the application of 
the administrative policy in Horrified of which 
I think Holmes and you should perhaps be 

You will remember that in General Admin- 
istrative Instruction No. 1 the general attitude 
of Civil Affairs officers towards the local popula- 
tion was laid down. Paragraph 3 lays down cer- 
tain general maxims of conduct and starts with 
the sentence "You will be guided in your attitude 
towards die local population by the memory of 
years of war in which the Italians fought against 
your people and your Allies." As a result of 
representations made to me by Spofford that the 
general sense of G.A.I. No. 1 was not wholly 
consistent with the CCS. directive, notably para- 
graph 4, I agreed to an amending G.A.I, saying 
that G.A.I. No. 1, paragraph 3, was to be read 
in conjunction with directive. 

I discussed this matter with Col. Haskell of the 
Civil Affairs Division in Washington who took 
the line that the first sentence of paragraph 3 of 
G.A.I. No. 1 might indeed be held to be at vari- 
ance with the CCS. directive that the adminis- 
tration was to be benevolent inasmuch as the 
sentence in question might be interpreted as 
vindictive. I did not as a matter of fact agree and 
I explained to him, as I have to others, that my 
experience is not of having to restrain the troops, 
at any rate British troops, from being vindictive 
and brutal, but rather of trying to prevent im- 
mediate fraternisation and treatment of the local 
population as domestic pets. Furdiermore, I held, 
and hold, that an invitation to the troops to be 
benevolent would encourage them in these 
habits. . . . 

I only refer to these matters to warn you of the 
different points of view which are now held. It 
is not always appreciated in London and Wash- 
ington that it is difficult to create a fighting spirit 
among the troops in the general atmosphere of 
benevolence. 36 

10 The controversial sentence was, in the end, never 
introduced into the printed manual. General Adminis- 
trative Instructions No. 2, to which the CAO's were re- 
ferred for their attitude toward the Italian people, merely 
restated paragraph 4 of the CCS directive and elaborated 
on policies to be pursued in eliminating Fascism. 


CAO's Enjoined To Adapt Themselves to a 
Joint Enterprise 

[AMGOT GAI No. i, AGO files, AMGOT Plan] 

2. The formation commander to which you, as 
a British or American officer are attached, may 
at any time be either an American or British offi- 
cer. Your superior Civil Affairs Officer may 
equally be either American or British. You must 
understand that there are differences in proce- 
dure, custom and outlook between the two 
Armies of which you form a part. It will be for 
you to see that these differences do not affect the 
efficiency of your work and in no circumstances 
form the subject of complaints or gossiping. A 
serious view will be taken by your superior 
officers of any idle chatter or criticism of any 
member of the other Forces. This Administration 
constitutes the first attempt at a Joint Allied 
Administration and it is your work, your effi- 
ciency, and your attitude of mind which will 
make the Administration a success or a failure 
and will serve as a model or a warning for the 
other administrations which will have to be 
built up in other parts of the world. . . . 

The First Thing Is To Help the Combat Units 
[AMGOT GAI No. i, p. 83] 

It is . . . important for Civil Affairs Officers to 
remember that the available Civil Affairs per- 
sonnel in the immediately post assault phase, will 
be very limited, and that they must preserve a 
sense of proportion about what is important. The 
most important thing is to assist the troops in 
their operations. It may, therefore, be less impor- 
tant to formally take over a center which has 
been bypassed than to go forward with the com- 
bat troops to help them in procuring food and 
maintaining order in their immediate rear. The 
rule of "first things first" must be remembered 
and "first thing" is to clear the enemy out of the 
territory. The "first thing" therefore is to help the 
combat units, even if this is at the expense of effi- 
cient administration. . . . 

The Principles of Good Administration 
[AMGOT GAI No. 1] 

4. . . . You must learn to disregard the national- 
ity of the people whom you are administering, if 
you are going to be a good administrator. The 
principles of good administration are the same in 
all Countries and for all people. They are the 
preservation of law, order and justice, the preven- 
tion of disease and distress, the removal of fear 
and the creation of economic well-being. To 

these, for a military government, is added as the 
first duty, to assist in the prosecution of the war 
by enabling the high Command to reduce garri- 
son troops for use elsewhere and to provide, with- 
in the resources of the country, whatever ma- 
terials are available which will assist in the prose- 
cution of the war. . . . 

Keep Existing Administration and Temper 
Defascistization With Discretion 

[AMGOT GAI No. i,p. 80] 

5. In order to economize in manpower, it will be 
the policy of the military government to secure 
the maintenance of the Italian administrative ma- 
chine, subject to the elimination of the Fascist 
Party and its influence. The Fascist Party ma- 
chine will be broken up from the earliest possible 
moment and in every way in which it is open for 
us to do so, but the machine cannot be broken 
up or Fascist influence eliminated in a day. Since 
also nearly all Italian administrative officials are, 
at any rate nominally, members of the Party, it 
will not be possible to remove or intern all mem- 
bers of the Party. This would merely cause a 
breakdown, not only of the whole of the Italian 
administrative machine, but also of all technical 
services, such as transportation, etc. The manner 
in which the policy of the two governments to- 
ward the Fascist Party and its officials is to be 
carried out will be the subject of joint directives 
from the governments to the Commander in 
Chief. Specific instructions based on these direc- 
tives, will be communicated to you. In any event, 
you should forthwith seek out information as to 
the identity of officials of the Fascist Party in the 
territory in which you are serving, as well as the 
identity of Fascist leaders and Pro-Nazi partisans. 
You will also collect information on the Fascist 
Secret Police (OVRA), its personnel and its 
operation in your region. . . . 

Economic Development Is Assigned a Second- 
ary and Limited Place 

[AMGOT GAI No. 1, pp. 80-81] 

4. . . . For obvious reasons economic develop- 
ment must take a second place and can only occur 
within the limits of transport and of military 
requirements. . . . 

7. As soon as the storm of war has swept away 
from your area, you will take steps to restore eco- 
nomic exchanges and the normal life of the in- 
habitants. It is particularly important that mar- 
kets and shops should be re-opened and that ac- 
cess to them should be permitted, since without 
this, the civilian population will starve. . . . Cir- 


culation of trucks, etc., to carry farm produce 
must be permitted as soon as military security 
allows. . . . 

AMGOT Proclamations Are Based on Initial 
Need to Subordinate Liberty to Military 

[Chanler, Chief Legal Officer, AMGOT Hq, Rpt, Func- 
tions and Operations of the Legal Division, AMGOT, 28 
April-i November 1943, 15 Nov 43, [hereafter cited as 
Chanler Rpt], CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43) (2)] 

As a result of all these deliberations and considera- 
tions, 12 proclamations were drafted by the 
Legal Division. . . . They covered the following 

Proclamation $ri. Announcement of occupa- 

Proclamation #2. Definition of offenses 
against law and order and against the Allied 
Forces, which the inhabitants of the occupied 
territory must not commit. 

Proclamation #3. De validation of legal cur- 
rency of U.S. gold seal dollars and British mili- 
tary administration notes and the settlement of 
the rates of exchange between the same and be- 
tween them and Italian lire. 

Proclamation #4. The establishment of Allied 
Military Courts, and the definition of the juris- 
diction and constitution of such Courts and of 
their powers of punishment. 

Proclamation ^£5. The closing of certain fi- 
nancial institutions in the occupied territory and 
the establishment of a moratorium. 

Proclamation #6. The creation of a Controller 
of Property with the definition of his powers to 
safeguard Allied property in the occupied terri- 
tory and to take into his custody certain enemy 
State property and properties belonging to cer- 
tain citizens of enemy States. 

Proclamation ^£7. The dissolution of the Fas- 
cist Party and its subsidiary organizations and 
the establishment of provisions to deal with the 
properties of the Party and of such organizations. 

Proclamation To provide for rationing of 
food, fixing of prices and the stabilization of agri- 
cultural conditions. 

Proclamation #9. To provide for the publica- 
tion to be known as the "Sicily Gazette" which 
would contain copies of all proclamations and 
general orders and the production of which 
would be proof of its contents in all Courts. 

Proclamation #10. To make financial regu- 
lations regarding restrictions on exchange and 
commerce and to regulate prices. 

Proclamation $:n. To establish certain gen- 
eral police and security regulations for the pur- 
poses of regulating means of communication, 
controlling photography, requiring identity cards 
to be carried by civilian inhabitants, regulating 
newspapers, and controlling meetings and as- 

Proclamation #12. To establish Allied Mili- 
tary lire as legal tender in occupied territory. 

The two main principles which were borne in 
mind in preparing these proclamations were that 
they should be directed first to provide for the 
safety and security of the combat forces and sec- 
ondly to promote the welfare of the inhabitants 
of the territory, to continue peacefully to go about 
their respective occupations. It had to be borne in 
mind that the interests of the combat forces who 
were prosecuting the war were of paramount im- 
portance and that the inhabitants must undergo, 
at least in the early stages, some restrictions of 
normal liberty to make the safety of the forces 
certain. At the same time it was planned that 
these unavoidable restrictions of liberty should be 
gradually raised as the combat forces moved for- 
ward and as the situation and attitude of the in- 
habitants allowed. . . . 



The Test in Sicily 

Teachers of whatever rank — grade 
school instructors or college professors — 
are apt in the absence of specific knowl- 
edge or experience to resort, in the manner 
of Polonius, to vague generalizations and 
wearisome platitudes. The professors of 
military government at Charlottesville, un- 
able to predict what an officer would en- 
counter in an actual operational situation, 
had exhorted their students to "put first 
things first." One officer, soon after the 
landing in Sicily, said that this platitude 
might be translated: "Bury the dead and 
feed the living." As towns were taken over 
in the wake of battle chaos reigned ; there 
was no food, fuel, power, or water; rubble, 
ruin, and filth were on every hand and 
looting was rampant. In a word, every- 
thing had to be done and generally there 
was little with which to do it. Directives, 
manuals, and wise saws were less relevant 
in such a situation than had been expected. 
And improvisation was the order of the 

Nevertheless, the invasion of Sicily put 
to the test for the first time the theories, 
principles, and training that had been de- 
veloped in the military training program 
and in military planning. North Africa, to 
be sure, had been a proving ground of 
sorts because hosts of economic and politi- 
cal problems had been encountered and 
civilian control machinery had been set up, 
even though ordinary administration had 
been left to the French. The difficulties 
here indicated that even with a friendly 

administration and population civilian 
agencies could not deal too well with the 
problems of the wake of battle, and this, 
it seemed, would be even truer in enemy 
territory. Experiences in Sicily confirmed 
this view. They also showed that planners 
of the first exclusively military operation 
had underestimated the prospective dis- 
ruption and chaos, and had consequently 
fallen somewhat short both in provision of 
supplies and in development of adequate 
organization and methods for rebuilding 
the economic and social machinery behind 
fiercely contending armies. Some lessons, 
indeed, were learned immediately upon 

The story of military government in 
Sicily has three phases: beachhead, com- 
bat, and posthostilities. The beachhead 
phase saw a lack of uniformity between 
Americans and British on how the military 
government officers were geared in with 
the tactical forces. The British Eighth 
Army landed on the southeastern part of 
the island in two groups, XIII Corps on 
the beaches south of Syracuse, and XXX 
Corps around Cape Passero. Allied Mili- 
tary Government (AMG) officers were 
not included on the loading schedules but 
during the first three days about thirty 
officers were literally smuggled into the 
beachhead area. Reinforcements were 
called up later but the officers did not op- 
erate closely with the separate tactical 
units. Instead they remained in pools with 
the advance and rear army headquarters 


and took over towns as they were occu- 
pied. The American Seventh Army landed 
in the southeastern area on the beaches 
around Cape Scaramina (45th Division), 
Gela (1st Division), and Licata (3d Divi- 
sion). Only seventeen AMG officers came 
ashore with the Seventh Army on July 10 
and 11 (D and D plus 1) and these gen- 
erally remained with the headquarters of 
the units to which they were attached until 
enough territory was uncovered to set up 
military government on a provincial basis. 

The advance of the Seventh Army was 
rapid. In a broad sweep northward it en- 
tered Palermo on 22 July and by the end 
of the month the whole western half of 
Sicily was overrun. In the British sector 
stubborn German resistance in the plain of 
Catania slowed the advance and the town 
of Catania was not taken until 5 August. 
The Seventh Army, after taking Palermo, 
turned east and the Eighth Army contin- 
ued its advance northward until 17 Au- 
gust when the combined British and 
American forces entered Messina and the 
whole island was in Allied possession. 

An advanced Allied Military Govern- 
ment of Occupied Territories (AMGOT) 
headquarters had been established at Syra- 
cuse under Lord Rennell of Rodd as early 
as 22 July. About two weeks later the head- 
quarters was moved to Palermo and grad- 
ually assumed responsibility for the whole 
island. By the end of July a direct channel 
of communication had been established be- 
tween CAO's and headquarters in all areas 
turned over. Eventually, each of the nine 
provinces of Sicily was administered by a 
SCAO (Senior Civil Affairs Officer) who 
had a staff of specialists in the fields of law, 
finance, supply, public welfare, and public 
safety. The mere listing of these specialties 
is suggestive, but only suggestive, of the 
multitude of problems encountered both 

during and after cessation of hostilities. 
There was a tendency, especially in the 
early stages, for AMG officers to do too 
much themselves and to rely too little on 
indigenous officials. In their enthusiasm 
for seeing that things got done and in their 
passion for efficiency the AMG officers 
sometimes overextended themselves. 

Allied military government was able to 
make headway against a bewildering num- 
ber of problems only because it was not 
faced with a hostile population. Lacking 
enough men and materiel, Lord Rennell 
remarked that "I am frank to think we 
shall get away with things here more by 
luck than by good management." The 
Allied propaganda before, during, and 
after the landings helped to persuade the 
Sicilians to greet the Allies everywhere as 
liberators. Morale was at first high but de- 
teriorated as it became evident that the 
Allies could not always deliver on their 
promises. Though Sicilians could be, and 
on occasion were, difficult, there was never 
a serious problem of obtaining co-opera- 
tion from the civilian population. 

Before the island had been cleared of the 
enemy, indeed in the full tumult of battle, 
the old question of the entrance of civilian 
agencies was raised. But the North African 
experience was fresh in the minds of the 
commanders in the field if not of those in 
Washington. Furthermore the British did 
not want "starry-eyed" American civilians 
running loose in occupied territories. The 
President himself, who had once felt that 
the civilian agencies should dominate, was 
gradually moving toward the position that 
military officers must have administrative 
responsibility in all active theaters. The 
upshot was that General Eisenhower was 
authorized only to permit the entry of in- 
dividual civilians into Sicily and that they 
were to become a part of AMG. 



Two Proclamations With Same Theme but 
Different Purposes 

[Proclamation of Eisenhower, CinC, AF, on Invasion of 
Sicily, 10 Jul 43, OPD Msg files, 3913] 

( 1) Announcement to the Italian people — To the 
people of Sicily. As Commander in Chief of the 
Allied Force I transmit this message on behalf 
of the Governments of the United States and 
Great Britain. 

(2) The Allied forces are occupying Italian 
territory. They ars. doing this not as enemies of 
the Italian people, rru . s in inevitable part of 
their war to destroy the German overlordship of 
Europe. Their aim is to deliver the people of Italy 
from the Fascist Regime which led them into 
the war, and when that has been accomplished, to 
restore Italy as a Free Nation. 

(3) The Allied Forces have no intention of 
changing or undermining the traditional laws 
and customs of the Italian people. They will take 
all necessary measures, however, to eliminate the 
Fascist system in whatever Italian territory they 
occupy. Accordingly, the Fascist Party Organi- 
zation will be dissolved, and its appendages such 
as the Fascist Militia and the so-called Youth Or- 
ganizations will be abolished. Fascist doctrines 
and propaganda in any form will be prohibited. 
No political activity whatsoever shall be coun- 
tenanced during the period of military govern- 

(4) In furtherance of the policies of the Allied 
Governments, proper steps will forthwith be 
taken to stop the operation in Sicily of all laws 
which discriminate on the basis of race, color, or 
creed. Freedom of religious worship will be up- 
held and, to that extent the military interests are 
not prejudiced, freedom of speech and press will 
be instituted. 

(5) Measures will be taken for prompt re- 
lease of political prisoners. The special tribunal 
for the defense of the State will be abolished. 

(6) The Military Governor of the occupied 
territory will take action by proclamation or 
otherwise to carry into effect the foregoing meas- 
ures as military conditions may permit. 

(7) These evidence the principles to which the 
Allies are attached and for the re-establishment 
of which they will relentlessly fight. They are 
principles to which the Axis leaders, under Ger- 
man domination, are opposed. You will be bene- 
ficiaries of their defeat. It is therefore your in- 
terest, as men whose fathers fought for their 


freedom, not to resist the Allied army, but to 
facilitate their mission — the lifting of the Nazi 
yoke from Europe by quick and total victory. . . . 

[AMGOT Proclamation 1, AGO files, AMGOT Plan, pp. 


To the people of Sicily: 

Whereas in prosecuting their war against the 
Axis Powers, it has become necessary for the 
armed forces of Great Britain and the United 
States under my command to occupy Sicily. 

Whereas it is the policy of the Allied Forces 
not to make war upon the civilian inhabitants of 
the occupied territory but to protect them in the 
peaceful exercise of their legitimate pursuits in 
so far as the exigencies of war and their own be- 
havior will permit, and 

Whereas in order to preserve law and order 
and provide for the safety and welfare both of 
my troops and of yourselves, it is necessary to 
establish Military Government in the occupied 

Now, therefore, I, Harold Alexander, G.C.B., 
C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C., General, General Officer 
Commanding the Allied Forces in Sicily and 
Military Governor of the Territories Occupied, 
by virtue of the Authority vested in me by Gen- 
eral Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in 
Chief of the Allied Forces in the North African 
Theatre of Operations, do hereby proclaim as 


All powers of government and jurisdiction in 
the occupied territory and over its inhabitants, 
and final administrative responsibility are vested 
in me as General Officer Commanding and Mili- 
tary Governor, and the Allied Military Govern- 
ment of Occupied Territory is established to ex- 
ercise these powers under my direction. 


All persons in the occupied territory will obey 
promptly all orders given by me or under my 
authority and must refrain from all acts hostile to 
the troops under my command or helpful to our 
enemies, from all acts of violence, and from any 
act calculated to disturb public order in any way. 


Your existing personal and property rights will 
be fully respected and your existing laws will re- 

main in force and effect except in so far as it may 
be necessary for me in the discharge of my duties 
as General Officer Commanding the Allied 
Forces, and as Military Governor, to change or 
supersede them by proclamation or order issued 
by me or under my direction. 


All Italian civil and criminal courts and all 
universities, schools and educational establish- 
ments will be closed until further order of the 
Allied Military Government. 


All administrative and judicial officials of the 
provinces and communes and all other govern- 
ment and municipal functionaries and em- 
ployees, and all officers and employees of state, 
municipal or other public services, except such 
officials and political leaders as are removed by 
me are required to continue in the performance 
of their duties, subject to my direction or the 
direction of such of my officers of the Allied 
Forces as may be deputed for that purpose. 


Further proclamations, orders and regulations 
issued by me or under my authority from time to 
time will specify what is further required of you, 
and what you are forbidden to do, and these will 
be displayed in court houses, police stations, or 
other public places. 


So long as you remain peaceable and comply 
with my orders, you will be subject to no greater 
interference than may be inevitable in view of 
military exigencies, and may go about your nor- 
mal vocations without fear. 
Dated: 10 July 1943 

How CAO's Were Geared in With Tactical 

[Spofford Rpt. See also above chapter VII, Section y\ 

Briefly the units of 343 Force 1 landed on the 
southern coast of Sicily [10 July 1943] and pro- 
ceeded rapidly northward and westward through 

"Task Force 343, comprising three U.S. infantry divi- 
sions, the 2d Armored Division, and the II Corps of the 
U.S. Seventh Army, was commanded by Maj. Gen. 
George S. Patton, Jr. Task Force 545 comprised various 
elements of the British Eighth Army under General Sir 
Bernard Montgomery. The co-ordinating authority over 
the two task forces was the Fifteenth Army Group, known 
as Force 141, commanded by General Alexander. 

The island of Pantelleria had been invaded on 2 June 

the eastern part of Ragusa, Caltanissetta, Agri- 
gento, Palermo and Trapani provinces. Civil af- 
fairs officers attached to the units landed with 
them on D Day or shortly thereafter and gener- 
ally speaking remained with headquarters of the 
units to which they were attached, gradually 
peeling off into permanent assignments as the 
territories involved were occupied. . . . 

The officers with the 8th Army, except in a 
few isolated cases, were not attached to and did 
not enter with the Division or tactical units. In 
stead they remained in the rear with army head- 
quarters and were brought up when needed. 
The 8th Army quickly occupied the greater por- 
tion of Ragusa, all of Siracusa and the southern 
half of Catania. This occupation was completed 
on July 16 (D plus 6). Various civil affairs offi- 
cers coming in on D Day or shortly thereafter 
were assigned from a pool established first at 
Siracusa and later at Lentini to the various com- 
munes in the occupied territory. . . . 

On arrival in Sicily each senior civil affairs 
officer had his own individual approach to the 
problems facing his CAO's and specialists. Lt. 
Col. [Stephen B.] Story, for instance, at all times 
kept himself and his men up with the advance 
headquarters of the 45th Division, leaving towns 
in the rear to be taken over by other civil affairs 
officers attached to the Corps. Since reserves 
were few this resulted in the towns in which Lt. 
Col. Story and his men had the administration 
started remaining without CAO's for several 
days; but he was able to start the administration 
of towns as soon as they were taken further for- 
ward. On the other hand Lt. Col. [Wynot R.] 
Irish with the First Division more or less perma- 
nently assigned his men to various towns and 
areas as they were captured, moving them for- 
ward very slowly. It was his policy to allow Col. 
Kilroe, the JAG under whom he was serving, to 
take over the towns in the first instance and then 
turn them over to him when the command post 
passed them. Frequently, however, in the first 
few crucial days towns were without civil affairs 
officers in the forward areas covered by this Divi- 
sion. Col. [Damon M.] Gunn, JAG II Corps, 
also believed that civil affairs officers with AMG 
should not take over towns in the front line areas 
but should wait until the command post had 

by the British I Division in order to provide bases for 
the attack on Sicily. An independent AMGOT-Pantelleria 
was activated and placed under Brig. Gen. [Auby C. 1 
Strickland, U.S. Air Corps, as Military Governor. The 
attitude of the inhabitants was friendly. The islands of 
Lampedusa and Linosa had been seized on 19 June by 
the U.S. Seventh Army and placed under an AMG which 
reported directly to AFHQ. 


passed the towns. . . . On both the American 
and British side at all times a liaison officer was 
left with divisional or corps headquarters. This 
officer could find out from G-2 when a town was 
about to fall and then report back so that civil af- 
fairs officers could be called up to enter it at once, 
if any were available with transport. [Typical 
experiences of CAO's follow.] 

The Directive Helps Less Than Improvisation 
and Sense of Humor 

[Ltr, Graduate, SMG (Irish, CAO, ist Div, Seventh 
Army), 16 Jul 43, to SMG, Charlottesville, CAD files, 
461.01 (4-7-43) (1), Bulky Pkg] 

At last word came through that the town was in 
our hands; they gave us a Jeep and told us to get 
going. Shell fire was slacking; we were appar- 
endy pushing ahead. We drove parallel to the 
front line for some five miles to a port town on 
a hill. As we drove into the town, we passed 
groups of people who looked frightened and made 
the Fascist salute. A dead horse and dead civilian 
in the street, wounded men in stretchers, bombed 
houses to the Cathedral Square. A tank battle in 
the streets of the town had just ended. We en- 
tered the local Albergo, our headquarters, and the 
Commander was sure glad to see us, telling us 
that there were about 150 dead to bury. Across 
the street was a large building that we took over 
for an office — the palatial home of a fled Fascist 
leader. It was beautifully furnished — the dream 
of a CAO. One room was palatial ... I ar- 
ranged it like a throne, with chairs surrounding 
a beautiful marble topped table, and me sitting 
back in a high-backed luxurious chair. I was still 
soaked and looked anything but a Governor. I 
did put on a tie. Took off my leggings, and sat 
down in my chair of state, interpreter on my 
right hand, and got ready for the interviews. 

They all piled in, half scared, and bowed low. 
I was formally introduced, and told them to take 
seats in a half-circle around me. I made what I 
hoped was an impressive speech about being 
friendly invaders and liberators and all that sort 
of thing, to get a right start with them. It was 
quite a high moment — for the first time I felt 
like a governor. This exalted state of affairs, how- 
ever, which I was thoroughly enjoying, and 
which I shall probably never reach again, did not 
last long. A bombing raid began on the shore 
and ships by the Messerschmidts. The building 
trembled — all hell seemed to break loose! My 
privy council vanished. I finally located the Po- 
desta after the raid, hiding down cellar — Wise 
man! I forgot my gospel of "sweetness and 
light." It had been so rudely interrupted by bomb 

blasts, and I was embarrassed about starting it all 
over again. I had to get off my high horse and 
get down to business. And what a lot of head- 
aches I found. Water supply damaged. No power. 
No food. No fuel, and corpses all over town to 

Later: "First things first," says Charlottesville! 
No water — epidemics; no food — riots; corpses — 
plague! I decided to bury the corpses first. A 
judgment more of the nose than of the head. The 
Podesta said he needed a truck, which was rea- 
sonable, but there were no trucks available. A 
battle was going on — trucks were vital to success. 
A soldier said the city had two ambulances. Fine, 
fine! We'll use the ambulances. But no, the Si- 
cilian will not use an ambulance for a hearse! He 
has a superstition against it. I was about to exert 
my power and make them use ambulances when 
a medical captain came in very upset and said 
that 20 corpses were lying next to his field hospi- 
tal and, 'for God's sake get them out.' The CO 
troops gave me one truck for the burial of these 
corpses only. And I secured some prisoners of 
war to dig graves and load the corpses and got 
the Padre to go to the graves. A new difficulty 
had developed. The Padre insisted the corpses be 
put in wooden boxes. Captain said no, they were 
buried in the dark — a gruesome task. I arranged 
to have donkey carts collect the other corpses on 
the morrow, and retired. . . . 
. . . The City Hall had been looted, tax receipts 
destroyed, ration cards torn. The city treasury 
had been bombed; all tax books, etc., lay in a pile 
of rubble. The City Hall itself was in shambles! 
Records, archives, papers scattered all over. With 
what feelings I read the 'Directive' on what I 
was to do with records, examining the town 
budget, checking the taxation system, etc. . . . 

Putting First Things First in a Period of 
Rapid Advance 

[Maj John D. Ames and Maj James H. Griffin, CAO's 
II Corps, Rpt, 25 Aug 43, Spofford Rpt] 

Assignment of Divisional CA Officers: 

. . . The rapidity of the advance involved the 
divisional CA officers passing through the towns 
and villages with only a little time in which to 
set up an organization to organize the civil com- 
munities under the Plan. The Corps officers fol- 
lowed up behind the divisional officers and set in 
motion the Civil Affairs Plan and in due course 
when further CA officers were available, allo- 
cated and posted these officers for supervision of 
the towns and villages in occupied territory under 


Corps responsibility. In some cases it was neces- 
sary for the Corps officers to take over towns and 
villages in a divisional area which had either been 
by-passed by troops or for which no divisional 
CA officers were available. In this connection, 
on many occasions Colonel Gunn [JAG, II 
Corps] and other Corps officers acted as CA of- 

In the large area that fell to Corps control the 
difficulty of communication between towns, bad 
roads, the absence of telephone communication, 
necessitated the Corps CA officers spending the 
minimum time in each town and village in order 
to insure that towns and villages which had 
been in the hands of the Military Police and the 
C.I.C. [Counterintelligence Corps] were not left 
uncovered for too long a period. This factor also 
involved the transfer of CA personnel from town 
to town, and it was not possible in the first three 
weeks of operation to permanently assign CA 
officers to a single town. As provinces were com- 
pletely taken, the provincial organization of CA 
officers was introduced and assignment made in 
co-ordination with the senior CA officer in the 
province. The number of towns covered by the 
Corps CA officers and the co ordinator was 79, 
with a population of 689,000. The work of the 
divisional CA officers was in most cases limited 
to publishing proclamations and personal con- 
tact with city officials available, and by these 
means communicating the fact of actual occupa- 
tion. In many cases where the advance was not 
so fast, divisional CA officers continued with 
further C A duties. 

The Corps duties were as follows: 

Organization of the Carabinieri in accordance 
with the plan. It was considered essential to in- 
vestigate the use of the personnel and the ade- 
quacy of numbers of the police force. The re- 
organization of the Carabinieri and other police 
organizations were undertaken and where nec- 
essary, changes in the personnel were made. The 
officer in charge of the Carabinieri was made re- 
sponsible for maintaining law and order, insofar 
as his duties were concerned, and instructed to 
prepare a detailed scheme for the organization 
of the local police control of the town. Under the 
proclamation for the collection of arms, the Cara- 
binieri were named as agents for this collection 
and gave receipts and kept lists of private firearms 
turned in. Wherever possible, Military Police, 
Divisional or Corps, were placed on guard to 
prevent the looting of these arms by force by any 
individual. Corps CA officers interviewed the 
existing Podestas or Mayors, Communal Secre- 
taries and the Municipal Staff, and in many cases 

officials were relieved from their duties and other 
persons were chosen and substituted — this with 
co-operation and reports of the C.I.C. In the selec- 
tion of these individuals, care was taken that they 
were not associated in any way, so far as was 
known, with any political activity. In a number 
of cases it was found that the officials, apart from 
their political leanings, were totally unsuited to 
occupy their position. The municipal staff was set 
to work — as in the majority of cases after the in- 
vasion they had ceased to perform duty, and the 
normal life of the community was set in motion 
again, as far as circumstances permitted. No at- 
tempt was made to perform direct government 
except in one or two cases of actual emergency. 
The Civil Affairs duties were confined strictly to 
the supervision and direction of civil activities. 
Checks were made to see that guards had been 
posted by either C.I.C. or divisional CA officers 
on banks and post offices and other important civil 

Everything Needs Immediate Attention in 
Liberated Cities 

[Narrative Based on Undated Report from Lt Col George 
H. McCaffrey, CAO 3d Inf Div, Seventh Army, Spof- 
ford Rpt, ex. 3-A] 

At approximately 1000 hours on 17 July a mes- 
sage was received that Agrigento had fallen and 
the situation needed immediate attention. . . . 
Major [Robert L.] Ashworth and Lt. Col. 
McCaffrey with an interpreter, a veteran of the 
American army in the First World War, left 
at once in a rickety, requisitioned midget 
car. . . . 

The Prefect in Agrigento stated that there was 
about three days supply of grain on hand, but 
plenty available in the countryside, water was 
available for about 34 of the town and electric 
light for about '/ 2 of it. He estimated the number 
of civilian dead and wounded at 500, many of 
them still in the ruins. 

The Prefect was instructed to have copies of 
the proclamations and orders posted at once in 
ten places in the town customarily used for that 
purpose. At his suggestion the town crier made 
the rounds announcing that complete amnesty 
would be granted with respect to any loot turned 
in at the Carabinieri barracks within 24 hours, 
but the possession of loot after that time would be 
dealt with severely. A steady stream of people 
took advantage of this offer. Police agents (now 
provided with arm bands) started to collect the 
furniture and household goods standing in the 
streets and the public square. It was difficult to 
distinguish between those who were salvaging 


furniture from their own wrecked homes, those 
who were helping themselves to loot and those 
who were returning it. . . . 

The Prefect at Agrigento was ordered to have 
the PAD [police agents] continue their functions 
regarding rescue of wounded, burial of dead, 
search of ruins and caring for unexploded bombs. 
He was also ordered to put as many men and ve- 
hicles to work as were necessary to clear the main 
streets of debris to permit passage by Army vehi- 
cles and to secure unsafe structures and to pay 
the standard rate of wages as of 9 July for such 
work. He was authorized to draw up to 500,000 
lire upon a 2,000,000 lire credit in the Bank of 
Italy for war damages. 

The Bishop of Agrigento called to offer his full 
co-operation. He had turned % of his palace into 
an emergency hospital filled with both civilian 
and military wounded, volunteered to take charge 
of finding shelter for the homeless and submitted 
for approval a printer's proof sheet of a statement 
to all of his flock calling upon them to co-operate 
in every way with AMGOT. This statement was 
read at masses in the local churches the next day. 

Between these conferences every minute was 
used to give brief interviews and issue passes to 
various officials and essential employees, includ- 
ing the public engineer, millers, bakers, doctors, 
midwives and others with essential functions to 
perform. During the later afternoon Lt. Col. Mc- 
Caffrey went to Porto Empedocle with an inter- 
preter, posted the proclamations and orders, and 
checked into the situation with the Carabinieri. 
It was very bad. All responsible officials had fled. 
The town was badly damaged. No stock of flour 
was on hand. Both aqueducts were smashed, and 
an estimated % of the people had fled. The port 
area was crowded with Army and Navy person- 
nel. There was heavy two way traffic of supply 
vehicles already under way. The CO of the Port 
Engineer Bn. stated he was posting a guard in the 
port area and main street. The civil police were 
ordered to co-operate with the military and to be 
particularly watchful for looting. 

In Agrigento the water supply was badly re- 
duced by the bombardment. Some difficulty was 
encountered here because of direct dealing be- 
tween combat units and civilian agencies. In one 
case the Italian engineer was almost shot because 
of an error made by an interpreter in repeating 
what he said with regard to a break in the aque- 
duct. The Army wanted aid by civil affairs offi- 
cers in establishment of an Army CP. in Agri- 
gento. This took considerable time. 

The leaders of the Consorzio and the Amassi 
in the area were ardent Fascists and had fled. 

Others had to be located to take over these 
important functions. 

There was at first considerable agitation in 
Agrigento in favor of the Independence of Sicily. 
A meeting to sponsor this cause, in violation of 
Proclamation I, was raided. There was also con- 
siderable discontent because of Allied inability to 
open the sulphur mines and thereby relieve 
unemployment; and because of the low salaries 
paid to public officials. . . . 


[Lt. Comdr Malcolm S. MacLean, Liaison, MGS, Naval 
Aviation Hq, 4 Mar 44, Report on Information Obtained 
from Army CAO's Who Participated in the Assault Phase 
in Sicily, CAD files, 319. 1, Foreign (3-4-44), Bulky 

The colonel had a difficult decision to make in 
relation to combat operations in military govern- 
ment and civil affairs. As indicated he had only 
himself and three junior officers for the whole job 
with the Division [45th] . . . until they reached 
Messina and settled down there as military gov- 
ernment. The question arose as to whether these 
four should continue with the Division as it 
rapidly advanced or drop off and set up military 
government in the first area captured. Some 
other civil affairs teams who went up the western 
side of Sicily tried the latter and left the advanc- 
ing forces without any civil affairs officers to as- 
sist them. (This, said the colonel is why General 
Patton raised such hell to get more civil affairs 
officers sent over from North Africa in the early 
part of the campaign.) The colonel decided 
wisely on the former course of sticking with the 

In consequence he had to devise a procedure 
for military government that would meet this 
mobile, hit and run civil affairs situation. This is 
what he did: 

In entering a town he would take over the city 
hall or other appropriate building if the city hall 
had been damaged. He would fly the United 
States and British ensigns above the door of the 
hall. He would then go out or send his junior offi- 
cers to post the proclamations (he commented at 
this point that a paint brush was an essential part 
of the civil affairs officer's equipment). . . . He 
would then gather about him such town officials 
as remained, tell the story of their liberation, out- 
line to them the essential features of military 
government and what the civilians were expected 
to do and not to do, call their attentions to the 
proclamations, and dismiss them until a later 
designated time. He would then go with his of- 


ficers to the bank, the post offices, insurance head- 
quarters and the like taking with him some of the 
Carabinieri . . . and seize all moneys, records, 
valuable portable equipment, etc., lock these up 
and post a Carabinieri guard. He would then 
gather the leading priests and clerics about him 
and talk over the problems of the town and the 
personnel in it and get their advice, as he recently 
secured that of the town officials and of the police 
separately, on who would be most acceptable as 
civilian native officials. He would then do what 
he could to organize machinery for food collect- 
ing and rationing. Then he would return to his 
meeting with the city officials, summarize the 
recommendations for appointments, make the 
appointments, outline again what he expected 
them all to do, notify them that rear echelon 
civil affairs officers would be coming in in a few 
days to give continuous supervision and control, 
and then move on to the next town and repeat. 
By this means he got people, while they were 
numb from fighting, talkative and telling some- 
what near the truth, and organized them for later 
civil affairs control. . . . 

Insufficient CAO's at the Outset 

[Maj Gen Lord Rennell, CCAO, AMGOT Sicily, Rpt to 
GOC 15th AGp, 2 Aug 43 [hereafter cited as Rennell Rpt, 
2 Aug 43], CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 1] 

2. Some 30 AMGOT officers in charge of Group 
Captain C. E. Benson, D.S.O., were landed from 
D [10 July] to D + 2 in 8th Army assault areas. 
These were reinforced in the course of the next 
fourteen days, by the end of which period there 
were about 80 AMGOT officers, including 
CAO's, CAPO's [civil affairs police officers], 
etc., in 8th Army area. . . . 

4. With the 7th Army assaults, a group of 17 
officers were landed on D and D + 1 day under 
Colonel Charles Poletti (AUS). This number 
soon proved entirely insufficient. There was much 
delay in landing the first reinforcement group of 
an additional 50 officers owing to the unwilling- 
ness of the 7th Army headquarters to accommo- 
date any reserve of personnel in the advanced 
7th Army embarkation areas. In consequence, 
when sudden and urgent need was felt for 62 
extra administrative officers for AMGOT, the 
officers had to be called forward from Algiers to 
Tunis before they could be embarked. It was 
consequently not until about 28 July that the 
much needed reinforcement of 62 officers reached 
Palermo. . . . Colonel Poletti and his second in 
command of the AMGOT personnel in 7th Army 
area, Lt. Col. P. [Peter R.] Rodd, were them- 

selves alone trying to cope with the problems of 
Palermo City. . . . 

First Aim Not Defascistization but Avoid- 
ance of Administrative Breakdowns 

[Rennell Rpt, 2 Aug 43] 

12. Initial arrests for obstruction, hostility or 
strong Fascist sentiments were few in the first 
two weeks owing to lack of information and a 
desire ... to do nothing which would cause a 
breakdown in the administration while AMGOT 
officers were trying to get something running. In 
the eastern and central areas the three Prefects 
[senior officials in provinces] of Syracuse, Cal- 
tanisetta and Ragusa were arrested. The prefects 
of Agrigento and Enna who had previously been 
notified as likely to be helpful have been retained. 
The Prefect of Palermo had departed prior to the 
arrival of the American troops. . . . Where the 
Prefects were removed the Sub-Prefects have gen- 
erally been called upon to act. A few podestas 
[mayors], questori [superintendent of police] 
and municipal officials have been arrested as well 
as such political (party) secretaries as have been 
discovered. In most cases new podestas have been 
appointed either from the vice-podestas available 
or from the more prominent citizens. . . . What- 
ever criticisms will be made for not arresting 
more people immediately I am convinced that 
the right course is to continue weeding out un- 
desirables week afte: eek, rather than to effect 
wholesale arrests on insufficient information and 
then to have to release innocuous persons. The 
apprehension of inevitable doom has a better 
morale effect generally than wholesale action and 
risking having to go into reverse. . . . 

Successful Gamble in Administration 

[Rpt, Rennell, CCAO, AMGOT Sicily, 8 Aug 43 to GOC 
15th AGp [hereafter cited as Rennell Rpt, 8 Aug 43], 
CAD files, 319.1 AMG (8-17-43) (1)] 

The gamble of sending single Civil Affairs Of- 
ficers to take charge of large districts with no 
escorts and little or no transport from the very 
first moment of occupation without regard to 
their personal safety was successful. I am not 
aware of any case of hostility or discourtesy to 
an Allied Civil Affairs Officer since the landing. 
I am acutely aware of my own anxiety whether 
the experiment would succeed without some in- 
cident or even attacks on my officers by stray 
Italian soldiers or by hostile local elements or 
angry mobs when in the first days food was really 
very precarious and scarce. The risk is not one 


which can be taken as a precedent in other coun- 
tries or necessarily all over Italy. . . . 

The decision to maintain the local administra- 
tions in towns has so far proved successful. In 
a number of places advisory municipal councils 
of prominent officials and persons have been 
nominated to advise C.A.O.'s and the podestas. 
Local private people and business men have 
proved helpful and public spirited in trying to 
restore normal conditions especially in heavily 
damaged areas. Ecclesiastical personages have 
all been helpful. I am particularly struck by the 
absence of expressed resentment or bitterness 
about bombing or civilian casualties. 

There is no doubt that the experiment of 
retaining the Carabinieri as the nucleus of a 
local police force throughout the island and of 
allowing them to retain their uniforms and rifles 
(but not revolvers) has been successful. Except 
for the arrest of certain special branch carabinieri 
on counter-espionage duties, very few carabinieri 
have had to be interned for refusal to continue 
duty as police or for unsatisfactory behavior. The 
senior carabinieri officers have been distinctly co- 
operative in transferring personnel when it was 
wanted and in replacing personnel when individ- 
uals have been interned. The carabinieri have 
taken whatever has been done with dignity and 
the sense of duty which comes from a well-dis- 
ciplined force with a long tradition. . . . There 
was a good deal of looting by the civil population 
during the first few days, nearly all of food 
stores, an increase of housebreaking and theft, 
and jail breaking. But arrests are being made 
mainly by the carabinieri and authority seems to 
be on the way to being restored. . . . 

Local Government Is Kept Functioning 
Through AMGOT Loans 

[Financial Div, AMGOT, Rpt for May 43-Nov 43, Spof- 
ford Rpt, ex. Y-11] 

It was realized at the start of the planning at 
Chrea that if AMGOT officers in the field were 
to be successful in keeping the local machinery 
of government going it would be necessary to 
assure the availability of funds to pay the salaries 
of local government employees as well as other 
proper expenditures of local government. It was 
also realized that at least in the opening phases 
of the occupation, transportation and communi- 
cation would be so inadequate, that a highly de- 
centralized system in AMGOT of controlling 
expenditures of local governments and providing 
funds to meet deficits would have to be estab- 
lished. Accordingly there was issued G.A.I. No. 
3 . . . containing financial instructions to 

C.A.O.'s on handling expenditures and receipts 
of communes and S.A.I. Finance No. 2 . . . con- 
taining instructions to F.O.'s [finance officers] 
on expenditures and receipts of provinces and 
the state. . . . 

G.A.I. Finance No. 4 . . . was issued author- 
izing F.O.'s to provide money, if necessary, to 
continue the function of the Amassi system in 
acquiring and distributing wheat and to meet 
other emergency situations where the carrying 
out of AMGOT plans made the advance of funds 
desirable. . . . 

As soon as AMGOT arrived in Sicily, C.A.O.'s 
and F.O.'s had to deal with problems of expendi- 
tures of the local governments for their normal 
recurrent expenditures and for relief, with the 
problems of financing the movement of wheat 
which was being harvested at the time, and the 
price which had been subsidized by the Italian 
State. Control of expenditures and advance of 
funds were handled substantially in accordance 
with the above mentioned instructions. . . . 

How AMGOT Funds Were Disbursed in the 
Large Centers 

[Financial Div, AMGOT Rpt, May-Nov 43] 

Palermo has been chosen to illustrate the types 
of problems confronting . . . Finance Officers. 
The Officer who later became the Finance Offi- 
cer of Palermo Province arrived at Gel a on 14 
July and was ordered to follow the 7th Army's 
advance on Palermo, reaching the city on 8 
August. Palermo, with a normal poulation of 
400,000, was reduced to 10,000, and the sur- 
rounding communes were swollen to almost 
twice their normal size. The immediate prob- 
lems were the acquisition of grain, through the 
Ammassi system, the restoration of some trans- 
port system, and the restoration of the normal 
financial channels for governmental receipts and 

Funds for the purchase of grain were advanced 
by the Finance Officer directly to the Consorzio 
Agrario 2 in cash. This was necessary since 
Palermo Province had 74 amassing points, of 
which only 32 are served by banks. The cash 
funds were distributed to the amassing agents 
who proceeded to purchase the limited quantities 
of grain which were offered for sale. To further 
aid the normal flow of grain products to the con- 
sumer the accounts of the millers and bakers 
were unlocked in advance of the opening of the 
banks on a restricted basis. The situation in 

"Italian organization for collecting (amassing) agricul- 
tural produce. 


Palermo contrasted strongly with conditions 
which prevailed in Agrigento and Caltanissetta 
Provinces. These latter provinces were fortunate 
in having large surpluses of grain, a docile agri- 
cultural population, and an absence of war 

Next in order of priority came the problem 
of restoring local governmental functions, par- 
ticularly the payment of civil officials and the 
fire, police, and health services. In Palermo 
Province, as in other provinces, various com- 
munes of the province were brought under Allied 
control when the provincial capital had not yet 
fallen. Since the financial channels for payment 
of civil servants and communal obligations nor- 
mally center in officials stationed in the provin- 
cial capital, it is often impossible to follow pre- 
liminary planning and employ such channels. In 
Palermo Province this problem existed with ref- 
erence to food, relief and state payrolls. It is be- 
lieved that the practice varied from CAO to 
CAO. It is submitted that the preferable method 
would be to employ temporarily one agency for 
disbursements, probably the Commune, since 
its employees have some knowledge of the normal 
system of disbursements, vouchers and account- 
ing. . . . 

Initial Food Supply Is Brought in 
by the Troops 

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 28 Jul 43, CAD Msg 
files, CM-IN 20137] 

. . . Initial supply [of food] for both our troops 
and civil population had to be taken across the 
beaches. Emergency civil feeding was met from 
rations and continues from military stocks, hence 
precise quantities for civil supply not known. 
Stockpile of food especially for civil population 
established in near-by North African ports and 
now going in. . . . 

Improvisations in the Food Problem 
[Poletti Rpt, 31 Jul 43, ACC files, 10000/100/650] 


When a community was vacated by Italian 
troops and before law and order could be re- 
established by Seventh Army, considerable loot- 
ing took place, particularly looting of flour and 
other food products. All military stores of Italian 
Army were likewise usually seized. In all events, 
this supplied the people until Civil Affairs offi- 
cers could reorganize matters and get additional 
grain into town. All sorts of improvisation 
occurred. Civil trucks and Italian and American 

Army trucks were used. At times we put Cara- 
binieri or soldiers on them in order to persuade, 
in a gentle manner, the farmer to give up his 
grain. Often the mills and bakeshops were dam- 
aged or deprived of coal or Diesel oil or elec- 
tricity. Transport had collapsed. Again we im- 
provised. In a few towns only did food clamoring 
demonstrations occur. It is gratifying that Civil 
Affairs was so successful. Of course, the food 
problem has been the most difficult, the most 
pressing and the most time consuming for all 
Civil Affairs officers, and it still is in general. 

[Rennell Rpt, 1 Aug 43] 

17. The food situation is interesting. There is 
no doubt that there is plenty of grain, enough 
meat for the modest local requirements, and 
probably enough oil. Of vegetables and fruit there 
is an ample supply. The difficulty is, first and fore- 
most, transport. The troops on entering seized all 
available civilian transport including many mules 
and carts. The consequences were as anticipated. 
A very precarious situation developed in all towns 
for the first few days. Local ingenuity and re- 
sources displayed by all my officers tided over this 
situation and no town has starved though in many 
cases there was frequently not more than 24 hours 
in hand. Now, most places have a few days in 
hand. The major problem, however, was and 
is milling wheat into flour. 

18. Nearly all the mills are electrically 
operated. All electricity, with the exception of a 
few small towns with a local supply, is drawn 
from the Sicilian power grid which in turn 
draws its supplies from the large power stations, 
of which in eastern Sicily Catania is outstand- 
ingly the most important. The only power station 
on the grid functioning in E. and S. Sicily is at 
Cassibile which is insufficient even for Syracuse 
district. . . . 

We Now Know We Must Count on 
Finding Chaos 

[Ltr, Holmes to Hilldring, 18 Aug 43, CAD files, 319.1, 
AMG (8-17-43) (i), No. 126] 

. . . After 21 years of control the Fascist Party 
became so woven into the warp and woof of all 
phases of life in the country that when the party 
officials fled provincial and municipal administra- 
tion came to a standstill. We did not bag a single 
Federal Secretary. Every town of any size has its 
large "Casa del Fascio," usually elaborate and 
pretentious. Local officials have been accustomed 
to coming to these Fascist Headquarters for their 
orders and so in almost all cases our officials 


moved in. In many towns there had been so 
much destruction by bombardment and shell fire 
and the people so frightened and paralyzed that 
no local administration existed. In fact in many 
cases all of the machinery of modern life had 
ceased to exist: there was no government, no 
police, no food supply, no water, no electric 
light, no transportation and no organized medi- 
cal service. All of these things had to be reorga- 
nized from the ground up, the dead buried, the 
streets cleaned of debris, water and food brought 
in, etc. In places where the administrative ma- 
chinery was more or less intact it was in neutral. 
Officials and populace alike seemed to be unable 
to do anything to help themselves. When told 
what they ought to do by the military government 
personnel, they were perfectly willing to comply. 
It is possible that we shall find a more solid 
situation as we progress north and as the habit 
of being ordered about by party officials may be- 
come less of a factor following the abolition of the 
party by Badoglio. However, I am doubtful that 
this effect will be very great as the abolition of 
Fascism by decree and undoing what has been 
done in 21 years are two different things. I feel, 
therefore, that we should not reduce the estimates 
of personnel for future operations even though 
control of the country may be exercised by a com- 
mission under an armistice rather than as in 
Sicily by military government with suspension of 
Italian sovereignty. 

Many Organizational Lessons Have Been 
Learned From the Assault Phase 

[Memo, Spofford for Chief, MGS, 22 Sept 43, ACC files, 

I. With reference to request contained in your 
memorandum of 9 September 1943, the following 
is a consolidation and summary of points raised 
in memoranda submitted by AMGOT field 
officers on this subject. 

2. AMGOT and its relations with other units. 
(i) AMGOT started in the Sicilian opera- 
tion with one big handicap. It was, to almost all 
concerned in the operation, a new branch, whose 
functions and raison d'etre were neither appre- 
ciated nor understood by the fighting services. 
The first task was therefore to "sell" AMGOT. 
This was achieved with some measure of success 
at the top, but efforts to penetrate the lower for- 

mations were not successful. It is, therefore, of 
great importance that during the planning stage 
opportunities should be given for putting all 
concerned in the picture as regards the role which 
AMGOT is to play in the operation. 

(ii) Furthermore, AMGOT officers at- 
tached to assault forces should join their units 
well in advance of D Day, not only to carry out 
what has been mentioned in the above para- 
graph, but also to co-ordinate their activities with 
those of the various army units with which they 
are most likely to be in contact, e.g., C.I.C. . . . 

3. AMGOT in early stages of Operation. 

(i) The invasion of Sicily has clearly dem- 
onstrated that Civil Affairs officers should be 
present in invaded cities at the time of their 
capture. Civil Affairs liaison officers should be 
attached to combat units to help the commander 
to deal with civilian problems arising immediately 
after the assault. Adequate numbers of Civil Af- 
fairs administrative officers should be sent for- 
ward with the troops to be left in supervision of 
the cities and towns from the time of their 

(ii) In cases where the assault force is ad- 
vancing rapidly, high priority is essential for 
additional AMGOT personnel and transport. 
Lack of such priority has resulted in officers being 
spread too thinly over the ground to be able to do 
their jobs properly. 

4. AMGOT Transport. 

(i) It is essential that all AMGOT person- 
nel with assault forces go in with their own 
transport. Dependence on the units to which offi- 
cers are attached does not work. Locally requisi- 
tioned transport cannot be relied on, as experi- 
ence has shown that tactical units requisition all 
available vehicles. Furthermore the average local 
vehicle is not sufficiently reliable for the strenuous 
work on bad roads that it must perform. 

(ii) If they do not land with their own ve- 
hicles officers cannot get into cities at the time of 
their capture, nor can they properly supervise the 
large areas for which they usually find themselves 

5. AMGOT Personnel. 

(i) In the early stages all specialist officers 
must be prepared to do the work of C.A.O.'s. 

(ii) Under the present organization 
AMGOT officers are not provided with sufficient 
OR/EM clerks, interpreters, guards and for other 
basic duties. There have been numerous cases of 


looting both by civil population and the troops, 
which might have been alleviated by the presence 
of a body of troops under the control of AMGOT. 
There is no such body provided, in the AMGOT 
organization, and the strength of C.M.P.'s and 
F.S.P. [Field Security Personnel] in relation to 
the number of villages in a metropolitan coun- 
try, such as Sicily, has been shown to be lamen- 
tably small. Shortage of OR/EM personnel 
heavily handicapped AMGOT officers in their 
attempts to prevent looting and the enforcement 
of the Proclamations, in particular curfew for the 
civilians and the "Out of Bounds" notices for 
troops. In cases where the advance was particu- 
larly rapid it often occurred that a town was left 
completely devoid of troops, particularly if the 
axis of advance had altered. This aggravated the 
problem for the AMGOT officer who found him- 
self the sole person in uniform in a village or 
town, thus more strongly emphasizing the neces- 
sity for some form of accompanying OR/EM. 

(iii) Other personnel points raised included 
the following: 

(a) That some of the men, selected for their 
knowledge of the Sicilian dialect, were of little 
value in translating Italian into English, or vice- 
versa on paper. 

(b) That they should receive more training con- 
cerning their attitude and behaviour towards the 

(c) That a ZI Military Police Battalion, or de- 
tachments thereof, be placed at the disposal of 
the Senior Civil Affairs Officers. 

6. Supply Arrangements. 

(i) Owing to shortage of transport, AM- 
GOT personnel could not carry sufficient ra- 
tions to be self supporting for more than a few 
days, and difficulty was often experienced in 
persuading the Quartermaster to provide them 
with rations. This could have been partly obviated 
if the function of AMGOT had been directly 
acknowledged by unit commanders as a part of 
the force. 

(ii) Medical supplies were not provided for 
AMGOT personnel other than the General Issue 
first aid packet. In a unit which is obliged fre- 
quently to conduct its operations in compara- 
tively isolated areas at considerable distances 
from Army hospital units it is felt that special 
provision should be made for equipping all 
AMGOT personnel with medical kits and equip- 
ment adequate to meet the situation. 

7. Communications 

These were found to be of the utmost diffi- 
culty and here again the primary cause was lack 
of transport. The next most important reason 
was that priority on army signals had, quite 
naturally, to go to operational messages. 

8. Miscellaneous. 

(i) It is considered essential that such iden- 
tification marks as police arm bands, special 
police identity cards, vehicle permit cards and 
special passes for after curfew hours be printed 
in advance. 

(ii) C.I.C. should co-ordinate its activities 
more extensively with AMGOT and should sub- 
mit copies of their reports to insure a uniform- 
ity of treatment of civilians. 

(iii) A lack of sufficient instruction with 
respect to procedure of requisitioning property 
caused considerable confusion. . . . 

Lessons in the Art of Governing 

[Contemporary Summary of Views Expressed in Reports 
From CAO's Attached to the Tactical Units in Eighth 
Army, Spofford Rpt, ex. 3-A] 

i. Talk to the population in extremely short and 
simple sentences. 

2. Inquire from time to time from people on 
the street how various things are going in the 
town, as the people on whom the civil affairs 
officer relies may be unreliable and may try to 
take advantage of him. 

3. Scrutinize all complaints very carefully be- 
cause complainers are opportunists. 

4. Build up the prestige of the local police force 
as quickly as possible. It is particularly desirable 
to get into the town early in order to keep them 
armed and to protect them from the possibilities 
of insults in the early stages. 

5. Irrespective of the confusion adherent [in- 
herent] in the situation, it is of great value to 
have the personnel well and neatly attired. . . . 

13. If it is found that the Chief of an office, 
such as the police, is corrupt and has to be re- 
moved, it is generally true that his subordinates 
are also corrupt and will have to be removed or 
closely watched. . . . 

22. Don't make promises to the population 
unless you are sure you can fulfill them. . . . 

30. Impress upon the public officials that 
AMGOT does not come to take over the work 
of governing, but to supervise and direct the 
local people in that work. . . . 



Italian Provincial Government Must Take 
on New Functions 

[Poletti Rpt] 

. . . In my opinion, the provincial seat of gov- 
ernment must be strengthened. Functions, prev- 
iously stemming from Rome, will now have to 
be centered in the respective provinces. . . . 

The Stock of AMGOT Has Risen and It Now 
Sets Up Shop for Itself 

[Rennell Rpt, 2 Aug 43] 

29. The setting up of a civil government has been 
as rapid as I hoped but would in certain areas, 
notably in certain parts of 7th Army area, have 
been more rapid and more effective if my officers 
had had the full co-operation of formations gen- 
erally. Formations in both 7th and 8th Armies 
remain ignorant of the purpose and existence of 
civil government. I think it is necessary in any 
future operations for directions to he issued to 
formations on the subject of civil administration 
which are brought to the attention of all officers. 
I remain of the opinion that general directions 
to all ranks regarding their behavior on occupy- 
ing a country should be issued before any opera- 
tion, on the lines of the 'Do's and Don't's' which 
were authorized for issue by you but never is- 
sued in 8th Army. It has nevertheless been grati- 
fying to me to find senior formation commanders, 
when they have since understood why and what 
a civil administration does, clamouring for more 
staff in their areas and passing over more and 
more work to that staff to do in various branches 
which they had thought to do themselves. I 
should have been even more gratified had they 
adopted this attitude earlier. 

On 31 July you decided to turn over to me un- 
der your direct authority the administration of 
the Provinces of Syracuse, Ragusa, Agrigento, 
Trapani, Caltanisetta, as well as the southern 
part of Catania and the western part of Palermo 
Provinces. The remainder of the occupied terri- 
tories, that is the forward areas, remain under 
the direct control of the G.C.O.'s 7th and 8th 
Armies. 3 . . . 

3 Even in areas where fighting was still going on, 
AMGOT Headquarters was permitted to give a consider- 
able amount of actual direction to the officers in the 
field, Chanler, Chief Legal Officer (CLO), AMGOT, re- 
ported to Hiildring in a survey report of 27 December 

AMGOT Headquarters Takes Over Under 
Difficult Conditions 

[Rpt, Gen Rennell, for August 1943 [hereafter cited as 
Rennell Rpt], CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43) (01 

AMGOT Headquarters established in skeleton 
form at Syracuse during the last ten days of July 
was transferred during the first week in August 
to Palermo, but the complete staff of headquarters 
was not fully assembled until a fortnight later, 
owing to delay in the arrival of the last echelon 
from North Africa. I transferred myself and per- 
sonnel staff to Palermo arriving, after touring the 
western provinces, on 7 August. My Deputy had 
preceded me by a few days. AMGOT Headquar- 
ters cannot therefore he said to have started work- 
ing as the headquarters of a government until the 
second half of August. The Headquarters, in- 
cluding files, central registers, etc., were started 
up from nothing, since the planning staff Head- 
quarters and working files at Chrea were con- 
cerned with planning and not with government. 
Moreover, even the personnel of the Chrea nu- 
cleus had not lived together as a whole since the 
end of June, having been dispersed between 
Algiers and Palermo or used for other purposes 
during the assault phase. Nevertheless Headquar- 
ters officers from the first moment of their arrival 
in Sicily undertook extensive touring in connec- 
tion with their work to familiarize themselves 
and provincial personnel with the problem of 

The whole staff of AMGOT including provin- 
cial personnel was not even remotely complete in 
the Island until the middle of August, but be- 
fore that date personnel was already being se- 
lected and held in readiness to take over the 
unoccupied part of Sicily and to prepare parties 
for operations on the mainland. It was thus nec- 
essary, as soon as provinical administration had 
been set up in areas occupied, to remove and 
replace officers. This constant ebb and flow of 
personnel retarded the establishment both of the 
Headquarters and the provincial administration; 
it was inevitable if the forward Civil Affairs 
Officers, with or immediately behind combat 
formations were to have the necessary experience 
and be of the right type; but it did not improve 

1943 that "it would have been easier if they had been 
able to do this by issuing formal 'technical directives' with- 
out having to struggle with the great communications 
difficulties of going through channels." CAD files, 319.1, 
AMG(8-i 7 -43)(i) 


the machine. I have thus been faced in the pro- 
vincial administration, not only with the neces- 
sity of cutting down staff before I could properly 
do so, but also of constantly replacing experienced 
by less experienced officers. These are probably 
the main reasons why the administration has not 
progressed as quickly as I could have wished in 
dealing with local problems. These are also the 
reasons why my SCAO's in the last occupied parts 
of Sicily have not made as much progress as I, 
and others, could have wished. . . . 

Restoration of Italian Provincial Disbursing 

[Financial Div AMGOT, Rpt, May-Nov 43] 

2. ... As operations progressed, the Revenue 
Section became increasingly engaged in ascertain- 
ing the Italian channels through which payments 
were made, with deciding what salaries and ex- 
penses should be approved, and generally with 
all types of State expenditure. The stage had 
passed in which it was necessary to give C.A.O.'s 
wide disbursing authority in order to immedi- 
ately start the functions of the Italian local gov- 
ernmental machinery. The exigencies of the mo- 
ment having been met, it became possible to 
set up controls over governmental expenditures 
by insuring that proposed disbursements would 
be regularly reviewed through both Italian and 
AMGOT channels. It also became possible to 
inquire into the nature of the various province- 
wide parastatal organizations, with a view either 
to reviving their activities or checking them off; 
in the process of imposing systematical control 
over expenditures, the C.A.O. lost in large meas- 
ure his disbursing function, these being now per- 
formed at the provincial level by the FO. Since 
the average C.A.O. was inexperienced in finan- 
cial and accounting matters and was overbur- 
dened with tasks more immediately related to 
public health and safety, the removal of expendi- 
ture control from his sphere of activity was also 
in the interests of more orderly accounting. 
AMGOT 2020/F dated August 22 . . . in- 
structed F.O.'s and C.A.O.'s on the procedure to 
be followed in the case of AMFA funds being 
required to meet cash shortages for expenditures 
of various sindicati, aziende and enti, and for the 
payment of state salaries. C.A.O. and F.O.'s 
were required to obtain full information on the 
functions, resources, and purposes of the institu- 
tions for which an advance was desired, with 
particulars of estimated expenditures for the area 
concerned. If the organization and its expendi- 
tures were approved by higher authority, an ad- 
vance would be authorized through the normal 

Italian channels at as high a level as possible. In 
practice, this meant that the advance was to be 
made to the Ufficio Provinciale del Tesoro when- 
ever possible, any necessary sub-accounts being 
opened in the R. Tesoreria accounts at the Banco 
d'ltalia to cover the organization concerned. 

Who Shall Be Paid and How 

[Memo, Poletti for SCAO's, 21 Jul 43, Spofford Rpt, 
ex. 3-A] 

1. No more payments of military assistance 

2. No more payments of pensions to army offi- 
cers even if veterans of last war. 

3. Any relief will be given as general relief by 

4. Regional state treasurer located at provincial 
seat shall issue warrants for the payment of all 
state employees — carabinieri, guardia di finanze, 
school teachers above rank of elementary school, 
medical and sanitary officers, custodians and 
other state civil servants. 

5. The postmaster at provincial seat will exer- 
cise the power of the Minister of P.T.T. [Post, 
Telephone, Telegraph] and be held responsible 
for the functioning of all post offices in his prov- 
ince, including payment of P.T.T. employees, 
elementary school teachers and also pensions 
previously paid through post offices. 

6. All railway administration shall be centered 
in Capo Compartimento Ferrovie dello Stato at 
Palermo. This office will pay salaries and wages 
of railway employees. 

7. All existing provincial and communal ad- 
ministration except to the extent specifically for- 
bidden shall continue. 

8. The regional state treasurer located at pro- 
vincial seat shall assume the provincial obliga- 
tions of Rome with respect to state grants in aid 

a. Hospitals, lunatic asylums, orphanages, 
homes for incurables, old age homes. 

b. Scientific institutions. 

c. Museums, monuments, and archeological 

d. Schools and universities. 

e. Special improvement districts like drain- 
age, irrigation. 

/. Industrial and utility organizations only if 
necessary to Allied military effort. 

9. The Ammassi and Consorzio system shall 
continue as presently except that subsidy shall be 
supplied through the provincial state treasurer, 
who in turn will be reimbursed by AMGOT. 

10. The social security benefits except miiltary 
family allowances shall continue to be paid and 


premiums continue to be collected. AMGOT will 
assume the immediate cash deficit and such 
AMGOT funds shall be paid through the central 
offices of the Istituto di Previdenze Sociale and 
the Infortuni Lavoro respectively. 

AMGOT Rule Cannot Continue 
To Be Free 

[Financial Div AMGOT, Rpt, May-Nov 43] 

i. General Administrative Instruction No. 
3 . . . stated that after the lifting of the mora- 
torium provided in Proclamation No. 5, all fees, 
imposts and taxes were to continue to be paid. 
However no specific instructions were given as to 
the steps to be taken to reconstruct the Italian 
revenue machinery. It was found that Italian 
revenue officials were receiving little help from 
C.A.O.'s and F.O.'s and that the Italian revenue 
authorities almost completely lacked the trans- 
port necessary to reassemble dispersed offices and 
personnel and to remove records from damaged 

2. The language difficulties were, as in any 
foreign operation, considerable, particularly in a 
technical and specialized subject such as Revenue 
and one in which there is normally little inter- 
action or knowledge between one country and 
another. ... In the early stages it was found 
that one of the quickest methods of procedure 
was to obtain the forms used and from these 
ascertain the work performed by the various 
officials and their organizations. . . . 

3. Since the August bi-monthly tax collections 
began 10 August, immediate problems arose 

(a) the treatment of contributi sindicati, 4 
an important source of Fascist funds: 

(b) the release of tax moneys from the closed 
banks. . . . 

Thereafter A.M.G. 22 Headquarters dated 13 
August . . . and a revised General Order No. 
2 . . . were issued. These documents: 

(a) ordered the prompt payment of all taxes. 

(b) ordered that all taxes were to be paid in 


(c) authorized the banks to make transfers 
from the accounts of Essatori to the Ricevatore 

(d) authorized the banks to pay over to the 

'Taxes from the syndicates, a component of the 
Fascist system of centralized economic control. 

tax collection agencies moneys held by taxpayers 
on deposit, 

(e) abolished contributi sindicati. 
4. Another immediate problem arose concern- 
ing the granting of collection concessions in view 
of the abnormal conditions caused by evacuation 
and bomb damage. The Italian system authorized 
the Ministry of Finance to grant a "tolleranza" 
(extension of time for payment) to Essatori and 
Ricevatori Provinciale in cases in which unfore- 
seen and widespread collection difficulties oc- 
curred. A tolleranza had been granted the officials 
of Palermo commune for the June installment 
and it was decided to use this device throughout 
the island, wherever it was necessary. Accord- 
ingly under AMGOT/226/Headquarters dated 
16 August . . . Finance Officers in the provinces 
were authorized to agree with the Intendente di 
Finanza for tolleranza up to 50% to be given by 
him for August tax payments in heavily bombed 
and evacuated localities. Authority was later 
given for the granting of tolleranza for October 
and December payments. . . . 

Provincial Prefects and Other Fascist Offi- 
cials Are Replaced 

[Rennell Rpt] 

18. The removal and internment of Fascists pro- 
ceeds. . . . There are now no prefects of preoc- 
cupation days; the last of these in Enna was an 
old civil servant without pronounced leanings 
towards Fascism: he was removed for incompe- 
tence. Replacements have been effected ad interim 
from vice prefects, mayors, or local personages. 
Here, as in the replacements of mayors, local 
opinion has been consulted, including church 
authorities. The Fascist tide of Podesta has been 
abolished and replaced by that of Sindaco. A 
limited number of better class Sicilians is being 
co-opted for administrative work in economic, 
financial and management posts. 

CAO's Obtain Abundant Local Labor for 

Armed Forces 

[End A, Fid Rpt 12, Capt David A. Morse, Dir, Labor 
Sub-Corn, Hq AMG, Labor in Sicily From 10 July 1943 
to 26 October 1943 [hereafter cited as Morse Rpt], CAD 
files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec - 2 1 

2. . . . (a) Procurement and Supply of Labor. 

i. ... In each province the main Fascist trade 
union office was taken over by the S.C.A.O. and 
opened as an employment office. The clerical and 


executive staffs (except known Fascist leaders 
who were removed on the spot) who were fa- 
miliar with the office records, and registration of 
workers under Fascism, were directed to continue 
at work under A.M.G. supervision. The public 
was invited to register for work and the offices 
were immediately overrun by men, women, and 
children of all ages who desired employment. 
Compulsory registration was not required. The 
problem was not one of procuring sufficient 
labor, but in finding enough work for the thou- 
sands of persons who for the moment were out 
of employment because of disorganization of 
trade, industry and commerce. In Palermo City 
alone, over 1,800 persons were registered for 
work the first day. . . . 

ii. Certain fundamental rules were established 
for the employment offices, (a) Registration was 
voluntary. Under Fascism it had been compul- 
sory, (b) Persons were classified for work by 
skill with full listing of all skills; under Fascism 
they were classified under one skill and could 
only work in that classification, (c) Preference 
in employment to members of the Fascist party 
was to be abolished. Persons were to be em- 
ployed on an equal basis regardless of race or 
creed, (d) Preference for employment was to be 
given to political prisoners who had opposed 
Fascism and had been imprisoned by the Fascists 
for that reason; individuals who had been de- 
nied employment opportunities under Fascism 
because of religion, anti-Fascist activity, or re- 
fusal to join the Fascist party; and to heads of 
families who could show great economic need. 

The Army Is Now Sold On Civil Affairs 

[Ltr, Poletti to McCloy, 2 Aug 43, CAD files, 321 (12- 
21-43), sec - 2 1 

. . . the Army is sold on Civil Affairs. We are 
all delighted. It is proof of the faith the Secretary 
and yourself had had in Civil Affairs. . . . 
... I should have said that one reason Civil 
Affairs has been so good over here is that officers 
move in immediately behind fighting troops. The 
minimum lapse occurs. That prevents continua- 
tion of looting which always commences the 
moment Italian troops pull out. . . . 

Only One Criticism of CAO's From 
Army Commanders 

[Ltr, Holmes, Chief, MGS, to Hilldring, 18 Aug 43, 
CAD files, 3 1 9. 1, AMG (8-17-43) (1), CCS Memo 
for Info No. 126] 

. . . We found in the planning stage that it was 
somewhat difficult to convince the combat com- 
manders of the necessity of an adequate number 
of military government officers in the assault and 
follow-up stages and that it was essential for 
them to have transportation. Both the Command- 
ers of the Seventh and Eighth Armies, as well as 
the Commanding General, 15th Army Group, 
have expressed themselves as now being fully 
convinced that adequate numbers of officers and 
vehicles in the earlier stages were essential. As 
a matter of fact the only criticism received from 
either Army Commander has been that there 
were not enough Civil Affairs Officers. 


What Solution for the Difficult 
Food Situation? 

[Rennell Rpt, CCAC Memo for Info No. 5] 

23. The food situation in Sicily has been the most 
serious preoccupation of the Administration 
throughout the period and is still far from solved 
yet. In theory Sicily should produce about 
enough grain, beans and other basic foodstuffs 
for its own requirements. In fact there is prob- 
ably enough grain in Sicily to supply this agri- 
cultural year's needs. But it is improbable that 
the administration will succeed in feeding Sicily 
without grain imports. Twenty years of corrupt 
management have ingrained hoarding and black 

market practices to an extent which it will take 
more than a few months of Allied Military Ad- 
ministration to change. In July I raised the price 
of wheat from 360 lire a quintal to 500 for that 
month and August, to 450 for September and to 
400 for October and thereafter. The results have 
been disappointing. The harvest was late and 
somewhat scanty owing to drought; warlike op- 
eration and lack of transport delayed collections. 
The farming population continued to withhold 
grain in the conviction that the prices, though 
raised, could not be maintained, and that a fur- 
ther rise would have to be made. Up to date these 
prices have, however, been maintained and there 
are a few signs that grain is coming forward to 


the collection centres under pressure a little bet- 
ter, but very litde better in spite of police meas- 
ures and the personal effort to collect of all my 
officers. I think, but I am not sure, that these 
measures are beginning to have some effect, as 
is the policy of paying hard cash at the collection 
centres instead of issuing payment or dues in ac- 
cordance with Italian practice. 

The standard ration was raised to 300 grammes 
of bread a day plus 40 grammes of pasta. It was, 
however, not possible to achieve this level in the 
large towns like Palermo and Catania. In 
Palermo in particular the ration remained at 150 
grammes throughout August. The principal dif- 
ficulty in the towns had been to move grain in 
to the mills and bakeries in the absence of trucks 
and trains. In spite of orders issued by 15th Army 
Group very little of the seized transport has been 
returned by Seventh and Eighth Armies to 
AMGOT for Civil Supply. Palermo and Catania 
have literally been on a starvation bread ration 
owing to the inability in which my officers found 
themselves of handling the wheat they had avail- 
able outside. In Palermo the situation has now 
improved by securing a quota of rail freight to 
bring in grain and the ration of 200 grammes is 
now available to all ration book holders with 
virtually no queuing up. There are a number of 
illicit ration book holders who cannot be elim- 
inated until 1 October, when the new books will 
be issued. 

Some 6,000 tons of stockpiled foodstuffs from 
North Africa, mainly flour, called forward on the 
D 15 and D 30 convoys, was much delayed in 
arrival and instead of providing a small reserve 
at Palermo and Catania has had to be earmarked 
and diverted to Messina and Calabria. I am satis- 
fied that with a reserve of grain or flour at strate- 
gic points in the Island, I can break the black 
market and make the producers disgorge grain. I 
am equally sure that without such a reserve we 
shall go on living from hand to mouth. The state 
is not a satisfactory one when large urban centers 
like Palermo have to live as they have lived for 
weeks with not even 24 hours reserve of bread- 
stuffs in the town. But the cure, which requires 
shipping and trucks, is not one which can be 
applied at any rate so long as the call forward 
of shipping is in the hands of the Seventh and 
Eighth Armies, who naturally fill their own re- 
quirements first, and so long as virtually all truck 
transportation remains in the hands of military 
formations. The food situation at Messina and 
in Trapani provinces and road/rail communica- 
tions between Trapani and its normal supply 
area, Agrigento province, remain seriously inter- 
rupted. I am more than doubtful whether it is 

possible for a civil administration to depend en- 
tirely on fighting formations for the services nec- 
essary to maintain civ il supply . [Further discus- 
sion of food supply in |ch. XII] below.] 

Problem of Obtaining Transportation for 
Civilian Needs 

[AMGOT Hq, Rpt, Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501] 

79. A start, on an island-wide program for motor 
transport was made. 5 Virtually all operating 
transport was removed from civilian and 
AMGOT control by the military shortly after 
the occupation. Under the orders of 7th and 8th 
Armies some vehicles were returned to AMGOT 
and a portion of them were put into operating 
condition. S.C.A.O.'s of most provinces orga- 
nized their own motor pools, engaged primarily 
in the transportation of supplies. The creation 
of a motor transport subsection at AMGOT 
Headquarters laid the groundwork for an island- 
wide organization by turning over to Istituto 
Nazionale Transporti [INT] (the truck and 
bus subsidiary of the State Railways) certain 
vehicles and by requisitioning garages and repair 
shops in Palermo capable of caring for approxi- 
mately 100 trucks. INT is being used as the 
agency of AMGOT for operating an island-wide 
truck service with terminals and garage facili- 
ties in the provincial capitals. The motor trans- 
port subsection continued the operation of a bi- 
weekly bus service throughout the island. . . . 

80. A water transport subsection was estab- 
lished under a U.S. Naval officer who was as- 
signed for the purpose. Two schooners were 
transferred to AMGOT, one of which is a 450- 
ton boat used for water supply for the island of 
Ustica. Several smaller boats at Trapani were 
also taken over, which were made available to 
the S.C.A.O. Trapani to move in grain from 

Problem of Reopening Banks When Cash 
Reserves Are Low 

[Financial Div, AMGOT, Rpt, May-Nov 43] 

Under normal conditions the banks of Italy de- 
pend on the Central Bank (the Banca d 'Italia) 

5 On 20 September all railway operations in Sicily 
were turned back to civilians, under the supervision of 
Allied military operating units. In September, also, 
AFHQ ordered that as of 15 October AMGOT would 
become responsible for rail operations in the American 
area. Previously AMGOT's principal service had been 
that of keeping the Sicilian organizations intact through 
advancing funds. Rpt of Transportation, Communica- 
tions and Utilities (T.C.&U.) Div, Hq AMG, 6 Nov 43, 
ACC files, 10000/1 54/317. 


for supplies of currency and for emergency credit 
through loans against Government securities or 
rediscount of commercial paper. The AMG knew 
before the invasion of Sicily began, that the 
Banca d'ltalia and local banks held only small 
stocks of currency (if, indeed they had not de- 
stroyed what they had) and that in any case 
further shipments from Rome would cease. It 
was for this reason, among others, that AMFA 
had to be supplied as rapidly and as soon as pos- 
sible with adequate stocks of some type of cur- 
rency preferably expressed in terms of lire. . . . 

The anticipation proved correct: cash reserves 
of the Sicilian banks were small, and while the 
Banca d'ltalia branches had in only a few cases 
followed the instructions to destroy their stocks 
of currency, there were not over 500 million lire 
available. To be sure, holdings of currency in 
the hands of the public were abnormally large 
(though estimates diSered); but until the banks 
were reopened and confidence restored these 
hoardings were unlikely to come out of hiding. 
Therefore it was the first task of AMFA, after 
the minimum needs of the military establish- 
ment and of the AMG were taken care of, to 
accumulate enough AM lire to provide the cash 
reserves essential to a reopening of the banks. 
Moreover, it was necessary, in order to carry out 
this Central Banking function in a proper man- 
ner, to enter into credit agreements (or overdraft 
arrangements) with all banks which felt they 
needed cash reserves. ... It was also necessary 
in view of the inadequacy of civilian transport, 
to provide trucks and guards to move into the 
nine chief provincial branches of the Banca 
di Sicilia (which is the largest bank having a 
head office and branch network in Sicily, and is 
being used by AMFA as banking agent) amounts 
of lire judged to be necessary to meet maximum 
permitted withdrawals when the banks were al- 
lowed to reopen. It should be explained that 
when AMFA first entered into this credit agree- 
ment it was considered necessary, owing to the 
lack of communications, and for the purpose of 
building up confidence, to place a 100% cash 
reserve in each branch of the Banca di Sicilia 
against AMFA's credit commitments. ... As a 
matter of fact, the public reaction to the reopen- 
ing of the banks was so satisfactory that the 
banks never needed to draw from AMFA more 
than a small proportion of the sums to which 
they were entitled under their credit agreements. 

Under the provisions of General Order No. 6, 
published 1 September, the Banks in Palermo 
Province were opened on a restricted withdrawal 
basis on 6 September, and in all the rest of Sicily 
on 15 September. During the first few days with- 

drawals by depositors exceeded new deposits, 
then the trend was reversed. By about the middle 
of the month new deposits in Palermo City were 
50% above withdrawals. Total credit lines of 
1,630,000,000 lire were placed by A.M.F.A. at 
the disposal of the banks to enable them to meet 
the 5,000 lire per account withdrawals. At the 
close of business on 30 September loans to banks 
against these credit lines totalled only 124,000,000 
lire. . . . 

A.M.F.A.'s credit lines to banks . . . were re- 
stricted to the coverage of withdrawals of de- 
posits. In view of some demand for loans from 
banks' customers to finance the movements and 
processing of crops and the reconditioning of 
mines, it was deemed advisable to offer additional 
credit to the banks to enable them to make such 
loans. . . . 

The Bank of Sicily has functioned entirely 
satisfactorily as agency for A.M.F.A., both in con- 
nection with the distribution of funds in its 
branches in all the provincial capitals and Calta- 
girone, and in carrying other accounts required 
by A.M.F.A.'s operations. . . . 

Toward the end of the month the banking sit- 
uation was considered such as to justify steps 
being taken to prepare for the removal of all 
restrictions on deposit withdrawals and the re- 
sumption of normal operations. The date for such 
action was fixed for approximately 6 Octo- 
ber. . . . 

How Revive Industry Without Critical 
Raw Materials? 

[Msg, ID, ASF, to CG, NATO, 15 Aug 45. CAD Msg 
files, CM-OUT 6263] 

. . . Our economy extremely tight due to mili- 
tary demands and War Department cannot sup- 
port procurement of listed material unless and 
to the extent clearly essential to military opera- 
tion. We are doubtful of justification of large 
quantity of critical material for Sicily. . . . 

Should a Faulty Tax System Be Changed at 
an Early Stage? 

[Memo, Chief Finance Officer, AMGOT, for AH Finance 
Officers, 5 Sep 43, CAD files, 319.1 (8-17-43) (1)] 

2. The general principles are that all Italian taxes 
enforced at the date of occupation should be con- 
tinued (except the Contributi Sindacati specially 
abrogated under General Order No. 2), and that 
the Italian method of collecting taxes should also 
be continued. 

It is realized that many of the taxes are cum- 
bersome, some produce a badly arranged burden, 


and some are collected through organizations 
which have apparently an unnecessary large 
"rake-off" and could be replaced. It is undesir- 
able, however, to abrogate any particular taxes 
or to disturb the existing machinery, purely on 
the local data obtainable in the Island of Sicily, 
and the above general principles will accordingly 
be followed. 

3. It is important that dislocations in the Ital- 
ian revenue services should be obviated as soon 
as possible. This will include the re-centraliza- 
tion of dispersed staffs and the occupation of 
buildings to replace those permanendy damaged. 
The Intendente and the Ufficio Provinciale del 
Tesoro should make the best economical ar- 
rangements possible. In difficult cases buildings 
may be requisitioned through the proper chan- 
nels. . . . Similarly every assistance should be 
given to Esattori and other revenue collecting 
agents in bringing in their moneys to the banks 
or post offices. 

Problem of Wages To Be Paid to Civilians by 
the Armed Forces 

[Morse Rpt] 

(b) ... Civilians employed by the armed 
forces . . . presented problems of an emergency 
nature because the military was at the time the 
largest single employer of labour on the Island; 
wage rates paid were not uniform between the 
various branches of the services; and it was ob- 
vious that the official and unofficial army rates 
of pay were in most cases too high, and in some 
too low. Wages were not related to the economy 
of the Island, and in cases where they greatly 
exceeded prevailing customary rates, were draw- 
ing persons away from private and government 
employment and adding to the spiral of inflation. 
The lack of an official Armed Forces wage policy 
and scale caused confusion in the labor market. 
In view of these circumstances conferences were 
called by the Labor Section of A.M.G. attended 
by representatives of the Allied Armies, Navies 
and Air Forces, and a uniform wage scale was 
adopted. . . . The scale was promulgated by 
A.M.G. and issued to all of the branches to be re- 
issued in routing military orders or directives. 
The scale became effective 1 October 1943, and 
included 171 working categories. In addition, it 
was agreed that periodic joint conferences would 
be called by A.M.G. for further revision of 
wages and addition of job classifications. . . . 
Basic conditions of employment were also estab- 
lished and made part of the wage publication. 
An effort was made to eliminate the wide dis- 
crepancies between wages paid by the military 

and those prevailing in other fields. It was borne 
in mind that the scale would establish an Island- 
wide precedent which would eventually be re- 
flected in wages paid to government and private 
employees. The result was that approximately 
50% of the then existing military rates of pay 
were reduced by L 10 to L 30 per day, while in 
other cases rates were left unchanged, and in 
some cases increased. . . . While the uniform 
scale was not the answer to the wage problem as 
such, it was of constructive value since it estab- 
lished a uniform scale and policy; stabilized 
wages and wage procedure; and revised rates to 
a more economically desirable level. . . . 

How Build a Sound Judicial System on Ruins 
of Fascism ? 

[Chanler Rpt] 

13. It has been found generally on arrival in 
occupied territory that owing to bombing and 
other reasons, the judicial authorities had fled 
from the congested towns and that there has been 
little or no system of justice in operation. Mili- 
tary Courts have been established at once to deal 
with offenses against the Armed Forces and a 
search has quickly found many members of the 
Italian judiciary willing and able to continue in 

14. The Italian legal profession had not done 
well under Fascism. The profession had in the 
old days been of some standing, but with the 
Fascist syndicates and Fascist controls, it had 
sunk to a low level and the judiciary had become 
little more than an underpaid Government Civil 
Service, whose every decision had to be consid- 
ered in the light of whether it would annoy the 
Fascist leaders. It is obvious that no sound sys- 
tem of justice could exist in such conditions and 
the older members of the profession who re- 
turned to their jobs were quite obviously thank- 
ful that the days of subservience to such condi- 
tions were over. Each, upon his return, was care- 
fully scrutinized as to his past and his record in- 
vestigated and, if it was then found that he had 
tried to do an honest job he was reinstated. Most 
of the ardent fascist judges, like most other fascist 
government officials, had fled to the mainland at 
the time of the invasion. But most of the judi- 
ciary had been outstanding in their unwillingness 
to embrace Fascism and while most of them had 
to nominally join the party to keep their posi- 
tions, they had done so unwillingly. Many of the 
principal leaders of the Bar had actually refused 
to join the Fascist party at all. The Italian judi- 
ciary were informed that a much higher standard 
of work was expected of them and that the fullest 


measure of justice must be administered in the 
future without thought of politics. 

15. Before generally opening Italian Courts, a 
committee was formed composed of four high 
Italian judicial officials, the President of the Court 
of Appeals, the President of the Tribunale, the 
Procuratore Generale and the Procuratore del Re. 
This Committee met with the Officer in charge 
of Italian Courts and the Chief Legal Officer to 
discuss the various problems relating to the open- 
ing of Italian courts. Suggestions were made by 
them and accepted for simplifying criminal pro- 
cedure in some respects so that the many persons 
awaiting trial could be brought to trial more 
quickly. Also discussions were had regarding per- 
sonnel of the courts. By 19 August, all criminal 
courts in Sicily were permitted to reopen under 
the supervision of AMGOT legal officers. A simi- 
lar procedure was adopted regarding civil courts 
and instructions were given to open those courts 
throughout the Island of Sicily on 31 August. 
Similarly efforts were made for the reorganiza- 
tion of an independent and democratic Bar Asso- 
ciation upon the lines of the earlier association 
which had been abolished under Fascism. A Gen- 
eral Order providing for its reorganization and 
constitution was issued, and the Association was 
formed by leading members of the Bar who were 
known and proven anti-Fascist. One of the great 
difficulties in connection with the opening of 
Italian Courts arose from the fact that a large 
number of court houses had been damaged by 
bombing and that others were occupied by mili- 
tary organizations. Transportation difficulties also 
made the trial of cases very difficult, especially 
during the early phases. . . . 

The Army Needs Law and Order But Will 
Not Vacate Courthouses 

[Chanler, CLO, AMGOT, Rpt for Sep 43, ACC files, 


5. The work of re-opening courts has been ham- 
pered by the destruction of some court buildings 
and the requisition of others for army use. More- 
over, requisition has usually been followed by 
dispersal of the court records. Whilst the destruc- 
tion was unavoidable, it is doubted whether req- 
uisitioning of such buildings was vital. Requisi- 
tioning of court buildings is likely to do more 
harm than good to the combat forces, by prevent- 
ing the re-establishment of law and order. It is 
recommended that an agreement be made, if 
possible, with Army Headquarters that build- 
ings such as court houses, be exempted from 
requisition, except in cases of extreme urgency. 

Only Extraordinary Adaptability Can Meet 
the Problems 

[Lt Comdr Malcolm S. MacLean, USNR Liaison, MGS, 
NAHQ, 3 Feb 44, Report Summarizing Information 
and Advice Obtained from Major Keagwin, CAO, Enna, 
Sicily, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 2] 

3(a). The chief problem of MG operations is 
the selection of personnel and the chief criterion 
for their selection is their adaptability to the 
range of circumstances with which Civil Affairs 
officers are confronted. As examples of this es- 
sential adaptability he cited: 

(1) The case of one of his officers, an Amer- 
ican, a former New York City policeman who, 
while knowing nothing of civil or electrical engi- 
neering, has nevertheless done an excellent job as 
public utilities officer. He has done so by search- 
ing out skilled men among the Sicilians and driv- 
ing them by cajolery and threats when necessary 
to find materials, make repairs, and get things 
going. Thus by using native electricians and 
much ingenuity he got operating the Enna City 
electric light plant which has been in disuse for 
seven years. He completed by mid-November 
nine of eleven bridges that had been blown up 
or washed out in the province. 

(2) The case of a young lieutenant (Amer- 
ican), former employee of the National City 
Bank, who despite his youth and low rank and 
inexperience has dealt efficiently with the pro- 
curement of tons of wheat, coal, sugar, and olive 
oil with millions of Allied Military lire; has 
worked out and got running the distribution, and 
has been careful and accurate in his accounting. 

(3) The case of the former London constable 
who with one enlisted man has bossed the Cara- 
binieri for the whole province, restored much 
of the telephone communication system, orga- 
nized a motor pool including the setting up of 
a repair garage and the employment of mechan- 
ics, and taken charge of the fishing fleet along 
the south coast. 

(4) The case of a mild mannered, gentle, 
faithful American captain, a lawyer in civilian 
life, who in the early phase directed the burial of 
the dead, took care of the wounded soldiers of 
four nations, wounded and sick civilians; who 
found a U.S. soldier holding up a group of Cara- 
binieri and robbing them of their watches at the 
point of a Tommy gun and took the gun away 
from him and put him under arrest. Now he 
does a good job as chief judge in the Military 

(b) The CAO Enna province has handled 
the black market as smartly as this observer has 


seen it done in any place thus far. He found 
that salt was selling for 350 lire a kilo. He got 
in a ton by truck and employed a civilian to sell 
it for 2 lire a kilo (he having bought it for 1 lire) 
and thus he broke the black market and made a 
profit for the military government. The Enna 
butchers were selling meat at 80 to 120 lire a kilo. 
He protested and they told him that they could 
not sell it for less. He sent two trucks to Gela 
and Arigento and brought back fresh fish bought 

at 10 lire a kilo, sold at 16 to 20 lire a kilo. Meat 
dropped to 20 to 30 lire a kilo at once. When the 
butchers again protested he offered to raise the 
price of fish and thus the price of meat provided 
the butchers were willing to take the conse- 
quences of his posting a notice that this action 
was taken because of "the greed and selfishness 
of the local butchers." No protest has been made 
since. . . . 


A Friendly Reception 

[Rennell Rpt, 1 Aug 43] 

10. From the very outset the attitude of the popu- 
lation generally has been friendly. In certain 
areas and on particular occasions the population 
has been definitely enthusiastic. General Eisen- 
hower's declaration in particular was very well 
received, had a considerable effect, and in one or 
two places provoked demonstrations of enthu- 
siasm. . . . 

11. Even if full allowance is made for syco- 
phants and the desire to curry favor with the 
Allies at this juncture, I accept as genuine a very 
large measure of the anti-Fascist sentiment in 
Sicily and of genuine relief at its prospective ter- 
mination. I have no particular comments to re- 
cord on the issue of Proclamation No. 7 [Defas- 
cistization]. The announcement in Proclamation 
No. 1 that steps would be taken to dissolve the 
Fascist Party proved sufficient to set free a sub- 
stantial volume of criticism of the regime. One 
prominent person, the Bishop of Noto, in a dis- 
cussion with me, asserted that it was high time 
the regime came to an end, adding that in south- 
ern Sicily especially there never had been any real 
following for the Fascist Party where prominent 
members were distrusted and detested. Every one 
of my officers has reported in the same vein and 
this, coupled with the co-operative spirit shown 
by everyone, with very few individual exceptions, 
must be held to substantiate the view that the 
population of occupied Sicily is on the whole 
really friendly and anti-Fascist. 

They Quickly Admire Our Ways 
[Chanler Rpt] 

18. Particularly worthy of note is the impression 
created upon the public by our Courts. Spectators, 
both laymen and professional, crowded the court- 

rooms, and were outspoken, even to the extent 
of committing contempt of court by applauding 
in their praise of the fairness of our procedure. 
It was a novel sight to most of them to see a 
judge protecting the rights of the accused, and 
to see the accused himself permitted to cross 
examine the prosecution witnesses, call his own 
witnesses and even testify in his own behalf, in 
the open courts. It is believed that a profound 
and lasting impression of the fairness of Anglo- 
American justice has been created. 

The Church Is Co-operative 
[Rennell Rpt] 

The Roman Catholic Church authorities have 
been co-operative and easy to deal with. The 
Cardinal Archbishop of Palermo in particular 
through his Chancellor has gone out of his way 
to provide comment and some information. He 
is not a persona grata in all sections. He has done 
some local touring and both he and his bishops 
have made use of the facilities for transmitting 
correspondence which my administration has 
placed at their disposal. The Church authorities 
have availed themselves to a limited extent within 
their scanty resources of personnel and premises 
to undertake elementary instruction of small 
children. I have heard two sermons to large 
congregations exhorting the people to obey and 
accept the Allied Military Government coupled 
with invective against the Fascist regime. On 
the other hand, the parish priests generally seem 
to have been as little helpful as any other Sicilians 
to my officers in warning them of bad characters 
within or without the Italian administration, or 
of doing anything tangible to assist in dealing 
with black markets. They, as all others in the 
country, complain of Mafia tendencies, black 
markets and profiteering, but are unwilling to 


help the administration effectively by producing 

The Bishop and the CAO Agree To Co-operate 

[Notes, Some Reflections and Experiences of a CAO 
(Unsigned and Undated), apparently written by a Brit- 
ish CAO after the assault phase in Sicily, MTO, HS 
files, G-5 AFHQ] 

One of the first things I did at Nicastro was to 
get into touch with the Bishop, a rather remark- 
able old boy of about 79. He whinnies like a 
nanny goat and is altogether a most attractive 
person. I explained to him that he would perhaps 
find my society in too large doses rather too em- 
bracing for a man of his years and suggested that 
he should attach a priest of intelligence to me 
as a sort of liaison officer. He offered four but I 
felt enough was as good as a feast and said so. 
The Parlece Fiere was chosen. He is an elderly 
and rather bird-like man who keeps one eye 
semi-closed. He is an excellent man of business 
and we got on famously. He agreed to use the 
Church organization throughout the 28 districts 
to assist my work both by distributing literature 
and by the use of tactful influence. I on my side 
agreed to consult the Church on all matters, al- 
though not necessarily to accept their views. 
Also I agreed to pay the utmost outward respect 
tp the Church. For instance I always kiss the ring 
and attend Mass with the Municipal authorities 
every Sunday. All work is suspended and we 
proceed from the Municipio to Church. 

*I have used the word agreement but it was not 
so much a hard and fast agreement as the ap- 
proach to understanding of men who had a 
common object up to a certain distance. We 
really, I believe, became friends so that we would 
sense erch other's wishes and were anxious to 
do so. It is surely very silly not to make friends 
with the Church. I speak as a non-Catholic be- 
cause they are the one great organization which 
stands today if not unshaken at least undestroyed 
by the catastrophe. We are here for the moment 
only but La Chiesa will remain a great power 
in the land long after we have taken ourselves 
off. The Bishop was not universally loved. The 
FSS [Field Security Service] told me that this 
was due to his Fascist tendencies but I later 
learned that when he became Bishop he put a 
stop to the orgies which annually took place on 
the feast day of a certain St. Antonio. 

A Change Is Beginning 

[Rpt, Gen Rennell, CCAO Sicily, 8 Aug 43, ACC files, 

Since my arrival in Sicily, I have to report a sub- 
stantial change in public sentiment. From being, 

and adopting the attitude of, whipped dogs or 
fawning puppies immediately after the landing 
of the Allied troops, the Sicilians, of all classes, 
have reacted. They seem to me again to be be- 
coming thinking, emotional and definite human 

As a whole they accepted the Allies as libera- 
tors. They have not ceased to do so. As a whole 
they are still friendly and anti-Fascist. They have 
been perhaps somewhat disillusioned by the be- 
haviour of the Allied troops, and this is more 
marked as I judge in the 8th Army than in the 
7th Army area. But they have not as yet dis- 
played resentment. Superficially they are no 
doubt aware that the advent of the allied troops 
has not meant a reign of plenty; and I should 
say that they generally accepted so long as ac- 
tive operations in the island were in progress, 
that the needs of the troops came before civil re- 
quirements. They have been disappointed and 
impatient at the delay in completing the con- 
quest of the island. But while this is attributed 
to the German troops in the island, there is prob- 
ably an undercurrent of feeling that with the 
numerical preponderance of the Allied troops 
and their vastly superior equipment, they might 
have driven the Germans out before. Of what 
happens in Italy, or hereafter there seems to be 
little heed. The successful landings of July 
meant peace and liberation for Sicily. 

The "liberation" propaganda and the innate 
anti-Fascism of the Sicilian has led him to regard 
himself almost as quasi-AUy. The consequences 
of not so being treated may be more serious. 
From an attitude of fawning the Sicilian has 
begun to ask, and in the larger centers to demand. 

Poor Morale and Dissatisfaction Develop 

[Rennell Rpt] 

9. The morale of the population has certainly 
declined and there is dissatisfaction in the coun- 
try. The failure of the Allies to secure a reign 
of plenty, the absence of coal and fertilizers, 
broken communications, and lack of postal fa- 
cilities form the subject of a growing volume of 
complaint at Headquarters and in the provinces. 
Not a week passes without my receiving letters 
of complaint that the promises made by radio 
of food and goods for the occupied countries 
have not been carried out. One of the latest 
forms of complaint is that whereas Italy has 
been promised on the radio 200,000 tons of coal 
a month, no coal has yet been made available in 
Sicily after two months of occupation. This com- 
plaint is justified. In the present situation I am 
unable to hold out any hope of fertilizers arriv- 


ing in time for the autumn sowing and no chem- 
icals or manufacturing requisites will be available 
to make Marsala wine or start up the sulphur 
mines within any reasonable time. I anticipate 
a growing volume of justifiable complaint for 
many months; justifiable, that is, inasmuch as 
we have not lived up to our propaganda. 

CAO's Can't Always Take It 

[Rennell Rpc] 

27. ... I do not find that all my American or 
British officers are so enthusiastic about the free- 
dom of the press as their antecedents would al- 
ways suggest, when criticism or comment is 
directed towards the AMGOT administration. 

The Governed Assert Their Right To See 
the Governors 

[Memo, Spofford, for SCAO, Agrigento Province, 18 
Aug 43, ACC dies, 1 0000/100/691] 

A U.S. patrol reported to the CC.A.O. that the 
population of Rivona had complained to the 
O.C. Patrol that they could not get access to 
the C.A.O. who only visited the town rarely 
and then only saw the officials. 

The C.A.O. in question . . . has, as you know, 
been transferred to this Headquarters but if, 
after investigation, you find the report to be true 
his successor must be told of it and be warned 
to contact the people as well as the officials of 
the area for which he is responsible. 

The Mafia and Civil Crime 
[Rennell Rpt] 

12. One of my anxieties already reported has 
been some recrudescence of Mafia activities. My 
S.C.A.O.'s and my own sources lead me to be- 
lieve that the initial impetus to this development 
was given by the temporary loss of prestige of 
the Carabinieri as a result of their being dis- 
armed, . . . This has to some extent been re- 
medied, but the harm was done in an interval 
when the rural population concluded that the 
Carabinieri as well as Fascism, the two great 
enemies of the Mafia, would simultaneously dis- 
appear. I also fear that in their exuberance to re- 
move Fascist Podestas and Municipal officials in 
rural towns, my officers have in certain cases by 
ignorance of local personalities appointed a 
number of Mafia "bosses" or allowed such 
"bosses" to propose suitable malleable substitutes. 
Here my difficulty resides in the Sicilian Omerta 
code of honor. I cannot get much information 
even from the local Carabinieri who in substa- 

tions inevitably feel that they had better keep 
their mouths shut and their skins whole if the 
local AMGOT representative chooses to appoint 
a Mafioso, lest they be accused by AMGOT of 
being pro-Fascist. The local Mafiosi who of course 
had no love for the regime which perscuted the 
Mafia are naturally not slow in levelling accusa- 
tions of Fascist sympathies against their own 
pet enemies. 

13. The fact of the matter is that while ordi- 
nary civil crime other than black market offenses 
is at a satisfactory level except in Trapani prov- 
ince and in most provinces has been decreasing, 
homicide has undoubtedly increased in the prov- 
inces reported to be Mafiosa. Many of these 
homicides are of the Mafia type or bear indica- 
tions of Mafia antecedents. In these cases arrests 
are infrequent and evidence unobtainable. . . . 
The only remedy to this state of affairs lies in 
the improvement of the Carabinieri morale and 

Potential Subversive Movements 
[Rennell Rpt] 

5. Four S.C.A.O.'s report some Communist stir- 
rings, the formations of a cell here and there, 
and a fair amount of propaganda. There have 
been no further disturbances among unemployed 
sulphur miners, but I have no doubt that there 
is a considerable potential element of proletarian 
Communism or anarchism in these communities 
which could flare up into disorder and violence. 

At Times Sicilians Are Delightful 
[Some Reflections and Experiences of a CAO] 

. . . Dr. . . . struck me as a man of 

genuine political instincts and some personality 
and the first thought that passed through my 
mind was that it would be good fun to have him 
as Podesta. ... I therefore consulted the Bishop 

as to whether Dr. would be acceptable 

from the point of view of the Church. The old 
man gave me an excellent glass of Curacao and 

said while he didn't interfere in politics 

was an excellent fellow. From my experience of 

British politics I took it that this meant 

was OK by the Chiesa. Therefore I saw Dr. 

and invited him to become Syndache. 

About an hour later I received a letter from the 

Bishop informing me that had been living 

in sin for a long time and that it would be a 
cause of great sorrow if he became Syndache 
without first marrying the lady and would I use 
my excellent influence in the matter. I went and 
saw the Parlece and told him I was sorry but had 


now offered the job. He told me that the 

Bishop had not liked to express his real feelings 
via my interpreter. I said that I would not per- 
sonally appoint Dr. but that I would hold 

an election so that it would not seem as if I were 
putting in a man of doubtful morals. I then ad- 
vised at luncheon. He gave a roar of some- 
what angry laughter and said "This is too bad of 
Mr. Bishop." He said that he had lived with the 
woman for 20 years and that she was his wife in 
the sight of heaven. I replied that the trouble was 
that this was exactly what she wasn't. He then 
told me that the husband of the woman was alive 
and had an unpleasant habit of writing to her 
from America. He then asked me whether I 
wished him to commit perjury. This rather put 
me on the spot and I said that I thought it would 
be better to have an election, that this would 
please the people and let me out of appearing as 
a supporter of loose living. He laughed like hell; 
said he was sure he would get in and nothing 
would please him better. Giuseppina Rappa and 

her friends did not at all like the idea of 

and told me that Niccela [sic] Nicetera, a wealthy 
farmer and well-known gambler was much loved 
by the people. He came and saw me and ex- 
pressed his willingness to be Podesta and I told 
him that the election would be at five o'clock next 
day. The next morning two other candidates 
appeared on the scene, a gentleman called Ernest 
Broglia representing the something socialists and 
a gentleman called Mancuse, who was also of the 
left. They both struck me as rather unpleasing 
persons and I felt rather worried. Broglia decided 
to stand down in order to give Mancuse a better 
chance. Nicetera the candidate of the right came 
to see me and said that he had decided to with- 
draw his candidature which left two only in the 
field. I sent for Rase and asked him whether 

was sure to be elected and he said that 

he thought so. All my own information was to 
this effect and I began to feel happier. During 

the afternoon crowds gathered and there was a 
good deal of singing. The Chief of Police seemed 
a little anxious but I am used to crowds and they 
seemed to me very good humored. At 5:30 pre- 
cisely I appeared on the Municipio balcony be- 
fore a crowd of several thousand; the two candi- 
dates and their supporters were with me. I re- 
ceived a splendid reception. Nobody listened to 
my speech but they all cheered and I felt very 
happy. I eventually got silence and told them that 
I was going to ask three questions. The first was 
"Do you want either of these men? If you want 
some one quite different shout his name and I 
will make him a candidate." A few names were 
called but there was obviously no strong feeling 
for another nominee. I then said all who want 
Mancuse shout his name. There was some re- 
sponse. I then called on the supporters of 

to do the same. There was a great roar which 
could be heard kilometres away. then ad- 
dressed the people during which period I had 
withdrawn. . . . The people felt that they were 
really choosing their own Syndache and made a 

night of it. felt as proud as if he had been 

chosen to represent the City of Rome and always 
begins all his public ordinances with the "Le 

Dottore elette per acclamazione dei cit- 

tadine di Nicastro. . . ." 

Despite Dissatisfactions They Riot on the 
Rumor AMG Will Withdraw 

[Chanler to Chief, CAD, Rpt, 27 Dec 43, ABC files, 014, 
Horrified, Govt] 

A . . . good impression was created generally by 
. . . activities of Allied Military Government. 
It is interesting to note that in September there 
was a riot in the Commune of Floridia, Syracuse 
Province, which upon investigation was found to 
have been caused by a rumor that Allied Military 
Government was going to be withdrawn. The 
people wanted to prevent the AMG personnel 
from leaving their commune. 


Don't Try To Do Everything Yourself 

[AMGOT GAI No. 1, 1 May 43, AGO files, AMGOT 

9. In taking over a district or any center, try to 
preserve the local administration and not try to 
do everything yourself. Give instructions to the 
higher Italian officials for them to pass on to their 

subordinates. If you give orders to subordinates, 
you will find that the authority of the local ad- 
ministration is so impaired that we might have 
to take it over ourselves entirely; we have not 
the personnel for this. Remember that there are 
other areas in Europe where Civil Affairs person- 
nel will be needed. . . . 


We Disregard Instructions and Do Too Much 

[Rennell Rpt] 

10. . . . both educated Sicilian and municipal 
communities alike have done little or nothing to 
help themselves or us. There is an almost com- 
plete absence of any local initiative. The historical 
reason lies in the centralization of every activity 
ultimately in Rome. The consequence is that 
every local matter is referred to the nearest Civil 
Affairs Officer for action. . . . 

ii. I am sometimes inclined to think that if 
AMGOT had had many fewer officers, and been 
less ambitious, more local initiative might have 
been secured. As it is, even with my reduced es- 
tablishment, officers nearly all tend to try to do 
too much themselves instead of asking the local 
population to work things out by and for their 
own account. 

The Health of AMGOT Personnel Is Not 
Very Good 

[Rennell Rpt] 

28. The health of my staff has not been very 
good: the number of cases of sand-fly fever, ma- 
laria, intestinal trouble and fatigue suggests to 
me the necessity of only employing fit personnel. 
Much of the sickness has been due to reaction 
from the fatigue of the first weeks. 

The Health of Sicilians Is Excellent 
[Rennell Rpt] 

19. The public health of Sicily continues to 
be excellent. . . . The welfare section has been 
mainly occupied in study and plans but progress 
has been achieved in limited direction. The re- 
turn of refugees from bombed or dangerous areas 
has been proceeding gradually throughout the 
island except in and around Messina. Notably 
around Syracuse the rehousing of cave dwellers, 
refugees from Syracuse city, has made good pro- 
gress and the hygienic conditions of those still in 
the caves has been notably improved. It has 
generally not proved possible to prevent the in- 
flux of refugees to the larger cities they had 
abandoned in vast numbers, which has added 
considerably to urban problems of food, water 
and fuel. On the other hand, when the attempts 
of the Italian authorities to carry out provincial 
orders to stem the tide of reflux proved half 
hearted, we decided not to take severe measures 

either with the police or the refugees, since with 
the advent of autumn it seemed better to face 
the urban problem than distress in caves and 
overcrowded villages. 

It Is Time To Let Sicilians Do More Work 

[Memo, Rennell, CCAO, Sicily, for SCAO's, 6 Sep 43, 
ACC files, 10000/100/693] 

1. As the second month of occupation nears 
completion, there are unmistakable signs that 
our administration is not as well advanced as it 
should be at this time. . . . 

2. It is my view that such difficulties are de- 
pendent or attributable to the failure in most 
localities of the S.C.A.O.'s and their subordinates 
to rely sufficiently on the Italian Administration. 
Ours is a military government of indirect con- 
trol and it is essential, not only to conserve our 
personnel but to get the job properly done, that 
the most competent Italian personnel available 
should be drawn into the administration and 
put to work. At this time there should be no 
vacancies in the office of Syndache in any im- 
portant commune and candidates for the office 
of prefect should have been found in most prov- 
inces, and submitted to this Headquarters for 

3. Italian personnel must, of course, be care- 
fully chosen. However on the basis of the inves- 
tigation that has already been completed you 
should be pretty well aware of the reliable ele- 
ments in your province. A political check of civil 
servants and office holders by means of a ques- 
tionnaire is to be commenced shortly of which 
you will be further advised. . . . 

5. It will be necessary in the near future to 
make further substantial reductions in the ad- 
ministrative personnel in the provinces and pos- 
sibly to combine the AMGOT personnel for one 
or more of the provinces in a single group. It is 
imperative that the responsibility for adminis- 
trative routine be shifted to the most capable 
Italian personnel at the earliest possible moment. 

Headquarters Is Told It Is Doing Too 
Much Itself 

[Memo, Rodd, for AMGOT Hq, 31 Aug 43, ACC files, 


For your information, since my return from Pa- 
lermo last Sunday I have been visited by the fol- 
lowing AMGOT staff: 
1 Labour captain 


i Sulphur lieutenant 
i Revenue colonel 
i Prison colonel 
i Police captain 
i Refugee major 
i Yugoslav colonel 

i Fireman captain and i fireman lieutenant 
i Infant Welfare captain 
i Legal colonel and i Legal major 
i Social Insurance captain and i Social In- 
surance lieutenant 
i Yugoslav diplomat a/d 
You will recognize that in addition to the 
normal and always over-burdened interview time 
table of a S.C.A.O. whose door is besieged by 
bishops and mayors and distressed gentlewomen, 
not to mention his own staff, and the senior 
Italian officials of the province, this list represents 
14 man hours (a minimum average of 1 hour per 
Headquarters visitor may be assumed) out of a 
working week of 60 hours. 

I might add that in not one single case was any 
notice of the arrival of these officers given. 6 

[Memo, AMGOT Hq for Rodd, 7 Sep 43, ACC files, 

It is true that visits of various officers from this 
office consume time of the S.C.A.O.'s. However, 
information with respect to the conditions in the 
Provinces is most necessary, and ultimately, if not 
immediately, their visits should prove of benefit 
to you. Much of the work is new to all of us and 
a great deal of co-operation and patience is re- 
quired. It is our policy to reduce these visits to a 
minimum, and now that the initial stage of in- 
vestigation is passing the volume should fall off. 
Visiting officers have been ordered to inform the 
S.C.A.O. relative to their activities in his Prov- 

Was Headquarters Paralyzing Italian Offi- 
cials With Too Many Regulations? 

[Memo, Rodd for AMGOT Hq, 10 Sep 43, ACC files, 

i. I would submit that one of the obstacles to the 
development of the indirect system in provincial 

'in reading the communications of CAO's to their 
military superiors it must always be borne in mind that, 
whatever their rank, these officers were apt to have the 
type of civilian background which develops independence 
of thought and tongue. Thus, while carrying out orders, 
they tended to tell their organizational superiors pre- 
cisely what they thought, no matter how bold from the 

administration is the volume of detailed enquiry 
and administrative direction which is issued from 
Headquarters, Palermo. 

2. If an Italian organization is scrutinized as 
closely as the returns required would necessitate, 
and its procedure is governed by directives as de- 
tailed as those received, the officials concerned 
are bound to get into the habit of referring any 
action to be taken to the AMGOT officer in 
charge and not unnaturally feel that it would 
be unwise to take the responsibility and their 
reluctance is certainly strengthened by this ad- 
ministrative development. 

[Memo, AMGOT Hq for Rodd, 24 Sep 43, ACC hies, 

It is realized that the volume of detailed enquiry 
and administrative direction issued from this 
Headquarters probably causes alarm and des- 
pondency to S.C.A.O.'s who have inadequate 
clerical staff and an ever decreasing officer staff. 
At the start of an administration it is inevitable 
that there should be a large amount of this type of 
correspondence, but control is and has been kept 
on it. 

Though close scrutiny and detailed directions 
at the outset may have the immediate effect de- 
scribed by you, it is considered that they should 
tend to greater efficiency on the part of Italian 
officials later on when they have to work on their 
own to a far greater extent than they do at 

Those You Help Get a Hold on You 
[Some Reflections and Experiences of a CAO] 

So much for Nicastro. When I shut my eyes at 
night I can still often enough see the people I 
knew there. Somehow or other, at least in my 
own imagining, I had come to belong to the place. 
Since I left Nicastro I had found myself thinking 
about how they are getting along almost as much 
as I do about my own folks and friends in Eng- 
land. This is no doubt only a passing matter but 
it is strange how in quite a short space of time 
the people and affairs of a small Italian country 
town can twine themselves around you and be- 
come a part of you. 

point of view of conventional Army practice. Head- 
quarters had the good sense to realize that it was dealing 
with an unusual group of subordinates, and, as the fol- 
lowing memorandum from the Chief Staff Officer illus- 
trates, usually answered their honest complaints and 
criticisms patiently. 



In Full Tumult of Combat an Inquiry About 
Entrance of Civilian Agencies 

[Msg, CAD to CG, NATO, 24 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, 
CM-OUT 10261] 

To assist civilian agencies in making their plans 
it is requested that the following information be 
furnished for the Island of Sicily only: 

1. The approximate date you contemplate rec- 
ommending to the CCS that civilian observers 
enter Sicily preparatory to their assuming such 
responsibilities for supply, rehabilitation, etc., as 
may be delegated to them by Allied military 

1. Your estimate as to which agencies will be 
invited to send representatives such as Lend- 
Lease, OFRRO et cetera and their British coun- 

3. The earliest approximate date you will rec- 
ommend that civilian agencies should be author- 
ized by you to send full working teams to Sicily. 

In the event conditions are such that you do 
not desire to submit the above estimates at this 
time statement to that effect is desired. 

AFHQ Disapproves Entrance of Civilian 
Agencies Until After MG Is